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22 April, 2022

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Submission to Inquiry - Lt (Ret) John Ward Hunt

Part 1 – Name of Inquiry

Name of Inquiry *

medallic recognition for service with Rifle Company Butterworth

Part 2 – About the Submitter

Title or Rank *

Lt (Ret)

Surname *

Hunt

Given Names *

John Ward

Postal Address *

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Email Address: *

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Primary Contact Number *

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Secondary Contact Number

Is the Submission on behalf of an organisation? If yes, please provide details:

No, Individual submission

Part 3 – Desired outcome

Provide a summary of your submission:

I would like my service in North Malaysia, especially on the Thai Border in 1970 71 to be recognised for the dangers encountered and upgrade my service from Normal Peacetime Service to War service with the award of the AASM. "In the Butterworth auditorium, we were warned and told that there had been recent CT activity in the region we were going to, and there was a possibility that the CT's could contact us. We were also told, that if we were contacted, then we would be resupplied within 20 minutes, and the reason we were going to the border region was "To be seen to be present as a deterrent to the CT's". Apart from this warning by Intelligence officers and senior RAAF officers, it was widely reported in newspapers and warnings from our own Commanding Officer, of the killings, IED's, Ambushes that the CT's were inflicting in what is now recognised as the "Malaysian Communist Insurgency War 1969 to 1989". I served on and near the Thai border on many week long patrols as a medic/rifleman, in virgin jungle, unprotected and very isolated. There is a plethora of evidence available reporting on the upwards of 2000 highly trained CT's and their Regiment locations and the highly advanced skills at ambushing. I was in the same areas as the CT's which was widely recognised at the time. My RMO warned me of the dangers and went to great depth to ensure I was as prepared as much as possible to carry out my medics duties. I have attached in my submission just a snap shot of the news paper articles available, describing how we were patrolling in known CT areas. In about 2001, Mr Pat Clarke the then

Secretary of Defence described the area north of Butterworth, when i I served there, as "A No Go Zone for ADF Personell" due to the ongoing War that Malaysian Security Forces were involved in fighting the CT's, and now recognised as the "Malaysian Communist Insurgency War 1969 to 1989" This comment was in a backgrond briefing attachment sent to Ministers at the time. I have the documents. I contend that it is not normal peacetine service to be :- 1.Warned for active servcice 2.Made to do last will and testimates 3.Charged under military Law as "WOWS" wilst on war service 4.Be warned that there were enemy soldiers (CT's) in the areas we were going to 5.Be warned that we could come in to contact with the CT's 6.Be in the same area that Malaysian soldiers were in, and who were on active service, who were sustaining killed and wounded. 7.Be aware of the newspaper articles describing IED's, ambushes, explosives being used and the death and destruction that the CT's were inflicting in general. 8.Have served in a zone that was later described by the Defence Secretary as "A No Go Zone for ADF Personell" I have waited for 52 years to have this service recognised.

Part 4 - Your submission and Supporting Documentation

File Attached: [DHAAT-SUBMISSION-20220422-RE-rcb.pdf](#)

Part 5 – Consent and declaration

✓ I do not consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal making my submission publicly available. My reasons are



Because of the trauma attached to PTSD, Councelling and medications etc.

✓ I also consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal:

- using information contained in my submission to conduct research;
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation considered by the Tribunal to be appropriate; and
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation the subject of adverse comment in the submission;
- using content in my submission in its report to Government.

The Tribunal will decide which person or organisation is appropriate, and this may include:

1. persons or organisations required to assist with the inquiry; and
2. persons or organisations with an interest in the inquiry.

✓ I declare that the information I have provided is correct.

Name

John Ward hunt

Date


22/04/2022 /

Signed by Lt (Ret) John Ward Hunt

Signed on: 22 April, 2022

Signature Certificate

Document name: Submission to Inquiry - Lt (Ret) John Ward ...



John Hunt
Army Number 3796996



Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal
Floor 1, 5 Tennant Street
Fyshwick
Locked Bag 7765
Canberra BC ACT 2610

Re Medallic Recognition Hearing into Rifle Company Butterworth

To whom it may concern,

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1. Introduction :-

Thank you for the opportunity to lodge a submission before your tribunal.

In this submission I have put forward substantiated, evidence based arguments, to have my North Malaysian Border service recognised as War Service with the award of the AASM included. There is a plethora of evidence available proving my case, and I am happy to supply whatever evidence the tribunal may require. Since all previous Reviews and tribunal hearings, much undisputed evidence is now available and the stance on Malaysia's Communist Insurgency War 1969 to 1989, has changed by Australian bodies like your tribunal. Also, the New Zealand Government recently revised upwards its Veterans classification who served in Malaysia and Singapore from 1959 to 1974 due in part to this new evidence.

It was common knowledge, prior to our going to the Thai border region, for pre build up and participation in the Bersadu Padu masquerade, that the CT's (Communist Terrorists) were well and truly there, in the same area. The following newspaper articles are just some of what's available, and it came as no real surprise when we were briefed in the ABB (Air Base Butterworth) Auditorium about their presence. The Auditorium briefing was conducted by Intelligence officers and quite a few senior RAAF & Army officers were present.

The context of the briefing went as follows :-

*"In the Butterworth auditorium, we were warned and told that there had been recent CT activity in the region we were going to, and there was a possibility that the CT's could contact us. We were also told, that if we were contacted, then we would be resupplied within 20 minutes, and the reason we were going to the border region was **"To be seen to be present as a deterrent to the CT's".**"*

I call the Bersadu Padu War Games a masquerade, as that is what it was. We knew the CT's were there, the brass obviously saw it as an ideal opportunity, to intimidate the CT's, by such a large show of force. This show of Force was a Deterrent to their build up, and border crossings, By "Being seen to be present", which was exactly what the FESR role was in Malaysia.

I am not strictly RCB, but I was with 1RAR Jan 1970 to May 1971 in Singapore and travelled to Malaysia on many occasions as a Rifleman/Trained Medic with different companies and support groups and moved in and out of Butterworth many times. My submission revolves primarily around my Malaysian Thai/Border service between Jan 70 and Nov 70, which was prior to the first rotation of RCB by C Coy , Nov 70 whilst I was with 1 RAR.

When I was in Malaysia, pre Nov 1970, which was the precursor to the RCB rotations, the principle important difference is that we spent all our time north of ABB, in the jungle near the border, and not in the base itself. We were unprotected and a long way from support. We were moved often by British Wessex helicopters, up and down the border region to maximise the "Deterrent" theme and "To be seen to be present", well outside of the Bersadu Padu grid square area shown on Map 6.b.

I know this because on several occasions I accompanied injured soldiers back to base as Medivacs in the Wessex's and was told by the pilots these facts.

When 1RAR arrived in Singapore late Dec 1969 from their Malaysian base at Terendak, The RMO Capt. Jefferies had no RAAMC trained Medics, and none were available from Australia. The CO, Lt Col Trennery and Capt. Jefferies, decided to run a "Two week Field Medicine Course" from the rifleman ranks. I joined 1RAR as a National Serviceman weeks later in Jan 1970 as a Rifleman. I was asked, did the course, and ended up being one of five, similarly trained medics working for the RMO at the RAP. My Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) Capt. Jefferies, appointed me to do the Malaysian tours as the support Medic, and after he discussed with me about the inherent dangers, of serving in the border region,

amongst the ongoing Insurgency War, instructed me what to do in case of a CT contact, and any medical ramifications from that. Firstly, I was to administer all possible assistance to the injured, in line with the training he had given me, and was to use the radio system (If working), ask for Medivacs and rely on verbal support from medical staff if necessary and available. I suppose, in today's world, that would be equivalent to dialling 000.

He approved that I carried Morphine and other severe trauma equipment, in view of the above. As far as I was aware, I was the only Medic that regularly travelled to Malaysia out of the five medics in 1 RAR at the time. It was a heavy responsibility to be the Medic for large numbers of men at that time, and in such remote and obviously dangerous circumstances, knowing that potentially we could be ambushed at any time by the CT's, who were experts at ambushing.

I recall on one occasion when I organised a Medivac for a soldier suffering from severe Heatstroke and the group I was with could not wait with me. They cleared an area for the Medivac pickup by Chopper, then left me with the critically ill soldier, on our own in the jungle near the border. I was not a Sargent so had no ammunition to protect the soldier and or myself from CT's or Tiger attack. In those days, there were reported to be one Tiger per square kilometre and they grew to 1.7m long. I still recall the thoughts I had of this situation being extremely dangerous. This extreme responsibility thrust on me as a twenty year old National Serviceman, with minimal training, led to severe anxiety which still haunts me to this very day.

The sick men would report to the RAP, be seen by the RMO, then they would come out to us and we would administer and dispense what the RMO wrote on his slips. I did things like handing out the drugs and medicines, giving all injections required, like Penicillin in the buttocks etc, Ear syringes, lancing of massive boils, cleaning of wounds, Rash treatments etc. In hindsight, it is amazing that we had the authority of the CO, to do so much intrusive medical procedures, when considering our limited training in house. Proper RAAMC medics would have had extensive training at Healesville, Victoria. The fact was though that we were in a foreign country whilst a Communist Insurgency War was in full swing, and had no RAAMC trained people other than RMO Jefferies. There were obviously no choices for the CO or RMO other than what they did with us.

Being the medic, I travelled with the headquarters group and on several occasions at night, I recall the OC mentioning that we had to be very careful not to stray across the border. This was in reference to the fact that we often got lost for hours due to the hardship of navigating in canopy lined jungle, where visibility to features was impossible.

See next pages for media articles, which qualifies what we were told in the Auditorium :- ie :-

1. Canberra Times June 9 1970 "Close to Thai border and the scene of a recent and actual CT activity"
2. The Bulletin May 9 1970 " Ching Peng adds real realism to the so called exercise"

MALAYSIA

Exercise Bersatu Padu gets under way

From NEIL JILLET, in Singapore

A five-power military exercise, the biggest held in the region and the biggest in which Australia has participated anywhere, goes into full swing in the northern part of West Malaysia on Friday.

The exercise, Bersatu Padu (Malay for 'complete unity') has two main objectives.


One is to prove whether Malaysia and Singapore could survive without the permanent stationing of British forces in the area and the other is to test the

ability of the four nations, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, to plan and carry out joint-defence exercises in preparation for the nasty possibility of having "to do it for real".

The five nations agreed two years ago that the exercise should be held.

The main battleground is the State of Trengganu which is close to the Thai border, the scene of a recent and actual increase in Communist guerrilla activity.

Increase in CT activity



Adds a note of grim realism.
Ching Pengs CT's ambush and
killed 7 Malaysian SF rangers
and 2 police and volunteers

These articles qualify the Auditorium briefing, and when coupled with the IED knowledge etc, make it easy to understand the expectation of contact and my preparedness that I may have to deal with severe trauma.

On one occasion, I spent four weeks on a single patrol on the border, most were of one or two week duration.

My service is synonymous with RCB, but significantly more hazardous and arduous.

2. Basic Facts:-

- a. Served under the FESR as part of the 28 Commonwealth Brigade. Pre Nov 71
- b. Served during Malaysia's 21 month emergency, when parliament was disbanded and a nine man National Operations Council ran Malaysia. The country was in turmoil and under emergency ordinances.
- c. Served during the Malaysian Communist Insurgency War 1969 to 1989
- d. Served prior to when movement in North Malaysia was totally restricted.
- e. Served in North Malaysia in the region and period which was described by Mr Pat Clarke, the Sec of Defence in 2001 as a "**No Go zone for ADF personnel**".
- f. Was charge for an offence under Military Law as "Whilst on War Service" WOWS
- g. Was warned for Active Service after completing my last will and testament, see my AB83.
- h. Served in the north at the same time that Malaysian Security forces were on active service in the same area, who were sustaining significant casualties.

Statistics:- See section 6 a for statistics sheet from The Malaysian National Security Council :-

1970 16 CT's Destroyed, 41 casualties by Security Forces, 221 CT activities/Incidents

1971 13 CT's Destroyed, 44 casualties by Security Forces, 346 CT activities/Incidents

3. Discussion on DHAAT's findings into Mr Ray Fulcher's submission 2020. :-

I quote pars 52 to 54 from DHAATS findings and make comment in green.

52. The Tribunal also notes the continuing operational restraints on the deployment of troops outside the airfield boundary (*No restraints pre Nov 1970, I served for long periods near the border north of ABB whilst the Malaysian Security Forces were on active service fighting their Communist Insurgency War.*)- the exception being (*No exception*)if local Australian dependents required protection in a contingency - and the care with which Malaysian and Australian authorities tried to ensure that any Australian exercise activity would not stumble across insurgents.' (*Contrary to the facts, In the Butterworth auditorium, we were warned and told that there had been recent CT activity in the region we were going to and there was a possibility we could contact the CT's, and were told that if we were contacted, then we would be resupplied in 20 minutes, and the reason we were going to the border region was "To be seen to be present as a deterrent to the CT's"*)The Tribunal notes the statutory declaration of a soldier in a 1979 exercise in which contact with Communist insurgents is claimed to have been made but the Australian soldiers were immediately withdrawn 'without firing a shot' to leave the area to be cleared by Malaysian troops.⁵⁷ It is aware of other claims of encounters or near-encounters during field training (and, allegedly, even during a 'Hash House Harriers' run⁵⁸) in other years, but these similarly showed clear and consistent intent to avoid engagements (*No intent to avoid the CT's, we were warned otherwise*) with the insurgents, leaving them to be dealt with by Malaysian security forces. (*Not true in my case, we were told we would be resupplied with ammunition if contacted*).The Tribunal also formed the impression from these reported incidents that, for their part, the insurgents displayed no appetite for encounters with Australian forces. (*Not known in 1970, the CT;s had no issues engaging with the Malaysian Security Forces*)

53. The Tribunal accepts that Malaysian authorities consider there was an armed conflict between Malaysia and the Communist insurgents between 1968 and 1989 and that this meant that the Malaysian Armed Forces personnel were on 'active service' when involved in the operations concerned.⁵⁹ The Tribunal also recognises that there was a 'Second Emergency' in Malaysia, although the declaration of a new State of Emergency in May 1969 had its direct origins in the race riots that occurred in Kuala Lumpur that month, rather than the Communist insurgency itself. It is clear that the Malaysian Armed Forces suffered continuing, sometimes heavy casualties as a result of insurgent action.⁶⁰ (*Correct, statistics as in 6 a below. We were in the No Go Zone, and unprotected whilst the Insurgency War was in play.*)

However, despite whatever 'indirect' support that the Australian government may have been willing to provide⁶¹ — even up to the level of covert air reconnaissance,⁶² unlike the original Malayan Emergency there was no question of the direct involvement of Australian ground forces. (*Not true, we were warned that we could contact the CT's*) Nor would the Malaysian government have welcomed it. (*They did, we were there in the border region with their knowledge*) Australian involvement in the conflict was thus peripheral, (*It is not peripheral, when you are patrolling in the No Go Zone, whilst the Insurgency war was in play*) even if sometimes traumatic for the individual, as in the Applicant's account at the hearing of witnessing Malaysian soldiers' bodies being brought back to Butterworth in RMAF helicopters, which afterwards had to be washed clean of blood.⁶³

54. The Tribunal thus does not accept that a 'state of war' extended to the Australian situation, (*In my case, the state of War did extend to the Australian situation. How can you be patrolling in an*

Insurgency War Zone, unprotected and with the purpose of “Being seen to be present” and then be told that the state of war did not extend to the Australian situation.) despite the challenges and ambiguities inherent in the ADF presence at Butterworth between 1970 and 1989 (Would be more correct to change the dates to from Nov 1970 to 1989). It is of the view that the conditions there fit the 2009 description of 'hazardous' and 'non-warlike', as well as the 2018 definition of 'non-warlike' and were thus more than normal peacetime service, but do not satisfy the definition of 'warlike' in relation to medallic recognition.(My circumstances do satisfy the definition of War Service)

DHAATS arguments used against Mr Ray Fulcher, things like the Insurgency War was peripheral to the ADF etc, is just not true in my case, quite the opposite in fact.

4. The Ethicos Group's Report into the RCB, by Mr Whitton

The Whitton Report is very much related to my service.

I copy for your reference, the Executive Summary of the Ethicos report here :-

"Executive Summary

- 1. In summary, this Report concludes that Rifle Company Butterworth's operational deployment has been, and continues to be, wrongly classified as 'peacetime service', with adverse consequences for members of the Group and possibly other Australian service veterans.*
- 2. On the basis of the documentation provided to this reviewer, the Commonwealth's current position appears to have arisen from a series of failures by various decision makers since at least 1972 to identify significant errors of fact and misrepresentations of the nature of the RCB service deployment at issue.*
- 3. In particular, the 1972 recommendation by officials to the incoming government that RCB deployment in defence of Butterworth air base could be misrepresented - by the Government, for overtly political purposes - as 'training', remains at the heart of this matter.*
- 4. It is self-evident that for Australian forces, qualifying 'Warlike Service' may take place in peacetime where it occurs outside Australia, as it did in the case of the RCB.*
- 5. Further, the analysis shows continuing failure by advisers and Ministers to apply the relevant criteria for correctly determining the nature of RCB service, and reliance on irrelevant later criteria for that purpose, continue to undermine the Commonwealth's current position in relation to the status of RCB veterans.*
- 6. Analysis of the more recent decisions by relevant Ministers shows that the decisions at issue have been based on previous incorrect advice by officials of the Australian Public Service, (in particular, the Nature of Service Branch and its predecessors within the Department of Defence), and previous decisions by relevant Ministers which were similarly flawed.*
- 7. In addition, this review has found numerous instances in which Ministerial decisions in relation to RCB service, and APS practice, failed to take into account the relevant statutory and policy criteria for lawful decision making by Australian officials, including the requirement to afford procedural fairness to the representatives of the RCB Review Group affected by Ministerial decisions.*

As a consequence, it is this review's conclusion that the Commonwealth's current assessment of RCB Group's service in Malaysia is open to legal challenge on several grounds."

Para 4 is particularly interesting, as it was the advice given by PS bureaucrats at the time, to the incoming Government, that the Australian Public could be told that the RCB service was for training purposes. This got the incoming Prime Minister off the hook, because his election platform was that he would bring all Australian troops home to fortress Australia.

Para 6, is exactly what I have repeatedly kept saying in requests to DOD, DVA, Ombudsman, Ministers etc but to no avail.

Para 7, says that no procedural fairness has been applied. I argued this matter over and over but to no avail.

For the last 52 years, I have tried to have my service recognized for what it really was, through the DOD, DVA, Ombudsmans, PM, DHAAT etc etc and the treatment of obfuscation, has been debilitating, leading to years of Open Arms intervention, Medication for severe depression, and the flow on to family and life in general.

The Ethicos Group report documented by Mr Whitton, vindicates exactly what I have been saying for years.

5. New Zealand Government recently upgraded its Malaysian/Singaporean troops to Active Operational service.

Previous to this reversal, New Zealand held that their soldiers in Malaysia and Singapore between 1970 and 1974 were on normal peacetime service, as does our Government. After reviewing all the new evidence, in their recent review, the New Zealand Government, sore fit to reverse its previous stance. Their decision was not just about those that were in RCB, ABB, but anywhere in Malaysia or Singapore.

In many previous rejection correspondence letters I have received, The previous New Zealand's stance on the Nature of Service was used against me. New Zealand have now reversed its classification.

6. Some interesting Historical Articles :-

a. Malaysia's National Security Council printed statistics for the 1969 to 1989 period

Is it normal Peacetime Service to serve in a No Go Zone, whilst so many are being killed and or wounded ?

Year	CT DESTROYED				SF CASUALTIES			ACTIVITIES						
	Killed	Captured	Surrendered	Total	Killed	Wounded	Total	Clashes	Incidents	Movements	FINDINGS			
											Camps	Resting places	Food Dumps	Total
1969	-	-	1	1	6	22	28	-	5	83	-	18	-	18
1970	9	2	5	16	13	28	41	11	18	192	6	25	2	33
1971	9	1	3	13	9	35	44	17	13	316	7	46	12	65
1972	1	1	2	4	4	17	21	8	11	18	14	34	37	85
1973	8	-	1	9	4	19	23	16	22	181	17	50	76	143
1974	41	8	10	59	3	38	41	34	63	377	25	86	48	159
1975	7	1	5	13	33	150	183	22	76	323	34	117	35	186
1976	16	10	19	45	3	6	9	41	168	571	25	83	53	161
1977	23	28	27	78	13	85	98	31	35	285	17	58	32	107
1978	15	5	8	28	14	124	138	60	116	396	89	84	36	209
1979	26	7	9	42	15	80	95	54	64	449	58	102	52	212
1980	17	-	1	18	12	27	39	36	33	362	53	81	32	166
1981	6	3	18	27	9	34	43	16	32	314	18	28	11	57
1982	4	-	1	5	2	38	40	36	42	249	19	32	9	60
1983	10	-	3	13	5	23	28	15	34	171	22	43	20	85
1984	5	-	1	6	5	40	45	18	32	105	18	36	11	65
1985	-	-	-	-	3	23	26	3	14	142	18	45	10	73
1986	6	-	2	8	1	28	29	9	3	136	38	56	68	162
1987	7	2	-	9	1	28	29	10	6	35	40	73	40	153
1988	2	82	1	85	-	8	8	2	7	55	12	34	13	59
1989	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	8	10	21	4	35
Total	212	150	117	479	155	854	1009	439	796	4768	540	1152	601	2293


■ Figure 4.42: Statistics of Operational Achievement in Peninsular Malaysia from 1969 until 1989.
Source : National Security Council.

1970 16 CT's Destroyed, 41 casualties by Security Forces, 221 CT activities/Incidents
1971 13 CT's Destroyed, 44 casualties by Security Forces, 346 CT activities/Incidents

These figures paint a clear picture, that we were not in a "Normal Peacetime environment", in the midst of an ongoing, very serious, Communist Insurgency war Zone. One that was described by the Department of Defence, as "A No Go Zone for ADF personnel."


b. **Grid Map of Malaysia :-**

The Northern regions had CT regiments and upwards of 2000 highly trained soldiers. ? Is it normal Peacetime Service to serve amongst so many communist Terrorists CT's ?



c. Malaysia's 50 Year Anniversary Brochure.

Is it normal Peacetime Service to serve in a Communist Insurgency War Zone. ?



d. FESR Primary and Secondary Role :-

Is this normal Peacetime Service ?

Primary Role:

The primary role of the Strategic Reserve in accordance with the purposes of the South East Collective Defence Treaty, is to provide a deterrent to, and to be available at short notice to assist in countering further communist aggression in South East Asia. Further the role it will take is to form part of the force for external defence of Malaya and Singapore.

The Strategic Reserve may, at the direction of the Commander in Chief (Far East) be employed in defence operations in the event of armed attack against Malaya or Singapore. The Strategic Reserve or units thereof will not be otherwise committed for the use of force in its primary role without reference to the ANZAM Defence Committee except as specified.

Secondary Role:

The secondary role of the Strategic Reserve is to assist in the maintenance of the security of Malaya by participating in operations against communist terrorists.

Units of the Strategic Reserve may be employed in its secondary role to the extent such employment does not prejudice the readiness of the Strategic Reserve to perform its primary role.

The first directive in the FESR's primary role is "To provide a Deterrent to".

The following is a repeat of what we were briefed about at ABB auditorium :-

"In the Butterworth auditorium, we were warned and told that there had been recent CT activity in the region we were going to, and there was a possibility that the CT's could contact us. We were also told, that if we were contacted, then we would be resupplied within 20 minutes, and the reason we were going to the border region was "To be seen to be present as a deterrent to the CT's"."

e. **Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) :-**

Is this normal Peacetime Service ? Some of these devices were set just kilometers from our base at Salarang Barracks Changi. Our CO Lt Colonel Trennery, addressed us on several occasions warning us of the dangers of the CT's and the IED's.

11 HURT IN BLASTS

KUALA LUMPUR, Friday: Crude booby traps tied to Communist flags injured at least eight people, including two British children, in widely scattered areas of Malaysia and Singapore yesterday.

The incidents brought added tension to a nervous Malaysia where people have begun wondering whether there would be a repetition of the Malay-Chinese clashes that broke out here on May 13 last year, killing at least 200 people.

Police have discount-

ed the rumors and have warned against spreading them.

Yesterday's victims from at least 11 bombs included four Malaysian policemen and two British servicemen's children near the Royal Air Force base at Changi, Singapore. — AAP.

Papua New Guinea Post Courier Frid 24th Aprril 1970 Page 7

Changi, this is where we were stationed. We were warned of CT dangers early in my 453 day tour of Malaysia and Singapore

Bomb victim dies

The Straits Times, 25 April 1970, Page 1

Article also available on microfilm reel NL6486 [Lee Kong Chian Reference Library - On shelf]

Citation Added « First « Previous Next » Last »

Bomb victim dies

SINGAPORE, Fri.

SIX-YEAR-OLD Katty Salter, injured in a booby-trap bomb blast at Changi yesterday afternoon, died in the Changi Hospital tonight.

Katty, a primary school student, and her neighbour, Peter Neil, nine, stepped on the bomb buried in a playground where a communist hammer-and-sickle flag was planted.

Peter's condition is said to be improving. Their father, a British serviceman,

Two more bombs -- believed to be home-made -- were found in busy Gell Lane off Anson Street at

The CT's were very active in planting these bomb Flags (IED's in todays terminology). These incidents occurred just 1 to 2 km from our base.

f. **Communist camps captured May 1970 :-**

Is it normal Peacetime Service to be serving in a region where heavy mortar and gun ship attacks are taking place ? We were in the border region whilst these actions were being undertaken.

Canberra Times(act:1926-1995),Saturday 30 May 1970,page 5



Same enemy 1970 as in 1960. ADF have AASM for their service in the Malayan Emergency. ? ADF then were FESR same as in 1970 ? What Is the difference ?

g. Increase in CT activity :-

Is it normal Peacetime Service to serve when so many CT incursions from a foreign country is occurring ?

Canberra Times (ACT : 1926-1995), Saturday 5 September 1970, Page 4




A dozen incursions into West Malaysia across the border, losing 5 dead and two captured. ?

h. Mythical Menace May 1970, Ching Peng adds realism to ex Bersatu Padu

Who really exercises in the middle of an Insurgency War zone. ? Ching Peng adds realism to the so called exercise. Remember, we were warned at ABB auditorium that we could contact the CT's. ? This article was published on May 9th 1970, the day the first Moratorium marches took place when hundreds of thousands took part. I was in North Malaysia on a long patrol on this very day. I remember well as my 21st birthday was on the 11th.

The Bulletin May 9 1970



Grim realism, the enemy was real and present, just like we were. ?

i. Straits Times Interview with Dr Tun Ismail Rahman 21 June 1969 :-

The Emergency and democracy

A QUESTION AND ANSWER INTERVIEW WITH

TUN Dr. ISMAIL bin DATO ABDUL RAHMAN

Tun (Dr.) Ismail, acting Director of Operations and Minister of Home Affairs, discussed in an interview with the Straits Times yesterday the conditions governing the period of the state of emergency, the prospects of a return to parliamentary democracy, reinforcement of the police, and the Communist threat.

Q The foreign press has suggested that prolonging the Emergency may harm Malaysia's investment climate?

A: I suppose they assume we wish to prolong the state of emergency. It is the other way round.

The state of emergency was imposed because of the disturbances. As soon as we can get over the effect of the disturbances, and once we see we can go back to normalcy, then we will lift the state of emergency.

What is important, I feel, is the quick manner in which we have managed to restore law and order. That should be some sort of assurance to foreign investors.

Investors

I have noticed that people who had decided to invest in Malaysia have shown no sign of having changed their minds. For example, Dow Chemicals of USA are going ahead. Also Esso has not changed its investment plans.

If in order to satisfy the foreign investors, and ignoring all the considerations that I have mentioned, we lift the emergency, I think not only will foreign investors not come in, but the country will once again be thrown into a state of chaos. It is no pleasure for the Government to have this state of emergency."

Q: Roughly, how long will the emergency last—six months or a year?

A: I cannot tell. It depends on how the people feel towards each other. It is true that rumour-mongering is becoming less.

Also, we have to estimate whether the Communists, now that they have had time to prepare, will want to exploit the situation. At first I thought they were the chief cause. But later on I corrected myself; they were as much surprised as we ourselves were.

But now they have had one month. I wonder whether they will want to

Communist Threat

Exploit the situation

exploit things. We have had indications that they are interested because they have sent couriers along the border to see what the conditions are like.

Anniversary

In this connection, you must also consider the declaration of their (MCP) 20th anniversary last year about their intention to increase activities against Malaysia.

Q: Soon after the disturbances you said that democracy in the country was dead.

A: It was a statement of fact, at that time. That is why we have had to impose a state of emergency. When I said democracy was dead I meant that you could not deal with the state of affairs under the ordinary laws.

Q: Parliament cannot meet until the end of the Emergency?

A: That is right.

Sarawak

Q: When will elections be held in Sarawak?

A: That will be determined by the end of the Emergency. Conditions must be favourable there. We don't want elections to be held when people are intimidated or when people fear for their lives.

Q: So elections will be held as soon as conditions permit?

A: Yes. That is why we say we have suspended elections. When you say 'suspended' you have got to do it.

Q: You have spoken about safeguards for future elections. Can you give details?

A: I think I had better give details when we are ready.

Q: Will you consult with Opposition leaders?

A: I am not prepared to consider procedure when we are not ready with the substance.

Two factors will determine how soon the Emergency can be ended. One is, how quickly the Government will be able to prepare a statement on the disturbances; the other, how long it will take us to prescribe remedies to ensure there will be no recurrence of clashes.


We are working quietly day and night on remedies to see that this does not happen in the future. It is our intention to go back to parliamentary democracy.

Democracy must suit conditions in the country. So long as the fundamentals of democracy are there it is democracy.

MCP (CT's) declaration on 20th Anniversary

Statement of fact as to why the emergency was called

Parliament cannot resume



Curfews will be lifted once Reds wiped out on the Border.

There is urgent need to build up security forces on the border.

This interview is only six months prior to my arriving on the Peninsula with 1RAR.

j. Who was Ching Peng the CT Leader :-Straits Times May 1952

NOW IT'S \$250,000 FOR PUBLIC ENEMY No. 1 —if brought in alive

GEN. TEMPLER
MAKES THE
CLERKS

KUALA LUMPUR, Wednesday.

THE FEDERATION GOVERNMENT today announced a reward of \$250,000 for "bringing in alive" or giving information leading to the capture of the leading Malayan Communist terrorist, Chin Peng.

The new reward is three times the reward of \$80,000 offered for Chin Peng in June last year.

Chin Peng, 31-year-old secretary-general of the Central Executive Committee of the Malayan Communist Party, is the man responsible for directing the armed Communist revolt in Malaya.

A sum of \$125,000 will be paid for information leading to Chin Peng's killing. In June, 1951, \$60,000 was offered for his death.

An indication that the new rewards might be directed at the "bringing in alive" of the leading Communist figures in the Federation is given in the Government statement announcing the rewards.

"BRINGING IN ALIVE," THE STATEMENT SAYS, "INCLUDES THE POSITIVE ARRANGING WITH THE AUTHORITIES OF THE SURRENDER OF A KNOWN TERRORIST NOW IN THE JUNGLE."

It is known that many of the leading Communists have relatives living in new villages and towns in the Federation.

Other rewards

Other rewards increased today were for the capture or killing of all Communist leaders above district committee level.

The new rewards are all about three times previous rewards and in each case the amount paid for capture alive is double the reward for information leading to the killing of the man.

The rewards range from \$200,000 for the capture of any member of the central politburo, to \$75,000 for the capture of a state committee member or a regimental commander.

Rewards for district committee members and all other rank and file Communist members and armed terrorists remain the same as before.

Identity proof

"The full scale of enhanced rewards will only be paid on the personal sanction of the Commissioner of Police," the Government stated, "depending on the circumstances of each case and after the identity of the terrorist concerned has been definitely established."

The statement said also

that the Commissioner of Police had already sanctioned and paid the full scale of enhanced reward of \$35,000 to the persons who gave information which led to the recent successful ambush of Long Pin in North Selangor.

Long Pin was a member of the Selangor state committee of the Malayan Communist Party and commander of the Selangor regiment of the Malayan Communist Party's armed terrorist organisation.

The Government also

issued a warning to bandits who might have deserted their comrades in the jungle but had not given them-

selves up.

Any terrorist who deserts from the jungle and fails to surrender himself to the police, if later arrested, will be classified as "captured." If such persons report themselves voluntarily to the police forthwith they will be classified as "surrendered."

The new scale of rewards announced today are (first reward for "bringing in alive or for information leading to the capture of", figure in bracket "for information leading to the killing of"):

\$250,000 (\$125,000): Secretary of the Central Executive Committee;

\$200,000 (\$100,000): Members of the central politburo;

\$150,000 (\$75,000): Central committee members, and mem-

bers of the north, central and south bureau;

\$120,000 (\$60,000): State and regional committee secretaries;

\$75,000 (\$35,000): State and regional committee members, regimental political commissars, regimental commanders and vice-commanders, regimental political affairs officers.

\$18,000 (\$14,000): District committee secretaries or central figures.

\$13,000 (\$10,000): District committee members, company political commissars, company commanders and vice commanders and independent platoon political commissars.

\$8,000 (\$6,000): Directing committee secretaries, directing committee members, commanders and vice-commanders of dependent platoons.

\$6,500 (\$5,000): Branch committee secretaries, branch committee members, commanders and vice-commanders of platoons, leaders of protection corps, leaders of armed work forces.

\$4,000 (\$3,000): Section leaders, leaders of mobile squads.

\$2,500 (\$2,000): M.C.P. members and members of any armed M.C.P. terrorist organisation.



THIS IS CHIN PENG. The brains behind the terrorism in Malaya, he has a reward of \$250,000 to anyone who has information which will lead to his capture.

Ching Peng was a person awarded the OBE from England for his endeavours in fighting the Japanese for England in the second world war.

He was the leader of the CT's during the First Malaysian Emergency.

He was the leader of the CT's during the Malaysian Insurgency War 1969 to 1989.

Ching Peng was a highly awarded soldier and leader and feared through out Malaysia.

The CT's during my tour of Malaysia were ably lead by a man with immense skills in Jungle warfare and ambushing.

A.3 Incurred Danger

The accepted interpretation of the term 'incurred danger' is that made by the Full Federal Court in the case of *Repatriation Commission v Walter Harold Thompson* (G205 of 1988):

The words 'incurred danger' provide an objective, not a subjective, test. A serviceman incurs danger when he encounters danger, is in danger or is endangered. He incurs danger from hostile forces when he is at risk or in peril of harm from hostile forces. A serviceman does not incur danger by merely perceiving or fearing that he may be in danger. The words 'incurred danger' do not encompass a situation where there is a mere liability to danger that is to say, that there is a mere risk of danger. Danger is not incurred unless the serviceman is exposed, at risk of, or in peril of harm or injury.

This means that decision makers have to make an objective assessment of the military realities of the person's circumstances and be reasonable satisfied that the veteran was exposed, at risk of, or in peril of harm or injury from hostile forces of the enemy. The person's perceptions or fears of danger are not relevant to the assessment.

As a matter of fact, the recently announced inquiry into Butterworth Service by the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal must consider as a first priority. Did the troops at Butterworth "incur danger" from hostile forces?

Whether or not the veteran perceived that danger, felt threatened or fear, is irrelevant.

Discussing this fact Justice Mohr stated danger was incurred if an armed enemy was shown to be present, or, if the troops were told there was an enemy. Clarke, in his 2003 report stated to the effect that if the authorities send troops to a place where there is an expectation they could come under attack, the "incurred danger" test is met.

In my case:-

1. I have shown that an armed enemy was present.
2. I have shown that we were told that there was an enemy.
3. There was an expectation that we could come under attack, Re ABB Auditorium Briefing

**7. Discussion on the concept of running a major exercise (Bursatu Padu)
In the middle of Malaysia's Communist Insurgency War April- July 1970 ?**

Some key points to remember are :-

- a. Malaysia had no Parliament, as it was disbanded.
- b. Malaysia was being ran by a 9 man National Operations Council
- c. Malaysia was in a 21 month stated emergency
- d. Malaysia was fighting a Communist Insurgency War against Ching Peng and others.
- e. 1 RAR is part of the 28 Commonwealth Brigade and the FESR mandate.
- f. Bursatu Padu ? Exercise ?? is months prior to the first rotation of RCB.
- g. Malaysia's Security Forces are sustaining heavy casualties.
- h. Malaysia's Security Forces are on active service.
- i. ADF forces are not restricted to being inside the ABB perimeter at this time.
- j. In 2001, Pat Clarke scribes the realisation that north of the ABB during the RCB era is "A No Go Zone" due to the CT activities.
- k. Malaysia is experiencing a major number of contacts and skirmishes with the CT's in 1970 and 71. Ie.

1970 16 CT's Destroyed, 41 casualties by Security Forces, 221 CT activities/Incidents

1971 13 CT's Destroyed, 44 casualties by Security Forces, 346 CT activities/Incidents


This equates to over 5 ½ incidents per week on average.

- l. Australian politicians Goff Whitlam and Dr Jim Cairns announce that all ADF troops overseas will return home to fortress Australia. They forget or don't realize the need to protect our 40 Mirage jets at ABB and our over the horizon Radar. Our bureaucrat's advise Government, that the Australian public can we told that the ADF troops in Malaysia are there for training purposes. The start of the 50 year lie and cover up.
- m. We are told prior to the Bursatu Padu exercise ?:-
*"In the Butterworth auditorium, we were warned and told that there had been recent CT activity in the region we were going to, and there was a possibility we could be contacted by the CT's. We were also told that if we were contacted, then we would be resupplied within 20 minutes, and the reason we were going to the border region was **"To be seen to be present as a deterrent to the CT's".**"*

This intelligence briefing in the auditorium is fully consistent with the stated roles of the FESR.

As a conclusion to the above points in 7, it appears irrelevant as to whether you call the Bursatu Padu war games an exercise, or a chance to intimidate the CT's, using the games as a deterrent. We may as well have been collecting butterfly's, because the reality when considering all the intelligence documents, over 200 secret and over 20 Top Secret in total, and News-paper articles, that we were in fact, a deterrent force, operating under the FESR roles, so you can call the service what you like. It is academic to the reality of what the circumstances were on the ground. We experienced "Real and Incurred danger" from an armed enemy, whilst patrolling in the No Go Zone, which was also a Communist Insurgency war zone.

8. Resurgence of Armed Communism Malaysia, by Dept Prime Minister
Dr Tun Ismail Rahman 1971 :-



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Dr Tun Ismail Rahman, Dept Prime Minister of Malaysia writes this white paper of 40 pages in 1971 around the end of the 21 month emergency, to stop rumor amongst the public to try to stem unrest and the spread of communism in Malaysia.

There is a lot of detail of interviews with captured CT's and sympathizers, and paints a very good picture of the seriousness of the intentions of the communist's to take control of Malaysia by **violent armed struggle**. His conclusions are printed below, but clearly, is watered down to stop alarming the public. The body of the white paper paints a far more serious matter.

This white paper is a must read for the serious reviewer. Remember, he was the Dep. Prime Minister.

"White Paper CONCLUSION"

58. *Developments in the three years since the CPM declared its intention to revive the armed struggle have revealed that the Party has managed to achieve some degree of progress in attaining the preliminary requirements of this objective.*

59. *Certain areas well inside Malaysian territory have been penetrated by CT elements and this was made possible by the willing support of a few who sympathize with the Communist cause, and through Communist exploitation of the personal, religious or family sentiments of those susceptible to such influences.*

60. *The resultant situation must be viewed with **some concern** but certainly not with alarm. It is partly with this in mind that Government has decided to issue this Paper in order to provide the public with a clear and correct picture of the situation rather than allow rumor and speculation to distort it to the advantage of the Communists.*

61. ***The main purpose of this Paper is to expose the insidious tactics being used by the Communist Party of Malaya to advance its armed insurgency plans**, so that the people will be better able to recognize them and thus be in a position to act with greater effectiveness together with Government against the enemy."*

9. Moratorium Marches, Political dumping, (Media, Union and Civilian attacks) on ADF troops serving overseas

The 9th May 1970, saw Dr Jim Cairns (Dep Opposition Leader) organize Moratorium marches in the streets. Reportedly, 100,000 marched in Melbourne protesting about troops overseas etc. ADF members had paint thrown on them, eggs thrown and spat on and a lot of abuse, so we were told that on arrival back into Australia, not to wear uniforms and just integrate back to civy life transparently. My 21st birthday was on May 11th 1970, just two days after the first march and I was on a one month Thai/Malaysia border patrol.

All this turmoil, and hatred, generated towards ADF troops took a heavy toll, when laid on top of the hushed up nature of my service in the border region, and it made us feel like Lepers. The Prime Minister, (To be), made an election promise pre 1972, that all troops serving overseas would be returned to fortress Australia, once he was in power. He forgot the need for troops to protect the ABB, so this is where the cover up began, and the Ethicos Report's comment "*could be misrepresented - by the Government, for overtly political purposes - as 'training'*" comes from.

In 1972, I applied for a War Service Home loan and was really set back when told that I only had normal peacetime service. Sorry, but we appreciate your service.

For the last 52 years, I have tried to have my service recognized for what it really was, through the DOD, DVA, Ombudsmans, PM, DHAAT etc etc and the treatment of obfuscation has been debilitating, leading to years of Open Arms intervention, Medication for severe depression and the flow on to family, and life, in general. The Ethicos Group report documented by Mr Whitton, vindicates exactly what I have been saying for years.

I appeal to the DHAAT tribunal to please recognize the cover up, (See sentence from the Ethicos Group re quoted below) and reasons for that, and finally accord me with the award of the AASM.

"In particular, the 1972 recommendation by officials to the incoming government that RCB deployment in defence of Butterworth air base could be misrepresented - by the Government, for overtly political purposes - as 'training', remains at the heart of this matter."

10. Maj Gen Mohr's on Objective Danger, Incurred Danger etc 2000

Gen Mohr described his approach to determining Objective danger in his report into service anomalies in 1999 2000. He wrote :-

"To establish whether or not an 'objective danger' existed at any given time, it is necessary to examine the facts as they existed at the time the danger was faced. Sometimes this will be a relatively simple question of fact. For example, where an armed enemy will be clearly proved to have been present. However, the matter cannot rest there.

On the assumption that we are dealing with rational people in a disciplined armed service (ie. both the person perceiving danger and those in authority at the time), then if a serviceman is told there is an enemy and that he will be in danger, then that member will not only perceive danger, but to him or her it will be an objective danger on rational and reasonable grounds. If called upon, the member will face that objective danger. The member's experience of the objective danger at the time will not be removed by 'hindsight' showing that no actual enemy operations eventuated.

All of the foregoing highlights the inherent difficulty with this concept of perceived and objective danger. It seems to me that proving that danger has been incurred is a matter to be undertaken irrespective of whether or not the danger is perceived at the time of the incident under consideration. The question must always be, did an objective danger exist? That question must be determined as an objective fact, existing at the relevant time, bearing in mind both the real state of affairs on the ground, and on the warnings given by those in authority when the task was assigned to the persons involved.

In my case, an objective danger existed, the enemy were real and the warnings were real.

11. Trioxone-Agent Orange use in Malaysia during 1952 to 1962

19/04/2022, 11:12

Herbicide warfare - Wikipedia

WIKIPEDIA

Herbicide warfare

Herbicide warfare is the use of substances primarily designed to destroy the plant-based ecosystem of an area. Although herbicide warfare use chemical substances, its main purpose is to disrupt agricultural food production and/or to destroy plants which provide cover or concealment to the enemy, not to asphyxiate or poison humans and/or destroy human-made structures. Herbicide warfare has been forbidden by the Environmental Modification Convention since 1978, which bans "any technique for changing the composition or structure of the Earth's biota".^[1]



Defoliant spray run, part of Operation Ranch Hand, during the Vietnam War by UC-123B Provider aircraft.

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History

Modern day herbicide warfare resulted from military research discoveries of plant growth regulators in the Second World War, and is therefore a technological advance on the scorched earth practices by armies throughout history to deprive the enemy of food and cover.

Work on military herbicides began in England in 1940, and by 1944, the United States joined in the effort. Even though herbicides are chemicals, due to their mechanism of action (growth regulators), they are often considered a means of biological warfare. Over 1,000 substances were investigated by the war's end for phytotoxic properties, and the Allies envisioned using herbicides to destroy Axis crops. British planners did not believe herbicides were logistically feasible against Germany.

In May 1945, USAAF General Victor E. Betrandias advanced a proposal to his superior General Arnold to use of ammonium thiocyanate to reduce rice crops in Japan as part of the bombing raids on their country. This was part of larger set of proposed measures to starve the Japanese. The plan calculated that ammonium thiocyanate would not be seen as "gas warfare" because the substance

was not particularly dangerous to humans. On the other hand, the same plan envisaged that if the U.S. were to engage in "gas warfare" against Japan, then mustard gas would be an even more effective rice crop killer. The Joint Target Group rejected the plan as tactically unsound, but expressed no moral reservations.^[2]

Malaya

During the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), the British military deployed herbicides and defoliants in the Malaysian countryside (including crop fields) in order to deprive Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) insurgents of cover, potential sources of food and to flush them out of the jungle. The herbicides and defoliants deployed by the British contained Trioxone, an ingredient which was also formed part of the chemical composition of the Agent Orange herbicide used by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War. Deployment of herbicides and defoliants served the dual purpose of thinning jungle trails to prevent ambushes and destroying crop fields in regions where the MNLA was active to deprive them of potential sources of food. In the summer of 1952, 500 hectares were sprayed with 90,000 liters of Trioxone from fire engines; the British found it difficult to operate the machinery in jungle conditions while wearing full protective gear. Herbicides and defoliants were also sprayed from Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft.^[3]

Historical records of DOW chemical show that "Super Agent Orange", also called DOW Herbicide M-3393, was Agent Orange that was mixed with picloram. Super Orange was known to have been tested by representatives from Fort Detrick and DOW chemical in Texas, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii and later in Malaysia in a cooperative project with the International Rubber Research Institute.^[4]

Discussions in the British government centered on avoiding the thorny issue of whether herbicide warfare was in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibited chemical warfare in rather general terms. The British were keen to avoid accusations like the allegations of biological warfare in the Korean War leveled against the United States. The British government found that the simplest solution was to deny that a conflict was going on in Malaya. They declared the insurgency to be an internal security matter, thus the use of herbicide agents was a matter of police action, much like the use of CS gas for riot control.^[3]

Many Commonwealth personnel who handled herbicides and defoliants during, and in the decades after, the conflict suffered from serious exposure to dioxin, which also led to soil erosion in areas of Malaysia. Roughly 10,000 civilians and insurgents in Malaysia also suffered from the effects of the defoliant, though many historians argue the true number was higher given that herbicides and defoliants were used on a large scale in the Malayan Emergency; the British government manipulated data and kept its deployment of herbicide warfare secret in fear of a diplomatic backlash.^{[5][6][7]}

Vietnam War

The United States used herbicides in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. Success with Project AGILE field tests with herbicides in South Vietnam in 1961 and inspiration by the British use of herbicides and defoliants during the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s led to the formal herbicide program Trail Dust (1961–1971). Operation Ranch Hand, a U.S. Air Force program to use C-123K aircraft to spray herbicides over large areas was one of many programs under Operation Trail Dust. The aircrews charged with spraying the defoliant used a sardonic motto-"Only you can prevent forests"-a shortening of the U.S. Forest Services famous warning to the general public "Only you can prevent forest fires". The United States and its allies officially claims that herbicide and incendiary agents like napalm fall outside the definition of "chemical weapons" and that Britain set the precedent by using them during the Malayan Emergency.

The British Gov denied that a conflict was raging so declared a internal security matter not an Insurgency war. Our Gov did exactly the same, I have it in writing in one of my rejection letters.

Trioxone-Agent Orange life cycle is many decades, and it is interesting to note that these drugs manufactured by British ICI and Dow Chemicals, were sprayed by the British Military in North West Malaysia in large quantities up until the early 60's, during the First Emergency. When on Patrol in the border region, our water supply was from the local creeks. We relied on water from

these sources for our two week patrols and on one occasion two, two week patrols were combined making a total of a four week patrol. In those humid and hot jungle environments, water use is significant. These creeks are known concentration points for dioxins, so the likely hood of our consuming these chemicals is very high. Once again, I would not call this sort of exposure to harm from Trioxone, Tigers and of course the CT's as Normal Peacetime Service.

It is very interesting that the British Government, to avoid being seen to breaking the 1925 Geneva protocol, decided to call the First Insurgency War, an internal Emergency, The Australian Gov did exactly the same, and especially during the Malaysian Communist Insurgency War 1968 to 1989. I have in writing a rejection letter where it says exactly the same thing. Ie :-*There was no state of war or emergency in Malaysia after 1966, only internal race riots.*

12. Conclusion and what I would like to happen from the tribunals hearing :-

I have purposely not tried to add all of the evidence available, as the volume is immense, but will provide same if required or requested.

As stated in 7 above, it appears irrelevant as to whether you call the Bursatu Padu war games an exercise, or a chance to intimidate the CT's, using the games as a Deterrent, as stated in the FESR roles.

You could well say that we were collecting butterfly's, because the reality, when considering all the intelligence documents, over 200 secret and over 20 Top Secret in total, and NewsPaper articles and local knowledge, that we were in fact, a Deterrent force, operating under the FESR roles, so you can call the service what you like. It is academic to the reality of what the circumstances were on the ground. We experienced "Real and Incurred danger" from an armed enemy, (Ref sec 6.k) whilst patrolling in the No Go Zone, which was also a communist Insurgency war zone, in which many people were being killed and wounded.

This service was extremely hazardous, and as we were warned of possible CT contact, the expectation of casualties inflicted on us by the CT's was expected. Coupled with the real and incurred danger we faced, the service can only be described as Active Service, and the ongoing classification of Normal Peacetime Service, defies logic, and the intelligence, of mature persons.

The most significant aspect of this border area service under the banner of deterrence, conceived in the late 60's as being an exercise, was that we generally carried no ammunition, except that the platoon Sargent's carried red taped magazines with ammunition to fend off tigers.

I recall walking out of the ABB Auditorium after our briefing, and everybody was saying things like "Is this for real, we could contact the CT's and we don't have ammunition" the reference to re supply in the briefing went along the lines that if we were contacted, then they could supply us with ammunition within 20 minutes.

Some guys said, "At least we have machete's".

I recall at the time thinking, 20 minutes is a long time to be pinned down under ambush fire without ammunition.

All of this, CT's, Tigers, Oppressive heat and humidity, just added to my anxiety, compounding the realization of the unbelievable responsibility, that had fallen on the head of a young National Serviceman, some 9 months after being drafted and basically with only two weeks MEDICAL training and some one on one time with the RMO.

When discussing my service in Malaysia with people over the years, when they hear that we were in an Insurgency War zone without ammunition, the conversation just goes quiet.

In hindsight, Physiologically, I think that a lot of damage was done at the end of my two year National Service, service. I went from a position with great responsibilities, to being treated badly at my discharge at Watsonia Vic. No one wanted to know us, and we were very much just dumped, by the system, no unwinding counseling, just told to disappear transparently. Don't wear your uniform on return to Australia, too many people against the ADF and servicemen serving overseas, due to Moratorium marches and lots of negative press..

It was a weird feeling, one week your part of a full on Battalion, very strict, lots of discipline with my Medics duties, then civilian street. My service was hidden from the public and not recognized by anybody. I know where I was, what I did, the dangers involved, the responsibilities put on me, and to have absolutely no recognition has taken its toll.

The physiological damage and the associated PTSD that followed this service as a National Serviceman, and the 52 years since, has taken its toll and needs to be finally accorded the recognition it deserves. It is worth remembering that when I arrived in Malaysia and Singapore, I was still not of voting age, which was 21 years old till about 1973. In today's world of entitlement, it is amazing, to think that I was not allowed to vote, yet I was considered ably suitable by the RMO and CO to be a Battalion Medic and be responsible for the lives of up to a company of men at a time, in a known Communist Insurgency War Zone, and all with what would

be seen in today's world, minimal medical training, would be fanciful at best in today's world of political correctness, and the need for qualifications for everything. Obviously the RMO & CO, in appointing me this position of great importance, saw certain qualities in me. To a degree, my achievements later in life probably qualify what they saw, ie, Became an officer in the RAE, a World Cycling champion, a Fellow of the Inst of Engineers Australia.

I sincerely hope that the tribunal members now armed with this plethora of evidence, which was, in the past, either not found or purposely overlooked, can right the wrongs of the past reviews, and hearings, and reclassify my service, to War Service, and award the AASM, and its associated benefits.

It is also important to remember that Australian servicemen have been awarded the AASM, for serving in Malaysia in the 50 & 60's for being exposed to :-

- a. The CT enemy
- b. The CT enemy leader, Ching Peng
- c. The area of operations being the Thai Malaysia border
- d. The Political agenda of politically taking control of Malaysia as a Communist state
- e. Served during the First Emergency
- f. Served under the FESR.

And when compared to my service, it is exactly the same :-

- a. The same CT enemy
- b. The same CT enemy leader, Ching Peng
- c. The same area of operations being the Thai Malaysia border
- d. The same Political agenda of politically taking control of Malaysia as a Communist state
- e. They served during the First Emergency, I served during the Communist Insurgency War, Newspaper article 6.f, points out the above facts, so there is an inequality in the administration and fairness when considering my service in the past. They are War service veterans and I have Normal Peacetime Service ?
- f. Served under the FESR

I believe that I have proven that I have qualified, "Incurred Danger", as per Sect 6 k Page 26, and above, and more specifically, Mohr and Clarke's rulings on Incurred and Objective Danger Mohr at 10. Page 32. I note that PS bureaucrats have more recently applied the amended descriptions of War & No Warlike service.

I believe with the changed acceptance that Malaysia was in the midst of a Communist inspired Insurgency War, and the oversight by the system, that this little window of service, between 1966 and the start of the RCB rotations, Nov 1970, and still under the FESR guidelines, and designated as "A No Go Zone for ADF Personnel" have been overlooked or ignored for a long time, so now this tribunal has the opportunity to rectify the wrong.

This would go a long way to giving closure on what was a very un-stabilising time in my life.



John Hunt
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PM Keys [REDACTED]