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29 April, 2022

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Submission to Inquiry - Mr Christopher David Donnelly

Part 1 – Name of Inquiry

Name of Inquiry *

Inquirey into medallic recognition for service with Rifle Company Butterworth.

Part 2 – About the Submitter

Title or Rank *

Mr

Surname *

Donnelly

Given Names *

Christopher David

Postal Address *

Email Address: *

Primary Contact Number *

Secondary Contact Number

Is the Submission on behalf of an organisation? If yes, please provide details:

Rifle Company Butterworth 1970 to 1989

Part 3 – Desired outcome

Provide a summary of your submission:

The criteria to be met for the period of RCB service is contained in Cabinet Directive 1048 of 1965 and simply requires that ADF personnel were exposed to the possible risk of harm from the ongoing actions of hostile forces or dissident elements. This in a nutshell is the “incurred danger” test, as stated by Justice Mohr in his 2000 Report – Chapter 2 . This is a vital principle to be recognised in any consideration of warlike service. A serviceman is told there is an enemy and that he will be in danger, then that member will not only perceive danger, but to him or her it will be an objective danger on rational and reasonable grounds. If called upon, the member will face that objective danger. The member’s experience of the objective danger at the time will not be removed by ‘hindsight’ showing that no actual enemy operations eventuated”. However there was Resurgence of Armed Communist. Current Definition: A warlike operation is an Australian Government authorised military operation where ADF personnel are exposed to the risk of harm from hostile forces that have been assessed by Defence as having the capability and an identified intent to directly target ADF personnel. ADF personnel are authorised to use force to pursue specific military objectives and there is an expectation of ADF casualties as a result. Justice Clarke in his 2002 Report to Government Chapter 14 said: “In determining the nature of service for an approved operation, the Department of Defence uses three primary factors: the mission, the

rules of engagement and the threat to ADF personnel.” 1. The Mission. “Warlike operations are those military activities where the application of force is required to pursue specific military objectives, conventional combat operations against an armed adversary and peace enforcement operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents.....” The RCB deployment of a combat infantry rifle company (reinforced), was a conventional defence combat operation to protect the RAAF assets in a Shared Defence Plan with the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) within the air base. Specifically, RCB’s primary role, was a QRF to defend against an enemy attack. Its size was to be a deterrent to the enemy’s action. Defence is a conventional phase of war where a military force is deployed for a specific defensive/protective/security mission to a specific defended area. Elements of that defence force deploy into ‘front-line’ positions while others are designated as a reserve force for a counter attack. I have attached documents supporting my submission and The RCBRG will supply documents to support my claims.

Part 4 - Your submission and Supporting Documentation

File Attached: RCB-Chris-Donnelly-submission.docx

Resurgence-of-Armd-Communism-Malaysia-72-1-2.pdf

Commentary-Ted.docx

Part 5 – Consent and declaration

I consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal making my submission publicly available.

I also consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal:

- using information contained in my submission to conduct research;
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation considered by the Tribunal to be appropriate; and
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation the subject of adverse comment in the submission;
- using content in my submission in its report to Government.

The Tribunal will decide which person or organisation is appropriate, and this may include:

1. persons or organisations required to assist with the inquiry; and
2. persons or organisations with an interest in the inquiry.

I declare that the information I have provided is correct.

Name

Chris Donnelly.

Date

29/04/2022 /

Mr Christopher David


Donnelly

Signed by Mr Christopher David Donnelly

Signed on: 29 April, 2022

Signature Certificate

Document name: Submission to Inquiry - Mr Christopher David Donnelly



“Medallic Recognition for Australians who served with Rifle Company Butterworth in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989”.

I come to this matter with personal knowledge and experience. I would like the Tribunal to consider the following information and lift the veil of secrecy involved in the true deployment of Australian troops in Rifle Company Butterworth (RCB). More simply put a Conspiracy!

My name is Chris Donnelly, I served with 7 Platoon, C Company 3 RAR, 1st Jun 1977 to 6th Sep 1977 at Air Base Butterworth as a member of RCB. At the time, I was 212438 Private C D Donnelly. My primary task was Scout/Rifleman in the rifle section. My normal weapons were the M16 and SLR rifles, while the rest of the company carried their normal small arms weapons required for operational service. The company's heavy weapons were also readily available along with live ammunition on base. While on Quick Reaction Force (QRF) duties, section machine guns were routinely deployed. I also served multiple tours at Air Base Butterworth with 7 Platoon, C Company 3 RAR, being May 1980 to Sep 1980 and 1st Jun 1977 to 6th Sep 1977. My primary task on all tours was Scout/2IC in the rifle section. We carried the same weaponry as mentioned above for our first tour in 1977.

My statement about my time in the leadup to RCB and during our Deployment.

Before leaving Australia, we all had to become War Service Medical, Dental and Fitness Level (DP1), which is the standard for deployment overseas., Wills were made out. (I never made a will to go to friendly countries) We were given intense First Aid training as there was a possibility/expectation of casualties. We also lived where the Malaysians were unloading their casualties and dead from engagements with Ct Cells as we were the active Air base.

I vividly remember the briefings the Company was given by our commanders and legal members of the Army before we left country. We were brief by Military Law personnel (we were told we were subject to Military Law, Active Service Law, Malaysian Law and the Company Commander had the powers of a Commanding Officer Whilst on Active Duty), Intelligence Officers and briefed on numerous occasions about what our duties were before we embarked for Malaysia. When we arrived, we were taken directly to the base movie theatre for a intelligence briefing where they outline the bombing of a Malaysian Airforce base in KL and their belief the CT cells may attack BAB. They explained how this would be conducted with delayed rockets or bombs. They show us where the CT camps were around BAB. The QRF attended these meetings with their issued weapons, ammunition and truck. This happened every time the company moved around from the QRF Post.

Whilst posted in country, we undertook the following: base Quick Reaction Force (QRF), Standing Patrols and standby platoon on a rotation basis. Within all these activities we carried front line live ammunition and followed Rules of Engagement. Weapons were at action state (rounds in magazine on rifle, rifle cocked with a round in chamber and safety on). We had one situation where we were called out on QRF in the early morning where we encountered an intruder. Warnings were given to the point of firing when it was confirmed via radio that he was a Malaysian guard in wrong place. Every time on QRF or Standing Patrols I constantly felt in danger. We also conducted foot patrols with live ammo, fixed bayonets and radio. On QRF duties we were always called out to vital points around the Air Base where we were issued front line ammo. Once at the Vital Point/ ground sensors we would extend out in line and sweep through the area. At these times we did not know if it was a drill or real. I always had a very heighten sense of danger when patrolling and using the search lights. Standing patrols were conducted outside of the base security fence along the major road, again with front line ammunition and at the action state for all weapons carried.

I had no military exercises with the Malaysians Army. The contention we were there for exercise/training is fascicle as we were told we were there to protect Australian assets and to defend the air base and do what rifle companies do when deployed to an operational air base. To extract military families if an attack came.

I strongly object to MP's, Bureaucrats, and advisors who never went to Malaysia at the times I did, saying we were there for training only and we were not in danger. I will agree the two tours I participated in were different in their intensity. However, I had the same primary warnings and briefings. During both tours we conducted Quick Reaction Force (QRF), Standing Patrols and standby platoon on a rotation basis. Within all these activities we carried front line live ammunition and followed Rules of Engagement. Weapons were at action state (rounds in magazine on rifle, rifle cocked with round in chamber and safety on).

In my 9 years of military service, I never carried live ammunition on training exercises, unless we were conduction range practice or live fire shoots. These activities were strictly controlled with all unused ammunition and spent shell cases accounted for. We were definitely not brought to the action status until we had safety offices with us. In Butterworth sections were deployed nightly on armed patrols. Carrying live ammunition and weapons and operating within the Rules of Engagement, we would have taken offensive action and killed people without further orders on our operation if necessitated. We definitely did not have safety offices with us in Malaysian especially when we were called out to clear an area or walk the fence and not on standing patrols. We had to follow the Rules of Engagement. On special occasions the day was called a Red-Letter Day (Communist party celebration day). These occasions required a whole platoon of three sections on QRF, Standing Patrols, again with section weapons and frontline ammunition. The other two platoons acted as a ready reserve.

Examples support my arguments

We were regularly placed on high alert status prior to periods where additional unrest might be expected, like during Chinese New Year celebrations and immediately following Communist Insurgency attacks. On special occasions during our tour of duty we had days called a Red-Letter Day (Communist party celebration day of a historical date, a high-ranking party members birthday etc. This information was supplied to use by our intelligent officers and Malaysian Army). On these occasions a whole platoon of three sections was on QRF, Standing Patrols again with section weapons and front-line ammunition. The other 2 platoons were on ready reserve. In Butterworth every night sections were deployed on armed patrols. Live ammunition/weapons and with Rules of Engagement, where we would have taken offensive action and killed people without further orders on our operation. We did not have safety offices with us in Malaysia when we were called out to clear an area or walk the fence and not on standing patrol. We had to follow the Rules of Engagement.

Australian Army Quick Reaction Force – Authority to Shoot.

When on Quick Reaction Force, we had our section weapons, were issued ammunition and orders in the form of 'Rules of Engagement', that reflected the risk of attack by an armed adversary on Airbase Butterworth. We were authorised within the Rules of Engagement to:

1. Open fire on any person carrying out a deadly attack.
2. Open fire on any person carrying out an action of destruction or damage.
3. Open fire on a person entering a Protected Place who refused to stop when ordered to do so.
4. Open fire on any person who once arrested who attempted to escape and refused to stop when ordered to do so.
5. When deciding to open firer, shoot at the mean mass so the bullet does not miss and travel through to the campongs aligning the base fence.

Additionally, we were advised that it was to be regarded as War Service and any offences would be charged under the War Service Act, and everyone being deployed:
Had to be over 18 years of age. Note: "Never had to be over eighteen to travel with Battalion anywhere else."
Was required to complete a Last Will & Testament before deployment.
Was required to attain a War Service Medical, Dental and Fitness Level (DP1).
Underwent training with specific equipment and tactics.
Was warned about the weapons the enemy had like rifles, pistols, machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, mortars and told they were very good at booby traps.
Was told not to become complacent because our military installation was just as likely to be attacked as any other.
Was regularly briefed about Insurgent attacks taking place across Malaysia.
Was brought to a higher alert when there was a new attack.
Was warned about how close the enemy was operating.
Was advised by veterans of Vietnam and Malaya of their experiences and warned take care and be vigilant.
Was regularly drilled responding to attack by Insurgents.
Was regularly challenged by friendly forces armed with fully loaded firearms until they/we identified themselves.
Whenever there was a 'Red Letter Day' and an increased alert level, stayed alert all night in case of attack.
Witnessed helicopters and trucks being loaded with weapons, ammunition and soldiers departing on operations.
Saw helicopters arriving and ambulances taking away casualties and dead bodies.
Set roadblocks on the Airbase, stopping every car and searching the cars for weapons and ammunition.
Took part in realistic medical emergency exercises.
Conducted armed patrols of the Airbase boundary fence looking for breaches in the fence, passing close to villages and rice paddy fields. When passing the South Gate the Malaysian guard would take his machine gun off his shoulder, cock it and aim it at you identified yourself or until you passed.
Passed through Malaysian Army roadblocks on the way to the rifle range.
Always had someone with a loaded weapon in our truck.
When training in the jungle always kept a magazine of live ammunition in case of wild animals or Insurgents.
On returning to Australia after 3 months arrived quietly and without fanfare.
Was awarded The Australian Service Medal for operational service.
Was told that it wasn't Qualifying Service for repatriation because it was Peacetime Service and whilst arduous was no more dangerous than serving in Australia.

Some submissions & reports hard copy attached

Attachments.

1.



• MALAYSIA THE

- RESURGENCE OF ARMED COMMUNISM

WEST MALAYSIA, DI-CHETAK DI-JABATAN CHETAK KERAJAANOLEH MOHD. DAUD BIN ABDUL RAHMAN.
PENCHETAK KER_uXAN KUALA LUMPUR

2. The Whitton Report – Rifle Company Butterworth’s Service in Malaysia 1970-1989
H K Whitton Public Sector Ethics Consultant Brisbane 24 September 2022
3. Commentary – RCB Nature of Service as Warlike by Ted Chitham
Lt Col E.A. Chitham MC OAM (ret’d) 25th March 2022
4. Rifle Company Butterworth Review Group Review and recently supplied documents



*An operational QRF callout that officialdom claims never happened
Note: Malaysian Military police in back ground. Live ammunition*

I am prepared to attend tribunal or provide further evidence via phone or zoom meeting

Regards

C Donnelly

Chris Donnelly
[REDACTED]



MALAYSIA

THE
**RESURGENCE OF
ARMED COMMUNISM**
IN
WEST MALAYSIA



MALAYSIA

THE
RESURGENCE OF
ARMED COMMUNISM
IN
WEST MALAYSIA

DI-CHETAK DI-JABATAN CHETAK KERAJAAN
OLEH MOHD. DAUD BIN ABDUL RAHMAN, PENCHETAK KERAJAAN
KUALA LUMPUR
1971

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FOREWORD

In November 1968, the country was warned of a serious threat to its security posed by militant Communism in West Malaysia. The Communists had planned for a revival of armed rebellion as a means of usurping constitutional power. These plans and their ramifications were revealed in a White Paper entitled "The Path of Violence to Absolute Power".

2. Events since then have indicated that Communist efforts to produce a situation favourable to an armed insurrection have borne some results. This was due to the support given by a small section of the population who are either disloyal or misled. These people, however, form an insignificant minority of the population.

3. The State of Sarawak in East Malaysia also faces a threat of armed Communism. However since the situation prevailing there differs substantially from that in West Malaysia, the Government will be issuing a separate White Paper on the security situation in that State.

4. Public awareness and understanding of the Communist plans to further their aims, which are contrary to Rukunegara, will contribute to greater **rapport** between the people and the Government and improve the effectiveness of the measures that must be taken by Government to meet the Communist challenge. The objective of this Paper is to improve that awareness and understanding among the public.

5. Government strategy to meet the Communist threat consists of a twin movement of security measures on the one hand, and economic development-cum-social integration on the other.

6. To date, the threat of armed insurrection by the Communists has been successfully contained. This was possible due to the alertness, dedication and sacrifice

of the security forces. In their task the security forces receive a great deal of assistance from the people who give valuable information and support.

7. The fight against Communist insurrection cannot, and should not, rest on the force of arms alone. The more important battle, one that can produce decisive victory and lasting peace, lies in the field of social and economic development. The only defence against subversion is a socially just and united society.

8. Simultaneous with security measures, Government has in the Second Malaysia Plan embarked on fundamental economic and social measures to accelerate investment and economic growth, with national unity through prosperity as the objective. Malaysians from all walks of life can look forward to a life of greater participation, prosperity and unity under the Plan.

9. Guided by Rukunegara, and assisted by wide-ranging Government measures under the Plan, we in this country are geared for a new era of hard work and dedication in the creation of a prosperous and integrated Malaysian society.

10. The Government is determined, with the support of the people, not to give the Communists a chance to subvert the new Malaysia that we are building. I am certain that the people will co-operate and support the Government in any measures that may be necessary to ensure the peace, prosperity and security of our country.



TUN (DR) ISMAIL AL-HAJ BIN DATO' HAJI ABDUL RAHMAN,
Deputy Prime Minister

and

*Minister of Home Affairs,
Malaysia*

Date: 1st October, 1971

THE RESURGENCE OF ARMED COMMUNISM IN WEST MALAYSIA

INTRODUCTION

In June 1968, the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) announced its intention to re-embark on armed insurgency to capture political power. The Party categorically renounced all constitutional means for the achievement of this objective and spelt out the conditions that it planned to create for a successful return to a guerilla war.

2. The Government published a White Paper in November that year to appraise the public of the danger posed to the Nation's security by this threatened revival of armed Communism. Since then, changes have taken place in the situation that must now be made common knowledge so that the public can better understand and therefore act with even greater unity of purpose together with the Government in order to destroy the enemy that seeks to impose its will on this society by force of arms.

THE POLICY BACKGROUND

DIRECTIVES

3. When the CPM announced in June 1968 its intention to return to the armed offensive, it was virtually an open admission of total defeat for the Party in what it termed as the "open and legal struggle". It was in fact also indirectly a tribute to the resilience and strength of Parliamentary democracy in this country, as failure had dogged every attempt of the CPM to work its way into the seat of constitutional power.

4. In June 1969, the Party issued another statement in which a new dimension was introduced into its armed struggle policy. The statement came in the wake

of the May 13 racial disturbances in West Malaysia which the Party was quick to exploit. It attempted to hold the Government responsible for what had happened and, by the use of innuendoes, called for what amounted to fresh racial clashes in order to settle a so-called blood debt owed to those who had suffered in the disturbances. The statement declared:

“The Rahman-Razak clique, having torn off the badly worn-out mask of ‘democracy’, has ruthlessly carried out a massive sanguinary massacre of the people of Malaya, mainly the Chinese masses, and is openly imposing fascist military rule in the country”.

5. The statement urged the people not to forget this so-called “blood debt” and those allegedly responsible and that the people of all races in the country should oppose the Government. It then called on the people of various races:

“to join the Liberation Army Take up arms! Build up self-defence forces! Resolutely hit back at the enemy’s persecution and massacre and safe-guard our own interests! Rise up in action and positively wage a People’s War!”

6. This was followed by yet **another statement on 25 April 1970** ostensibly intended to commemorate the Party’s 40th anniversary **in which the CPM attempted to rationalise its new stand on the race issue.** The Party claimed that it had committed the error of overestimating the gravity of this race problem in the past and consequently had allowed it to influence the Party into accepting the peaceful parliamentary struggle as the only practical means of achieving power. It however blamed the error of policy on circumstances allegedly beyond the Party’s control at the time the blunders were made, **and argued that racial conflict would not after all be precipitated if the armed struggle developed out of the class struggle, viz:**

“Ours is a plural society, made up mainly of the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians as well as of other minority races. Although our Party has, ever since its inception, been carrying out its work among the toiling masses of the various races the fundamental question of whether to analyse the revolutionary motivating force within our country according to class or race has for a long time now not been solved in a clear-cut manner”

“The theoretical basis of our Party’s line in 1954 was that the Chinese and the Indians were the alien races but the Malays were the indigenous race. In the absence of conditions conducive to the promotion or racial unity with the ‘Malays’ as the so-called cardinal force, it was impossible to continue to persist in armed struggle; moreover, by persisting in armed struggle our Party would have helped the imperialists by creating racial clashes

“As a matter of fact, the question of races is, in its final analysis, one of classes. Although the racial problems in Malaya have certain characteristics it is by basing upon the class views of Marxism, Leninism and the Thought of Mao Tse Tung can we arrive at a correct conclusion on the question of the revolutionary motivating force within our country.”

7. Thus, insofar as the CPM was concerned, the Party had provided the necessary dialectical explanation to justify **its current policy of total committal to the armed struggle regardless of its racial implications.**

8. Implementation of the Party’s armed struggle policy has already begun, and this is taking shape in two parallel forms. One is the establishment and build-up of the CPM’s military presence on Malaysian soil, and the other is the creation of an underground mass support infrastructure that will constitute the base from which the armed struggle will be launched. This two-pronged strategy has since been implemented, and in the implementation of this strategy there is indication of co-ordination of effort between the Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO) and the Communist underground.

THE ARMED BUILD-UP

INFILTRATION

9. As far back as late 1968, armed units of the Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO) have been infiltrating across the Thai border into Malaysian territory. Their intention is to penetrate into areas that were CTO strongholds during the first Emergency. However, land development schemes introduced during the intervening years had produced considerable changes in the topographical features of the areas as well as the jungle regions surrounding them. Also, the

terrorist elements despatched into Malaysian territory comprised largely new intakes into the CTO. Hence the Communist Terrorist (CT) infiltration groups needed to familiarise themselves with the ground conditions in their efforts to reach the target areas. As they acquired better knowledge of the terrain, the infiltration which initially was confined to shallow probing missions gradually increased in range and frequency. The pace of infiltration rose sharply for a period following the May 13 disturbances in 1969, in an obvious Communist attempt to exploit the unsettled situation then prevailing in the country.

DRAMATIC IMPACT

10. On 24 July 1969 the CTO committed its first murder of a civilian on Malaysian soil when a Communist Terrorist (CT) infiltration group dragged a female Chinese from her house in the small isolated mining village of Sintok in Kedah and shot her dead before the local population. This was a vengeance killing as the woman was a former member of the CTO who had surrendered to the authorities. Three days later, the CTs ambushed a small Security Force (SF) unit despatched into the area to investigate the incident.

11. On 25 October 1969, CTs mined a stretch of the Changloon-Sadao Road on the Malaysian/Thai border, and tried unsuccessfully to ambush a Malaysian SF motorised convoy using the road.

12. On 10 December 1969, the CTO staged its first sabotage incident in Malaysian territory when CTs blew up the railway bridge at Kok Mak near the Malaysian border town of Padang Besar in Perlis, and strewed the scene with Communist flags and pamphlets.

13. On the night of 14 December 1969, CT elements sneaked into Padang Besar and fired three shots at the local Police Station in a token act of terrorism.

14. There was a dual purpose behind this sudden deliberate spate of terrorist incidents. Firstly, the CTO needed to establish the credibility of its much-publicised intention to stage an armed return to Malaysian soil and had therefore calculated that the best propaganda

impact on the masses would be achieved by staging these dramatic demonstrations of its guerilla capabilities. Secondly, they felt that it served as an inspiration to their supporters.

SHIFT IN INFILTRATION STRATEGY

15. The initial show of aggressive force has since given way to studied avoidance of contact with the Security Forces. The Security Forces have however frequently succeeded in making contacts with the terrorists. **The present Communist strategy is to concentrate on long-range infiltration for which the secrecy of jungle movement is obviously necessary.** By employing this strategy some CT groups have managed to penetrate into certain areas situated well inside the States of Kedah, Perak and Kelantan.

TARGET AREA

16. The choice of these particular areas is by design as **the CTO's primary targets for long-range penetration are those places that were previously under its domination during the first Emergency—then termed as "black" areas—the reason being that in the Communist estimation, former CTO sympathisers and CTs' relatives residing in these localities may be relied upon to provide the required mass support.** Proof of this CTO strategy is contained in a captured Party document which states:

"The present tasks are to carry on strengthening the forces, to consolidate and expand the guerilla bases, to expand the operational areas to the vast area at the northern tip (Note: referring to the north of West Malaysia), to resume the masses work in rural areas, to build underground bulwarks, to forge ahead with the masses movement and to expand the guerilla war;

"To positively develop the armed struggle in 'M' area and, taking one firm step after another, to establish an Armed Work Force. For work in 'M' area, to regard activating the masses as the main form of work and fighting battles as secondary. As the first step to achieve this, it would be quite all right to establish 'points' and nucleus organisations and then to extend, through these 'points', masses work to other places. The Armed Work Force must be well prepared for

battles and should fight some battles it is sure of winning. In places which cannot be reached by the Armed Work Force, efforts must be made to establish local guerilla squads so that certain actions could be taken to strike at the enemy”

And in the instructions given by the leader of a CT infiltration group to his second-in-command during the absence:

“For the purpose of solving the problem pertaining to the supply of foodstuffs, the work in the following two places can be developed. They are the work in the vicinity of X (place name) and in X (place name), South Kedah which involves its neighbourhood of X (place name) in Perak. There are Chinese-owned small rubber estates in these two places. The residents are close to us and can easily be contacted. This work is to be handed over to Comrade XXX who is to be assisted by a few comrades. As regards X (area name), many of its labourers are progressive Comrade XXX is aware of this. It is also easy for us to liaise with this place”

17. It is clear from the foregoing that the CTO intends to use these former Communist strongholds as stepping stones for the creation of a network of guerilla bases that would eventually envelop the entire Peninsula and constitute the spring boards from which the armed struggle would be launched. This Communist strategy has met with some success as evident from the ground developments that have since taken place.

MASSES' SUPPORT

18. The Kulim and Sungei Siput areas in Kedah and Perak respectively are cases in point. Both were “black” areas during the first Emergency and have in the present phase become the scenes of intensive CT activity as the result of penetration by terrorist infiltration groups over the past 24 months. **CTs' relatives and personal contacts are being actively exploited to help provide support** as evident from what a number of those affected had to say subsequent to their arrest:

Case A

“Some time in October 1970, XXX revealed to me that he had met four CTs at X Estate, and that one of the CTs is the son of XXX in X (place name), and when the CTs met him they saluted him”;

Case B

“I came to know CT XXX in 1959/60 when he was working as a lorry attendant with X Company in X (place name). So when he confronted me to seek my help, to buy him some supplies I could not refuse him because of our friendship”;

Case C

“Later I came to know that CT XXX is a distant relative of mine. This fact left me with no alternative but to help him whenever he requested me to do so”;

Case D

“Some time in November 1970, I was told by XXX that he had contacted a group of seven CTs led by CT XXX formerly of X (place name) During this period, CT XXX had met his elder sister”.

19. In Kelantan, Tanah Merah District constitutes one of the target areas singled out by the CTO for penetration. Terrorist infiltration into this area is geared to the immediate objective of establishing guerilla jungle bases and building up support among the rural masses for the armed struggle. That some progress has been achieved in this direction by the CTO will be evident from the following extracts taken from the statements of surrendered and captured CTs who had been operating in the area :

Case A

“In late May 1969, CT XXX’s unit arrived at X (area name) and set up a camp there. In order to find out the local situation prevailing and to re-establish the organisation’s (Note: CTO) influence in the area, CT XXX detailed small reconnaissance groups to visit the kampong. The first group that went was well received by the kampong folk. The two subsequent groups enjoyed the same hospitality

“Having been given the next task of penetrating the X area, CT XXX’s group shifted their base to X (place name) from where he sent out small CT groups to establish contact with the masses in the nearby kampongs

“One group under CT XXX of which I was a member was detailed to penetrate Kampong X. On the first occasion, we contacted XXX, a staunch Communist sympathiser Through him we were able to enter the kampong and were introduced to its headman named XXX. Soon after everyone in the kampong knew of our presence

“After several more visits CT XXX enlisted the help of the kampong folk in purchasing food supplies for us. Consequently, we experienced no shortage of food. The

kampong folk usually bought the supplies from X (place name). In one instance, CT XXX even directed XXX to buy rice and clothing for us in Kota Bharu ”

Case B

“Some time in late February 1970, the whole unit left the camp and made its way towards the Malaysian border. After arriving in Malaysian territory, we set up a base in the X area

“A reconnaissance group was sent out every three days to the nearby kampongs to spread Communist propaganda, gather intelligence on Security Force movements in the area, and to organise cell activities among the local masses

“We managed to recruit 12-15 supporters in this area and through their help we were able to obtain food supplies in quantity regularly ”

and also in the admission made by a CT sympathiser and food supplier after his arrest:

“In 1955 during one of my visits to Kampong X, I met five CTs who came to XXX’s house on a food-lifting mission Subsequently, I had several casual meetings with the CTs As a result I became very friendly with them

“In November 1968 a female CT informed me that CT XXX wanted to see me CT XXX’s first visit to my house signalled the beginning of a series of visits by him and his group to Kampong X. Some time in January 1969, XXX came to my house and told me that CT XXX wanted to meet all of us

“CT XXX said that we should have no difficulty in buying whatever supplies the CTs needed. Once the supplies were obtained, the settlers were to store them in their houses, and the CTs would take delivery on days suitable to them

“Towards the end of 1969 we in X (area name) had a good harvest. One day CT XXX approached and handed me \$500 to purchase rice worth that amount

“From the beginning till the end of 1970 they came off and on to X (area name) in small groups of three to five The CTs normally came in the morning and left late in the evening or at night

“The CTs came to X (area name) only for the purpose of collecting food supplies. There was no need for CT XXX to organise propaganda work purely for the purpose of winning over the masses there since the majority of the settlers in the area were already staunch CT supporters ”

20. The CTO does not confine itself to the exploitation of personal sentiment or kinship to get local support for its infiltration groups. **It has also fraudulently exploited religion in order to obtain this support**, as can be seen from what a former CT operating in the Kelantan area had to say after his surrender:

“During our short stay in X (name of place in Malaysian-Thai border area) in an attempt to woo masses support, CT XXX assisted them in solving their problems and even prayed together with the masses in the mosque. As a result, we received ample food supplies from the masses

“CTs in the 10th Regiment pretended to identify themselves with the masses and constantly propagated to the masses that the Party respected their customs and religion For example, they knew that the Malay masses did not eat certain wild animals such as monkey, wild boar or elephant. In order to convince the masses they purposely shot some of these animals and buried them in front of the masses. However, the Malay CTs ate anything, including wild boar during the absence of the masses.

“CTs also prayed together with the masses in the mosques. I had done it on several occasions

“The true colours of the CTO would invariably be exposed after the masses had been recruited into it. To those who were very religious-minded the CTO would try to neutralise their faith by instilling into their minds the revolutionary spirit of Communism. Hence they were not able nor allowed to pray in the jungle. To those recruits who resisted consuming the meat of certain wild animals e.g. pork, the CTs would explain to them that due to the shortage of foodstuffs and for the upkeep of their health, they would have to eat such meat. If they were unhealthy, they would not be able to participate in the revolution. The case of CT XXX, a very religious-minded recruit, was a glaring example. After much persuasion by CT XXX, coupled with the pressure of the environment, he eventually followed the crowd”

(Note—The 10th Regiment of the CPM operates in Kelantan.)

LOCAL RECRUITMENT

21. Recruitment of local pro-Communist elements into the ranks of these terrorist groups to increase their armed potential has been in progress for a considerable period. This is a vital feature of the overall CTO plan directed at the revival and expansion of its guerilla bases. In this context, the contents of a captured document belonging to a member of a CT infiltration group

are particularly illuminating. It enumerates the tasks to be performed in relation to their mission as :

“To vigorously restore and expand revolutionary bases in Malayan territory as a step forward in developing the war;

“To expand Min Yuen (masses movement) bases aided by ‘active war’. To strengthen and expand the conditions of preparing the masses struggle amongst the various races affected by the policies of chauvinism and national oppression;

“To re-contact and organise the local revolutionary masses into armed and semi-armed units. Suitable persons will be given training for a number of days and then given pistols, land-mines and hand-grenades. Such armed units, consisting of three to five persons, will form the ‘local underground cells’. If necessary, minor military support will be given to the masses struggle so as to disperse the enemy’s military strength and attention;

“To actively recruit as many members as possible from Malayan territory into the Assault Units but must beware of infiltration by enemy spies. Furthermore, must beware of ‘bad situations’—such as enemy military attacks, eviction of masses and food denial operations. The purpose is to actively expand and fight for a steady footing of the Assault Units, but in case the situation is serious for an Assault Unit, temporary withdrawal to Thai territory for readjustment before making further decisions may be considered”.

22. The CT camp found on 13 June 1971 in the Chemor area south of Sungei Siput in Perak is a good example of the potential effectiveness of this Communist infiltration strategy. It is a clear illustration of the success which the CTO is capable of achieving to advance its armed struggle plans if it can secure the support of even a small section of the population.

VIETCONG TACTICS

23. Vietcong tactics have been used extensively by CT infiltration groups for both offensive and defensive purposes. Jungle areas and paths have been indiscriminately seeded with land-mines and booby traps to hamper SF movements regardless of the danger they pose to rural folk who seek their livelihood by extracting jungle produce.

24. There is positive evidence to show that the CTO has been drawing specifically on the Vietnamese experience in the application of these tactics. This is indicated in the statement of a surrendered CT who had

been given such training prior to his despatch into Malaysian territory as a member of an infiltration group:

“Comrade XXX was responsible for lecturing on and demonstrating military theories/tactics regarding the Vietnam war; Vietcong tactics in shooting aircraft; methods of constructing tunnels/trenches and Vietcong anti-personnel devices

“We were taught how to rig up booby traps such as spikes protruding from a wooden base using 3”-6” nails and laid at spots where Security Forces were likely to take cover (i.e., around trees and besides foot paths); or spikes protruding from a round iron ball

“We were also instructed in the use of explosives, such as inserting electrically detonated charges into big tree trunks in likely Security Forces’ approach areas/routes as a counter-attack measure; hanging electrically-detonated mines on plants and setting up simultaneous mines. Another method taught was the use of Molotov cocktails. We were also taught how to blow up bridges and to sabotage buildings.”

THE ROLE OF THE UNDERGROUND

TRANSFORMATION

25. A year before the issue of the Party’s June 1968 statement, the CPM had, in fact, formulated plans for the systematic transformation of all its open United Front activities into underground preparations for the armed struggle. Instructions to initiate this switch to underground activity were given in a secret directive issued in the middle of 1967 which states:

“What form of struggle should be adopted? The most important is the armed struggle of the masses, i.e., People’s War. The so-called ‘peaceful road’, ‘constitutional road’ and ‘parliamentary road’ are all sham revolutions

“The leftwing progressive parties, trade unions and revolutionary masses organisations must gradually revolutionise the masses until they are ready to embark on the road of People’s War.

“. penetrate deeper into the towns, corporations, mines, estates, villages, schools and various centres, pay particular attention to the rural areas, perform well the masses propaganda and organisational work in the rural areas

“ lay strong emphasis on underground work and keep on performing various types of legal struggle to prevent the illegal struggle from being isolated intensify the illegal struggle and consolidate the underground fortress in order to ensure that we will not be without resources in the face of the white terror ”

26. This was followed by **another secret directive issued in early 1968**, evidently as a prelude to the CPM's formal call to arms made in June that year, which reiterates:

“The present situation had obviously shown that the enemy has considerably intensified its violent suppression

“To adapt ourselves to such circumstances, we should adopt a form of struggle which is semi-open and semi-secret, semi-legal and semi-illegal This means that we are using the two-prong revolutionary method to counter-act the two-prong anti-revolutionary method

“Following the development of the class struggle it is very necessary that we should excel in changing to a semi-open and semi-secret, semi-legal and semi-illegal form from a completely open and legal form

“All those cadres who are wanted by the enemy and are no longer able to remain in the open front should resolutely go underground, set up underground organisations and carry on the struggle underground ”

27. **However, by far the most significant directive was issued in August 1969 subsequent to the 13 May racial disturbances of that year. It clearly defined the role that the underground had to play to create the conditions necessary for the armed struggle.** Every aspect of underground activity to be implemented in the light of the new situation was spelt out precisely so as to leave no doubt in the minds of the cadres as to what was expected :

“The domestic situation has become more beneficial to the launching of an armed struggle A new revolutionary storm is surely in the making.

“Under such circumstances how should we carry out the struggle? How should we respond to and thoroughly carry out the great appeal mentioned in the Party statements?

“Through publishing newspapers, distributing pamphlets, pasting and writing slogans to ensure that the broad masses are well acquainted with the revolutionary discourses arouse and deepen the hatred of the broad masses against the enemy in order to unite them for the purpose of

launching the armed struggle (educate the people to forever remember the blood debts owed by the enemy in the "May 13" and other incidents).

"Wholeheartedly disseminate the heroic exploits of the National Liberation Army encourage the revolutionary comrades who have decided to take up arms to join the National Liberation Army"

" steadfastly lay strong stress on the revolutionary work in the countryside, in particular the Malay villages and old bases which have been deeply influenced by the armed struggle mobilise in full the fundamental masses, absorb underground members, form underground organisations and pave the way for launching the armed struggle.

"Cadres in the open progressive political parties should resolutely change their *modus operandi*. go underground and continue to persist in the struggle In the open field, leave only a small number of suitable personnel to perform some permissible activities.

"Adopt various means to procure fire-arms and gradually form armed or semi-armed self-protection organisations"

"Intensify class education, **devote special attention to cultivating the revolutionary cadres of the Malay race in order to mobilise the Malay masses through them**

"Intensify students' activities in the middle schools and universities of the various races help them to embark on the road of the revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party.

"Expand liaison with the bourgeois, enhance their dissatisfaction against the enemy and make the enemy become more isolated.

"Select suitable personnel to develop the work pertaining to employees of the bogus Military/Police and the bogus regime and destroy the mainstay of the enemy on which the latter rely to maintain its rule.

". prevent infiltration by the enemy arouse the common hatred of the masses against the enemy spies and running dogs and adopt suitable methods to eliminate some of the abominable traitors and spies"

"We must resolutely embark on the road to surround the cities from the country-side and capture political power by force of arms, spread the raging fire of People's War throughout the whole country, ensure the destruction of the imperialists and the domestic reactionary cliques and the birth of the Malayan People's Republic amidst this raging fire!"

FIRST MANIFESTATION

28. In April 1970, the progress achieved by the Communist underground became evident with an intensive campaign of Communist propaganda pamphleteering, poster-pasting and flag-hoisting throughout the country. **Explosive booby traps were used for the first time to enhance the propaganda impact of the militant revolutionary theme—a campaign which extended to Singapore.** A number of casualties were caused when attempts were made to remove the deadly devices. Documentary evidence recovered in the course of Police investigation revealed that underground elements had made use of instructional material on the manufacture of explosives from crude ingredients.

29. The inspiration behind this campaign clearly came from the August 1969 directive and set the pace for the spate of similar activity which had since been taking place. **An underground organisation calling itself the “Malayan National Liberation Front” (MNLF) was responsible for initiating the trend, and there is evidence to show that other similar clandestine bodies have also been formed for the common objective of creating the mass support base necessary to sustain the armed struggle.**

30. That the CPM’s directives have been digested for implementation by the Communist underground will be apparent from the detailed and amplified instructions circulated in June 1970 by the MNLF for compliance by its own cadres, which reads—

“The new changes which have been brought about in the political situation in the enemy-occupied areas have basically altered the phase of the ‘constitutional struggle’ which has been waged during the past ten years and more. The CPM’s Liberation Army has already replaced all the so-called opposition parties and truly functions as a directing nucleus
.....

**“Our policy is ‘to strengthen and consolidate the organisation, to develop the revolutionary strength, to organise the revolutionary arms and to prepare to throw ourselves into battles’
.....**

“This is the policy of co-ordinating with the armed struggle under the leadership of the CPM during the period of advancing more positively from ‘preparation for arms’ to

'take up arms' Our organisation shoulders an extremely significant historical duty All work and struggle must, directly and indirectly, be co-ordinated with the armed struggle. In enemy-occupied areas, steps should gradually be taken to develop the struggle towards the stage of armed struggle

“Under the guidance of this policy, our present work and duties are as follows:

‘Comrades of the various levels should make plans for the purpose of studying Chairman Mao’s Works on tactics and strategies relating to People’s War

‘. special training classes for cadres should be conducted It is also extremely important that they be taught rudimentary military and jungle knowledge

‘To deal with the question of arms in various ways. This includes the making and purchasing of arms; thinking of ways to improve the manufacture of land mines and gradually forming armed or semi-armed self-defence organisations

‘The student movement is part and parcel of the revolutionary movement It is therefore essential to strengthen students’ activities in secondary schools and universities to encourage them to follow the road of armed revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party.

‘. arouse the broad mass of people to harbour deeper hatred for the enemy so as to unite them together to wage an armed struggle

‘To step up class education **to attach importance to the training of Malay revolutionary cadres so that they can arouse the Malay masses** to actively carry out the work of educating and uniting the Asal (aboriginal) compatriots.

‘In carrying out rural work and in the recruitment of potential members we must draw our recruits mainly from the workers, peasants, and other poverty stricken labouring people because they are most desirous of and most resolute in carrying out the revolution. However we must develop our organisational work in all directions promote our relations with the middle and petty bourgeoisie so as to enable them to understand the indivisibility of their interest and the interest of the revolution

‘On the basis of our present set-up, we are to strengthen the organisational work in various ‘localities’ so as to increase our influence, improve our links, and develop underground cells In areas where we have built

up our foundation, the comrades should generally attach importance to providing intensive training to the cardinal figures of the area concerned recruiting ordinary members so as to increase the strength of the organisation In newly-developed areas or in some places where our foundation is not strong, attention must be paid to the question of security and technique

'To take strict precautions so as to prevent spies, special agents, enemy bogus elements from infiltrating into the organisation

'In favourable circumstances to carry out surprise assaults and nuisance attacks on the enemy in the enemy-occupied areas; to adopt various forms of violent struggles, such as hoisting of red banners, disseminating written propaganda, mining with dynamite, etc.; to co-ordinate with the armed struggle of the National Liberation Army and in the guerilla zones to harass the enemy, strike at and tie down the enemy, so as to serve the armed struggle directly and indirectly; to create the necessary conditions for a wide expansion of the armed struggle and gradually lead the people to the road of violent revolution!' "

FROM PREPARATION TO PARTICIPATION

31. There is little doubt that important parts of the CPM directives referred to above have been implemented. The United Front has, for the present, virtually ceased to exist and the transition to wholly underground activity is to all intents and purposes complete. **It is clear that the underground is now progressing from the preparatory stage to that of participation in establishing guerilla operational bases as a prelude to the armed struggle.** That this is now happening will be evident from the developments taking place in the CTO field of activity where underground elements are playing an increasingly significant part in the context of this programme.

32. In late 1967, a large number of hard-core cadres engaged in open United Front activity mainly within the Labour Party of Malaya (LPM) and the Partai Rakyat Malaya (PRM) began to move underground. The purpose was two-fold. Firstly, as mentioned in an earlier part of this Paper, the CPM had by then decided that the switch from open to underground activity would have to be made in order to lay the foundation for the armed struggle. Secondly, many of these hard-core

elements had compromised themselves through participation in militant open United Front activity and consequently their transfer to the underground was both necessary and timely if the Party's clandestine cadre structure was to be preserved.

33. The bulk of these cadres dispersed to the rural areas according to plan. Some were sent across the border to South Thailand to join the CTO there. **The reason for sending them became clear when these cadres returned as trained guerillas in the company of CTO infiltration groups in the latter half of 1969. One such group led by these elements reached the Kulim area of Kedah where their familiarity with local terrain and the inhabitants was used to advantage for the purpose of establishing jungle operational bases there. Another group under the command of a high ranking CT penetrated into the Sungei Siput area of Perak where old Emergency contacts were revived and CTs' relatives were utilised to provide the necessary support for the establishment of similar bases in the area.**

34. As the pace of CTO infiltration activity gained momentum, the value of such underground cadres as support elements to the CT guerilla groups became increasingly apparent. The need to despatch such cadres to South Thailand for training no longer existed as such training could now be provided by the CT groups already operating within Malaysian territory. However another batch was sent to South Thailand from Perlis in late 1970 to be trained for a different role, namely to recruit others and to carry out sabotage and assassination. The first assignment carried out by them was the attempted destruction of the railway bridge at Sungei Jarak in Province Wellesley on 7 March 1971. This is what two of those involved had to say after their arrest:

Case A

"In early December 1970, I was approached and encouraged to go to South Thailand to join the CTO by XXX He revealed that I was among the first batch of youths from X Village to undergo CTO training. Shortly afterwards XXX made arrangements for me and three others to be ferried to a CT camp We arrived at Sadao by road and were later taken through an estate road, arriving at a CT camp the same evening. On arrival, we were met by

an armed and uniformed CT. Having been formally introduced the CT provided us with jungle-green uniforms and also issued revolvers to three of us including myself

“After this, the CT introduced us to five other Malaysian youths who had arrived earlier. We all spent a night in the camp and the following evening the whole party left for the 8th Regiment Headquarters. After 14 hours’ march through rubber estates and jungle we finally reached the Headquarters where we were to receive our training.

“During our stay at the 8th Regiment Headquarters we were given training in:

- (i) Drill;
- (ii) Use of arms;
- (iii) Communist indoctrination; and
- (iv) Preparation of explosives and sabotage work.

“We were told that the CPM was expanding its armed units and that on completion of our training we would be sent back to our respective village to recruit other youths for similar CTO training.

Case B

“XXX told me on his return that after training local youths in the preparation of explosives in X New Village, he intended to blow up bridges so as to cause economic loss to the Government and also to lay land-mines on roads frequently used by military personnel Subsequently XXX informed me that it was not feasible for him to carry out such training as a local policeman had been making enquiries about their activities in the Village. XXX then stated that he would get rid of the policeman first but not in X Village area as this would cause hardship to local residents. XXX said he preferred to wait for the proper time to do it outside the Village area”

35. Arrangements were subsequently made for more recruits to join the CT infiltration groups, and the underground organisations played their part by providing the necessary manpower with the biggest contribution coming from the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF). Recruits of both sexes were drawn from various States for this purpose and precautions were taken to preserve the secrecy of the plan to move into the jungle. The scope of this recruitment effort can be assessed from the statement made by one of those responsible subsequent to his arrest:

“On 15 October 1970, I received a note from XXX requesting me to pick up XXX at the railway station on 16 October 1970.

“Accordingly on 16 October 1970, I picked up XXX and took him to my house. During his stay with me, XXX told me that five persons from other States had been selected by the Organisation to join the CTO

“On 20 October 1970 at about 1600 hours, after establishing initial contact with the CTs I came out and led the others in. After handing over the first batch of recruits, CT XXX asked me whether it was possible to arrange for another batch to join them within the next few days.

“On 21 October 1970 I wrote a letter to XXX stating that CT XXX had decided that another batch should be sent up on 28 October 1970. XXX and XXX from Kedah had been selected. He was to arrange for another four or five recruits.

“On 28 October 1970 after handing over the recruits to the CTs, I had a private discussion with CT XXX. I informed him that contact had been established with the CTs in Perak, and that we had sent in five recruits through that end CT XXX then told me that the number of recruits should be increased

“Towards the end of November 1970, I began to make the necessary arrangements in connection with the sending of the third batch of recruits

“On 17 December 1970 XXX and I went to the railway station At about 1730 hours, the north-bound train arrived, and XXX was seen alighting from the train followed by three females and two males No introduction was made, thus I do not know the names of the other members in his group

“Before I left, I instructed XXX to take them to the junction of X Road

“At about 2000 hours, both XXX and XXX arrived simultaneously bringing with them a total of thirteen recruits

“The latter told me that they lost contact with two other car-loads of recruits somewhere in X (place name). When the recruits had assembled, I then took them to CT XXX and informed him of what had happened. He replied that there was no point in waiting as the contact had been lost so far away and that when they turned up later, they should be told to return back. After CT XXX’s men had collected the recruits, I left them”

LOGISTICS

36. As a step towards obtaining sufficient supplies necessary to sustain an extended armed campaign, food reserves have been built up by these underground

elements for the CTO groups in the areas where the latter had established bases. Specific instructions on the methods to be used by members of the underground in the collection, storage and security of such supplies were issued, as revealed in a document captured in Kedah in May 1971 :

“Before carrying out such activities special attention should be paid to ensure that the prevailing situation allows us to do so. Under no circumstances must we expose out activities while trying to store as much foodstuffs as we can. This will cause more military pressure from the enemy and thereby adversely affected our development work in future. Three important factors should be taken into consideration while storing foodstuffs. Firstly, the foodstuffs should be fully secured. Secondly, they should be as general as possible. This means that they are available everywhere. Thirdly, they should be in good condition. This means that they will not get damaged easily. Careful study must be made as regards the members of the masses who are entrusted to store the foodstuffs. Particular attention should be paid to the methods of purchasing such foodstuffs, the type of containers to be used and the places where they are to be kept, etc. Efforts should also be made to store some foodstuffs in the jungle.

“With the exception of some essential commodities such as rice, oil, salt and sugar, we should also endeavour to store some tinned provisions like milk, wheat, sauce and beans, etc., if circumstances permit. In addition to those mentioned above, it is also advisable to store some cloth, plastic sheets, shoes and other necessities as well, but before doing this, we have to make a careful study of the ways and means of storing such things”.

37. There is abundant evidence to show that intensive efforts have been made to carry out this vital preparation for the armed struggle. The amount being stockpiled can be gauged from the statements of those who have been engaged in this activity. This is what an MNLF cadre has to say:

“In late September 1970, XXX told me that XXX would convey some supplies to the CTs in his three-tonner lorry, and before he undertook the mission, I was to reconnoitre the route to X Estate so as to make sure that the Security Forces were not around the area

“When the lorry arrived at the rendezvous I saw some twenty uniformed CTs. They came out from the jungle nearby, and immediately set to unload the lorry. The supplies were carried into the jungle and I had no idea where they were deposited

“Some time in November 1970 XXX conveyed another lorry-load of supplies to the CTs with his three-tonner lorry. My task was the same as in the first occasion, that was to reconnoitre the route to be taken by the lorry. The supplies were unloaded by some twenty uniformed and armed CTs at the jungle fringe at X Estate

“Some time in the beginning of December 1970, I went to see XXX to borrow his lorry, On the appointed day, the foodstuffs were conveyed to the CTs by the lorry driven by XXX

“During one of the food lifts, CT XXX told me to secure a contract in X Estate. This would enable him to find someone to work there who could at the same time serve as a food supplier to the CTs.”

and again, from the statement of one of a group of underground cadres similarly involved in another penetrated area:

“It was during my second contact with CTs in the X area of Grik that I and two other rubber tappers were instructed by the CTs to organise a cell Its main purpose was to purchase food supplies and obtain intelligence on SF movements in the area for the CTs. We were given instructions to purchase and store up food supplies such as rice, tinned provisions, milk, sugar, salt, coffee powder, etc.

“Some time in January 1970, during my third contact with CTs I was told by them to bring the supplies. I contacted members of my group and informed them of the CTs’ request. The same day the supplies were brought to my estate by them for the CTs

“The CTs instructed us to recruit more members into the cell to assist them in obtaining more food supplies

“My fourth contact with the CTs was in April/May 1970. They enquired about my progress made in regard to recruiting more members. I told them that I was successful in recruiting more new members and that they should be bringing supplies soon. Shortly afterwards seven members came with the expected supplies

“I contacted and supplied the CTs with bulk quantities of foodstuffs purchased by my cell members on two further occasions.”

38. The activities of the two groups in creating food dumps are good examples of what the Communist underground is capable of providing to the CTO by way of logistic support.

UNPENETRATED TARGET AREAS

39. In areas selected but yet unpenetrated by CT infiltration groups, there is evidence of underground organisations having made preparations for the anticipated return of the CTO. Cadres have been sent into secret jungle hideouts to undergo training for their armed struggle roles and instructions have gone out for the establishment of food dumps. Recruitment for the CTO has been initiated and, as indicated in an earlier part of this Paper, some of those selected have already been despatched to join CT groups that have established themselves in certain "black" areas in other States. Given below are relevant extracts of a secret directive issued by the central figure of the MNLF organisation in a certain State to one of his subordinates:

"The situation now is very favourable. The armed struggle led by the Party is progressing by leaps and bounds quietly. It has reached Chemor area of Central Malaya by the first leap and has eliminated a number of enemy troops. The areas from Chemor to X (place name) were once the Party's 'red areas' and also the LPM's strongholds. The 10th Regiment warriors will soon appear in X (area name). Comrades, let us all be prepared and resolutely carry out the organisation's directions and positively accomplish the mission with concrete action. Let us welcome with concrete action the arrival of our Party's Army with victory!"

"For future recruits, first of all you must find out their condition After study, the organisation will decide XXX's job of stock-piling foodstuffs should be positively carried out. In addition some of XXX's associates in X (place name) will also accept the duty of stock-piling foodstuffs. You and XXX should thoroughly understand this and carry it out wherever practical!"

THE UNITED FRONT IN RETROSPECT

PRESENT POSITION

40. Open United Front activity which has been continuously crippled by Government action, has now been downgraded in the CPM's present order of priorities. The LPM and the Communist-penetrated branches of the Partai Rakyat Malaya (PRM)—now known as the Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (PSRM)—as the leading components of the United Front have been allowed to wither. The labour field has been

relatively inactive, whilst the student front as a whole has had little to show for its reputation as the traditional hot-bed of open militant Communist activity.

41. This toning down of open activities is in conformity with current CPM policy. In this context, the substance of a recent secret directive outlining the measures to be taken to harness the support of both the urban and rural masses is pertinent:

“In the development of masses work, attention should be paid to the two different types of masses: i.e. the masses who live in rubber estates, villages and along the hillside and the masses who live in towns and out-stations. The former can be contacted directly or through masses executives but in the case of the latter, contacts have to be made indirectly. If the former become prominent, we can take action to evacuate them and they, on their part can also camouflage their activities. It is not so safe in the case of the latter as once they are exposed, they may easily fall into the hands of the enemy. In view of the above, when making contacts with the latter, it should not only be secretive but also not complex so that they will not suffer losses and will be able to lie low for a long time. To contact them by means of the underground method is considered the best for this type of masses.

“Continue to find out the connections of revolutionary masses in other places through the local masses Establish direct contact with them and assign them duties.”

POLITICAL FRONT

42. The LPM and PRM cadres have complied with the change in emphasis in CPM policy to underground activity. Out of over 300 Communist-penetrated LPM and PRM branches that used to spearhead open United Front activity, only a few are still functioning and even these, barely so. Their cadres now constitute the backbone of the Communist underground support. They have been found in the ranks of virtually all the underground organisations that have taken root since the CPM's call for preparations to be made for the armed struggle, and many of them have surfaced as leading lights of these bodies, notably the MNLF, which are dedicated to the achievement of Communist rule by force of arms.

43. Two Central Committee members of the MNLF were LPM cadres and four others were from the PRM, whilst other former members of these two political

parties have been identified amongst lower rung MNLF members, many of whom have since been arrested. In addition, an undetermined number have crossed over to South Thailand for guerilla training under the CTO. The degree to which these former United Front cadres are now involved with the CTO can be gauged from what a member of one particular LPM branch had to say after his arrest:

“In mid 1969 XXX contacted me on two or three occasions on behalf of the Organisation and CT XXX, to ascertain how I was faring in my underground activities. From my conversation with him, I learnt that the following LPM members/officials from the X and X Branches had joined the CTO—

(List of thirteen names)”

and from the statement of a member of yet another LPM Branch who was similarly involved:

“In mid 1969, XXX told me that the following persons would be joining the CTO in X (place name) in two batches to receive military training. They would be returning to Kedah after completing their training.

First Batch

(List of five names)

Second Batch

(List of three names)

“Before XXX himself left to join the CTO in late 1969, he also revealed to me that the following persons had also joined the CTO earlier:

(List of three names).”

44. All the recruits listed above were either members or officials of various LPM Branches in Kedah.

45. Some of them have, as already mentioned earlier on, returned as members of CT infiltration groups and proof of this has been furnished in the identification of two of the seven CTs killed in Kulim area on 15 May, 1971. One was the former Vice-Chairman of the LPM Serdang Branch in Kedah and he was, significantly, the leader of this CT group. The other turned out to be a former LPM member from Kota Tinggi in Johore who went underground before he joined the CTO.

46. It is no coincidence therefore that the areas already penetrated by CT infiltration groups were not only former "black" areas of Emergency notoriety, but also previous strongholds of pro-Communist LPM or PRM influence. The Kulim, Sungei Siput, and Chemor areas are clear examples of this trend, and this can be expected to be the pattern of CT infiltration activity in other areas.

LABOUR FRONT

47. Underground activity in the labour field has been geared over the last three years to organising a worker-peasant alliance that will constitute the mass support base for the armed struggle. The principles by which the labour movement is guided in the conduct of such activities have been laid down in a CPM directive which states:

"It should be affirmed that fundamentally it is only with the proletariat as the leader and the worker-peasant alliance as the basis that it is possible to achieve revolutionary victory"

"All organisations should pay attention to the peasant problem and make every effort to assign cadres to launch the peasant movement"

"All efforts by us are aimed at expanding the revolution and defeating the enemy The work includes stepping up the training of cadres assign cadres to activate the workers, peasants and students, control or set up masses organisations of workers, peasants and students, unite the broad masses, seize the opportune time to lead the masses in waging struggles"

48. Implementation of the CPM's directive has since been demonstrated in the establishment of a number of underground organisations catering for both rural and urban labour. It must however be borne in mind that the bulk of the United Front cadres engaged in labour and trade union activities were in fact more active on the political front.

49. Re-alignment of the labour front towards underground activity has consequently been less spectacular in impact than the political one, but it has nevertheless progressed and there is no doubt that it is a

co-ordinated move, as the following statement made by a cadre involved reveals:

“During the second visit of XXX to X Rubber Estate, he directed me to go to X (place name) in order to undertake certain underground activities there”

“On 1 February, 1970, as instructed, I went to X (place name) to meet XXX’s friend from northern Malaya who was to assist us in this purpose. I was accordingly introduced to this individual, and was told that he would be my directing figure in the promotion of underground activities in X area. The first task he gave me was to contact and recruit my former colleagues working in X Factory in X (place name) who had been active in the LPM”

50. Another labour movement cadre who switched over to underground activity and became a leading member of an urban-based secret organisation states:

“After de-registration of the National Union of Employees in the Printing Industry by the Government, XXX approached me to join a secret underground organisation known as the Front Revolusi Malaya”

The Front was formed some time in July 1970. Its main object was to establish contact with the CPM at the Malaysian-Thai border to receive its leadership and guidance in order to organise and unite the working masses in this country with the ultimate aim of bringing about the downfall of the reactionary Alliance Government by armed struggle”

STUDENT FRONT

51. Student involvement in the underground (as opposed to open student activity) has been more evident. The value of student support has never been lost upon the CPM and the Party has invariably laid stress on the vital need to channel the highly impulsive energies of students into the mainstream of Communist activity at every stage of the latter’s development. The appeal that things revolutionary hold for the would-be student social reformist has always been exploited to the full by the Communists in most countries. In the context of the present local situation, **the CPM has already set in motion the machinery to bring the student element within the purview of its armed struggle plans. The role that students are intended to play has already**

been defined in the CPM policy directive issued in August 1969, a full version of which is as follows:

“The thought of the young students is being gradually revolutionised. Intensify students’ activities in the middle schools and universities of the various races; educate them with the thought of Mao Tse Tung and the factual livelihood; help them to accept the revolutionary truth and to join forces with the workers and peasants; bring them in line with the fulfilment of the revolution to participate in the struggle against the enemy and embark on the road of the revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party”.

52. This CPM directive found faithful reflection in the instruction issued by the MNLF in June 1970 which is reproduced in more detail below :

“The student movement is part and parcel of the revolutionary movement, and the young students are also one of the sources from where the cadres derive. At present, the thought of the young students is being gradually revolutionised. It is therefore essential to strengthen students’ activities in secondary schools and universities; to educate them with the Thought of Mao Tse Tung and the realities of life; to help them in accepting the truth; to combine with the workers, peasants and revolutionary practice and to encourage them to take part in the struggle against the enemy and follow the road of armed revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party.”

53. It is clear that this policy is being implemented. **Numerous student underground organisations have been set up in various parts of the country and there is irrefutable evidence of central direction to ensure co-ordination of their revolutionary activities.** This is what a leading member of an underground student organisation known as the Malayan Communist Youth League (MCYL) had to say after his arrest:

“Some time in late December 1969, I was informed by XXX . . . that the Organisation had decided to send me to X State to assist the organisational work there. This was in accordance with the Organisation’s policy to safeguard/protect those ‘red’ cadres by transferring them to safe areas. Those under hot pursuit and who could not work independently, would be transferred to the Armed Unit; however, those who had the ability to work independently would remain in ‘enemy controlled territory’ to carry out masses work in safe areas.

"I was given the following 4 main tasks to carry out in X State:

- (i) to consolidate left-wing unity in X area;
- (ii) To recruit members into a revolutionary organisation to be formed at a later date;
- (iii) To carry out propaganda work and to educate the masses on the correct line of struggle as advocated by the Communist Party of Malaya; and
- (iv) To uplift the revolutionary spirit of the comrades by propagating to them the glorious achievements of the Malayan National Liberation Army."

54. Another student cadre arrested on 23 April 1971 whilst in the act of putting up CPM propaganda posters revealed how he was attracted to and eventually drawn into the activities of another underground student organisation which calls itself the All Penang Revolutionary Students' Union (APRSU). He states:

"After getting to know XXX (*Note: a leading member of the APRSU*) during a picnic in November 1970, he started to visit me some time in February 1971 From then onwards, he came to my house to give me tuition in mathematics at least 2 or 3 times a week In between tuition periods, he would introduce political subjects for discussion and told me that the Malaysian Government was not fair and there was massive unemployment. He also said that the rich minority suppressed and exploited the working class majority whose livelihood was always very difficult. He especially criticised the increase in taxes and the rising cost of living. In contrast, he pointed out that the people in China were living a good life and everybody had employment and was treated equally. He also said that education in China was free up to University level. In his explanation he attributed all these to the good of Communism and stressed that everyone must contribute a part to bring about a Socialist Republic in our country under which there would be no exploitation and suppression, and everybody would be given employment and treated equally."

55. Another student cadre who succumbed to the same process of Communist indoctrination relates:

"One day, some time in August/September 1970, XXX instructed me to go to his room at X Road As directed, I went to his room on the appointed day. He confided that because I had shown progress in Hsueh Hsih (Communist indoctrination) in understanding the various aspects of revolutionary struggle, I had been accepted as a trusted member of a secret organisation which he named as the All Penang

Revolutionary Students' Union. He explained that the aim of the Union was to unite and conserve the revolutionary spirit and strength of all progressive students in Penang for the ultimate object of over-throwing the bogus Government of Malaya to achieve national liberation One night in January 1970 he confided that there was another organisation which was encouraging young revolutionaries to support the Communist cause. He named the organisation as the Malayan Communist Youth League ”

56. The diversity of student involvement in multifarious aspects of Communist underground activity will be apparent from what two other students, one who had been expelled from Nanyang University and the other a graduate of the same University, had to say. The former who was involved much earlier admits :

“In March/April 1967, on my advice and manipulation, the PRM X Branch Committee held a Committee meeting and a resolution was passed to oust XXX from the Branch My object in having XXX ousted from the Branch was to re-organise the Party's activities in order to cultivate a batch of real revolutionary cadres and to send them to various places in X (State name) to unite the revolutionary forces in the State.”

57. The latter, a leading member of the MNLF, was involved in the spate of propaganda activities undertaken by the organisation in April 1970 when there was a rash of flag-hoisting, pamphleteering and booby-trapping incidents. He reveals :

“In the beginning of February 1970, I was officially informed that I had been made a District Committee (member) in the organisation known as the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF) Its objectives are as follows—

- (i) To apply Mao's Thought to the local practical situation;
- (ii) To embark on the path of armed struggle of 'encircling the cities from the countryside'; and
- (iii) To make preparations within 'enemy occupied areas' for eventual armed struggle.”

CONCLUSION

58. Developments in the three years since the CPM declared its intention to revive the armed struggle have revealed that the Party has managed to achieve some degree of progress in attaining the preliminary requirements of this objective.

59. Certain areas well inside Malaysian territory have been penetrated by CT elements and this was made possible by the willing support of a few who sympathise with the Communist cause, and through Communist exploitation of the personal, religious or family sentiments of those susceptible to such influences.

60. The resultant situation must be viewed with some concern but certainly not with alarm. It is partly with this in mind that Government has decided to issue this Paper in order to provide the public with a clear and correct picture of the situation rather than allow rumour and speculation to distort it to the advantage of the Communists.

61. The main purpose of this Paper is to expose the insidious tactics being used by the Communist Party of Malaya to advance its armed insurgency plans, so that the people will be better able to recognize them and thus be in a position to act with greater effectiveness together with Government against the enemy.



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Commentary – RCB Nature of Service as Warlike

There is a long running dispute between the RCBRG and the Defence Department on the rightful categorisation of RCB's service in Malaysia 1970 – 1989 to protect the RAAF assets at Air Base Butterworth (ABB) during the Communist Insurgency (1969-1989). Defence records this service as peacetime service while the RCB troops seeks to prove it is warlike service.

For over 16 years an RCB review group of veterans (RCBRG) have challenged both the truth of Defence's decision and the procedural unfairness of its complaints process with evidence from a huge number of documented sources including declassified 211 secret and 18 top secret documents many obtained from Freedom Of Information requests.

In this article I examine the criteria for warlike service to test Defence's decision not to classify RCB service as warlike. I come to this matter with personal knowledge and experience as:

- Commanding Officer 8/9 RAR in 1975–1976 where in that time the Battalion deployed two companies to Air Base Butterworth (ABB);
- Platoon Commander with 1 RAR 1960 during the Malayan Emergency;
- Company Commander with 9 RAR 1968-1969 in Vietnam;
- Instructor in Tactics at the Jungle Training Centre 1971-1973 specialising in Counter Revolutionary Warfare; and
- A practical researcher and analyst of discovered documents related to the RAAF's role and presence at ABB, the role, deployment and operations of RCB, and Malaysia's Communist Insurgency.

In this examination we must start with **Defence's definitions for the nature of service classifications** that expresses the extent to which ADF personnel deployed on an ADF operation, or on a third country deployment, in a specified area and within a specified timeframe, are exposed to the risk of harm from hostile forces as a consequence of executing the approved mission and tasks.

A warlike operation is an Australian Government authorised military operation where ADF personnel are exposed to the risk of harm from hostile forces that have been assessed by Defence as having the capability and an identified intent to directly target ADF personnel. ADF personnel are authorised to use force to pursue specific military objectives and there is an expectation of ADF casualties as a result.

A peacetime classification acknowledges that an element of hazard and risk is inherent to ADF service and that personnel are appropriately trained and compensated for their specific military occupation. Service on *peacetime* operations is not the same as serving overseas on a posting or short-term duty.

A *peacetime* operation is an Australian Government authorised military operation or activity that does not expose ADF personnel to a Defence-assessed threat from *hostile forces*. Therefore, there is no expectation of casualties as a result of engagement with hostile forces. There may be an increased risk of harm from

environmental factors consistent with the expectation that ADF personnel will from time to time perform hazardous duties.

A non-warlike operation is an Australian Government authorised military operation which exposes ADF personnel to the risk of *harm* from designated forces or groups that have been assessed by Defence as having the capability to employ violence to achieve their objectives, but there is no specific threat or assessed intent to target ADF personnel. The use of force by ADF personnel is limited to self-defence and there is no expectation of ADF casualties as a result of engagement of those designated forces or groups.

Justice Clarke in his 2002 Report to Government Chapter 14 said: “In determining the nature of service for an approved operation, the Department of Defence uses three primary factors: the mission, the rules of engagement and the threat to ADF personnel.”

An examination of these three primary factors reveals the following:

1. ***The Mission.*** *“Warlike operations are those military activities where the application of force is required to pursue specific military objectives, such as a declared war, conventional combat operations against an armed adversary and peace enforcement operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents.....”*

In 2001 the Government accepted this RCB mission in awarding the ASM to RCB and RAAF troops: ***“In 1970, the Rifle Company Butterworth (RCB) was raised to provide a quick reaction force (QRF) to meet the communist terrorist threat and provide internal security and protection for Australian assets within the perimeter of Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth.”***

The RCB deployment was a conventional combat operation : the defence of the RAAF assets in a Shared Defence Plan with the RMAF within ABB. Specifically, RCB’s primary role, was a QRF to defend against an enemy attack. Inherent in the RCB’s mission was to maintain an Australian presence in Malaysia for sensitive strategic and diplomatic reasons and with its combat sized force to be a deterrent to the enemy’s action.

Defence is a phase of war where a military force deploys to a specific defensive/protective/security mission. Elements of that force deploy into ‘front-line’ positions while others are designated as a reserve force for counter penetration and counter attack roles to stop penetration into the defended area and/or to counter attack to repel, kill and/or capture the enemy. At ABB the RCB QRF was the equivalent: it was NOT a front-line deployment for sentry duties.

1. ***“The Rules of Engagement authorise the application of, and limitations on, the use of lethal force to achieve an assigned mission. In warlike operations, the application of lethal force is authorised, within defined parameters, to achieve the mission. In non-warlike operations, the application of force is limited to self-defence”.***


Defence seems to have ignored the fact that the RCB troops were not sentries but a QRF deployed for offensive reaction to an enemy attack. At AAB the Shared Defence Plan had the MAF providing for perimeter defence with sentries and both the MAF and the RAAF providing patrols inside their own dedicated areas within the Base. The QRF would be deployed to action as ordered by the Ground Defence

Operations Centre as necessary to stop penetration into the Base area and to counter attack to repel, kill and/or capture the enemy: at that point the QRF's ROE/OFOF became lethal. This is provable from recorded documents.



1. ***The Threat to ADF Personnel.*** *“The level of threat is implicit in the definitions of warlike and non-warlike service. In warlike operations there is an expectation of casualties, whereas in non-warlike operations casualties could occur but are not expected”.*

In 2001 the Government had accepted this threat ***“The communist terrorist threat was proven to be real with recorded clashes on a number of occasions within its borders until Chin Peng the Communist Leader, signed a peace accord in Dec 89”.***



The threat from communist insurgents' actions were as reported in various intelligence reports from various sources such as: Secret: The Australian JIO Secret Report No 13/75 dated 1 October 1975 – The Security of Air Base Butterworth, and Secret: Butterworth Security Report to the Minister from AVM N.P. McNamara Deputy Chief of Air Staff dated 14 October 1975. There are numerous references to the insurgents regarding who, how many, where, their capacity, tactics, indirect weapons, confirmed attacks and other activities that constituted a warlike threat to ABB. Attacks did occur on other Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) bases in Sungai Besi on 31 Mar 74 and at Kuala Lumpur in 1975.

Pre-deployment, the RCB troops were fully briefed on their combat role, the enemy threat and the expectation of combat casualties. All troops were required to be DP1 status (ready for combat in war) before deployment: the same requirement as for Vietnam service.

A vital principle to be recognised in any consideration of warlike service is [The Incurred Danger Test – Justice Mohr Report](#). He reports:

“In essence, Section 7A of the VEA 1986 requires that a veteran must have ‘incurred danger from hostile forces of an enemy’ before such service becomes ‘qualifying service’ for the ‘service pension’.

On the assumption that we are dealing with rational people in a disciplined armed service (i.e. both the person perceiving danger and those in authority at the time), then if a serviceman is told there is an enemy and that he will be in danger, then that member will not only perceive danger, but to him or her it will be an objective danger on rational and reasonable grounds. If called upon, the member will face that

objective danger. The member's experience of the objective danger at the time will not be removed by 'hindsight' showing that no actual enemy operations eventuated".

RCB's deterrence was successful with no insurgent attacks. However, during their deployment there were a number of real 'Amber' (defence situation imminent) alerts activating the Ground Defence Operations Centre to deploy the RCB's QRF.

I trust that this article will help you understand the RCB's claim for warlike service. I believe there is sufficient evidence to have RCB's service reclassified as warlike.

For more information and support please visit the RCBRG website [here](#)

Duty First

Ted Chitham

Ted Chitham

Lt Col E.A. Chitham MC OAM (retd)

25th March 2022