

Document ID: 072122b9b9bdfaaac043d7a939fba9dd42fcb5f8

16 May, 2022

Signed On : <https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au>

Submission to Inquiry - CPL Mark Terry Stewart

Part 1 – Name of Inquiry

Name of Inquiry *

Review of service Rifle Company Butterworth

Part 2 – About the Submitter

Title or Rank *

CPL

Surname *

Stewart

Given Names *

Mark Terry

Postal Address *

[REDACTED]

Email Address: *

[REDACTED]

Primary Contact Number *

[REDACTED]

Secondary Contact Number

Is the Submission on behalf of an organisation? If yes, please provide details:

I have submitted stat dec's to the fact that we were told by the battalion commanders at the time that we were going on war service. We trained for a full month on tactics before being deployed. On my first deployment we went to a fortified camp outside Alor Setar Oct 1978, for a month we worked beside the Malaysians. Then we took over from B Coy 6 RAR on 30th Nov to relieved in Feb 1979. I also did another deployment in Jun 1985 to Sept 1985. Training was only archived at Paladua the Malaysian Army Jungle warfare centre.

Part 3 – Desired outcome

Provide a summary of your submission:

There was only live ammunition used at RCB on our call out we usually consisted of two to three a day. We had know idea if the call out was live or not, once we alighted the QRF truck at the allotted position we went straight to action.

Part 4 - Your submission and Supporting Documentation

File Attached:

Part 5 – Consent and declaration

I consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal making my submission publicly available.

✓ I also consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal:

- using information contained in my submission to conduct research;
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation considered by the Tribunal to be appropriate; and
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation the subject of adverse comment in the submission;
- using content in my submission in its report to Government.

The Tribunal will decide which person or organisation is appropriate, and this may include:

1. persons or organisations required to assist with the inquiry; and
2. persons or organisations with an interest in the inquiry.

✓ I declare that the information I have provided is correct.

Name

Mark Stewart

Date

16/05/2022 /


CPL Mark Terry Stewart
(Awaiting Signature)

Signature Certificate

Document name: Submission to Inquiry - CPL Mark Terry Stewart



contracts.



From: [Mark Stewart](#)
To: [DHA Tribunal](#)
Subject: RE: Reminder: Submission to Inquiry - CPL Mark Terry Stewart is awaiting your signature [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Date: Thursday, 2 June 2022 12:07:54 PM
Attachments: [19750801 Malaysia - The Threat to Air Base Butterworth\[314\].pdf](#)
[image003.png](#)
[image004.png](#)
[image005.png](#)

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Companies were always told by the Battalion Commanders before going that we were going on war service. All companies were of full strength with extra medics and machine guns, specially with tripods and C2 sights. Any ammunition left over towards the end of the deployment was expended. Every company was freshly supplied at the beginning of the deployment. After 1989 I am not aware of. Also not all VP Vital points or KP Key point were on the base sometimes we would have to wait for the duty officer and his Malaysian counterpart to open gates so we could clear points outside the wire, especially the eastern side.

Mark Stewart

I can't find my statements, but will attach a couple of other items that I have come across. I served under Major Peter James 1978/79 in the first tour and Major Smith on my second tour 1985

Sent from [Mail](#) for Windows

From: [DHA Tribunal](#)
Sent: Thursday, 2 June 2022 11:38 AM
To: [Mark Stewart](#)
Cc: [DHA Tribunal](#)
Subject: RE: Reminder: Submission to Inquiry - CPL Mark Terry Stewart is awaiting your signature [SEC=OFFICIAL]

OFFICIAL

Hi Mark

I have received your unsigned submission, and understand you are having difficulties using the online signature tool. I will use it to register your submission reading 'I have submitted stat dec's to the fact that we were told by the battalion commanders at the time that we were going on war service. We trained for a full month on tactics before being deployed. On my first deployment we went to a fortified camp outside Alor Setar Oct 1978, for a month we worked beside the Malaysians. Then we took over from B Coy 6 RAR on 30th Nov to relieved in Feb 1979. I also did another deployment in Jun 1985 to Sept 1985. Training was only archived at Paladua the Malaysian Army Jungle warfare centre. There was only live ammunition used at RCB on our call out we usually consisted of two to three a day. We had know idea if the call out was live or not, once we alighted the QRF truck at the allotted position we went straight to action.'

Do you want to attach copies of the Stat Dec's referred to in your statement to your written submission? I am happy to receive these by reply email and attach these to your submission for you.

The Tribunal does not need to be provided any of your records from DVA.

Tammy Hayes
Assistant Executive Officer

Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal

02 62661019

Locked Bag 7765

CANBERRA BC ACT 2610

tammy.hayes@defence.gov.au | dha.tribunal@defence.gov.au | <https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au>



IMPORTANT: This email remains the property of the Department of Defence. Unauthorised communication and dealing with the information in the email may be a serious criminal offence. If you have received this email in error, you are requested to contact the sender and delete the email immediately.

From: Mark Stewart [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, 18 May 2022 5:42 AM

To: DHA Tribunal <dha.tribunal@defence.gov.au>

Subject: RE: Reminder: Submission to Inquiry - CPL Mark Terry Stewart is awaiting your signature

⚠ EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe. **⚠**

I am on disability support pension and have no provisions for doing what you ask. I am in pain everyday and live alone. If you need confirmation ask DVA I am a Gold Card holder not a TPI person. I submitted two certified stat Dec's to my advocate to send to the department. My DVA identify is QSM 10115. I give you permission to obtain those documents.

Mark Stewart QSM
10115



Sent from [Mail](#) for Windows


From: [Defence Defence Honours Tribunal](#)

Sent: Tuesday, 17 May 2022 3:45 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: Reminder: Submission to Inquiry - CPL Mark Terry Stewart is awaiting your signature

Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal



Defence Defence Honours Tribunal has requested your signature

Document Name: Submission to Inquiry - CPL Mark Terry Stewart

Document ID: (072122b9b9bdfaacc043d7a939fba9dd42fcb5f8)

From: Defence Defence Honours Tribunal (DHA.Tribunal@defence.gov.au)

Hi CPL Mark Terry Stewart,

Defence Defence Honours Tribunal sent you a document that needs to be signed.

Please add your signature to the document below. - [Got a Question?](#)



Warning: Do not forward this email to others or else they will have access to your document (on your behalf).



This message was sent to you by Defence Defence Honours Tribunal who is using the [WP E-Signature Document Signing WordPress plugin](#). If you would rather not receive email from this sender you may contact the sender with your request.

WP E-Signature



copy for DAFI SRGD

MALAYSIA

SH

THE THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

DESCRIPTION OF THE BASE

General

1. Air Base Butterworth is a Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) base that is jointly used by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). It occupies an area of about 4530 hectares in the Province of Wellesley on the north-west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, eight kilometres north of Butterworth town (on both sides of the main north-south road) and about 65 kilometres from the Betong Salient section of the Thai/Malaysian border. The Base has a major all-weather airfield capable of supporting sustained bomber and fighter operations. The runway is 2440 metres by 46 metres and has asphalt overruns of 137 metres on the northern end and 158 metres on the southern end.

2. A wide range of installations, including air-defence centre, radar and navigational aids, fuel and ammunition storage, and a Matra missile preparation bay are on or near the Base. Functional elements on the Base include:

- a. Headquarters RAAF Butterworth.
- b. Headquarters RMAF Butterworth.
- c. Base Squadron RAAF Butterworth.
- d. Technical Wing RMAF Butterworth.
- e. No 472 (Maintenance) Squadron RAAF.
- f. No 7 Squadron RAAF.
- g. No 75 Squadron RAAF.
- h. No 11 Squadron RMAF.
- i. No 3 Squadron RMAF.

- j. Transport Support Flight RAAF.
- k. No 4 RAAF Hospital.
- l. Special Security Policy (SSP) of 26 Company Malaysian Military Police.
- m. No 1 Air Defence Centre RAAF.
- n. Headquarters Integrated Air Defence System (Five-Power Defence Arrangements).

Under Operational control

No 65 Ground Liaison Section Australian Regular Army (ARA) and an ARA Infantry Company are attached to the Base.

3. Aircraft based at Butterworth include:

a.	<u>RAAF</u>	<u>Aircraft Type</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Total</u>
	No 3 Squadron	Mirage III	All-weather Fighter	18	
	No 75 Squadron	Mirage III	Fighter	18	36
	Transport	Dakota C-47	Transport	6	6
		Iroquois UH-1B	AR	2	2
				Total	44

b.	<u>RMAF</u>	<u>Aircraft Type</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Total</u>
	No 11 Squadron	Sepru F-35	fighter	16	16
		Tebuan F-41	Fighter/ Ground- attack	3	3
	No 7 Squadron	Alouette III	Helicopter	10	10
	No 12 Squadron	F-53 (Tiger II)	Air Defence/ Ground- attack	16	16
				Total	45

Personnel

4. 1360 RAAF personnel are employed at the Base. Of these, 900 live in Pinang with their families, 250 live on the Base with their families, and the remaining 230 live in. Total dependants are 2837, of whom 2237 live in Pinang and 600 live on the Base. The ARA Company attached to the Base comprises 123 personnel.

5. The RAAF also employs about 1400 locally employed civilians (LEC).

6. The Malaysian service-personnel strength living on the Base is 386, comprising 610 RMAF, 126 SSP, and 150 Royal Malaysian Navy personnel who are employed at the Butterworth dockyard.

Security Measures to Protect Base

7. To support the operational function of Air Base Butterworth in addition to aircraft and personnel there are considerable installations and equipment located in areas that have been designated Vital Points (VP) for defence in an ASEAN/Malaysia shared Defence Plan for the protection of the Base in an emergency. Broadly speaking the Officer Commanding RMAF has overall responsibility for the protection of the Base throughout each 24-hour period, and the Officer Commanding RAAF is responsible for the point defence of RAAF aircraft and operational facilities and the protection of RAAF families.

8. To assist the OC RMAF an ARA Infantry Company is permanently available at Butterworth as a quick-reaction force. The Company is usually rotated by airlift, at three-monthly intervals, direct from Australia. It is available as a quick-reaction force, but it may be engaged in local training from

/time to time.

*but carries live ammo
+ ROE if contacted by
belligerents*

SECRET

263

time to time. The Company is not permitted to operate outside the base perimeter. Other support is provided by RAAF defence flights made up of RAAF non-specialist ground-defence personnel. Static defences comprise a single two-metre perimeter fence with barbed-wire overhang, and lighting of most Vital Points.

Present Base Security Arrangements

9. The Royal Malaysian Military Police, 26 Company, Special Security Police (SSP), is responsible for the security of the Base, including control of entry, the vetting of locally employed civilians, the guarding on a 24-hour basis of eight Vital Points, and the patrolling of the others at irregular intervals throughout the period. It maintains a quick-reaction force of section strength (about 10 men).

10. The RAAF Mirage flight lines are not guarded during working hours, when they are under normal surveillance by RAAF personnel; outside these hours they are floodlit and guarded by pairs of armed RAF security guards with two dogs. RAF Service Police carry out patrols in radio-equipped vehicles at irregular intervals every night, and during the patrol they check the security of Vital Points. They make reports to the Duty Security Controller located in the RAF guardroom.

11. The ARA Company assists with the protection of RAAF personnel, property, and shared facilities within the Base. It provides a section (normally 10 men) as a quick-reaction force from 1300 to 0600 hours daily.

SECRET

External Security Arrangements

The security of Penang, Province Wellesley and the states of Kedah and Perlis is the responsibility of 6 Malaysian Infantry Brigade (MIB) stationed at Sungei Pattani. The Brigade's units are stationed at Penang, Sungei Pattani and Alor Star and the Brigade is continuously committed to anti terrorist operations within its area of responsibility (see map opposite page). No security posts are permanently manned by the Security Forces in the area immediately surrounding Butterworth and there are no artillery units in the area. There is no known Security Force's contingency plan for the reinforcement of the Base, but, on the request of the OC RMAF Butterworth to 6 MIB, troops would be deployed from Penang or Sungei Pattani. This has been done once during 1975 but its effectiveness depends upon the immediate availability of troops who may be involved in other operations. Arrangements may be made for the area surrounding the Base to be patrolled if a VIP is visiting or the authorities believe the Base is about to be attacked. |||

Families Protection Plan

Under customary international law the Malaysian Government has a duty to protect all persons in Malaysia; however, under the provisions of the Australian/Malaysian Defence Accord, Commonwealth forces have the right to take additional measures for the protection of dependants of Service members and families of employees of Australian Government Departments attached to the RMAF, including visitors resident with those families.

SECRET

There is always a risk of racial communal disturbances that could affect families resident in Base married quarters, housing estates, and hirings in Butterworth and Penang. Because of this a Families Protection Plan has been instituted to ensure the protection of service personnel and dependants, including visitors of dependants resident with families, in the Butterworth/Penang area.

The OC RAAF Butterworth has delegated to the CO Base Squadron the responsibility of the Families Protection Plan. The Assistant Provost Marshal (APM) has been delegated the responsibility for implementing the operational aspects of the Plan. To facilitate the functioning of the Plan the APM maintains two control centres that direct a network of wardens within zoned areas of Butterworth and Penang. All zones and the control centres maintain continuous radio contact. In an emergency families would be directed to guarded safe areas.

THE EXTERNAL THREAT TO MALAYSIA

We believe that it is unlikely that any external overt military threat against Malaysia will arise in the foreseeable future.

THE THREAT FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA

Capability

There is a potential threat to the Butterworth Base from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and its military arm which is generally referred to as the Communist Terrorist

SECRET

Organization (CTO). The CTO controls areas along the Thai-Malaysian border and has been developing a widespread infrastructure throughout Peninsular Malaysia. It is the proximity of Butterworth to the CTO base areas on the Thai-Malaysian border that could render it an attractive target to the CTO. CTO units find it easier to attack targets and evade Government follow-up forces in northern Malaysia than to mount operations against installations further south into Peninsular Malaysia. Most members of the CPM are Chinese but there is a large minority of Thai Muslim and Malay members, mainly concentrated in the border area of the east coast. In June 1975, official figures of the Thai Malaysian Border Committee indicated that there were 2,054 Communist Terrorists operating in areas near or adjacent to Malaysia's border with Thailand. This increases by about 400 the previous official figure and reflects success in recruiting by the CTO during the past few years.

Since October 1974, the CP has been publicly split into three factions; the CPM (Central Committee), the CPM (Marxist-Leninist) and the CPM (Revolutionary Faction). There are several possible causes for the split but, although there are no signs of an early reconciliation between the factions, it has resulted in little interfactional fighting and seems to have encouraged the factions to compete with each other for successes against the Security Forces. There are four regiments and two assault units in the CTO and their division into factions is as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Allegiance</u>
5th CTO Regiment	113	Central Committee
8th CTO Regiment	250	Revolutionary Faction
10th CTO Regiment	500+	Central Committee
12th CTO Regiment (less 2nd District)	700+	Central Committee
2nd District, 12th CTO Regiment	150	Marxist-Leninist

SECRET

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Allegiance</u>
6th Assault Unit	37	Central Committee
8th Assault Unit	63	Central Committee

A map showing the locations of these units is opposite Page ().

The CTO is supported by several front organizations in southern Thailand and Peninsular Malaysia. The Central Committee Faction enjoys the support of the two largest organizations, the Malayan Communist Youth League (MCYL) and the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MCYL is based in southern Thailand and has between 3,000 and 6,000 members. It is particularly active in the Betong Salient where members supply the CTs with food and act as their agents among the local population. The Malaysian authorities consider the MNLF to be the best organized and most effective of the communist front organizations acting in support of the CTO throughout Peninsular Malaysia (including Singapore). The MNLF is estimated to have a strength of between 2,000-3,000 and has demonstrated a capability for coordinated acts of minor sabotage and terrorism on the anniversaries of events significant to the CTO. Other organizations which support the Central Committee Faction are the Malayan Patriotic Front (MPF), the All-Penang Revolutionary Youth League, the National Liberation League, the Melantan Communist League and the National Communist League, although they are not as well known and effective as the MNLF. The Marxist-Leninist Faction is supported by the Malayan People's Liberation League (MPLL),

SECRET

.../ 7

formerly the Selangor National Independence League (SNIL). The strength of the MPLL is not known but it has demonstrated the capability to conduct country-wide activities in support of the Marxist-Leninist Faction. There are no known front organizations for the Revolutionary Faction.

There have been reports that members of the Communist Front organizations, particularly the MRLF, have received short periods of military training in the jungle from the CTO. They have then returned to their home areas to form the nucleus of a local people's militia. There has, however, been no evidence of the formation of such units or any activities attributable to them.

Since November 1969, the CTO has been supported by a radio station, the Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VMR) which is based in southern China and broadcasts four times a day in Mandarin, Malay, Tamil and English. The broadcasts mainly contain criticisms of the Malaysian Government and encouraging versions of clashes between the CTO and Security Forces. Since the split within the CPA, the VMR broadcasts have consistently supported the Central Committee Faction and violently criticized the break-away factions. The currency of many of the news items indicates some form of rapid communication between the CTO and the station in China.

SECRET

CPM Policies and Intentions

The basic aim of the CPM, and of its associated organizations, is the establishment of a communist state of Malaya ("Malaya", in CPM usage, includes Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore). The 1972 Constitution of the CPM states, inter alia, that "The 40 years of practice of revolution by the Communist Party of China, particularly the experience of the two armed struggles, has proved that the road of using the countryside to the cities and capture political power by force of arms is the only correct road". There may be some disagreement between the factions as to whether an urban or rural guerrilla warfare campaign is the most appropriate for conditions in Malaysia but their common aim remains the overthrow of the Malaysian Government by force.

The CTC has well-established armed units in the Thai border region and in Central Perak State, but would probably want to have armed units operating effectively throughout the length of Peninsular Malaysia and to firmly establish its infrastructure (for example the MLF) before proceeding to the second phase of insurgency (openly contesting control of the rural areas with the government). Nevertheless, the CTC has sufficient numbers to greatly increase armed activity in some areas of northern Malaysia if it chooses to do so. Such increased conflict would, however, be likely to be localized; it would not result in a country-wide emergency, paralyzing the security forces, or the creation of conditions immediately favourable to a revolutionary victory, unless it

SECRET

.../11

were coupled with other factors such as widespread public disorder. The CTO has sought to re-establish its presence throughout Peninsular Malaysia by sending groups of experienced cadre from the Thai border bases back to the areas in which they used to operate during the first emergency in order to re-form the local CTO armed unit with local recruiting. In December 1973 and January 1974, a group of 58 such terrorists attempted to re-establish the 6th Assault Unit in Southern Pahang. Although it was broken up by Security Forces' action and a number of CTs starved to death, the bulk of the group has remained in the area and is presumably endeavouring to cultivate local support. The CTO can be expected to continue these efforts to extend the presence of its armed units throughout Peninsular Malaysia.

A secondary factor influencing the conduct of the CTO campaign is the desire to maintain a presence in the public eye in order to prevent the government from claiming that it has the situation completely under control. Success for the government, as for the CTO, depends upon public support and confidence. The CTO cannot afford to allow the Malaysian Government to be seen to be gaining complete control of the situation and so to win the confidence of the people. The legitimacy of the Federal Government is the principal target of the CTO propaganda and an unquestioned ability by the government to ensure the security of society would definitely contribute towards that legitimacy. The terrorists have shown that they will attack government positions and

individual officials in retaliation for reverses suffered as a result of government operations, and will attempt to maintain the impression that their influence is steadily expanding and effectively working towards the overthrow of the government. In May 1974, following a successful government operation in the Ipoh area, more than 100 CTs from the 12th CTO Regiment destroyed road plant used on the construction of the East-West Highway near Gerik, demonstrating a formidable capability to conduct large-scale sabotage operations - a factor which is very relevant to the point of this report. There was also a significant increase in CTO activity during the first six months of 1975 which was probably inspired, in part, by the Communist victories in Indochina and a desire to exploit the favourable publicity from them in the context of the Malaysian situation. The CTO has demonstrated a willingness to clash with Security Forces who penetrate its base areas, but, so far, not to the point of a protracted defence of those areas.

The CTO could easily adopt tactics used by other terrorist organizations, notably those in South America, of murdering or kidnapping important foreign residents in order to publicly embarrass the government and obtain concessions, such as the release of political prisoners as part of a wider campaign of urban terrorism. The CPI's Central Committee faction is mainly concerned with controlling the rural areas in line with the orthodox Maoist doctrine of revolutionary warfare and it is unlikely that the MNLF would be capable of

conducting a widespread and sustained terror campaign against foreign interests in Urban areas. There have been indications, however, that the Marxist-Leninist and Revolutionary Factions differ from the Central Committee Faction over this question and may initiate a campaign of Urban guerrilla warfare. One important limitation on this, however, would be their lack of support from Communist Front organizations in the urban centres. The Revolutionary Faction has no known support and, although the MPLL, supporting the Marxist-Leninist Faction, has demonstrated a capability for coordinated action throughout Peninsular Malaysia, it is doubtful as to whether it has the resources to conduct an extended urban campaign. If this situation did arise, however, Australian personnel and their dependants stationed at Butterworth could be threatened; it is impossible to say whether they would be primary targets in preference to other foreigners in Malaysia, such as members of diplomatic missions.

The CTO seems to have accepted the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China with resignation. The blow has been softened by the continued support of the VnR broadcasts and the pledge of solidarity from the Communist Party of China in a recent congratulatory message on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the CPM. The recent communist victories in Indochina, however, will have boosted the morale of the CPM and its sympathisers considerably while giving rise to doubts in the community as to the Malaysian Government's ability to contain the terrorist

problem. There is some evidence that the Chinese community, in particular, was considerably affected by the Communist victories and now believe that a CPM victory against the government is inevitable.

Assessment
We assess that the CTO's present intentions are to consolidate and extend its present position in Peninsular Malaysia by recruiting and building up mass support among the rural population, especially in areas where there were large numbers of terrorists during the first emergency; to cultivate the support of Malay peasants and Orang Asti (aborigiñes); to develop lines of communication and establish base areas; to consolidate supply links between armed units and the support infrastructure and to progressively extend CTO influence and presence, especially that of armed groups, while avoiding major contacts with the Security Forces unless the CTOs enjoy a maximum advantage at the time. The CTO appears to be sensitive to adverse publicity, and can be expected to carry out retaliatory action for any significant government success. We also consider that, at this stage, in spite of the encouraging example of Indochina, the CTO judge that an attempt to move into the second phase of widespread confrontation would be premature and possibly counter-productive, and that such an attempt is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Arms and Equipment

Until 1962, arms used by the CTO were mainly of British origin, having been obtained during World War II or
./captured

SECRET

252

- 15 -

captured during the First Emergency. They include British .303 rifles (short magazine Lee Enfield); .303 Bren Light Machine Guns; .45 US Thompson Sub-machine guns; 9mm Sten guns; .38 Smith and Wesson revolvers; 9mm Browning pistols and shotguns of various kinds. Other weapons have since been captured from the Thai and Malaysian Security Forces or purchased in Southern Thailand; they include US carbines; 7.62 SLR (Self Loading Rifle); 9mm sub-machine guns; US M-16 rifles (Armalite); M-79 Grenade Launchers and shotguns.

The CTO has shown a capability to manufacture and use both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosive devices. Although these are home made, they are technically effective and have inflicted severe damage on soft-skinned vehicles such as Land-Rovers and 3-ton trucks. Electrical detonation is frequently used and delayed timing devices were reported to have been used in the raid near Jerik in May 1974. The CTO use of booby-traps and mines has improved considerably and has resulted in a greatly increased casualty rate among the Security Forces in 1975. The MLR and other such organizations have also used electrically detonated charges in booby-traps. The CTO probably obtain explosives and detonation equipment from supporters working in the mines of northern Perak and southern Thailand.

There has been a noticeable increase in the types of weapons used by the CTO during the past 12 months. M-16 rifles and M-79 Grenade Launchers have been used in small quantities

SECRET

.../

in northern Malaysia since November 1974 and there have been unconfirmed reports of CTO use of Rocket Launchers. At about the same time, VMR broadcasts began to claim that the CTO had used mortars in contacts with the Security Forces, although there has been no reflection of this in official Malaysian reports. The Malaysian authorities, however, claim to have a photograph of the CTO training with mortars in southern Thailand. It is quite possible that the CTO possess mortars but has refrained from using them until the situation is ready for the initiation of Phase Two of revolutionary warfare.

Under these circumstances, the weapons could be deployed and used by the CTO with very little warning. The mortars, if they are of the 81/82mm type with an effective range of 3000 metres, could be used against area targets such as parked aircraft, headquarters etc. The NVA/VC forces in Vietnam frequently used mortars against area targets in surprise attacks. The CTO has also used makeshift rockets in attacks on military installations and airfields on 31 March and 1st April 1975. The rockets were manufactured from 5.5 inch Rocket Launcher rounds and were fired from unmanned positions, using crossed sticks and crude timing devices. These devices are unsophisticated and should not be confused with the modern rockets used by insurgent forces in Indochina. Nevertheless, the incidents attracted considerable publicity and a moderate amount of damage was done to a Caribou aircraft parked at Sempang airfield, Kuala Lumpur and this may encourage the CTO to stage similar incidents.

One possible source of modern arms for the CTO is the surplus weapons from Indochina. These may either be supplied to insurgent organizations by the governments of

Vietnam and Cambodia or gradually filter into the area in the hands of gun-running or smuggling organizations. Access to a reliable and continuous supply of modern weapons and ammunition would increase the capability of the CTO considerably but this possibility remains subject to the future policy of the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia towards materiel assistance to foreign insurgent groups.

CTO Activities in Butterworth Area

"The nearest major CTO unit to Butterworth is the 8th Assault Unit in the Kulim area, about 25 kilometers east. This was declared a "Black Area" (an area of strong terrorist activity) during the First Emergency, and the return of an armed unit logically follows the CTO pattern for expanding its influence throughout Peninsular Malaysia. The unit has been involved in contacts with Security Forces in the area since January 1971, but all have been within Kedah State. (A list of recent sightings and contacts is at Annex). Captured documents have indicated that the unit intended to establish contact with supporters inside Province Wellesley but, although armed UTs have been sighted within the Province, we do not know the extent of their support among the peasants in the area. The appearance of booby-trapped red flags in Penang and Butterworth on several occasions since 1970 indicates the presence of elements of the MRLA or some other subversive organizations. Acts of sabotage within the Province, such as the destruction of railway bridges south of Butterworth on 9 May 75, may have been the work of either the 8th Assault Unit or the local MRLA.

Incidents on the Base

In June 1971, about 12 metres of copper core cable was stolen from the Mirage engine run-up bay near the Motra site, and a locked building was forcibly entered at the same time. This area is within 15 metres of an SSP guard position. Between the 6th and 10th August 1971, copper earth strips were stolen from the roof of a building in the bomb dump. A week later, eight one-metre lightning arrestors and some fire-extinguisher caps were stolen from the bomb dump. The building from which the metal strips were removed is in full view of the SSP guard room at the gate to the dump. There have been other thefts from inside the base area, some outside working hours. In mid-September 1971, two Malays were seen on a platform in a tree outside, but close to, the eastern perimeter fence near the bomb dump. They were apprehended and handed over to the SSP and then to the Malaysian Police. Special Branch in Penang has informed RAAF Butterworth that it believes that those apprehended were engaged in surveillance of the base. On 10 May 1975, a 9 metre piece of heavy gauge fencing wire was found on the centre line at a point two thirds along the length of the runway. On 29 May, a 43 metre piece of copper wire was also found on the runway. The latter was probably accidentally left behind by contractors working in the area but, in the case of the former, the runway had been checked after contract personnel left the area. It may have been abandoned by thieves who were alarmed by the approach of a security patrol but the possibility remains that it was an attempt to damage aircraft during take off and landing.

/However,

However, no night flying was being conducted at the time and the runway is always checked every morning before air operations begin. On 4 and 5 August, two holes were found out in the southern and eastern perimeter fences by security patrols. Both had been camouflaged and did not appear to have been used for several months. Base authorities believe that they had been made by individuals entering the base area for the purpose of stealing materials and equipment. These incidents are not necessarily attributable to the CTC or its supporters; the thefts were probably carried out by local, perhaps locally employed civilian or contractor personnel, or even members of the SSP. The incidents do, however, reveal that unauthorized personnel have, on several occasions, been able to gain access to areas within the Base, including Vital Points.

Operations by Security Forces

In April 1974, the Security Forces conducted a division-sized operation near Ipoh which resulted in 11 CTCs being killed and the discovery of a large training camp. The operation was given wide publicity and its success was the cause of some increase in morale among the Security Forces. At the time, we assessed that, with the release of units from Sarawak, the Malaysians would conduct further such operations and, if they were as well planned as Operation Gonzales, they could expect similar success. This, however, has not been the case. The CTC effort against the East-West Highway and Kemengor Dam has drawn a considerable number of troops into static guard duties and close patrolling operations to protect the extended construction sites. The dismissal of several senior Malaysian Army officers for corruption practices in

December 1974 and the subsequent appointment changes may have disrupted plans for future operations. The increase in CTO activity during the first half of 1975 seems to have placed the Security Forces on the defensive and there have been few signs of initiative in Malaysian operations this year. The General Officer Commanding Peninsular Malaysia said in April 1975 that the Security Forces planned to conduct a large operation north of Ipoh in "the near future". To August 1975 this had not yet materialized and while the Malaysian High Command obviously recognise the possible advantages of large scale operations, they have so far been unable to concentrate their resources for such operations.

Summary of CTO Capability

The CTO has a total strength of over 2,000 terrorists based in the Thai border area and within Peninsular Malaysia. The terrorists have expanded their influence considerably since 1968 and have successfully established armed units and base areas within Malaysia as far south as the Kuala Lipis - Raub area of Pahang. The MRL and other subversive organizations have cells throughout Peninsular Malaysia which are capable of conducting minor acts of sabotage and terrorism. They have a variety of small arms and have experimented in the use of small rockets for attacks on military installations; there is some evidence that the CTO possess mortars which although we believe they have not been used yet, could be brought into action without warning. The CTO also uses mines and booby-traps with considerable effect. They displayed a significant capability in conducting large-scale sabotage operations in their attack near Gerik in May, 1974.

The Kulim area appears to be a centre for CTO movement between the Betong Salient and villages east and south-east of Kulim in Kedah and Perak States. We assess that there are about 63 terrorists of the 8th Assault Unit based in the Bulim-Baling area, supported by cells of various subversive organizations in Province Wellesley and the adjacent areas of Kedah State.

No armed terrorists are known to be on Penang Island, but there are branches of the MPF and MYCL there. They have planted flags and banners in various places on significant CTO anniversaries, conducted a rocket attack at a military target there and they could pose a threat to the RAAF families if the CPM initiated a terror campaign against foreign residents.

SITUATIONS IN WHICH AIR BASE MIGHT BE ATTACKED

It is possible that the CTO has refrained from attacking the base because of a fear that Commonwealth forces would be reintroduced into the government's anti-terrorist campaign. There is no way of determining whether this in fact, is the case.

If the CTO succeeded in substantially expanding its infrastructure and area of influence in Peninsular Malaysia to the point where a widespread campaign of attacks on prominent installations was launched as an introduction to the second phase of revolutionary warfare, Air Base Butterworth could well be included as one of the targets; we consider, however, that CTO development to this stage is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

.../22

The CTO might see advantage in mounting an attack on the Base in the event of large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest, perhaps involving the diversion of Security Forces. We do not however, consider such developments likely at present.

The CTO might decide to attack the Base if the presence of Australian aircraft and troops on Malaysian soil became a major public issue in Malaysian politics. It seems, however, that the question still has little potential as an important public issue, in spite of recent events in Indochina. The leader of the Democratic Action Party criticized the Australian military presence at Butterworth, in Parliament in May 1975 but the question was dismissed by the Prime Minister who claimed that there were no foreign bases on Malaysian soil and that the Australian presence was only at the invitation of the Malaysian Government. The matter received little coverage in the press and is considered unlikely to become a major issue.

The JIC might decide to attack the base if it believed it would gain a significant psychological or propaganda result. This might occur as retaliation for a major success against the terrorists by the security forces, especially as a result of an operation in the Butterworth area. The Base contains a concentration of relatively lightly-guarded, very expensive equipment, the destruction of which would impose no direct

/inconvenience

inconvenience or hardship on the local population. The CTO could expect to gain prestige for attacking the Security Forces in their own bases. However, they would not have to face the firepower of Army or Police units and accept possibly high casualties. A successful attack on an RMAF installation would gain a great deal of publicity for the CTO and would considerably weaken government claims that it is winning the campaign against the terrorists. We do not believe that the CTO would attack the Base solely because of the presence of Australian aircraft (excepting the conditions in paragraph above) but in the event of an attack, it is unlikely that they would try to discriminate between RAAF and RMAF targets; both Australian personnel and equipment would obviously be endangered. The destruction of RMAF aircraft and equipment would be attractive propoaganda, and this possibility must be considered.

Although we assume that Australian aircraft would not be deployed from Butterworth in an anti-terrorist role, the use of the Base by the RMAF units for anti-terrorist air operations might prompt a CTO reaction. RMAF aircraft, based at Butterworth, including the Cobres, have been used several times in 1975 in air-strike operations near the Thai-Malaysian border. The results are unknown but if the RMAF were to score some successes against the CTO which were well publicized, the CTO might be prompted to retaliate against the Butterworth Air Base. The accidental killing of civilians in these RMAF operations would also give the CTO a good /propaganda

Propaganda issue which could be fully exploited by a retaliatory raid on the Base. The distance of the Base from the Tahi-Malaysian border area would pose some problems for most of the CTO; all of these circumstances, however, would be much more potentially dangerous when applied to the 8th Assault Unit in the nearby Kulim Forest Area. These circumstances are not improbable and therefore, this possibility must be considered.

The MNLF or one of the other smaller subversive groups might make some limited sabotage or booby-trap attempt against the Base as part of a nation-wide, or local, campaign.

Possible Forms of Attack by the CTO

The forms of an attack by the CTO on Air Base Butterworth ranges through a number of possibilities:

- a. An open conventional assault on the Base by day or night, by a large group of CTs using small arms and explosives. This would run the risk of meeting superior firepower of Base defence personnel and could result in severe casualties for the terrorists.
- b. Covert penetration by night by separate groups of terrorists with the object of attacking vital points and aircraft, using explosives. The CTO has demonstrated its capability to carry out such operations and such a plan offers the prospect of destroying a large amount of expensive equipment with a relatively low risk of casualties among the terrorists.

SECRET

- c. An attack by fire using mortars or other indirect fire weapons from the surrounding padi-field/kampong areas especially those to the east. Crude rockets have already been used in attacks on military installations and it is also likely that the CTO have a mortar capability; this form of attack is quite likely.
- d. Sabatage by the planting of delayed action explosives, booby-traps, and other similar devices designed to damage equipment and injure personnel, by members of subversive groups or sympathetic locally employed civilians or contract personnel. In this case, targets outside the Base might be chosen as there would not be as much danger of detection by security patrols. Minor acts of sabotage committed within the Base by such personnel would result in their detection and a tightening of security with no significant gains for the CTO cause. Nevertheless, the use of booby-traps and minor acts of sabotage by subversive groups are relatively common throughout Peninsular Malaysia and pose a distinct threat both to the Base and Australian personnel and their dependants.

SECRET

241
SECRET

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Base and the Target

Air Base Butterworth, an RMAF Base jointly used by the RAAF, is situated on the north-west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, 65 kilometres from the Betong Salient section of the Thai border and supports operations by RAAF Mirages, RMAF Sabres and other aircraft. Of the 1,380 RAAF personnel who work at the Base, 480 live on it, as do nearly 900 Malaysian servicemen and 600 RAAF dependants and police. An ARA company of 123 men is also stationed at the Base. Some 1,400 locally employed civilian and contract personnel work at the Base. A wide range of installations, including an air defence centre, radar and navigational aids, fuel and ammunition storage, and a missile (MATRA) preparation bay are on or near the Base.

Present Security Arrangements

The Malaysian Special Security Police is responsible for the security of the Base, including control of entry, guarding/patrolling of vital points and the maintenance of a 10-man quick-reaction force. At night, pairs of RAAF security guards, each with a dog, guard the Mirage flight lines, which are floodlit, and RAAF Service Police carry out mobile patrols of vital points at irregular intervals. An ARA Infantry Company is available at Butterworth as a quick-reaction force within the base perimeter, but it may be engaged in local training from time to time. This company is usually rotated by airlift, direct from Australia, every three months. It has a section of about 10 men on stand-by from 1800 to 0600 hours daily.

SECRET

Static defences comprise a single two-metre perimeter fence with barbed wire overhang, and lighting of most Vital Points.

In the past, attention has been drawn to serious weaknesses in the defences, including the ineffective performance of the SSP, the possible absence of the ARA Company, deficiencies in the static defences and the parking of Mirages in a straight line without the protection of revetments. Cases of theft have shown that unauthorized persons have been able to gain access to areas within the Base, including the Vital Points.

The security of Province Wellesley, Penang, Kedah and Perlis is the responsibility of 6 Malaysian Infantry Brigade (MIB), based at Sungei Patani. No security posts are permanently manned in the area immediately surrounding Butterworth and there are no artillery units in the area. There is no known Security Forces' contingency plan for the reinforcement of Butterworth but troops from 6 MIB may be deployed to the area on the request of the OC RAAF Air Base Butterworth. The effectiveness of the Brigade's response would depend upon the availability of troops, who may be involved in operations.

Capability of the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO)

In the absence of an overt external threat to Malaysia, which we assess to be unlikely during the period under review, the principal threat to the Base is from the CTO and its related subversive organizations.

The CTO has an estimated strength of over 2,000 terrorists in the Thai border area and the northern states of Peninsular Malaysia. The 8th Assault, with a strength of 63, is based in the Baling and Kulim districts east of the Base. The CTO is armed with small-arms and is proficient in the use of mines, booby-traps and other explosive devices. Makeshift rockets have been used in attacks against military installations and they probably possess mortars which could be deployed without warning. The CTO has also demonstrated a capability to conduct large-scale sabotage raids against targets supposedly protected by Security Forces patrols.

CTO Policies and Intentions

We believe that the CTOs intentions are to consolidate its present position in Peninsular Malaysia by recruiting among both Chinese and Malays, by developing base areas and extending the presence of armed units, by establishing communications with its underground supporters among the population and by maintaining its image as a serious, active threat to an illegitimate government. These aims should be common to all three factions and there is likely to be continued competition among them for the leadership of the anti-government revolutionary movement. It is difficult to predict when the second phase of revolutionary warfare (open attacks on government installations and actively contesting the control of the countryside with the security Forces) might commence, but we doubt that this phase will be initiated in the foreseeable future. We assess, however, that the CTO presence with Peninsular Malaysia will continue to increase.

The Threat Assessment

Likelihood of Attack. We assess that:

- a. It is unlikely that any threat to Air Base Butterworth will arise from an external overt military attack on Malaysia.
- b. There is a potential threat to the Base from the CTO and related communist, subversive organizations. The CTO has an estimated 63 terrorists armed with rifles, machine guns and explosives in the Kulim and nearby Forest areas about 40 milometres from the Base.
- c. CTO policy will be directed towards the consolidation of the infrastructure within Peninsular Malaysia but this will not be taken to the point at which a decision is made to launch the second phase of revolutionary warfare. It is, therefore, unlikely that the CTO will, as a deliberate act of policy, attempt an attack on Air Base Butterworth.
- d. It is possible that the CTO could decide to attack the Base if the presence of Australian Forces became a major political issue in Malaysia or there were large-scale civil disturbances and industrial unrest. We consider this development unlikely for the present.
- e. There is a danger that the CTO may decide to attack the Base in order to achieve a psychological and propaganda victory over the

/government

government in retaliation for a major success by the Security Forces. Such an attack may also be encouraged by use of the Base by RMAF strike aircraft against the CTO.

- f. There is some risk that members of subversive groups could, regardless of CTO policy, or acting on their own initiative, attempt an isolated attack on or within the Base at any time.

Likely Methods of Attack. If the CTO did attack the Base, it would be likely to take one of the following forms:

- a. An attack by fire, using mortars or other indirect fire weapons from the surrounding Kampong/padi-field areas, especially those to the east.
- b. Covert penetration at night by separate groups of OAs with the object of attacking Vital Points and aircraft, using explosives.
- c. The planting by subversive group of delayed action explosives, bobby-traps and other devices to damage equipment and injure personnel. Targets outside the Base perimeter may be chosen to avoid detection by security patrols.

RIFLE COMPANY BUTTERWORTH OFFICER COMMANDING

Ser	RCB	Arrive	Depart	Unit	Sub-Unit	Officer Commanding	Corps
001	ANZUK		NOV 71	1 RAR			RAInf
002	6 RAR	DEC 72	MAR 73	6 RAR		MAJ ROSS BISHOP	RAInf
003	6 RAR	JAN 73	JUN 73	6 RAR		MAJ COLIN TITMASH	RAInf
004	1 RNZIR	JUN 73	AUG 73	1 RNZIR	V COY		RNZIR
005	8 RAR	AUG 73	NOV 73	8 RAR	A COY	CAPT GUY BAGOT	RAInf
006	3 RAR	NOV 73	MAR 74	3 RAR	A COY	MAJ DOUG BYERS MC	RAInf
007	5/7 RAR	MAR 74	JUN 74	5/7 RAR	C COY	MAJ GREEN	RAInf
008	1 RAR	JUN 74	SEP 74	1 RAR	C COY	MAJ STEVE BRAMAH	RAInf
009	1 RAR	SEP 74	NOV 74	1 RAR	C COY	CAPT MCLAUGHLIN	RAInf
010	8/9 RAR	NOV 74	MAR 75	8/9 RAR	B COY	CAPT DAVE PROCOPUS	RAInf
011	2/4 RAR	MAR 75	JUN 75	2/4 RAR			RAInf
012	1 RAR	JUN 75	SEP 75	1 RAR	A COY	MAJ PAUL JACKSON	RAInf
013	2/4 RAR	SEP 75	DEC 75	2/4 RAR	C COY		RAInf
014	6 RAR	DEC 75	MAR 76	6 RAR	D COY	MAJ PETER MICHELSON	RAInf
015	6 RAR	MAR 76	JUN 76	6 RAR	A COY	MAJ JAMES BLACK	RAInf
016	8/9 RAR	JUN 76	SEP 76	8/9 RAR	B COY	MAJ PAUL GREEN	RAInf
017	8/9 RAR	SEP 76	NOV 76	8/9 RAR	C COY	CAPT MICK BELL	RAInf
018	5/7 RAR	NOV 76	FEB 77	5/7 RAR	D COY	MAJ TERRY NOLAN AM	RAInf
019	3 RAR	FEB 77	JUN 77	3 RAR	B COY	MAJ DON STEWART	RAInf
020	3 RAR	JUN 77	AUG 77	3 RAR	C COY	MAJ PETER ABIGAIL	RAInf
021	3 RAR	30 AUG 77	30 NOV 77	3 RAR	A COY	MAJ STEVE THORNTON	RAInf
022	1 RAR	30 NOV 77	1 MAR 78	1 RAR	B COY	MAJ MICHAEL M. HUGHES	RAInf
023	2/4 RAR	1 MAR 78	31 MAY 78	2/4 RAR	A COY	MAJ GRAHAM J. KELLS MC	RAInf
024	1 RAR	31 MAY 78	30 AUG 78	1 RAR	C COY	MAJ GARY D. BRYANT	RAInf
025	6 RAR	30 AUG 78	30 NOV 78	6 RAR	B COY	MAJ BRUCE G. WALLIS	RAInf
026	8/9 RAR	30 NOV 78	14 FEB 79	8/9 RAR	D COY	MAJ P. S. N. JAMES	RAInf
027	2/4 RAR	14 FEB 79	23 MAY 79	2/4 RAR	C COY	MAJ ROD M. CHANDLER, MC	RAInf
028	3 RAR	23 MAY 79	02 SEP 79	3 RAR	B COY	MAJ PHIL J. HAYDEN	RAInf
029	5/7 RAR	02 SEP 79	02 DEC 79	5/7 RAR	D COY	MAJ DAVID J. MEAD	RAInf
030	6 RAR	02 DEC 79	24 FEB 80	6 RAR	A COY	MAJ IAIN JONES	RAInf
031	1 RAR	24 FEB 80	12 JUN 80	1 RAR	SPT COY	MAJ MATT P. FAUKNER	RAInf
032	3 RAR	12 JUN 80	10 SEP 80	3 RAR	C COY	MAJ JOHN B. LANGLER	RAInf
033	8/9 RAR	10 SEP 80	03 DEC 80	8/9 RAR	C COY	MAJ GLYNN D. WILLIAMS	RAInf
034	2/4 RAR	03 DEC 80	04 MAR 81	2/4 RAR	B COY	MAJ W. J. EDWARDS	RAInf
035	1 RAR	04 MAR 81	02 JUN 81	1 RAR	A COY	MAJ JOHN D. PETRIE	RAInf
036	5/7 RAR	02 JUN 81	09 SEP 81	5/7 RAR	B COY	MAJ 'BLUE' CRAZE	RAInf
037	6 RAR	09 SEP 81	09 DEC 81	6 RAR	B COY	MAJ RON ELMS	RAInf
038	1 RAR	09 DEC 81	17 FEB 82	1 RAR	B COY	MAJ RUSSELL LINWOOD ASM	RAInf
039	2/4 RAR	17 FEB 82	19 MAY 82	2/4 RAR	D COY	MAJ RICHARD GREVILLE	RAInf
040	8/9 RAR	19 MAY 82	25 AUG 82	8/9 RAR	B COY	MAJ LES BOAG	RAInf
041	3 RAR	25 AUG 82	07 DEC 82	3 RAR	A COY	MAJ JOHN CULLETON	RAInf
042	5/7 RAR	07 DEC 82	23 FEB 83	5/7 RAR	D COY	MAJ RON. P. WHITE	RAInf
043	3 RAR	23 FEB 83	17 MAY 83	3 RAR	C COY	MAJ PHIL CHARLESWORTH	RAInf
044	1 RAR	17 MAY 83	07 SEP 83	1 RAR	C COY	MAJ JOHN SANDS	RAInf
045	6 RAR	07 SEP 83	30 NOV 83	6 RAR	A COY	MAJ A. L. EDWARDS	RAInf
046	8/9 RAR	30 NOV 83	22 FEB 84	8/9 RAR	A COY	MAJ ANTHONY L. CASEY	RAInf
047	5/7 RAR	22 FEB 84	22 MAY 84	5/7 RAR	C COY	MAJ PETER A. PEDERSON	RAInf
048	3 RAR	22 MAY 84	28 AUG 84	3 RAR	B COY	MAJ J. MOVA	RAInf
049	1 RAR	28 AUG 84	09 DEC 84	1 RAR	A COY	MAJ DOUGAL MCMILLAN	RAInf
050	2/4 RAR	09 DEC 84	06 MAR 85	2/4 RAR	A COY	MAJ NOEL PARTRIDGE	RAInf
051	6 RAR	06 MAR 85	05 JUN 85	6 RAR	SPT COY	MAJ MAX J. MORAN	RAInf
052	8/9 RAR	05 JUN 85	04 SEP 85	8/9 RAR	B COY	MAJ C.R. SMITH	RAInf
053	1 RAR	04 SEP 85	04 DEC 85	1 RAR	A COY	MAJ DOUGAL MCMILLAN	RAInf
054	3 RAR	04 DEC 85	05 MAR 86	3 RAR	SPT COY	MAJ GARY A. BORNHOLT	RAInf
055	5/7 RAR	05 MAR 86	04 JUN 86	5/7 RAR	B COY	MAJ PATRICK MACINTOSH	RAInf
056	2/4 RAR	04 JUN 86	28 AUG 86	2/4 RAR	B COY	MAJ IAN (JACK) GREG	RAInf
057	6 RAR	28 AUG 86	03 DEC 86	6 RAR	B COY	MAJ K. HARTMAN	RAInf
058	8/9 RAR	03 DEC 86	04 MAR 87	8/9 RAR	A COY	MAJ DAMIEN S. M. ROACH	RAInf
059	5/7 RAR	04 MAR 87	03 JUN 87	5/7 RAR	D COY	MAJ MARK P. SAMPSON	RAInf
060	1	03 JUN 87	01 SEP 87	3 RAR	A COY	MAJ STEELE D. BROWN	RAInf
061	2	01 SEP 87	03 DEC 87	1 RAR	B COY	MAJ GLEN A. CROSSLAND	RAInf
062	3	03 DEC 87	02 MAR 88	2/4 RAR	D COY	MAJ MARK PROBERT	RAInf
063	4	02 MAR 88	01 JUN 88	6 RAR	D COY	MAJ STEVE J. DUNN	RAInf
064	5	01 JUN 88	02 SEP 88	8/9 RAR	C COY	MAJ JAMES C. DITTMAR	RAInf
065	6	02 SEP 88	01 DEC 88	2/4 RAR	C COY	MAJ RICHARD G. WILSON	RAInf
066	7	01 DEC 88	28 FEB 89	8/9 RAR	A COY	MAJ JOHN F. EDWARDS	RAInf
067	8	28 FEB 89	03 JUN 89	3 RAR	C COY	MAJ MICK J. HUMPHREYS	RAInf
068	9	03 JUN 89	10 SEP 89	5/7 RAR	C COY	MAJ WAYNE T. BOWEN, SC	RAInf
069	10	10 SEP 89	30 NOV 89	1 RAR	A COY	MAJ GARY E. HEALD	RAInf
070	11	30 NOV 89	07 MAR 90	6 RAR	B COY	MAJ MARTY D. SOUTHWOOD	RAInf
071	12	07 MAR 90	01 JUN 90	3 RAR	A COY	MAJ S. J. EVANS	RAInf
072	13	01 JUN 90	08 SEP 90	5/7 RAR	D COY	MAJ JEFFERY M. QUIRK	RAInf

ANZUK

AUST

ROAFIWS