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13 June, 2022

Signed On : <https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au>

Submission to Inquiry - Mr Peter James Kelly

Part 1 – Name of Inquiry

Name of Inquiry *

INQUIRY INTO RECOGNITION FOR MEMBERS OF RIFLE COMPANY BUTTERWORTH FOR SERVICE IN MALAYSIA BETWEEN 1970 AND 1989

Part 2 – About the Submitter

Title or Rank *

Mr

Surname *

Kelly

Given Names *

Peter James

Postal Address *

[REDACTED]

Email Address: *

[REDACTED]

Primary Contact Number *

[REDACTED]

Secondary Contact Number

Is the Submission on behalf of an organisation? If yes, please provide details:

No

Part 3 – Desired outcome

Provide a summary of your submission:

It is my submission that, owing to the prevailing circumstances (including legal framework), the various aspects of the pre-deployment actions, conduct of the deployments and post-deployment actions for all Australian Defence Force elements committed to the Counter-insurgency war in Malaysia for the period 1970 - 1989 (comprising mostly Infantry rifle companies) and known as "Rifle Company Butterworth" (RCB), consideration should be given for recommendation of the award of the Australian Active Service Medal (AASM) with clasp "S. E. Asia", plus attendant repatriation benefits. Due consideration should also be given for recommendation of the award of the AASM with clasp "Vietnam 1975" to those RCB soldiers who were members of "A" Coy, 2/4RAR (March - June 1975) and who were activated to evacuate the Australian Embassy in Saigon in April 1975.

Part 4 - Your submission and Supporting Documentation

File Attached: DHAAT-Inquiry-into-RCB-Submission-by-Peter-Kelly-6-June-2022-FINAL.pdf

Part 5 – Consent and declaration

✓ I consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal making my submission publicly available.

✓ I also consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal:

- using information contained in my submission to conduct research;
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation considered by the Tribunal to be appropriate; and
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation the subject of adverse comment in the submission;
- using content in my submission in its report to Government.

The Tribunal will decide which person or organisation is appropriate, and this may include:

1. persons or organisations required to assist with the inquiry; and
2. persons or organisations with an interest in the inquiry.

✓ I declare that the information I have provided is correct.

Name

Peter James Kelly

Date

13/06/2022 /


Mr Peter James Kelly

Signed by Mr Peter James Kelly

Signed on: 13 June, 2022

Signature Certificate

Document name: Submission to Inquiry - Mr Peter James Kelly



DHAAT Inquiry into service with Rifle Company Butterworth (RCB)

The Facts

I am a veteran who was deployed to RAAF Butterworth in 1975 as a member of “A” Coy, 2/4RAR.

Prior to departure from Australia, members of “A” Coy were briefed on the deployment. We all had to be at Draft Priority 1 – the same state of readiness as troops deployed to Vietnam. We all had to write a will if we hadn’t done so already.

We were briefed on the Mission i.e. to defend the RAAF Base against attack by Communist Terrorists who, at that time, were engaged in combat operations against the Malaysian Forces arrayed against them. In the case of RAAF Butterworth, we would participate as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) which would be the counter-penetration force should the air base be attacked. Said QRF was operational on a 24/7 basis for the duration of the deployment. At all times when on QRF duty, first line ammunition was carried for all weapons. The term “first line ammunition” refers to the minimum ammunition load for a combat unit engaged in warlike operations.

Very few RCB deployments were similar to other RCB deployments.

During my deployment, the threat was heightened to such a level that a second Infantry section operated from a separate location on the air base to provide close protection to the aircraft flight line where F5E fighter aircraft had been dispersed after arrival from the USA. The F5Es had been purchased by the Malaysian Government. That section patrolled the flight line constantly after dark with the same Rules of Engagement as the QRF and – again like the QRF – carrying first line ammunition. The increase in terrorist action was the result of the fall of Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge and the successes made by the North Vietnamese Army in Vietnam. Malaysia was likely to be the next “domino” to fall from internal unrest.

Attached is a small number of documents that confirm the heightened security situation around the time of the fall of Vietnam, plus the constant political struggle between the sensitivities of both governments and the need for operational integrity. RCB remains part of the “collateral damage” from that situation. Nothing in the attached documents indicates “training” or any co-operation/collaboration between RCB and Malaysian troops.

We were briefed on the Rules of Engagement, which authorised each and every member on QRF duty and flight line patrol to apply lethal force in the execution of the Mission. Naturally, we were cautioned to be certain that the target was indeed hostile prior to opening fire.

Because of the use of live ammunition and the likelihood of conflict, there was an expectation of casualties. All members of the company had to carry a field dressing and it had to be in good order at all times. A “field dressing” is a first aid kit primarily for the treatment of gunshot wounds in a first aid setting.

Whenever we were tasked to leave the RAAF Base on duty, we carried first line ammunition as the minimum requirement. We never trained with the Malaysian Armed Forces. They were too busy fighting a war.

At no time – repeat NO time – in over 20 years service was I ever required to carry first line ammunition, nor was I issued an ROE permitting me to apply lethal force in a training, peacetime or non-warlike situation. On the evidence, it is foolish and incorrect to suggest that RCB service for the period 1970 – 1989 was anything other than warlike service.

In April 1975, elements of “A” Coy were activated to fly to Saigon to evacuate Australian government officials owing to the impending fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese Army. I was allocated to the second C-130 Hercules, but all aircraft were ordered to return to RAAF Butterworth prior to landing at Saigon and we disembarked. Our places were taken by RAAF personnel who were lightly armed.

In another situation, my platoon was returning in three trucks from the firing range at Gurun (located in a “black area”) where we had expended over a thousand rounds per man of old ammunition, plus thrown a number of hand grenades. The term “black area” relates to an identified area where the CTs were active, requiring a high level of alertness. On the journey back to RAAF Butterworth, we unwittingly drove through the killing ground of a CT ambush. A few minutes behind us was three RMAF trucks carrying Malay troops. The CTs activated the ambush on the Malay vehicles, resulting in a substantial number of casualties.

Comparisons

Putting the New Zealand decision aside, if one were to apply simple logic to this matter, it is easy to arrive at the correct conclusion using the circumstances of the ADF members who were at Ubon in Thailand. They were in a country at peace. They did not fire a shot in anger, yet their deterrent effort was sufficient to justify the award of the AASM. RAAF Butterworth had a similar arrangement of fighter aircraft on standby that Ubon had, yet those who served at RAAF Butterworth receive no such recognition.

Diego Garcia was a situation where ADF troops were deployed, unarmed, to a location that was at peace – thousands of kilometres from the nearest hostile environment. They were unable to fire a shot in anger because they were unarmed, yet they were awarded the AASM.

RCB was a deployment to a country at war. We did not fire a shot in anger, yet our deterrent effort has been largely ignored in spite of it being possibly one of the most significantly successful military operations in Australia’s history.

The Whitton Report

1. From his Covering letter: *“In summary, it is my opinion that Rifle Company Butterworth’s operational deployment has been, and continues to be, wrongly classified as ‘peacetime service’.*

This situation appears to have arisen due to failures by various decisionmakers since at least 1972 to identify significant errors of fact and misrepresentations of the nature of the RCB service deployment at issue, and continuing failure by advisers and decisionmakers to

apply the relevant criteria for correctly determining the nature of that service, as well as the relevant statutory criteria for lawful decision making.

It does not appear to be the case, on the basis of the information and correspondence available to me, that Defence officials or the relevant Minister have ever provided an adequate Statement of Reasons for the various discretionary decisions which appear to have determined the status of RCB operational service”.

- **From his Report**

“Executive Summary. *In summary, this Report concludes that Rifle Company Butterworth’s operational deployment has been, and continues to be, wrongly classified as ‘peacetime service’, with adverse consequences for members of the Group and possibly other Australian service veterans. On the basis of the documentation provided to this reviewer, the Commonwealth’s current position appears to have arisen from a series of failures by various decisionmakers since at least 1972 to identify significant errors of fact and misrepresentations of the nature of the RCB service deployment at issue. In particular, the 1972 recommendation by officials to the incoming government that RCB deployment in defence of Butterworth air base could be misrepresented – by the Government, for overtly political purposes - as ‘training’, remains at the heart of this matter. It is self-evident that for Australian forces, qualifying ‘Warlike Service’ may take place in peacetime where it occurs outside Australia, as it did in the case of the RCB. Further, the analysis shows continuing failure by advisers and Ministers to apply the relevant criteria for correctly determining the nature of RCB service, and reliance on irrelevant later criteria for that purpose, continue to undermine the Commonwealth’s current position in relation to the status of RCB veterans. Analysis of the more recent decisions by relevant Ministers shows that the decisions at issue have been based on previous incorrect advice by officials of the Australian Public Service, (in particular, the Nature of Service Branch and its predecessors within the Department of Defence), and previous decisions by relevant Ministers which were similarly flawed. In addition, this review has found numerous instances in which Ministerial decisions in relation to RCB service, and APS practice, failed to take into account the relevant statutory and policy criteria for lawful decision making by Australian officials, including the requirement to afford procedural fairness to the representatives of the RCB Review Group affected by Ministerial decisions. As a consequence, it is this review’s conclusion that the Commonwealth’s current assessment of RCB Group’s service in Malaysia is open to legal challenge on several grounds”.*

- **“Rationale and Findings** *The various decisions post 1972 to regard RCB service in protecting RAAF assets at Butterworth as ‘peacetime service’, similar to garrison duty in Australia, has denied those troops (9,000 RCB members and 12,000 RAAF personnel) eligibility to Commonwealth repatriation benefits under the Veterans’ Entitlements Act, and the award of the Australian Active Service Medal (AASM). It is this reviews finding that RCB’s service has been classified, wrongly, as ‘peacetime service’, due to previous failures by various APS advisers and Ministerial decisionmakers to identify and correct significant errors of fact and misrepresentations as to the nature of the RCB service deployment - whether due to flawed application of Government policy or inadvertently. It is relevant that the origins of the present situation stem from the Whitlam Government’s 1972 election undertaking to withdraw all Australian forces then deployed in SE Asia. It is self-evident that ‘Warlike Service’ can be provided - and has often been provided - overseas, in time of peace in Australia. In the case of RCB service in Malaysia, it is evident*

that a series of Commonwealth decisionmakers and advisers have applied a later definition of 'Warlike Service' which did not obtain during the period of RCB service, and have failed or refused to apply the 'Incurred Danger' test which properly applied to that service. Until 1972, Australia, under international treaty obligations, had a leading role in deterring Communist expansion in SE Asia, in particular in Malaysia. In 1973 the Commonwealth's Defence Committee recommended to the incoming Government that a rifle company be retained at Butterworth. The Defence Committee Secret Minute 2/1973 para 28(e) refers. 'When the Australian Battalion is withdrawn, the requirement for a company for security duties at Butterworth will be met by providing the unit, on rotation, from Australia. This could be presented publicly as being for training purposes.' It is noteworthy that the most recent reply by Defence officials to the RCB Review Group continues to misrepresent was clearly the Committee's advice to the Government on the proposed RCB deployment as 'training'. Further, the advice provided to the Government by Defence Committee's Secret Minute 2/1973 para 28(e) is also incorrectly referred to as 'a decision' of the Committee. The records show that RCB was an operational deployment of an Australian infantry combat Rifle Company in Malaysia during the Malaysian Counter Insurgency War (1968-1989). RCB's role was to protect and defend the strategically-deployed RAAF assets (personnel, families, aircraft, facilities including the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS)) at ABB against a recognised Communist insurgent threat. In accordance with the recommendation of the Defence Committee in its Minute 2/73 of 11 Jan 1973, the RCB deployment was continued by the Australian Government on a three-monthly rotation. RCB's protection role continued until the Peace Accord was signed between the Malaysian Government and the communist insurgent leader Chin Peng in December 1989. In summary, the documentation shows that the incoming Government, acting on the Defence Committee advice, effectively misrepresented the true purpose of the RCB deployment, due to the sensitivities of both the Australian and Malaysian Governments concerning the deployment of Australian troops in Malaysia. In this respect, it appears to be the case that the Whitlam Government's concern to achieve its election policy of a 'Fortress Australia' (which sought the return of all overseas troops to Australia), and the Malaysian Government's concern for its independent foreign policy position on neutrality and the presence of foreign troops, provided the fundamental justifications for the Defence Committee's advice to government that the provision of an Australian unit for ensuring security at Butterworth "could be presented publicly as being for training purposes". In short, the Defence Committee's secret 1973 advice to the incoming government amounted to a recommendation that the government should effectively and deliberately mislead the Australian people as to the nature and extent of Australia's military involvement in the Malaysian Insurgency. It is our view that the Defence Committee's proposal of deliberate misrepresentation of the nature of RCB service, subsequently advocated to other Ministers by at least some officials and adopted by later Ministerial decisionmakers, has continued to undermine all subsequent decision making concerning the original RCB service deployment".

To examine the New Zealand decision for just a moment, it is very clear that the evidence is irrefutable, the service was warlike and the troops were deployed for the period corresponding to part of the period of the Counter-Insurgency War. What is more significant is the New Zealand authorities had the courage to overturn an embedded false rhetoric that had been held onto for decades, despite the evidence clearly pointing to the fallacy of that rhetoric. History shows that the New Zealand authorities had previously

clung to false information and diligently defended that position for decades - not unlike the Australian government, where successive politicians of all stripes and Department of Defence apparatchiks bent on not taking the trouble to critically evaluate the facts, nor simply do the right thing when confronted with the evidence that didn't accord with their own narrative.

Hopefully, the Tribunal will have the intestinal fortitude to do the right thing in this instance.

Conclusion

I believe the members of "A" Coy 2/4RAR satisfied the elements of the requirements for warlike service and request that this submission be taken into consideration in your deliberations for the award of the Australian Active Service Medal with clasp "Malaysia" plus "Vietnam 1975" and/or the General Service Medal 1962 with clasp "Malaysia". I believe it would be reasonable for a conclusion that all other rifle companies deployed during the period 1970 – 1989 were similarly engaged (minus the Vietnam involvement) and, accordingly, qualified for a determination of warlike service to be applied to their deployment as well under the VEA 1986.

I am willing to appear before the Tribunal to make these submissions orally and undergo examination, if required.



CONFIDENTIAL

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TO RAMQC/HQBUT

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BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FROM FOREIGN CANBERRA

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FM. CANBERRA /

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PAGE 2 RAYWAG 439 C O N F I D E N T I A L

BUTTERWORTH RAAF COMPLEMENT

PLEASE INFORM APPROPRIATE MALAYSIAN AUTHORITIES THAT
RAAF SECURITY PERSONNEL AT BUTTERWORTH ARE FINDING THEMSELVES
OVER-TAXED BY THE NEED TO PROVIDE SUPERNUMERARY CREW MEMBERS
FOR THE RAAF AIRCRAFT FLYING ON HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS IN
VIETNAM SO AS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF AIRCRAFT AND PASSENGERS.
AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE RAAF IS UNABLE TO MAKE A FULL CONTRIBUTION
TO BASE SECURITY, AT A TIME WHEN AN ADDITIONAL GUARD RESPONSIBILITY
IS IMPOSED ON THE BASE BY THE PRESENCE OF HERCULES
AIRCRAFT. WE WISH TO MAKE ADEQUATE AUSTRALIAN CONTRIBUTION
TO THESE SECURITY NEEDS RESPONSIBILITY, WHILE AT THE SAME
TIME ENSURING THE SAFETY OF AIRCRAFT IN VIETNAM.

2. WE ARE THEREFORE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO SEND ADDITIONAL

RAAF SECURITY PERSONNEL (SERVICE POLICE AND AIRFIELD

SECURITY GUARDS) TO BUTTERWORTH TEMPORARILY. WE PROPOSE

TO SEND NINE PERSONNEL FROM AUSTRALIA WITH THE NEXT AVAILABLE

SERVICE FLIGHT. SOME TWENTY FURTHER PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN

PLACED ON STAND-BY AND SOME OR ALL OF THEM MAY BE SENT TO

BUTTERWORTH DURING THE NEXT WEEK, TO SERVE MAINLY AS RELIEF

PAGE 3 RAYWAG 439 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUPPLEMENTARY AIR CREW.

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

Note: My understanding
is that SLO for BUT, ADG's
for supplementary crew
for C130's operating out of
BUT to SVN.

① 9 x SLO 4 Apr
② 1 SNGO + 13 ADG's 7 Apr
③ 6 ADG's on standby 7 Apr
7
4
SRGD 75

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE (AIR OFFICE)

MINUTE PAPER

418/4/12

(Write on this side only)


Subject: BUTTERWORTH BASE SECURITY

DPE 8506

MINISTER

Copy to: CCS

1. OC Butterworth has advised that rocket attacks have taken place at RMAF Base Sempang (Kuala Lumpur) and a military installation at Penang on 31 March and 1 April 1975. The RMAF has advised of possible threats to Butterworth.
2. Increased security arrangements have been implemented at Butterworth including controlled access to the base and vehicle search, dispersal of aircraft and patrols on aircraft lines. The RMAF has also planned dispersal of their aircraft to other bases.
3. The arrival of Australian maritime aircraft to Butterworth from 3 - 8 April for an exercise will further stretch the security resources.
4. The period of tension is expected to last until at least 22 April and probably for a further month.
5. There is some feeling among the Malaysian authorities that this activity is being spurred on by successes in Vietnam. However, 6MIB (Malaysian Infantry Brigade responsible for area security) has reported that they do not consider the activity to be connected with operations in Vietnam.
6. Air Office has asked OC Butterworth to advise if further assistance is required. You will be advised of developments.


(J.A. ROWLAND)

AM
CAS

3 Apr 75

SECRET

SKG

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE (AIR OFFICE)

Deas 110
DOR 18 Apr 75
160

**BUTTERWORTH BASE SECURITY AND SECURITY OF C130 AIRCRAFT
IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

MINISTER

Copy to: CCS

Security at Butterworth

1. Further to my minute of 3 Apr 75, I should like to advise you that increased security arrangements have been implemented at Butterworth, including:
 - a. increased patrolling and guard post manning by Malaysian Military Police;
 - b. tightened control of access to the base, and vehicle search of all civilian vehicles entering and leaving the base;
 - c. an extension of RAAF police dog patrols;
 - d. the use of Australian Infantry Company personnel on picket duty; and
 - e. limited dispersal of RAAF Mirage and C47 aircraft.
2. To supplement the Australian forces available for security duty, including off-base family security patrols, nine RAAF Service Police (SP) departed Australia on 4 Apr 75.

Security of C130 Aircraft in South Vietnam

3. To assist aircrews in ensuring the security of their aircraft and passengers, one SNCO and 13 other Airfield Defence Guards (ADGs) deployed to Butterworth today, 7 Apr 75. They will be employed as supernumerary crew. They do not comprise a formed ADG operational unit either by establishment or by equipment. They will be unobtrusive in accordance with the ministerial direction permitting the use of ADGs.
4. Both ADG and SP increments were requested by the OC Butterworth. A further six ADGs are on standby in Australia.

J. A. ROWLAND

(J.A. ROWLAND)

AM
CAS

7 Apr 75

SECRET

167 (67)

MINUTE PAPER

(This side only to be written on)

Subject: DRAFT CAS DIRECTIVE TO OC BUT

A/DSE

f67A

Your comment that "airfield defenders are far more effective if they are allowed outside the wire" is valid. When the perimeter fence is used to delineate the limits within which defence forces must operate, it is an arbitrary boundary which places severe limitations on the effectiveness of the force.

2. In the case of Butterworth, recent incidents in the local area have highlighted the need for effective ground defence forces. Defence of the area is a Malaysian responsibility, however, 6 MIB, in whose area BUT falls, has all its operational units deployed on anti-terrorist operations well away from the base. Its Coy, MMP, not only lacks the capability for military ops, but is fully committed to day-to-day security tasks.

3. In these circumstances, it would seem sensible to seek approval for the Australian Infantry Company to operate outside the limits of the base as normal procedure. A limit needs to be placed on such off-base operations/activities, but I suggest that the constraint should be that such employment must be directly related to the protection of aircraft and installations. The actual distances involved would need to be determined locally.

4. I am aware, of course, that political

2
MINUTE PAPER

(This side only to be written on)

166

Subject:

Considerations could rule this out. Nevertheless, from an operational point of view, I must recommend Malaysian agreement be sought to change para 12 of the Directive to allow limited use of the infantry company outside the perimeter to permit effective protection of our assets.

5. This confirms our conversation.

J. H. Hough
W. C. C. R.
S. R. C. D.

Ds Apr 75

- Note: 1. This directive held pending a decision on whether BUT is to become an OCOM base or not, and, if so, the propriety of this office issuing such a directive. DORA will notify. Telecon SRAO/ORA1A of today refers.
2. In any event the question of ~~the~~ security and threat at BUT is under review - see f73.

15 Jul 75

J. H. Hough
W. C. C. R.
S. R. C. D.

SECRET

70

172

NNNN

'75 MAY 15 8 26

VV LRA759 HH

MAY 15 00 09Z 75

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FM HQBUT

TO RAYWPP/DEFAIR CANBERRA

INFO RAMQAH/AUSTCOM KL

RBMWC/JISC

BT

SECRET

A26

FOR DCAS FROM OT/C PD SECURITY AIR BASE BUT PD FOLLOWING IS TEXT
OF CABLE FROM AUSTCOM KL DTG 130912Z MAY 75 QUOTE SECURITY:

RAAF BASE BUTTERWORTH PD

2. AT JID MINDEF BRIEFING FOR JLL MILITARY ATTACHES IN KUALA LUMPUR
ON 7MAY75 CMM WE WERE SHOWN PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE ROCKETS AND
LAUNCHERS USED IN THE ATTACK ON RMAF BASE KUALA LUMPUR ON 31MAR PD
PHOTOGRAPH ALSO SHOWED POINT OF IMPACT OF ONE ROUND AND MARKS ON
TARMAC BUT NO DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO THE CARIBOU AIRCRAFT PD
3. AFTER THE BRIEFING CMM WE ASKED THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE (DDMI) FOR COPIES OF PHOTOGRAPHS FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND HE AGREED TO SUPPLY THESE PD DDMI MENTIONED (WITHOUT PROMPTING)
THAT THE SECURITY OF AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH FROM SIMILAR ATTACKS WAS A



DEPPS 21/5 Copy to DAFI
D60R 22 May 75

PAGE 2 RAMQC 139 S E C R E T

MATTER OF CONCERN TO MINDEF AND THAT THERE WAS QUOTE A STUDY IN PROGRESS UNQUOTE ON THIS MATTER AT PRESENT PD HE ALSO SAID THAT THE CTO URBAN CELL IN PENANG QUOTE ALTHOUGH ONLY FIVE OR SIX MEN CMM WAS ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVE AND QUOTE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING A (SIMILAR) ATTACK ON BUTTERWORTH UNQUOTE PD

4. WE GATHERED THAT RMAF BUTTERWORTH IS ALREADY AWARE OF MINDEF INTEREST AND CONCERN PD QOU MAY ALREADY KNOW OF OR WISH TO CHECK ON WHAT IS BEING DONE BY RMAF AND MINDEF PD WE WILL FOLLOW UP SUPPLY OF PHOTOGRAPHS WITH DDMI PD UNQUOTE PD

PARA EYE HAVE SPOKEN TODAY WITH CO RMAF ON MATTER BUT GATHER HE IS UNAWARE OF ANY SUCH MINDEF PGANNING PD HE HAS REQUESTED ALLOCATION OF AN ADDITIONAL THIRTY TERRITORIALS FOR PATROLS OUTSIDE PERIMETER BUT HAS RECEIVED NO INDICATION OF MINDEF REACTION PD PRESENT SITUATION HERE IS AS FOLLOWS CLN

A RANGERS PROVIDED FOR SHORT PERIOD DURING RECENT ALERT HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN TO 6MIB PD WILL RETURN FOR ONE DAY 2JUN75 WHEN F5S ARE TO BE HANDED OVER TO RMAF AT CEREMONY ATTENDED BY PM ANDHSENIOR DEFENCE AND GOVT OFFICIALS PD

B SSPTS ARE MANNING NEW WATCH TOWERS IN BOMB DUMP AND IADS AREAS BY DAY ONLY (AND NOT EVERY DAY) BECAUSE RMAF HAS NOT YET PRODUCED SEARCH

PAGE 3 RAMQC 139 S E C R E T

LIGHTS FOR WHICH TOWERS ARE WIRED PD

C CONSTRUCTION OF GUARD POSTS AT NORTHWEST CMM NORTHEAST CMM AND SOUTHWEST CORNERS OF PERIMETER BORDERING MAIN RUNWAY WAS COMPLETED FEB75 AND HANDED OVER TO RMAF PD ALL HAVE WATER CONNECTED BUT POWER PROVIDED ONLY TO NW POST CMM OTHERS SHOULD HAVE POWER IN NEAR FUTURE DEPENDING ON FUNDS PD DESPITE EARLIER ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY WE NOW FIND THAT NONE OF THESE POSTS HAVE YET BEEN MANNED BECAUSE SSPS DID NOT BELIEVE HUTS HAD BEEN HANDED OVER TO RMAF PD WE HAVE SUGGESTED MATTER BE SORTED OUT PD

D RAAF SP ASSISTANCE IN CONTROLLING ACCESS TO BASE ENDED WITH RTA OF ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL ON 8MAY75 CMM HOWEVER SSP PERFORMANCE OF TASK WHILE NOT 100 PERCENT HAS IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY PD

E ARMY PICQUET ON RAAF AC OTHER THAN MIRAGE HAVE BEEN DISCONTINUED BUT IN VIEW OF LATEST INFO EYE INTEND TO REINTRODUCE SYSTEM DURING STANDDOWN PERIODS BUT AT IRREGULAR INTERVALS WITH NO SET PATTERN PD

F DISPERSAL OF MIRAGE ALSO DISCONTINUED AND WONT BE REINTRODUCED UNLESS A MORE POSITIVE THREAT DEVELOPS PD SYSTEM PROVED DISRUPTIVE TO SQUADRON OPS AND COULD ONLY BE MODERATELY EFFECTIVE BECAUSE OF LIMITED AREA WITHIN WHICH TO MANOEUVRE PD IN ANY CASE THERE IS NO AC DISPERSAL AREA ON AIRFIELD THAT WOULD NOT BE IN BOTH LINE OF SIGHT

PAGE 4 RAMQC 139 S E C R E T

AND RANGE OF EVEN TYPE ROCKETS USED AT SEMPANG ON 31MAR PD

G WE ARE MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACTS WITH CMIB CMM LOCAL POLICE CMM AND SPECIAL BRANCH CMM ALL OF WHOM ARE MOST COOPERATIVE

BT

SECRET