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26 June, 2022

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Submission to Inquiry - Mr Stanley Leonard Hannaford

Part 1 – Name of Inquiry

Name of Inquiry *

Medallic Recognition for Service with Rifle Company Butterworth

Part 2 – About the Submitter

Title or Rank *

Mr

Surname *

Hannaford

Given Names *

Stanley Leonard

Postal Address *

[REDACTED]

Email Address: *

[REDACTED]

Primary Contact Number *

[REDACTED]

Secondary Contact Number

[REDACTED]

Is the Submission on behalf of an organisation? If yes, please provide details:

Australian Rifle Company Group Veterans 1970 – 1989

Part 3 – Desired outcome

Provide a summary of your submission:

This is a submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, Inquiry into Medallic Recognition for Service with Rifle Company Butterworth, from the Australian Rifle Company Group Veterans 1970 – 1989. In this submission we have addressed, what we consider to be the primary elements that constitute Warlike Service being: Mission - To protect operational assets, property and personnel within the perimeter of Air Base Butterworth by joint arrangement and mutual support. Rules of Engagement – The Infantry Company carried out two distinct roles whilst at Air Base Butterworth comprising both roles of Security and Defence as referenced in Section 3-9 of this submission. The Rules of Engagement were broad in application to cover both of these situations. Objective Danger / Incurred Danger – If a serviceman is told there is an enemy he will be in danger, then that member will not only perceive danger, but to him or her it will be an objective danger on rational and reasonable grounds. If called upon, the member will face that objective danger.

Part 4 - Your submission and Supporting Documentation

File Attached: Cover-Letter.docx

THE-THREAT-TO-AIR-BASE-BUTTERWORTH.pdf

Reference-Document-1-to-16.pdf

Reference-Documents-17-25.pdf

Reference-Documents-18-to-24-26-to-30.pdf

Part 5 – Consent and declaration

✓ I consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal making my submission publicly available.

✓ I also consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal:

- using information contained in my submission to conduct research;
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation considered by the Tribunal to be appropriate; and
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation the subject of adverse comment in the submission;
- using content in my submission in its report to Government.

The Tribunal will decide which person or organisation is appropriate, and this may include:

1. persons or organisations required to assist with the inquiry; and
2. persons or organisations with an interest in the inquiry.


✓ I declare that the information I have provided is correct.

Name

Stan Hannaford

Date

26/06/2022 /




Signed by Mr Stanley Leonard Hannaford

Signed on: 26 June, 2022

Signature Certificate

Document name: Submission to Inquiry - Mr Stanley Leonard Hannaford





To Whom It May Concern

This is a submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, Inquiry into Medallic Recognition for Service with Rifle Company Butterworth, from the Australian Rifle Company Group Veterans 1970 – 1989.

In this submission we have addressed, what we consider to be the primary elements that constitute Warlike Service being:

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Rules of Engagement – The Infantry Company carried out two distinct roles whilst at Air Base Butterworth comprising both roles of Security and Defence as referenced in Section 3-9 of this submission. The Rules of Engagement were broad in application to cover both of these situations.

Objective Danger / Incurred Danger – If a serviceman is told there is an enemy he will be in danger, then that member will not only perceive danger, but to him or her it will be an objective danger on rational and reasonable grounds. If called upon, the member will face that objective danger.

Stan Hannaford – RCB Veteran 1974/75
On behalf of RCB Veterans 1970/89



Australian Treaty Series

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Australian Treaty Series 1971 No 21

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CANBERRA

Five Power Defence Arrangements:

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia regarding External Defence

(Kuala Lumpur, 1 December 1971)

Retrospective entry into force: 1 November 1971

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Singapore regarding External Defence

(Singapore, 1 December 1971)

Retrospective entry into force: 1 November 1971

AUSTRALIAN TREATY SERIES

1971 No. 21

Australian Government Publishing Service

Canberra

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**EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONSTITUTING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
MALAYSIA ON ASSISTANCE REGARDING EXTERNAL DEFENCE**

[Note from the Australian High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur, to the Malaysian Deputy Minister of Defence]



Australian Government
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Exchange of Notes constituting an Assistance to the Malaysia Armed Forces in the Furtherance of the Agreement on the Five Power Defence Arrangements for Malaysia and Singapore, with Annexes

Australian Treaty Series Number	[1971] ATS 21
Done at Place and Date	Kuala Lumpur, 12/01/1971
Treaty Status (Australia)	In Force
Agreement Type	Bilateral
Country (Bilateral)	Malaysia
Subject of Treaty	Defence Aid Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA)
Entry into Force for Australia, Date and Conditions	11/01/1971, eif retrospective in accordance with notes
Treaty Acceptance	
1. Action and Date	
2. Action and Date	
Treaty Withdrawal	
1. Action and Date	
2. Action and Date	
Registered with UN	07/30/1980, 27455, Australia
Other Series Numbers and Reference to Text	UNTS 1571 p105; UKTS 1972/15
Amendments to Treaty and Notes	see agreement of 10 Feb 1988, and agreement with Malaysia of 1 Dec 1971
Last Updated	09/14/2007

44 Jalan Ampang

Kuala Lumpur

1 December 1971

Y B Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen Al-Haj bin Tengku Ismail, PMK

(Tengku Sri Mara Raja)

Deputy Minister of Defence

Ministry of Defence

Kuala Lumpur

My dear Minister

1. I have the honour to refer to the Exchange of Letters between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Federation of Malaya on 24 March and 21 April 1959, associating Australia with the Agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Federation of Malaya; to the Exchange of Letters between the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia on 17 and 18 September 1963, extending Australia's association with the Defence Agreement to all the territories of Malaysia; and to the Communiqué issued by representatives of the Governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom at the conclusion of the Ministerial Meeting in London on 16 April 1971, to consider matters of common interest to all five Governments relating to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore. I have the honour to propose the following:

(1) The Exchanges of Letters referred to in paragraph 1 of this Note shall cease to have effect between the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia as from 1 November 1971, and, in furtherance of the intentions expressed in the Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting, the following arrangements shall apply instead between the two Governments as from that date:

(a) The Government of Australia shall, as may be agreed from time to time between the two Governments, furnish the Government of Malaysia with assistance of the kind referred to in Annex I to this Note for the training and development of the Armed Forces of Malaysia.

(b) The Government of Malaysia may after mutual consultation permit an Australian force to be present in Malaysia upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the two parties, and as set out in the Annexes to this Note. With the object of securing mutual agreement, the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia will consult together over any proposal to alter the size or character of the Australian force.

(c) The Government of Malaysia agrees that the Australian force stationed at Butterworth, composed of two squadrons of fighter aircraft and their supporting units and from time to time an infantry company, may continue to be stationed there, so long as that is mutually agreed, in accordance with the purposes expressed in the Five-Power Communiqué of the 16 April 1971. With the object of securing mutual agreement, the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia will consult together over any proposal to alter the size or character of that force.

The Government of Malaysia and the Government of Australia agree that the terms and conditions as set out in Annexes II and III to this Note shall apply to that force. The terms and conditions for occupying the installations at Butterworth shall be as set out in a separate agreement.

(d) The Government of Malaysia shall afford, in respect of an Australian force, its civilian component and dependants and such authorised service organisations as may be approved by the Government of Malaysia and the Government of Australia, rights and facilities in accordance with the provisions of Annex II to this Note.

(e) In respect of the permission granted herein the Government of Australia shall, where liability shall be established in accordance with the laws of Malaysia, make good or pay compensation for any damage to property or for personal injury or death caused to any person arising from its exercise of the rights and facilities accorded to it for the purposes of this Note:

Provided that each Government shall waive its claims against the other for damage to property used for the purposes of their armed forces arising out of an act or omission committed in the course of his official duty by a member of the armed forces of either of them, or for personal injury or death of military personnel whilst such personnel are on duty;

Provided further that a member of the Australian force or civilian component shall not be subject to any proceedings for the enforcement of any judgment against him in Malaysia in respect of a claim which arises out of the performance of his official duty.

The procedure for dealing with claims shall be in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 15 of Annex II to this Note.

(f) The provisions contained in Annex III to this Note shall apply to any Australian force that may be stationed or present in Malaysia with the consent of the Government of Malaysia and to the authorised service organisations, civilian component and dependants of such a force.

(g) It is the duty of the Australian Service authorities, members of the Australian force and its civilian component and dependants to respect the laws of Malaysia. The Australian Service authorities shall render all assistance within their power to the Malaysian authorities to prevent misuse of the privileges granted in this Note and Annexes to members of the force, its civilian component and dependants, and shall take all necessary measures to that end.

(2) For the purposes of the arrangements described in this Note, or in its Annexes, the terms used therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the following meanings respectively assigned to them:

(a) "installations" means the areas in Malaysia occupied by the Government of Australia for the purposes of this Note and includes the immovable property and structures situated thereon or built therein;

(b) "Australian force" means any contingent, or detachment of any naval, land or air forces of Australia when stationed or present in Malaysia with the consent of the Government of Malaysia but does not include loan personnel;

(c) "Australian Service authorities" means the authorities empowered by the law of Australia to exercise command or jurisdiction over members of an Australian force or civilian component or dependants;

(d) "Malaysian authorities" means the authority or authorities from time to time authorised or designated by the Government of Malaysia for the purpose of exercising the powers in relation to which the expression is

Security

- (1) The Australian Service authorities may take such measures within their installations as they deem necessary to ensure the security of the installations and of the equipment, property, records and official information of an Australian force.
- (2) The Malaysian authorities shall cooperate with the Australian Service authorities in taking such steps as from time to time may be necessary to ensure the security of the installations and of the equipment, property, records and official information of an Australian force, its members, civilian component and dependants and their property.
- (3) An Australian force shall have the right to maintain Service police for the maintenance of discipline within the force and for the security of the installations which it occupies. Such Service police may, with the agreement of and in liaison with the Malaysian authorities, be employed outside the installations insofar as such employment may be necessary to maintain the security of such installations or discipline and order among the members of an Australian force.
- (4) An Australian force shall have the right to raise and maintain civil police services for the maintenance of order and security within any installations which it occupies. With the agreement of the Malaysian authorities, such civil police may be employed outside the installations under arrangements made between the Australian Service authorities and the Malaysian authorities.

Section 3

Compulsory service

Members of an Australian force or civilian component or dependants shall not be subject to any law enacted in Malaysia relating to liability for compulsory service of any kind.

Section 4

Carriage of arms

Members of an Australian force and members of civil police services mentioned in Section 2(4) above may possess and carry arms when authorised to do so by their orders, except that the members of such civil police when employed outside the installations shall carry arms only with the agreement of the Malaysian authorities.

Section 5

Exchange control

- (1) Members of an Australian force or civilian component and dependants shall remain subject to the foreign exchange regulations of Australia but as regards acts done in the territory of Malaysia shall also be subject to the exchange control regulations of Malaysia in force from time to time.
- (2) Remittances between Malaysia and Australia shall be freely permitted in respect of:
 - (a) funds derived by members of an Australian force or civilian component from services or employment in connection with the purposes of the Note;

ANZUK

ANZUK was a tripartite force formed by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom to defend the Asian Pacific region after the United Kingdom withdrew forces from the east of Suez in the early 1970s. The ANZUK force was formed in Singapore on 1 November 1971 under Rear Admiral David Wells and disbanded in 1974.^[1]

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External links

ANZUK order of battle

ANZUK initially consisted of the following major units:

ANZUK Force HQ

- 9 ANZUK Signal Regiment: Under command of the Royal Australian Corps of Signals, 9th (ANZUK) Signal Regiment task was to support the ANZUK Force, which in 1970 had replaced the British Forces Headquarters and Installations in Singapore. this joint service, multi national regiment took over, as going concerns, the Royal Navy Transmitter Stations at Suara, and the Royal Navy Receiver Station Kranji. The regiment employed New Zealand and British Army, Navy and Air Force Personnel together with locally enlisted Singaporean, British, New Zealand and Australian civilian technicians and communication specialists. In addition there was operational control of a group of Malaysian Navy communicators, which were to interface the force with the Malaysian Navy.^[2]
- ANZUK Traffic Management Agency (ATMA)^[3]
- ANZUK Intelligence and Security Unit^[4]

ANZUK



Active 1 November 1971
 – 16 December 1974

Country  Australia
 New Zealand
 United Kingdom

Garrison/HQ Singapore

Commanders

Notable commanders Rear Admiral David Wells
 Air Vice Marshal Richard Gordon Wakeford

Insignia

Flag of ANZUK



- 65 Ground Liaison Section
- ANZUK Provost Unit^[5]

Naval component

- Two RN frigates
- RAN Frigate
- RNZN Frigate
- RN or RAN submarine

Land Component

The land component of ANZUK Force was essentially the units of 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Group renamed and relocated from Malaysia to Singapore.

28th ANZUK Brigade

Brigade Commanders of 28 ANZUK Brigade were:^[6]

- Brigadier Michael Walsh^[7] 1971–1972
- Brigadier Michael Kennedy^[8] 1972–1974

Units that constituted 28 ANZUK Brigade were:

- 28 (ANZUK) Brigade HQ and Signal Squadron
- 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment,^[9] Kangaw Barracks
- 1st Battalion Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment,^[10] Dieppe Barracks
- 1st Battalion Royal Highland Fusiliers,^[11] Meerut Barracks^[12]
- 28th ANZUK Field Regiment,
 - Combined Australian/British HQ Battery
 - 1st Battery Royal Artillery "The Blazers"
 - 106th Field Battery, Royal Australian Artillery^[13]
 - 161 Battery Royal New Zealand Artillery^[14] (1972 only)
- 28 ANZUK Field Squadron^[15]
- 28 ANZUK Aviation Squadron
 - 182 Reconnaissance Flight AAAC (two helicopters),
 - No. 656 Squadron AAC (one flight): Was the RE Air Troop, moved and rebadged from Jungle Warfare School, Kotatingi, Johore

ANZUK Support Group

Transport Element

- Commander Royal Australian Army Service Corps (CRAASC) and staff
- ANZUK Base Transport Unit^[16]^[17]
 - Headquarters
 - Field Platoon

- 50 Transport Platoon, RAASC^[18]
- 402 Troop, RCT
- Base Platoon
- Workshop Component
- ANZUK Supply Depot
- ANZUK Postal and Courier Unit.^[19]

Ordnance Element

- ANZUK Ordnance Depot:^{[20][21]} To support the Land Army component of the ANZUK Force, the ANZUK Ordnance Depot was established from the existing Australian/New Zealand 5 Advanced Ordnance Depot. Located in the premises vacated by the Royal Navy Victualling Depot on the dockside at Sembawang Naval Base. Ordnance support to ANZUK Force was based upon an integrated supply service manned by service personnel from the RAOC, RAAOC and RNZAOC with locally employed civilians (LEC) performing the basic clerical, warehousing and driving tasks. ANZUK Ordnance Depot was constituted of the following elements:
 - Stores Sub Depot
 - Vehicle Sub Depot
 - Ammunition Sub Depot
 - Barrack Services Unit

Workshop Element

- ANZUK Area Workshops, Kangaw Barracks

Air Component

- No. 3 Squadron RAAF – Dassault Mirage III
- No. 41 Squadron RNZAF – Bristol Freighter and Bell UH-1H Iroquois
- No. 75 Squadron RAAF – Dassault Mirage III
- No. 103 Squadron RAF – Westland Whirlwind (later Westland Wessex) helicopters
- No. 205 Squadron RAF – Avro Shackleton

Dress distinctions

Contributing nations wore their individual national uniforms with the addition of the following identifying patches;

- ANZUK Headquarters and Support elements:



- 28 ANZUK Brigade Units:



Sea and Air components did not wear any of the patches as they remained under national command and were only attached to ANZUK command on an as required basis.

Disbandment

By 1973 the political climate in Australia and the United Kingdom had changed and it was time for ANZUK to be disbanded. Rear Admiral Wells,^[22] the First ANZUK commander who established the Force, had the task of planning the run-down phase and handing over to his successor Air Vice Marshal Richard Gordon Wakeford,^[23] to follow through.

Australia would be retaining a presence in Butterworth in Malaysia^[24] and the United Kingdom had decided to withdrawal all its forces east of Suez.^{[25][26]} It was in New Zealand's interest to retain a force in southeast Asia, so on 30 January 1974 New Zealand Force South East Asia was formed,^[27] taking under its command all the New Zealand units formerly part of ANZUK.

Over the course of 1974 the integrated units which made up the ANZUK were gradually disbanded and replaced by national units. On 16 December 1974 the Naval and Air Headquarters were disbanded and their assets reverted to their respective national command and what remained of the United Kingdom's land component forces became the 28th (UK) Infantry Brigade.

Taking several years for the Australian and United Kingdom units to draw down and withdraw, it was not until 1977 that NZFORSEA was the sole remaining foreign presence in Singapore.

See also

- ABCA Armies

PATHFINDER

AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT CENTRE BULLETIN



Issue 148, January 2011

INTEGRATED AREA DEFENCE SYSTEM: 40 YEARS OLD AND STILL GOING STRONG

On 11 February 1971 the Headquarters of the Integrated Air Defence System (HQ IADS) was formed at Butterworth air base in Malaysia under the command of Air Vice-Marshal Ron Susans of the RAAF. Over the past 40 years, IADS has been an important mechanism for the cooperative defence of Malaysia and Singapore. As the main instrument for coordinating military action in defence of the Malay peninsula, it has helped build security in the region.

In 1967 Britain announced its intention to withdraw military forces from territories it had formerly governed 'east of Suez'. Two years later US President Richard Nixon announced the 'Guam Doctrine', which made it clear that America expected its regional friends and allies

to contribute more to their own security. As a result, the newly independent nations of Malaysia and Singapore had to find the means to provide for their own defence. Australia and New Zealand, recognising that stability in South-East Asia was essential for their own security, also had to rethink the basis for their own continued military involvement in the region. In 1970 Britain guaranteed that it would not entirely abandon the region; instead, 'a modest presence in the Far East' would be retained.

A series of talks between Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore began in June 1968, and concluded in April 1971 with the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). Although none of the parties specifically committed themselves to military action in the defence of Malaysia or Singapore, it was expected that ongoing consultation and cooperation between the services of each nation would generate a strong military partnership which added to the overall security of the region.

In the FPDA talks defence ministers had acknowledged that the defence of Malaysia and Singapore was indivisible, and it was decided that a single headquarters, IADS, would be established to organise the air defence of both nations.

The Commander of IADS was given emergency powers to employ assigned forces against surprise attack, although in practice the role was limited to the command of HQ IADS and did not include control of the various national forces. As such, IADS was the operational cornerstone of the FPDA.

Six months after HQ IADS was formed, it was declared operational on 1 September 1971, even though the FPDA did not formally come into effect until 1 November of that year. Under the terms of the agreement covering IADS, Australia provided the commander of a staff drawn from each of the FPDA nations. As a consequence, when AVM Susans vacated the post of Commander in 1974, he was

replaced by the first of another 16 senior RAAF officers who have held it since. The current Commander, AVM Warren Ludwig, took up the reins only in December 2010.

From the start of IADS consensus has been the keyword, for although the Commander was delegated great power he operated under a formal directive issued by an Air Defence Council (ADC), and the ADC chairmanship was rotated every six months between Malaysia and Singapore. These

two nations exercised the leadership role, and ensured that IADS always met their national interests.

As the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) and the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) developed and matured, the IADS evolved and rapidly established its reputation as the focal point of the region's air defence capabilities. By late 1972, the Commander IADS was responsible for two major Air Defence Exercises (ADEXs) and two minor ADEXs annually, centred on Butterworth and Tengah. A no-notice air defence exercise (*Kumpul*) was also added to test the readiness of the air defence units assigned to the FPDA. In addition, HQ IADS planned and coordinated a program of air defence training to meet each nation's requirements.



AVM Susans (right) receiving a Singapore flag for HQ IADS, 1971

The effectiveness of IADS has evolved gradually over time. The conduct of air operations and exercises was simplified and made significantly safer when combined IADS Air Defence Instructions were approved in 1976. The scope and complexity of the ADEXs also increased rapidly, the major ones growing from two to four days, to the extent where they needed to be carefully coordinated to manage disruption to civil air operations.

All IADS exercises have been constructed around the defence of Malaysia and Singapore rather than on offensive operations. One success followed another and, although achievements were kept very low-key, the air defence of Malaysia and Singapore improved considerably. By 1981, the mature RMAF and the RSAF were able to take on much more of the load, and the other three nations reduced their FPDA contributions accordingly. While Australia based two Mirage fighter squadrons and a rifle company at Butterworth, New Zealand maintained a single squadron and a battalion in Singapore, while the UK contribution was limited to visiting units.

During the 1980s the first Malaysian officer was appointed to the new Deputy Commander IADS position and a Singaporean officer filled the Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) position, now Chief of Staff. RMAF fighter aircraft replaced the two RAAF Mirage squadrons at Butterworth—No 75 Squadron departed in 1983, and No 3 Squadron in 1986. Since then, Australia has sent aircraft such as F-111s, F/A-18 Hornets and P-3 Orions to both Malaysia and Singapore for the duration of each FPDA exercise.

As the scope of FPDA activities expanded, land and naval activities were also incorporated within the exercises, and IADS became increasingly 'joint' by including Army and Navy on the staff. During 2001 the acronym IADS was redesignated to refer to the 'Integrated Area Defence System' and has concentrated on building interoperability. Subsequently IADS has been the glue that has held the region's network of military capabilities together.

The *Bersama* series of FPDA exercises were introduced in 2004, partly in response to the new security environment that emerged after the 9/11 terror attacks on the USA. They are now some of the most advanced military exercises conducted in the region. Last year Exercise *Bersama Padu 2010* included 14 ships, 66 aircraft and about 3000 personnel, and once again demonstrated the professionalism of the forces of the FPDA nations. The very presence of such FPDA forces provides a measure of

stability throughout the region, and by extension also helps to protect other nations that have adjacent maritime zones in the neighbouring seas.



IADS ops room during Exercise Bersama Padu 2010

IADS has been working to protect Malaysia and Singapore for 40 years. Although largely unsung, it has shaped a secure framework for international cooperation in the region which, as the 21st or Asia-Pacific century progresses, seems likely to only increase in importance. In all of this, the RAAF has played a crucial role, providing the professional guidance which has helped maintain stability while the regional partners developed their own forces and skill levels. Hopefully, IADS can continue its constructive function well into the present century.

- *The air forces of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom have worked together harmoniously through IADS for 40 years.*
- *IADS has helped shape a secure framework for regional cooperation on the Malay peninsula.*
- *RAAF officers at HQ IADS have gained valuable operational command and staff experience within a coalition environment.*

IADS represents the strong bonds that have been formed over the last four decades and shows great promise for further development of the arrangement in the future.

AVM Kevin Paule,
Commander IADS 2007-2010



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CANBERRA ACT 2600

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Email: airpower@defence.gov.au
Web: <http://airpower.airforce.gov.au>

The views expressed in this Pathfinder are not necessarily those of the RAAF



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ANNEX A TO
AS RIFLE COY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 17 DEC 78.

ORDERS - DUTY OFFICER

1. The company Duty Officer is to be rostered from all senior NCO and above, excluding the OC and Education Officer. Duty Officers are to be rostered in Routine Orders Part 1. Duties are not to be changed without prior approval of the OC.
2. The company Duty Officer is to be briefed by the OC, or in his absence, the 2IC at 1600 hrs daily. Weekend company Duty Officers will be briefed at 1600 hrs on Friday.
3. The Duty Officer's tour of duty is to be:
 - a. Working Days. From 1600 hrs on the day of mounting until 0800 hrs the following day, except that he is to inspect the midday meal.
 - b. Weekends and Stand-down Days. For 24 hrs commencing at 0800 hrs.
4. Dress - Polyesters with cap/slouch hat and Sam Browne/Black Belt and red sash as appropriate. A cane is to be carried.
5. The Duty Officer is the Coy Comd's direct representative.
6. On mounting duty the Duty Officer is to:
 - a. draw from the 2IC or receive from the previous Duty Officer the following:
 - (1) Duty Officer's Log Book,
 - (2) Duty Officer's Signal Register,
 - (3) Company Standing Orders,
 - (4) Plan of Air Base Butterworth with KP shown,
 - (5) List of KP, and
 - (6) Key to the Duplicate Key Cabinet.
 - b. report to OC or 2IC at 1600 hrs for briefing
 - c. ensure that the QRF Commander understands his duties and responsibilities.
 - d. ensure that the Duty Driver fully understands his duties
 - /e. ensure

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ANNEX A

- e. ensure the QRF COMD fully briefs all other duty personnel on their duties, powers of arrest and rules of engagement.
- f. check the armoury and the ready use ammunition and pyrotechnics.
- g. check the servicability of all duty vehicles and all stand by equipment.
- h. advise RAAF Police Duty Room (extension 555) of his name and how he may be contacted.
- i. check the duplicate keys against the inventory and enter the log book accordingly.

7. During his tour the Duty Officer is to:

- a. maintain the Duty Officer's Log Book.
- b. remain on the ~~air~~ base unless otherwise ordered.
- c. sleep in the Operations Room at CHQ.
- d. control and authorise the use of duty vehicles.
- e. supervise all other company duty personnel.
- f. inspect dress and quality of meals at the Airman's Mess.
- g. visit all other ranks bars in the base including the swimming pool at least once during off duty hours during the week, and, on weekends, once in the afternoon and once in the evening.
- h. remain sober.
- i. turn out the QRF once before and after midnight. On one of these occasions the Duty Officer is to deploy the QRF to a particular KP and, on the other he is to practise the quick turnout. He is to enter the time of call out in the Duty Officer's Log Book.
- j. supervise the control of CB. Work tasks are to be detailed by the CSM. Orders for the CB personnel are at Annex H.
- k. visit any company personnel in detention or under close arrest and note details in the Duty Officer's Log Book.

/1. In the

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ANNEX A

- l. in the event of a disciplinary incident involving any company personnel, liaise with and, if requested, assist RAAF Police.
 - m. be aware of any personnel on medical restrictions and visit any hospital patients daily at 1930 hrs, ensuring that they have taken their Chloroquine.
 - n. On receipt of any classified material graded CONFIDENTIAL or above, or on receipt of a priority message/signal, notify the OC or next senior officer.
 - o. ensure that he knows the whereabouts of the OC at all times.
 - p. on Sundays, inspect the ready use ammunition and pyrotechnics in detail, ensuring that they are clean and accounted for; ensure that all magazines are stripped, reassembled and refilled with rounds, and conduct a weapons check. He is to report the details in the Duty Officer's Log Book
 - q. ensure that the QRF COMD knows his whereabouts at all times.
 - r. observe the burning of waste paper by QRF and enter details in the log book.
8. The method of deploying the QRF to a KP is:
- a. visit the SP Guard at the main gate and obtain approval to deploy at the particular KP chosen at the time selected;
 - b. arrange for the SP on duty to telephone the Operations Room at the time selected and order the QRF to deploy on the chosen KP;
 - c. be at the chosen KP at the time SP telephones the Operations Room, or observe turn out and follow QRF to the KP.
 - d. note the time the QRF arrives and observe the method of deployment and selected positions; and
 - e. return the QRF to the duty room and make notes in the log book.
9. The method of practising a quick turnout is by verbal order to the QRF.
10. In the event of an alert or call out the Duty Officer is to:
- a. stand-to the QRF.

/b. ensure

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A-4

ANNEX A

- b. ensure the security piquet section is prepared to react as a reserve and mans the duty room.
 - c. proceed to the Duty Control Room (main guard room at the main gate) or to the GDOC Ops Room if he is so redirected by a GDOC representative, and
 - d. inform the OC or, in his absence, the most senior officer and advise details of any recall plan.
11. If the alert or call out is validated and the base is on alert he is to:
- a. arrange the paging of all company members on the base Tancy system;
 - b. despatch transport immediately for round up of personnel on the base, ie swimming pool, yacht club, etc;
 - c. establish numbers in Penang and Butterworth from the Leave Warning Out Book; and
 - d. implement any instructions received for recall of personnel.
12. The Duty Officer is to report to the OC or 2IC upon dismounting duty.

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ANNEX B TO
AS RIFLE COMPANY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 17 DEC 78

ORDERS - QUICK REACTION FORCE(QRF) COMMANDER

1. Tour of Duty. Your tour of duty is for 24 hours starting 0800 hrs daily. You are to assemble the QRF section in the QRF room at 1630 hrs on working days and at 0800 hrs on weekends, and dismount at 0730 weekdays and at 0800 hrs on weekends.
2. Dress. Dress is dress of the day and an additional belt and basic pouch.
3. Procedures on Mounting Duty. On mounting duty you are to:
 - a. draw, check and distribute ready reserve ammunition and pyrotechnics from the company duty room;
 - b. check inventory for QRF and Duty Rooms and sign inventory check list. All discrepancies to be reported to CQMS on dismounting. Record action in incident log;
 - c. check the working keys against the inventory and enter your log book accordingly;
 - d. parade and inspect the QRF outside the QRF Room at the following timings:
 - (1) Weekdays - 1630 hours.
 - (2) Weekends - 0800 hours.
 - e. brief in detail all members of the QRF on:
 - (1) their orders (particularly stress to be made on orders for opening fire),
 - (2) procedures for turnout, and
 - (3) location of KP's; and
 - f. check all ready reserve equipment, including vehicles and sign for it in the Incident Log Book.
4. Duties. During your tour of duty you are to:
 - a. Control and deploy the QRF as required in accordance with their orders and additional instructions given by the Duty Officer.
 - b. Be responsible for security of all coy HQ buildings and vehicles. All company offices are to be cleaned and locked after duty hours. You are to

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unlock all company offices by 0730 hours on working days. All paper in waste bins is to be burnt.

- c. Ensure that the Duty Room is manned continuously by the QRF telephone/radio picquet during your 24 hours on duty; when you are called out/reacted you are to ensure that the security picquet (reserve) takes over the manning of the Duty Room.
- d. Ensure that you know the whereabouts of the Duty Officer at all times and refer to him any problems outside your jurisdiction.
- e. Maintain the Company Leave Warning Out Book outside the Duty Room and ensure that soldiers are correctly dressed before proceeding on leave. This book is to be shown to the CSM at 0730 hours each work day.
- f. Maintain the Incident Log Book which is to be shown to the CSM at 0730 hours each work day. The following is to be recorded:
 - (1) names of the personnel not signed in on completion of leave and standard of dress;
 - (2) details of the two hour radio checks, including timings and any lack of response; and
 - (3) any other incidents.
- g. Make two hourly radio checks with the main RAAF Guard Room. A net diagram is maintained in the Duty Room.
- h. Conduct CB parades as required. Orders for CB are at Annex H.
- i. Raise the company flag at 0730 hours and lower at 1700 hours daily.
- j. A perimeter patrol is to be conducted daily commencing at first light. The patrol is to be conducted by the QRF mounted in the QRF truck and is to follow the perimeter road checking from the Coy lines and concluding at the cemetery. A foot patrol is to be conducted along the golf course fence where access by vehicle is restricted. The task of this patrol is to identify if the perimeter fence has been interfered with either by the wire being cut or removed or if any object has been placed against or over the wire to gain access to the base. The patrol is to be conducted in random directions daily and the entry recorded in the QRF Comd's Log Book.

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k. You are not to drive the QRF vehicle; you are to appoint a driver from your section. If there is no driver in your section you are to arrange for a driver to be appointed from your platoon.

5. Duties - Weekends/Stand-down. On weekends and stand-down days you are to co-ordinate the coy area security patrol using the QRF members during the period 0800 - 1800 hrs daily. The security patrol duties are to be conducted by the security section from 1800 - 0800 hrs.

6. Ammunition. You are held responsible for the ammunition and pyrotechnics drawn by you, on signature, as the ready reserve. This ammunition is to be issued to members of the QRF and returned to the Duty Room when you dismount the following morning.

7. Meals. Meals for all duty personnel are to be consumed in the Coy HQ building/armscote. The duty driver and one member of the QRF are to collect all meals from the Airmens' Mess.

8. Change of Duties. Duties are not to be changed without the CSM's prior approval.

9. Alcohol. You are not to consume alcohol during your tour of duty or during the six hours before mounting duty.

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ANNEX C TO
AS RIFLE COY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 17 DEC 78

ORDERS - QUICK REACTION FORCE

1. Tour of Duty. The tour of duty is for 24 hours from 0800 hrs daily. The QRF is to be operational from the QRF room during the following times:

- a. Working days - 1630 hrs to 0730 hrs the following day,
- b. Weekends and stand - down days - 0800 hrs to 0800 hrs the following day, and
- c. On working days the QRF is to conduct normal platoon training within Air Base Butterworth during working hrs and is to be capable of reacting during this period if required.

2. Dress.

- a. Where there is no specific state of alert:
 - (1) for mounting - dress of the day with additional belt and basic pouch.
 - (2) after mounting - clean fatigue; and
 - (3) for turnout - as for mounting.
- b. When a state of alert has been specified, the additional belt and basic pouch throughout the turnout period.

3. Sleeping Arrangements. Personnel of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) are to sleep in the QRF room.

4. Duty Room. The QRF is not to leave the QRF Room except when ordered to do so by, or with the approval of the QRF Comd or the Duty Officer or whilst they are conducting weekend security patrols.

5. Composition. The QRF is to consist of:

- a. QRF Comd;
- b. minimum of six OR's, including section radio operator and QRF driver, and
- c. 24 hour Radio/Telephone picquet.

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6. Weapons. The section weapons are to be as follows:
- a. ~~three~~ pistols,
 - b. one GPMG M60, and
 - c. remainder SLP and M16.
7. Security Picquet. See Annex A
8. Radio/Telephone Picquet. Duties as detailed in Appendix 1.
9. Drills.
- a. Turnout. Designed to practise the QRF in turnout at maximum speed. The turnout ends when the duty vehicle containing the section reaches the halt sign at the perimeter of the company lines,
 - b. Deployment to a KP. Designed to familiarise the QRF with location of KP and the best route to them. The SP Guard Room will order the QRF to proceed to a particular KP where the Duty Officer will meet them. This turnout is to be done with full regard to speed limits, road safety and personal safety. On arrival the QRF will adopt a tactical disposition around the KP which will be inspected by the QRF Comd.
10. Weapons and Ammunition.
- a. Weapons will be drawn from the armoury before mounting. Immediately after mounting they will be placed in the QRF Room, where the QRF Comd becomes responsible for their security.
 - b. Loaded magazines and link ammunition are to be issued by the QRF Comd at 1630 hrs on weekdays and 0800 hrs on weekends and public holidays, when the QRF assumes duty in the QRF Room.
 - c. During period of daily training within Air Base Butterworth the QRF is to be equipped and available for reaction. If training outside the coy area, the QRF is to move in the QRF vehicle with a radio, and with the QRF ammunition secured in the ammunition boxes in the truck. During training periods no live QRF ammunition is to be carried on the men. If reacted the QRF weapons are to be cleared and the members subsequently issued with the QRF ammunition before deployment to the KP.

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- d. The state of weapon readiness for the QRF are contained in Appendix 2. Rules of Engagement are in Appendix 3.
- e. The quantity of ammunition to be held in the QRF boxes is:
 - (1) 420 x 7.62 mm ball and 400 x 5.56mm ball;
 - (2) 800 x 7.62 mm link (1 in 4 tr);
 - (3) 50 x 9 mm ball; and
 - (6) 6 flares.

11. Alcohol. Personnel of the QRF section are not permitted to consume alcohol during their tour of duty, nor for six hours before mounting duty.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX C

ORDERS - TELEPHONE/RADIO PICQUET

1. The telephone/radio picquet is rostered by the QRF Comd in the Duty Room; on call out, the security picquet is responsible for manning the Duty Room.
2. Dress is as for the remainder of the QRF.
3. You are to record all transmissions and calls in the Log Book.
4. You are not to leave your post unless relieved.
5. On receipt of a telephone message from the SP Guard Room to deploy to a KP, you are to:
 - a. hang up the telephone,
 - b. immediately ring back the SP Guard Room (ext 555) to confirm the deployment and KP,
 - c. on confirmation from the SP Guard Room advise the QRF section to deploy,
 - d. react with the QRF once relieved by the Security Picquet Comd. On weekends or during the periods when the QRF assumes the responsibility of the security picquet from 0800 - 1800 hrs you are to remain at your telephone/radio post, and
 - e. the security picquet Comd is to assume the telephone picquet responsibility during the QRF reaction.
6. You are responsible for ordering meals for the following personnel:
 - a. QRF section (incl yourself).
 - b. Arms cote Picquet.
 - c. Duty Driver.

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX C

STATES OF WEAPON READINESS - QRF

1. Weapons are to remain UNLOADED during training reactions.
2. If reacted by the SP's on other than training tasks, you are to react with weapons UNLOADED.
3. Weapons are not to be LOADED unless ordered by the QRF Commander and then only if the requirement exists once the QRF reaches the KP, ie 'A REAL' emergency.
4. Weapons are only to go to the ACTION condition if danger is imminent.
5. Weapons are to be UNLOADED immediately it has been identified that there is no longer a threat.
6. Remember, Commonsense is the biggest factor, use discretion.
7. A thorough ammunition check is to be made of each magazine by the QRF Commander before dismounting to ensure all rounds are accounted for. This task IS NOT to be delegated. A record of this check is to be entered in the QRF Log Book.

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

ENGAGEMENT BY FIRE

APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX C

General

1. All troops are to be made aware, through briefing and discussions, of the difficulties of and necessity for, identifying friend from foe. Most Malaysians who have access to the Air Base, seldom carry identity cards and probably have only a vague awareness of authorized and unauthorized areas.
2. It is imperative that all ranks know and understand the rules of engagement and methods of ensuring own troops safety.
3. The most important implication of engagement by fire is 'IF IN DOUBT DO NOT SHOOT'.

Rules of Engagement

4. Application. The rules are to be applied within the Air Base regardless of curfew, periods of increased security, air defence exercises and time of day or night. All ranks operating within the Air Base are to be aware of friendly national organizations which operate within the Air Base.
5. Orders for Opening Fire. You may open fire at a person or persons only in the following circumstances:
 - a. If you are ordered to guard any building vehicle, aircraft, tent being used as a dwelling or as a place of storage, or you are ordered to guard the occupants of, or any property contained in each such building, vehicle, aircraft or tent you may open fire at any person who is in the act of destroying or damaging by fire or explosives the building, vehicle, aircraft or tent, or the property contained therein PROVIDED THAT THERE IS NO OTHER MEANS OF PREVENTING THE PERSON FROM CARRYING OUT THE ACT OF DESTRUCTION OR DAMAGE.
 - b. If you or any other person is illegally attacked in such a way as to give you reason to fear that death or grave bodily injury will result, you may open fire on the person carrying out the attack PROVIDED THAT THERE IS NO OTHER MEANS OF PREVENTING THE PERSON FROM CARRYING OUT THE ATTACK.
6. Before opening fire you are to warn the person whom you intend to shoot of your intention to open fire unless he ceases his illegal act. You should use the challenge 'HALT OR I FIRE - BERHENTI ATAU SAYA TEMBAK' repeated three times.

/ 7. At all times

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7. At all times, before opening fire you must remember:
- a. If in doubt do not shoot.
 - b. You must not fire unless this is the least force necessary to enable you to carry out the orders you have been given.
 - c. Shoot to wound and not to kill.
 - d. Use the minimum number of rounds necessary.
 - e. Your right to shoot ceases as soon as the necessity for protection has passed, ie, if your first round wounds the person so that he can no longer continue the act which caused you to open fire, you are not to shoot him again.
8. You are to take careful note of the fact that your right to shoot ceases at the Air Base boundary fence. You are not to shoot at a person on the other side of the fence.

Sentries on Protected Places

9. If you are posted as a sentry on a Protected Place, the provisions of paragraph 3 apply. However, if any person enters the Protected Place and whilst within the boundaries of the Protected Place fails to halt when challenged with the words 'HALT OR I FIRE - BERHENTI ATAU SAYA TEMBAK' repeated three times you may fire at him provided you are unable to stop him or to arrest him by any other means.
10. Similarly, should a person whom you have arrested within a Protected Place attempt to escape, you may shoot them subject to:
- a. your having challenged them correctly in accordance with the procedure given in paragraph 5; and
 - b. there being no other means of affecting their rearrest.
11. You are to take careful note of the fact that your right to shoot ceases if the person you challenge leaves the Protected Place, whether escaping from arrest or not. You must not shoot at such a person or any other at any time when they are outside the boundaries of the Protected Place, except within the provision of paragraphs 5 - 7.

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APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX C

QRF POLICY AND
MANNING OF GDOC/DUTY CONTROL ROOM

Info Required on Call Out

1. The QRF Commander is to attempt to obtain the following information before reacting to a call:
 - a. The nature of the incident.
 - b. The type of reaction required of the QRF.
 - c. An RV and identity of any person at the KP, including that person's role.

If any of the above information is not available, the QRF Commander should react the QRF, however, he should exercise extreme care before committing his force at the KP. It would be better to arrive at the KP, cordon it and wait, rather than to rush in without adequate briefing.

2. The Duty Officer or commander of the duty platoon as applicable, is to be given the information in para 1 by the telephone picquet if it is available.

Duty Officer/Duty Platoon Commander

3. During normal working hours, the platoon commander of the duty platoon is to react to call out of the QRF by reporting to the duty control room. He is to ensure that he is available for call out at all times during the day and that the telephone picquet is aware of the method by which he can be contacted. He is not to leave the Air Base without the OC's approval.

QRF Reaction

4. The QRF is to be armed as follows:
 - a. Section Comd: M16 and pistol.
 - b. Radio op: M16 and pistol.
 - c. 2 x rifleman: Pick helm, pistol and M16/SLR.
 - d. Remainder: SLR/M16/GPMG as appropriate.
5. The above weapons are to be taken on all reactions. The QRF Commander is to decide on the type of weapons required after arrival at the KP. Examples of weapons required and tactics employed are as follows:

- a. Building Search.

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(1) 4 pers for the cordon - GPMG/SLR/M16.

(2) 3 pers for the search:

(a) Searchers with pistol in holster and
pick helm.

(b) Section cmd/2IC with pistol drawn and
on load, and

(c) Radio op behind sect cmd/2IC with
pistol drawn.

b. External KP. All personnel are to carry normal sect
wpns (ie GPMG, SLR and M16) as well as the four
pistols.

6. Pistol holders are to draw one 9 round magazine each.
All members drawing pistols are to have been trained in pistol drills
and safety precautions and are to have fired an introductory practice.

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ANNEX D TO
AS RIFLE COY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 1 DEC 78

ORDERS - SECURITY PICQUET

1. The security picquet is to comprise a minimum of one NCO and six other ranks, plus an armscote picquet.
2. The security picquet is to mount at 1630 hrs and dismount at 0630 hrs on week days, and on weekends and stand down days is to mount at 1800 hrs and dismount at 0800 hrs. The picquet is to report to the Duty Officer for briefing at 1630 hrs on week days and at 1800 hrs on weekends and stand down days.
3. Two soldiers are to be posted on picquet at all times during the hours specified. Details of the picquet duties are as follows:
 - a. The picquet is responsible for the security of the company offices and lines.
 - b. Their tour of duty is to be two hours with staggered shifts.
 - c. Dress to be dress of the day and a pick handle is to be carried.
 - d. The Picquet Commander is to brief the picquet on the following:
 - (1) shift timings,
 - (2) picquet patrol area, and
 - (3) action if QRF is turned out or deployed to a KP.
 - e. The picquet is to continually patrol the company area in a random pattern and is not to enter a building without clearance from the Picquet Commander, unless urgent circumstances dictate that he does so.
 - f. The picquet is not to loiter near or behind buildings to smoke and is to remain alert throughout its patrol.
4. The security picquet comd is responsible for providing one soldier as Armscote picquet for a 24 hour period commencing 0800 hours daily.
5. On weekends the coy area patrol is to be conducted from 1800 hours to 0630 hrs. On weekends, and during stand down periods, the security picquet is to conduct security patrols during the period 1800 - 0800 hrs. The QRF is to conduct security patrols during the period 0800 - 1800 hrs on weekends and public holidays. On the day of mounting, they are to be on standby from 0800 hrs until they mount duty at 1800 hrs and during that period they are to adhere to the following:

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- a. remain in the base area at all times,
- b. do not consume alcohol during the 24 hour duty period nor 6 hours before mounting duty, and
- c. the picquet may visit any of the clubs and/or recreational facilities on the base provided that they comply with para 5(b) above.

6. If the QRF section is called out, the security picquet is to assemble in the QRF room in patrol order, ready for deployment as a reserve. Ammunition will only be issued on order by the duty officer. The Picquet Commander is to ensure that each man is thoroughly aware of his orders, particularly those for opening fire.

7. The picquet is responsible for the cleaning of the company recreation hut and is to have the hut and its surrounds clean by 0630 hrs daily.

8. The Picquet Commander is to work in conjunction with the QRF Comd in regard to manning the telephone, supervising the leave and any other tasks allotted by the Duty Officer.

9. The picquet comd is to ensure that the juke box in the Rec Hut is turned off at 2200 hrs each day.

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ANNEX E TO
AS RIFLE COY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 1 DEC 78

ORDERS - ARMSCOTE PICQUET

1. The armscote picquet is to be rostered from the Duty Platoon.
2. Your tour of duty is for a period of 24 hrs from 0800 hrs.
3. You are not to leave the armscote unless relieved.
4. You are responsible to ensure that no one enters the armscote except the following:
 - a. OC, 2IC, CSM, Pl Comds;
 - b. CQMS or Storeman;
 - c. Armourer;
 - d. Duty Officer;
 - e. relief; and
 - f. QRF Comd when a state of alert has been given.
5. You are to lock yourself in. At no stage should the door be unlocked unless authorized personnel are going in or out of the armscote as detailed in paragraph 4 above.
6. No weapons are to be issued unless CQMS or Storeman are present except in the case of the security section on call out of the QRF. If weapons are issued to the security section, individual signatures are to be obtained.
7. The bed is to be made and all bedding is to be changed daily. The floor is to be mopped each morning and all eating utensils are to be washed after each meal.
8. All spare weapons as designated by the CQMS are to be cleaned on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday of each week.
9. Check and sign Inventory daily.

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ANNEX F TO
AS RIFLE COY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 17 DEC 78

ORDERS - DUTY DRIVERS

Duty Driver

1. The duty driver's tour of duty is to be for a period of 24 hrs commencing at 0800 hrs daily.
2. Dress is polyester summer.
3. You are not to undertake a driving task or leave the area without the authority of the COY COMD, 2IC, CSM or Tpt NCO during working hours, or the company Duty Officer during non working hours.
4. You are to sleep in the transport duty room.
5. You are not to change duties without the CSM's prior approval.
6. Duties: You are to:
 - a. refuel the duty vehicle (if necessary) before 1530 hrs,
 - b. report to the Duty Officer at 1630 hrs, and
 - c. conduct tasks as directed by the authorized personnel.

QRF Driver

7. Report to the transport duty NCO before 1600 hrs and collect and sign for the duty vehicle keys.
8. Before dismounting, carry out last parade vehicle service and ensure vehicle is clean.

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ANNEX G TO
AS RIFLE COY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 1 DEC 78

ORDERS - TRANSPORT NCO

1. These orders are to be read in conjunction with respective Unit Standing Orders for drivers.
2. Tpt NCO Responsibilities. Your duties include the following:
 - a. maintain a transport detail board,
 - b. maintain a duty driver roster,
 - c. ensure that first and last parades are carried out on all vehicles,
 - d. inform 2IC daily on vehicle states,
 - e. ensure all **drivers** are aware of Standing Orders for drivers, and
 - f. ensure that vehicle documentation is correctly completed.

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ANNEX H TO
AS RIFLE COY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 1✓DEC 78

ORDERS TO PERSONNEL CONFINED TO BARRACKS

1. Personnel awarded CB shall commence their punishment on the day of the award.
2. Personnel awarded CB may be employed on normal duties.
3. CB personnel are not to leave the company area except for programmed training and meals;
4. The following privileges are **denied**:
 - a. use of the recreational rooms,
 - b. any living quarters other than those allocated to CB personnel,
 - c. any canteen or similar establishment,
 - d. film shows or entertainment of any type,
 - e. stand-down and rest days, and
 - f. social activities.
5. CB personnel are not to partake of, or have in their possession, any drugs or alcoholic stimulant during their period of award.
6. Parades are to be held by the QRF Comd daily at the following times and places:
 - a. 0600 hrs. First parade - parade outside Duty Room (shaven and dressed in marching order).
 - b. 0715 to 0730 hrs. CB drill parade (marching order), drill supervised by the Duty Officer.
 - c. 1300 hrs. Report to the CSM.
 - d. 1600 hrs. Report to QRF Comd in marching order (kit inspection).
 - e. 1800 to 1815 hrs. CB drill parade (marching order).
 - f. 1900 to 2200 hrs. CB personnel are to report to QRF Comd at Duty Room every hour on the hour.

/7. CB personnel

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7. CB personnel are to shave before the first CB parade of the day.
8. The dress for CB personnel is outlined in Appendix 1.

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APPENDIX 1
TO ANNEX H

DRESS FOR CB PERSONNEL

1. The dress is to be greens short, web belt, bush hat and GP boots.
2. The following items are required in the basic webbing:
 - a. Clasp knife;
 - b. Pistol belt;
 - c. Water bottles & carriers (full);
 - d. Cups canteen steel;
 - e. Combat pack small;
 - f. Suspenders;
 - g. Basic pouches;
 - h. Toggle rope;
 - i. Pouch fad;
 - j. Magazine and fad;
 - k. Shaving gear;
 - l. Boot gear;
 - m. Sand shoes; and
 - n. Shell dressing.
3. The following items are required in the large pack;
 - a. Blanket bed outer;
 - b. Blanket bed inner;
 - c. Shelter individual;
 - d. Mattress cover;
 - e. Mosquito net;
 - f. Set jungle greens;
 - g. Pan set messing;
 - h. KFS set;
 - i. Sewing kit;
 - j. Water bag collapsible (full);
 - k. Mil bank filter; and
 - l. Smock tropical light weight.

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ANNEX I TO
AS RIFLE COY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 17 DEC 78

INVENTORY - WORKING KEYS

<u>Serial</u> (a)	<u>Particulars</u> (b)	<u>No in Set</u> (c)
1	OC Office	1
2	2IC Office	1
3	CSM Office	1
4	Orderly Room	1
5	Pay Office	1
6	CAP	2
7	Produce Store	1
8	Band/Lof Office	1
9	QRF Room	2
10	Sig Store	1
11	Passage Way	1
12	Recreation Hut	1
13	Lecture Room	1
14	Band Hut	2
15	Ration Store	1
16	Company Q Store	4
17	Company 1st Line Ammo	3
18	QRF Ammo	2
19	Armscote	
20	Transport Hut	2
21	Map Board	1
22	Building 87B	10
23	Building 87C	3
24	Building 87D	8
25	Building 87E	1
26	Building 87K	6
27	Building 87L	3
28	Building 87U	6
29	Keys to Key Cabinet	2 (2)

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ANNEX J TO
AS RIFLE COY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 17 DEC 78

INVENTORY - DUPLICATE KEY CABINET

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Particulars</u>	<u>No in Set</u>
1	Company HQ	13
2	Building 87A	5
3	Building 87B	10
4	Building 87C	3
5	Building 87D	7
6	Building 87E	1
7	Building 87K	6
8	Building 87L	4
9	Building 98U	5
10	Company Q Store	3
11	Armscote	3
12	Transport Hut	2
13	QRF Ammo	

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ANNEX K TO
AS RIFLE COY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 1 DEC 78

COY PERIODIC Q CHECKS

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Check</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>By Whom</u>
1.	Weekly SA ammo check.	Sun	DO
2.	Weekly 25% spot-check of Coy Q Store.	Fri	DO
3.	Con stores check.	Pay Day	
4.	Weekly inventory check.	Fri	
5.	Weekly barracks damage check.	Fri	
6.	Fortnightly non-tech insp.	Pay Day	Also upon return of stores.
7.	CES check.		CQMS
8.	Fortnightly RQMS store check: stores and rations.		
9.	Monthly ammo spot-check.		
10.	Monthly AIU inventory check.	Last work day	RQMS/CQMS
11.	Monthly coy clothing check.		RQMS

Notes:

1. RQMS is to be consulted before entering results of Ammo checks in the CSM's register.
2. Con stores check results are to reach the RQMS the following day.
3. Non-tech inspections are to be additional when equip^{ment} is returned from fd exercises.

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SECURITY OF AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL AND ASSETS
AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

INTRODUCTION

The general political and security situation in Malaysia has been unstable since the period of the Emergency. The riots of 1967 and 1969 culminating in the formation of the National Operational Committee has been an indication of the measure of this condition. Dissident action in the Kuala Lumpur district has drawn attention to the possible vulnerability of Butterworth. The following newspaper articles illustrate the publicity which has been given to this situation in Australia:

- a. Our Defences are Down, by J. Hoffman, Sydney Herald March 11,
- b. Rebels Threaten RAAF Bases, Sydney Sunday Telegraph 18 April, and
- c. Our Vulnerable Base, by Mike Cavanaugh, Canberra News 22 April.

2. The theme of the newspaper articles is that the defences and control of Air Base Butterworth is inadequate in view of the alleged threat. The only official answer released concerning these allegations was made by Mr Gorton 12th April, when he stated in Parliament that the protection of Air Base Butterworth was the responsibility of the Government of Malaysia.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to study the threat to Air Base Butterworth, and the adequacy of the defence arrangements.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

To obtain a realistic assessment of the threat, to Air Base Butterworth both current and likely, JIO was approached through DAFI. In the absence of relevant intelligence from JIO, DAFI supplied the basic information. Although specific details as to enemy capabilities and the nature of warning time for possible enemy operations was not available, the following general picture emerged:

- a. Border Area There are between 1200 and 1500 GIs operating on the border and the strength of the Malay National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the area is stated as 15,000. Concern has been expressed by DAFI MNLF at the ease of penetration by GIs to areas in the southern part of 6 Brigade's TAOR which includes Butterworth. There is little GI intelligence being provided by the local population for fear of reprisals. Hopes are held for improvement in this aspect.
- b. Butterworth Area An exact figure of hard core GI for the Butterworth area generally is not available however by example the 1st Battalion 1st Brigade of the 1st Division has a hard core membership of 1000. In support of this force there are 1000-1500 guerrillas in the area.

- 2

Contrary to newspaper reports stating that a bridge was attacked, only the track was attacked. Intelligence sources assess this action as being of propaganda rather than military value.

- c. Capabilities (Enemy). Intelligence reports assess that the enemy has no mortar capability, at the moment, for attacking the base. The railway attack incident indicates that the enemy has the capability to use explosives in an attack.
- d. The Likelihood of Attack on Air Base Butterworth. Opinion as to how serious is the threat to Butterworth is largely guesswork. The immediate risk does not appear to be great for two reasons, firstly attacks on the target to date have been of a propaganda nature rather than having a definite military objective, and secondly an attack on a vital installation such as Butterworth may provoke intense military reaction which at the moment may not be acceptable to the CT command. However, the possibility of attacks cannot be ignored.

Threat Assessment for this paper

5. In the absence of urgent requests for increased assistance from the OC CT and from the limited specific intelligence available the current threat to the base is considered to be only that resulting from uncoordinated actions by dissident elements. However, there are many current factors which could influence public acceptance of government control in the area. Any lessening of control could result in greater threat to the base by allowing the CT more initiative and opportunity for the manipulation of the population.

6. The day to day peacetime security of Air Base Butterworth was taken over by the RMAF on the 1st April 71. A complement of 266 MAF has been provided by MIBEM for this purpose. This force will provide entry control, security guarding and part of the normal base patrol measures. The RAAF supplement these arrangements by guarding their own Mirage flight lines using RAAF Police Auxiliaries (LEO's) trained as dog handlers. In addition the RAAF Service Police patrol the base married quarters area. These arrangements have proved satisfactory to date to meet the guarding commitment in a normal situation.

7. In the event of covert or overt action caused or threatened by CTs or dissidents the base security plan with the mission "To protect service property and residential persons in the Butterworth area" will be implemented. This plan is designed to guard against a threat to persons or property arising from:

- a. sabotage or malicious damage;
- b. civil unrest arising from racial troubles or industrial disputes;
- c. the withdrawal of civil labour; and
- d. interruption to essential services such as light, water, supplies and waste disposal.

The plan provides for protective operations to be implemented in four stages based on the following:

- a. the possibility of civil unrest or other troubles which may threaten the safety of persons or property;

It is known that an internal security situation threatening service personnel or property is imminent;

or civil unrest actually exists; and

-3-

Personnel to implement the RAAF base security plan will come from RAAF resources. Help from RMAF resources and the AUSTARM element at Butterworth will be used if available at the time. The MOP will continue its role in emergency situations but MINDEF has advised that it could be withdrawn in part or in toto in an internal security situation. The guaranteed availability of the AUSTARM element in an emergency is, at the moment, in question.

The basis of the plan is to utilise the RAAF manpower on the base to:

- a. safeguard service property by ad hoc flights in defensive postures, to be supplemented by a mobile reserve and external reinforcements if necessary and if available;
- b. protect families and nominated persons by deploying the RAAF Base Police Section and any other protective force which may be required into residential trouble areas to supplement the RAAF Warden Organisation;
- c. replacing lost civilian labour as necessary, and as far as is practicable by servicemen or dependents - or, if necessary, from outside agencies either in-theatre or from Australia; and
- d. maintaining essential services by using base personnel, or if necessary by obtaining assistance from in-theatre resources or from Australia.

COMMENTS ON AVAILABLE FORCES

9.

With effect 1 APR 71 the RMAF accepted responsibility for the security of Air Base Butterworth, but requested that the RAAF remain responsible for the security of certain of their own assets. MINDEF EL have provided MOP for this purpose. The force will continue its role in an emergency situation, however MOP advise that they may be withdrawn by higher authority in part or in toto in an internal security situation.

10.

This is a most unsatisfactory situation for the base commander.

RAAF Auxiliary Force

11.

As a result of the introduction of MOP the RAAF Auxiliary Force of 110 men was disbanded. However to afford police dog protection to Australian personnel (Kings lines, bomb dump) a force of 14 indigenous dog handlers was retained. MOP opposed this arrangement on the grounds of standards of proficiency in the current circumstances and proposed their replacement by 15 RAAF SQUADS. This proposal has been supported and referred to MOP by FE but to date no establishment action has been taken.

RAAF Personnel

Personnel are trained to the level required for their duties. However if they are maintained at a state of readiness for an extended period they may well become out of date.

-4-

Malayan Army Elements

13. The question of the operational status of the Army element vis a vis Butterworth is currently under consideration. However at the moment the situation is such that the element cannot be integrated into the base defence plan owing to its uncertain tenure of the base. To meet Army requirements during 1971 absences of one month are planned. Unplanned gaps can also occur, as an example the deployment of a replacement company was delayed by the Jan 71 floods. The element can therefore only be regarded as a bonus, should it be available during a situation requiring its deployment.

External Forces Committed to the Base Security Plan

14. Commonwealth forces situated in Minden Barracks, Penang, and in the general area of the base are tasked for assistance in the family protection plan, and for possible reinforcement of the base. However as their future stay in the area is uncertain they can at the best be regarded as a bonus for use if available.

CONCLUSIONS

15. The conclusions are:

- a. The intelligence immediately available to this department falls short of that required to make an accurate assessment of the Butterworth situation.
- b. The threat to Air Base Butterworth has not increased in recent months, however any deterioration in the political or racial conditions prevailing could lead to an upsurge of CI activity which may affect Butterworth.
- c. The forces generally considered to be available to the commander of Air Base Butterworth would be adequate to meet current and likely future threats if their continued presence and availability could be guaranteed.
- d. The RAAF Auxiliary dog handling force is not as effective as it should be.
- e. Reliance on base combatant personnel to provide the main force for security in a situation of indefinite duration could adversely affect the primary function of the RAAF component.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations are:

This Department should take all possible steps to ensure the intelligence affecting the situation is as accurate as possible.

-5-

- b. The role and availability for the defence of Air Base Butterworth of:
- (1) MAF;
 - (2) Australian Army element at Butterworth; and
 - (3) other Commonwealth and local forces in the theatre
- should be defined.
- c. If the presence of these forces cannot be guaranteed, arrangements should be made for their replacement. In the case of the AUSTALM element, replacement from RAAF resources should be arranged, and in other cases the replacement should be made by the national authority involved.
- d. Fifteen security guards should be established at RAAF Butterworth as requested by BSEUT 4/1/11/Air (Part 1) of 11Nov79.
- e. A deployment plan for relieving the commitment of the base combatant personnel in an extended security situation should be made.
- f. Appropriate staff officers from this department should visit RAAF Butterworth as soon as possible for discussions with appropriate authorities to assist and advise and make recommendations to improve the security of Australian personnel and assets at Butterworth

J.A. Downie
(J.A. DOWNIE)
Wg Cdr
SR (GD)

R.D. Barnes
(R.D. BARNES)
Wg Cdr
PM

AP SR (GD)

*In the absence of DAFPA I have read the paper and have no
objection to the conclusions and recommendations put forward*

Wg Cdr
SR

SR (GD)

*It is noted the implications of para 8b,
the political problem remain does not
change from the paper in any way.*

SECRET - FARLEY

Copy No 3 of 48

Department of Air
Russell Offices
CANBERRA ACT 2600

564/8/28

25th May 1971

REPORT OF VISIT BY SR(CD) AND (TM) TO
HEADQUARTERS AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
4TH TO 12TH MAY 1971

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Visit

1. The purpose of the visit was to obtain details on the security and defence of RAAF Air Base Butterworth and to advise on specialist aspects of base security.

Officers Consulted

2. Officers consulted were:

- a. Air Vice Marshal SUSANS - Commander 1ADS,
- b. Air Cdre PARKER - Officer Commanding Air Base Butterworth,
- c. Gp Capt JOSKE - Commanding Officer Base Squadron,
- d. Wg Cdr STEVENS - Administrative Staff Officer,
- e. Sqn Ldr LONGLAND - Assistant Provost Marshal Air Base Butterworth,
- f. Sqn Ldr PRITCHARD - Legal Staff Officer,
- g. Maj MANION - OC 65 Ground Liaison Section Butterworth,
- h. Flt Lt HOMBSCH - Acting Base Defence Officer,
- i. Flt Lt MATIER - Base Provost Officer,
- j. Capt SAYED - OC Malay Military Police (SSP).

3. Before departure the draft of this report was discussed with the Officer Commanding Air Base Butterworth and the Commanding Officer Base Squadron Butterworth.

4. In addition the reporting officers visited ALOR STAR and in the absence of the Chief Police Officer, interviewed Superintendent MANASAMY, Officer in Charge, Operations Room State of Kedah Police Headquarters. MANASAMY briefed on the role of the Police Field Force in the border area and gave a resume of intelligence affecting the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) in his area of responsibility.

5. Gp Capt J. THORPE Air Attache KUALA LUMPUR arranged for a Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) briefing. The D/IMI Lt Col AHMAD lead the briefing team. Butterworth area intelligence was developed by Major Mohd ALI supported by Sqn Ldr KOAY JIN ANK.

THE BASE AND THE ENVIRONMENTLocation and Extent

6. Air Base Butterworth is located 5 miles North of Butterworth Township in Province Wellesly, State of Penang. The base area of 670 acres has been promulgated as a Protected Place within the terms of the Protected Areas and Protected Places Ordinance 1959. On the Western Side of the Butterworth - Alor Star Road are situated the married quarters, messes and No 4 RAAP Hospital. This area is not included in the protected place gazetal, although action is in hand so to do. Outside the base, married quarter areas are located on Penang Island, and in estates on the mainland to the North and South of the base. Apart from the married quarters the base property outside the perimeter includes remote facilities such as radio and navigation aids. There are also supporting facilities connected with the base, but not part of it, such as Western Hill air defence installations and the medical facilities at Minden Barracks, both on Penang Island. Because of the imminent withdrawal of the units concerned, these facilities have not been further considered in this report.

Base Personnel and Dependents

7. Service personnel on strength of the base as at 1 May 71 totalled 2144.

8. There are 1169 dependant families located on Penang Island, and 297 dependant families quartered on the mainland. These figures include school teachers and other nominated persons not included in the service strength figures above.

THE THREAT

9. The 1971 JIO assessment of the threat to Air Base Butterworth may be briefly summarised as follows:

- a. It is unlikely that any armed action by formed bodies of troops from the CPO or Malaysian Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF) will be mounted against the base within the next twelve months unless a favourable situation resulted from the diversion of the base security forces and local forces to quell civil disturbance.
- b. There is a continuing threat from unco-ordinated action by dissident individuals which could result in loss or damage to the assets of the base.
- c. There is no evidence to indicate that potential enemies have any indirect-fire weapon capability such as mortars.

10. The acceptance of this threat assessment leads to a requirement for two phases of defensive arrangements, apart from the arrangements necessary to protect members, dependants and nominated personnel in the event of civil disturbance. These are:

- * a. day to day security measures to protect the base against the minor threat stated at paragraph 9.b. consisting of routine guarding measures, and,
- * b. the capability to adopt an expanded security posture to counter the unlikely, but nevertheless possible, threat summarised at paragraph 9.a.

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Page 195

Another analysis of the Malaysian white paper.
Note a reference to ABB being close to CT activity para 3.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

I.100807
5 October 1971
TOR 05.10.71...1436 LT
207/2/7

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR.

TO:

Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. Sav.67

REPEATED:

Australian High Commission,
SINGAPORE. Sav.56

MONTHLY SAVINGRAM ON INTERNAL SECURITY
IN WEST MALAYSIA - SEPTEMBER 1971

Summary: The Government has issued a White Paper on Internal Security. An offensive operation has been launched against the Communists in Perak.

White Paper on Internal Security Situation

1. Please refer to our telegram No. 2777, repeated to Singapore as No. 435, dated 3 October 1971 giving a brief outline of the Government White Paper entitled "The Resurgence of Armed Communism in West Malaysia". Copies of the White Paper have been forwarded to you under our memorandum No. 2052 dated 5 October 1971 (repeated to Singapore with attachments as No. 174).
2. The White Paper is interesting from many points of view, and documents well the progress which the CPM has made since the call to arms was issued in June 1968 in converting the United Front to a systematic underground; in re-infiltrating areas where they

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INWARD SAVINGRAM² 100807

had been strong during the Emergency; and in recruiting both Chinese and Malays. A telling point is the Government's admission that the CPM has changed to a policy of multi-racialism and was having some success in recruiting Malays. This is a matter which particularly concerns the Government as a multi-racial communist movement is a much greater threat than a purely Chinese movement.

3. One point which the White Paper does not clarify, and one which is very pertinent for the Government, and indeed for Australia with an air base near one of the areas where the CTs appear to have considerable interest and influence, is the timing of the eventual armed struggle. When will the CPM decide that the time is right for armed attack? The White Paper refers to the launching of the armed struggle (particularly paragraphs 8 and 17), but does not give any indication of how serious in real terms the threat is, and if it is likely to result in some form of communist uprising. We have been told by a senior officer in the Intelligence Directorate, Ministry of Defence (reference: ASA's memorandum Def.194 to JIO dated 1 July 1971) that his assessment was that major action by the CTs could occur in 1973, but may well occur as early as the latter part of 1972. Given the difficult nature of the task of re-establishing themselves and the setbacks, however minor, achieved by security force harassment, the date assessed may be too soon. Special Branch, however, also have said that it would be possible to interpret some CPM directives as indicating that the armed struggle could begin in 1972. It may be, however, that with the capacity of the armed forces being at present limited by an extensive expansion programme, the CTs might feel that they should strike before the Forces have recovered their full strength.

4. Of more immediate significance than the eventual date of the armed attack is the increasing current potential which the various communist groups have for disruption of Malaysian society. The White Paper shows correctly that the CPM has built up an urban, as well as the traditional rural, following. Any form of concerted CT action in both areas could have a seriously disruptive effect on the capability of the armed forces to deal with the problem. The Paper shows too, the increasing capacity of the CT to do this.

5. We cannot, therefore, fill in the facts which the White Paper has omitted on the imminence of armed attack, but cognizance must be taken of the fact that the Government is becoming genuinely concerned that within three years, the CTs have manoeuvred themselves into a position where they are calling the tune for the Government.

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Operation Loyalty

6. To avoid this continuing pattern of being led by the nose by the CTs the Government on 25 September launched Gerakan Setia (Operation Loyalty). See our telegram No. 2716 repeated to Singapore as 416, dated 28 September 1971.

7. The operation is being conducted in the Sungei Siput and Ulu Kinta areas of Perak. The area has traditionally been one noted for deep communist influence and it was in Sungei Siput that the Emergency was sparked off in June 1948. We were told that it was launched to coincide with a smaller and unpublicized operation in the Taiping and Port Weld area where there is a considerable amount of lawlessness amongst the trawlermen, and where it was felt that smuggling operations were supplying the CTs in inland Perak.

8. The operation began under a blanket 24 hour curfew which was later relaxed between 0600 and 1900 hours daily. Questionnaires were handed out to all the population and opportunity was given to people to speak securely with officers conducting the operation or to send the questionnaire anonymously to a special post box. As a result of information received, Security Forces have been able so far to: make several arrests, including some armed terrorists (number unknown), but mainly comprising sympathisers: find plastic explosives, fuse wire, jungle green clothing, two emptied food dumps and three drums used for food storage in the Chemor area, and an abandoned camp and two rest areas in the jungle near Sungei Siput. Announcing this on 28 September, the Chief Minister of Perak who controlled the operation in his position as Chairman of the State Security Committee, also said that security forces had been able to ascertain methods used to recruit youths from rural villages, and methods of recruiting Malays (also discussed in para 20 of the White Paper), by mixing with them at mosques.

9. On 1 October, to add to the impression that the Government was viewing the operation as having great importance, Tun Ismail flew to the area for briefing. During a subsequent speech, Tun Ismail congratulated all the authorities concerned, both civil and military, for working harmoniously together. We believe that this was an actual feature of the operation, and one worthy of remark (although we also believe that the operation had to be postponed, and its secrecy threatened, because the original date clashed with the Sultan of Perak's birthday).

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10. We discussed the operation with one of the Political Secretaries to the Prime Minister, who said that the aim of the operation was to take the offensive away from the CTs and to take a strong Government presence into areas where the Government's influence was sufficiently weak as to enable the CTs to intimidate the local population with impunity. He said that local people who had been supplying food dumps for the CTs appeared willing to confide in Security Forces under such conditions as the 24 hour curfew when the source of the information leading to the discovery of a cache could remain anonymous, but he also said that in normal circumstances they would be too scared to do anything but what they were told to do by the CTs.

11. Despite the unpopularity of the curfew, the Government believes that it has helped to impress on the local population the real importance of helping the Government against the CTs. The security forces intend to take follow up action, including the imposition of another 24 hour curfew in the area to make use of information received during the operation. We have been told that with the experience of this operation behind them, the security forces will now conduct similar operations in the border areas.

Conclusions

12. The trend shown during September is that the Government, realising the potential seriousness of the threat from the CTs and having ascertained that the current strength of the CTs entrenched in areas some distance from their base camp on the Thai border, has decided to take more positive action to fight the CTs, rather than merely reacting to CT moves. They are doing this through emphasis on the problem in the mass media, public education campaigns, such as that involved in the issue of the White Paper, and by conducting more positively offensive operations as Operation Loyalty. Care will have to be taken in regard to such operations as the latter, which does not have the normal elements of a "hearts and minds" campaign, that the local population are not adversely influenced, particularly if the Malaysian Government intends to make it the pattern for further operations throughout Malaysia. Vigorous complaints have already been received by business interests and by wage earners in the areas.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

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I.100807

A/FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J10
PM'S

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ACTION: SEA

SEC DEP SEC(A) A/DEP SEC(B) PR LA FAS(A) NA SA SEA FAS(PW)
PC EAME FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(DVP) ICR FAS(10) SAS(LGL) FAS(MS)

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ANZUK INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SINGAPORE)

NOTE No. 1/1971

THE THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

UP TO THE END OF 1972

SINGAPORE

30 November, 1971


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THE THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTHUP TO THE END OF 1972A. AIM

The aim of this paper is to assess the threat to Air Base Butterworth up to the end of 1972.

B. INTRODUCTION(1) Description of the Base

2. Air Base Butterworth is a Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) base jointly used by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The Base also houses the Headquarters of the Five Power Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) and its Air Defence Operational Centre (ADOC) which are in the south-east section of the Base together with the RMAF Air Defence Centre (ADC).

3. The Base is a major all-weather airfield capable of sustained bomber and fighter operations. It is in Province Wellesley on the north-west coast of West Malaysia five miles north of Butterworth town (on either side of the main north-south road) and approximately 46 miles from the Betong Salient section of the Thai/Malaysian border (see map and photograph). The runway is 8,000 feet by 150 feet, with asphalt overruns of 450 feet on the northern end and 520 feet on the southern end.

4. There are approximately 1430 RAAF personnel at the Base of whom some 300 live on it. There are some 886 Malaysian Service and Police personnel living on the Base (610 RMAF servicemen, 126 Special Security Police (SSP) and 150 Royal Malaysian Navy personnel).

5. To the east of the Base there is flat agricultural land, mainly ricefields. A narrow civilian bitumen road passes parallel to the runway at a distance of about 400 yards through several small kampong areas. A side track from this road runs through ricefields to the eastern boundary gate of the Base. To the south there are scattered kampong dwellings; to the north a local housing estate, small holdings and ricefields; on the western side, where the married quarters, transmitter aerial farm, messes and hospital are located, the boundary runs along the sea front.

(2) Description of the Target

6. The Base (see plan) supports operations by two RAAF Mirage squadrons each with 19 aircraft, a flight of six RAAF C47 transports, and two RAAF Iroquois helicopters in a Search and Rescue (SAR) role.

7. The RMAF maintain a squadron of 10 (shortly to be 16) Sabre aircraft, three Tebuan strike aircraft and up to 10 Alouette helicopters. RMAF Caribou, Dove, Devon and Herald transport aircraft and Nuri helicopters as well as additional Tebuans operate from time to time from Butterworth. Other aircraft from the Five Power countries periodically visit the Base.

8. To support operations by these aircraft, the following facilities are located within the perimeter east of the north-south road: servicing and maintenance hangars and sections dealing with airframe, engine, radio, hydraulics, instruments, radar, armament and electrical repairs; fuel storage areas; ammunition and armament storage; missile (MATRA) preparation bay; equipment storage; motor transport storage and repair sections; control tower and Precision Approach Radar (PAR) section; emergency power plant; operations building; communications centre; Air Defence Centre; telephone exchange and administrative sections. The Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) installation and its emergency power plant, transmitter station, surveillance radar, single sideband receivers, water supply pumping station, and marker beacons are outside the perimeter fence. Thirty-eight of these installations have been designated Vital Points in the Shared Defence Plan for the Base (Operations Order 1/71) which covers co-operation between the ANZUK and Malaysian forces in the defence of the Base in an emergency.

(3) Current Security Arrangements

9. The Royal Malaysian Military Police (26 Company, Special Security Police (SSP)) are responsible for the security of the Base, including control of entry, the guarding on a 24-hour basis of eight Vital Points, and the patrolling of the others at regular intervals. They maintain a quick reaction force of section strength (approximately ten men). The RAAF Mirage lines are not guarded during working hours when they are under normal surveillance by RAAF personnel; outside these hours they are guarded by two RAAF Security Guards, each armed with a pistol and accompanied by a dog. RAAF Service Police carry out mobile patrols at irregular intervals every night during which they check the security of Vital Points and observe the state of vigilance of the SSP guards, reporting by voice radio (also held by the SSP guards) to the RAAF duty security controller at the RAAF guardroom near the main entrance to the Base.

10. A company (currently Australian or New Zealand but in the future possibly British as well) drawn from 28 ANZUK Brigade is stationed on monthly rotation

at Butterworth although at certain times during periods of training and handover - expected to aggregate two months during a twelve-months' period - no company is present. The company on rotation normally travels by train and its movements are therefore easily observable. One of the company's tasks, when at Butterworth, is to assist with the protection of ANZUK personnel, property and shared facilities within the Base. The company provides a section (normally 10 men) as a quick reaction force from 1800-0600 hours daily. The area of active responsibility of ANZUK forces is restricted to within the perimeter of the Base.

11. The RAAF employs about 1,400 Locally Employed Civilians (LEC), of whom all but 60 were vetted by the RAAF before 1 April, 1971, after which date responsibility for vetting passed to the SSP. It is not known what vetting is carried out by the SSP, who have hitherto been unwilling to discuss their procedures with the RAAF on the grounds that they (the SSP) are responsible for the security of the Base. Senior Malaysian officials and service authorities undertook in November, 1971, however, to have RMAF Butterworth produce a consolidated list of LEC for use by the Malaysian authorities in Kuala Lumpur for re-vetting purposes. On average, some 50 LEC are employed within the Base area outside normal working hours, for example fire service, tanker and transport drivers, and air movements and messing staffs.

12. Contractor personnel are employed on the Base by the RAAF, the Australian Department of Works and the RMAF. Individual firms are carefully selected for reliability and experience but vetting of the rank and file employees is the responsibility of the SSP who are given lists of such personnel for the issue of passes. Details of whatever vetting may be carried out are not made available to the RAAF. Upwards of 150 contractor personnel could be working at the Base on any given day.

13. The main static defence of the Base east of the north-south road is a perimeter fence, due to be completed at end November, 1971, approximately 9.3 miles in length. Except in the IADS-ADC area where there is a double fence, the perimeter fence is a single, chainlink fence the height of which varies from six to eight feet. It is topped by a barbed wire outward overhand. Drains running under the fence are protected by bars. A number of Malay and Chinese kampong dwellings are built close to the perimeter fence; in some cases chicken runs and pig pens use the fence as part of their structure.

14. The Mirage lines, the IADS complex and the TACAN installations are protected by good lighting. Most other Vital Points have ineffective lighting; a few are unlit. Lighting at the bomb dump is shortly to be improved, as is street lighting generally. Four sixty-foot towers with floodlights will shortly be erected; these will give good lighting protection to the Staging Aircraft Servicing Section (SASS) and the visiting aircraft/RMAF Sabre and helicopter lines.

15. The Officer Commanding, RAAF Butterworth, has drawn attention to serious weaknesses in the current defences, including: inadequacy in the control and performance of the SSP generally and especially in regard to lack of patrolling of the perimeter, ineffective guarding of Vital Points, the inexperience and youth of the officers and the personnel, and their unwillingness to co-operate closely with the RAAF; the fact that an ANZUK company (with its quick reaction section) is not present on the Base at all times; inadequate control by the SSP of access to the Base; the fact that the perimeter fence is in the main single chainlink, unpatrolled and inadequately lit, and has kampong dwellings abutting on certain sections; ineffective lighting of most Vital Points including the bomb dump (although this aspect should be improved in the near future); lack of knowledge and control of the vetting of LEC and contractor personnel and doubt that the SSP is carrying out effective vetting; the parking of the Mirages in a straight line because of limitations in ground servicing equipment; and the absence of revetments to protect the Mirages.

C. FACTORS AFFECTING THE THREAT

(1) The External Threat

16. The ANZUK Joint Intelligence Committee assessed in October, 1971, that it was unlikely that any external overt military threat against Malaysia would arise during the period under review.

(2) Capability of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO) and Related Organisations

(a) General

17. The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), with its guerilla arm the Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO), enjoys virtual control of areas along the Thai border, from where it has been developing a widespread infrastructure in West Malaysia. Although claiming to be multi-racial, the CPM is basically Chinese, but recent recruiting has included numbers of Thai Muslims and some Malays.

18. The Joint Intelligence Organisation (Australia) estimated in October, 1971, that the CTO has about 1,800 to 2,000 armed terrorists, organised into three regiments - the 8th in the Sadao area of Thailand adjoining Perlis and Kedah States, the 12th in the Betong Salient adjoining Perak State and the 10th in the Weng District opposite Kelantan State - with up to 300 CTs operating in West Malaysia.

19. There is also a reserve and operational support organisation, the Malayan Communist Youth League (MCYL), estimated to number between 3,000 and 6,000, based mainly in Southern Thailand, but with small cells in West Malaysia. Since November, 1969, the CTO, which has always had propaganda support from Radio Peking, has also had similar support from a radio station, Voice of the Malayan Revolution, located in southern China.

20. The Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF), which first came to notice in April, 1970, is the largest and best-organised communist subversive organisation in West Malaysia. The MNLF has cells in most States. Direct links exist between the Perak and Kedah MNLF committees, and each of these also has direct links with the 12th CTO Regiment. The MNLF has already demonstrated a capability for co-ordinated subversive and minor terrorist activities in both West Malaysia and Singapore. There are also a number of other minor subversive groups, some of whom are in touch with the CPM or the MNLF, including the Malayan Patriotic Front (MPF) and the Malayan People's Liberation Front (MPLF). The organisations mentioned operate in the Penang/Butterworth area.

21. In the years 1960-1968, the CPM/CTO concentrated on establishing their bases in Southern Thailand. In mid-1968 the CPM/CTO began to probe the areas of West Malaysia near the Thai border, with the object of assessing whether conditions were suitable for re-establishment of bases prior to the eventual revival of the armed struggle. This new and more aggressive policy of revived activity within West Malaysia was marked in June, 1968, by the ambush of a Malaysian Police Field Force (PFF) patrol near the Thai border at Kroh, in which 17 PFF were killed. After the May, 1969, riots in Malaysia, the CPM/CTO took advantage of the unsettled situation and stepped up their policy of penetration into Malaysia; this has continued up to the present time (November, 1971).

(b) Nature of CT-Initiated Incidents and Modus Operandi

22. Since the CTO intensified their activity in West Malaysia from mid-1968, they have not attacked military installations or large formed units. Their

activities have been directed to renewing contacts with supporters, to the development of lines of communication, bases and food caches, and to recruitment. The CTs have usually carried out these activities in small groups, but occasionally in larger groups of between 20 and 30. In general they have avoided contact with the Malaysian Security Forces, although they have initiated a few incidents within a few miles of the Thai/Malaysian border principally in the form of ambushes of Security Force patrols. Features of the CT modus operandi in such incidents have been the careful selection of ambush sites and timing, the placement of trip wires and anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosives about half a mile apart to trap security forces within a "killing zone", brief attacks by small arms fire and subsequent rapid dispersal.

(c) Arms

23. Up to 1969, arms used by the CTO were mainly of British manufacture, obtained from the British during World War II or captured during the Emergency. These include: British rifles (Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE) Nos. 1 Mk.III and 4 & 5); Bren Light Machine Guns (LMGs) Mk.1, 2 & 3; Thompson Sub-Machine Guns (SMGs); Sten guns; .38 Smith and Wesson (S & W) and 9mm. Browning pistols; and shotguns of various kinds. Other weapons have since been captured from the Thais and the Malaysian Security Forces as a result of ambushes; these include 9mm. and .45 pistols; American-made M3 and M3A1 carbines; LMGs (FN Bren); heavy-barrel, self-loading rifles (HBSLRs); self-loading rifles (SLRs); sub-machine guns (SMGs) and shotguns purchased locally in Thailand.

24. There is no evidence of the CTs having Chinese, Soviet or other communist weapons, nor of any heavier weapons, for example mortars or other indirect weapons. Although there is no evidence that the CTO have a mortar capability, we accept that this could be acquired at short notice and probably without our receiving advance warning.

25. The CTs have shown capability in the manufacture and effective use in ambushes of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle devices. Although these devices have usually been home-made, they have been technically sound. The amount of explosive used in anti-vehicle devices has been sufficient to cause severe damage to soft-skinned vehicles such as land rovers and 3-ton trucks. Subversive groups have used electrically-detonated booby traps and gelignite.

(d) Activities in Butterworth Area

26. The following summarises known CPM/CTO and other subversive activities in areas close to Butterworth Air Base (i.e. within a radius of approximately 50 miles) during the period mid-1968 to November, 1971.

27. In September, 1969, two CTs were sighted 12 miles north-east of Kulim or about 20 miles east of the Base. This sighting was significant in that it showed that the terrorists were operating in the Kulim area well away from the Thai border. The Kulim area has been a traditional centre of CT operations; it was classified a "Black Area" (viz. an area of strong CT activity) during the 1948-1960 Emergency.

28. In April, 1970, booby-trapped flags were planted in many parts of Malaysia and Singapore mainly by the MNLF; in Georgetown (capital of Penang) and Butterworth town, they were planted by the Malayan Patriotic Front (MPF), a subversive political organisation some 200 strong in Penang.

29. Between 29 June and 8 July, 1970, there were eight unconfirmed sightings in southern Kedah, the majority about 12 miles north-east of Kulim. Malaysian Special Branch reported in June, 1970, that a group of CTs was operating near Junjong on the Kedah/Province Wellesley border, and that CT supporters in the Kulim area were supplying food on a regular basis to the CTO 8th Assault Unit (a unit of the 12th CTO Regiment) located nearby.

30. As a result of increased CTO efforts to recruit members, a meeting was held in the Kulim area in June, 1970, between the CTO and the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF). At this meeting the MNLF were instructed to send cadres to the CTO for guerilla training. In August, 1970, 14 Chinese cadres left the Kulim area for guerilla training in southern Thailand.

31. In January, 1971, groups of between four and seven CTs were sighted about two miles north-east of Bukit Mertajam in Province Wellesley about eight miles south-east of the Base. On 8 March the railway line spanning the Sungai Jarak about a mile south of Tasek Glugor about seven miles east of the Base was damaged by explosives. This was a rather inept attempt at sabotage by a small group from the Malayan People's Liberation Front (MPLF), which had received training from the 8th CTO Regiment in the Sadao area.

32. Following increased attention to southern Kedah by the Security Forces, they successfully attacked a group of CTs from the 8th Assault Unit on 15 May, 1971. This group had been established in an overgrown rubber plantation in a hilly area three miles south of Kulim (from which area, incidentally, the Base can be seen). The CTs lost seven killed in the attack and follow-up actions. Documents obtained from the incident revealed that the CTs intended to establish contact with supporters in northern Perak and Junjong in Kedah. Other places mentioned were Penang and Sungei Bakap in Province Wellesley. Another directive stated that the 8th Assault Unit was to expand its activities (development of bases, contact with and training of supporters, recruitment) in southern Kedah and the Selama district of Perak. A further directive instructed the unit to continue stockpiling food and, in suitable circumstances, to supply arms to supporters (while avoiding exposure of their activities).

33. In September, 1971, a Malaysian military source stated that it was thought that the Kulim area would come to life again because "survivors of the 8th Assault Unit" were still in the Gunong Inas Forest area approximately 25 miles east of the Base. The number of these survivors was estimated in November, 1971, by Malaysian Special Branch to be between 20 and 30. The Malaysian military intelligence estimate of November, 1971, was that there were some 60 CTs in the wider Mahang/Gunong Inas/Bintang Hijau Forest Reserves area. In November, 1971, the Security Forces restricted road travel around the Gunong Bongsu Forest Reserve east of Kulim, and about 15 miles from the Base, an indication of official concern for the safety of military and civilian road traffic in an area of continuous CT presence.

34. Localities mentioned in sightings throughout 1971 indicate that Kulim is a centre of movement for terrorists between the Betong Salient and village areas east and south-east of Kulim in the southern part of Province Wellesley, southern Kedah and the Selama district of Perak. CT movement from the Salient appears to have followed the high terrain to Bukit Mertajam. No sightings of CTs have been reported in the "rice-bowl" areas around the Base. This may indicate that the CTs do not, as yet, have enough support from the population to enable them to move freely in this open and largely Malay-populated area.

35. In November, 1971, Malaysian Special Branch reported that they had recently obtained evidence of plans to establish Malayan Communist Youth League (MCYL) groups in Selama and Butterworth town.

(e) Known Incidents on the Base

36. In June, 1971, about 40 feet of copper-core cable was stolen from the Mirage engine run-up bay near the Matra site. A locked building was also forcibly entered at the same time. This area is within 50 feet of an SSP guard position. Between 6 and 10 August, 1971, copper earth strips were stolen from the roof of a building in the bomb dump. A week later eight four-foot lightning arrestors and a number of fire extinguisher caps were stolen from the bomb dump. A search failed to reveal the method of entry to the dump. The building from which the metal strips were removed is in full view of the SSP guard room at the gate to the dump. There have been a number of other thefts from inside the Base area, some outside working hours. In mid-September, 1971, two Malays were seen on a platform in a tree outside but close to the eastern perimeter fence near the bomb dump. They were apprehended and handed over to the SSP and then to the Malaysian Police. Special Branch in Penang have informed RAAF Butterworth that they believe that those apprehended were engaged in surveillance of the Base.

37. These incidents are not necessarily attributable to the CTs or their supporters; the thefts were probably carried out by locals, perhaps LEC or contractor personnel, or even members of the SSP. The incidents do, however, reveal that unauthorised personnel have been able on several occasions within the past few months to gain access to areas within the Base including Vital Points.

(f) Summary of Capability

38. The CTO have an estimated 1,800 to 2,000 armed terrorists in the Thai border areas, with several hundred in the Betong Salient and an estimated 300 operating within West Malaysia. The Kulim area, a traditional area of CT influence and operation, appears to be currently a centre for CT movement between the Betong Salient and village areas to the east and south-east of Kulim in southern Kedah, the Selama district of Perak and the southern part of Province Wellesley. We assess that there are some 60 CTs in Kulim and nearby forest areas some 15 to 25 miles east of the Base with a group - estimated to be 20 to 30 strong - of the 8th Assault Unit (the 12th CTO Regiment) in the Gunong Inas Forest Reserve. It is assumed that these CTs possess small arms (rifles and machine guns) and have the capacity to use anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosives.

There is no evidence that the CTO have a mortar capability but we accept that this could be acquired at short notice and probably without our receiving advance warning. Several communist subversive organisations linked with the CPM/CTO, including the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Malayan Patriotic Front (MPF), and the Malayan People's Liberation Front (MPLF) are known to operate in areas close to Air Base Butterworth, including Penang and Butterworth town. They have the capability to commit minor acts of sabotage (using explosive booby-traps and gelignite). There have been several incidents of minor theft at Air Base Butterworth within the past few months which have revealed that unauthorised persons have been able, despite the current defences, to gain access to areas within the Base including Vital Points. There has been one incident suggesting the possibility - we would put it no higher - of surveillance of the Base for unknown purposes.

(3) CPM/CTO Policy and Intentions

39. The basic aim of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and its associated organisations is the establishment of a communist state of "Malaya" embracing West Malaysia and Singapore. The CPM currently states that this will be accomplished ultimately by engaging in "armed struggle" (referred to in western military writing as Phase II of communist strategy) i.e. that phase of the insurgent campaign involving widespread terrorism, sabotage, guerilla action and attacks on military and para-military forces and government property.

40. This policy involves the development of an extensive underground infrastructure, accompanied by the systematic build-up of an armed capability. A captured document states CPM tasks as "to carry on strengthening the forces, to consolidate and expand the guerilla bases, to expand the operational areas of the vast area of the northern tip (i.e. the north of West Malaysia), to resume the masses' work in rural areas, to build underground bulwarks, to forge ahead with the masses' movement and to expand the guerilla war."

41. That this document is a reliable indicator of CTO intentions is confirmed by other captured documents containing directions to the 8th and 12th CTO Regiments; by the pattern of CTO activity since mid-1968 - small scale isolated incidents near the Thai border with limited objectives such as "blooding" newly trained groups, capturing arms and celebrating a particular anniversary in the CTO calendar; and by

the fact that past CTO practice, has been to develop infrastructure support before embarking on wider armed action. Thus the expansion of "operational areas ... and guerilla war" mentioned in the CTO document is likely to be accorded a lower priority than the consolidation of guerilla bases and infrastructure.

42. It is difficult to predict how soon, and in what areas, the CPM/CTO will feel confident enough to initiate the armed struggle. Communist documents captured in May, 1971 (date of issue unknown) contain directives to build towards armed struggle in 2 to 5 years - a relatively short time-scale if mid-1968 were assumed to be the starting point. The initiation of armed struggle must largely depend on the rate at which the communists' infrastructure and influence can be expanded. The extent of progress here will in turn depend largely on the Malaysian Government's capacity to counter them. We consider it unlikely, chiefly because of lack of expertise, indifferent Thai co-operation and performance in the border area, shortage of training and sound intelligence, an apparent lack of overall strategy, and inadequate leadership, that the Malaysian Security Forces will be able during the period under review to prevent further extension of communist influence and activity. We consider, nevertheless, that the development of the communist infrastructure will not have proceeded to the point at which the CTO would judge the time ripe to proceed to the armed struggle phase.

43. We accordingly assess that current CPM/CTO intentions are to consolidate and extend their present position in West Malaysia; to continue recruiting and building up mass support among the Chinese peasants especially in those areas (such as Kulim) which were communist areas during the Emergency; to enlist support among the Malay peasants; to develop lines of communication and to establish camps as base areas and for training purposes; to develop food supply arrangements and lay down food caches; to obtain arms; and progressively to spread their influence and presence, including that of armed groups, while avoiding other than limited contact with the Malaysian Security Forces. We also consider that the CPM/CTO currently judge that an attempt to move to large-scale terrorism would be premature and possibly counter-productive, and we therefore assess the initiation of armed struggle throughout West Malaysia by the end of 1972 to be unlikely.

44. On the basis of present trends, therefore, we consider that by the end of 1972 the communist infrastructure is likely to be well on the way to completion

in the West Coast states and in Kelantan; that, within that area, a competent and well-organised clandestine organisation will exist; that there is likely to be an increase in armed terrorist activities, largely confined to the border area in Kedah, Perak and Kelantan, although isolated incidents might occur further south; and that the MNLF, which will probably improve its present capacity for booby trapping and sabotage, could initiate a limited campaign involving minor acts of sabotage throughout West Malaysia for propaganda purposes or to celebrate certain communist anniversaries.

(4) Situations in which Air Base Butterworth might be Attacked

45. If the CTO succeeded in substantially expanding their infrastructure and area of influence in West Malaysia to the point at which a widespread campaign of attacks on prominent installations was launched towards the end of the period under review as an introduction to the "armed struggle" phase, Air Base Butterworth might be included as one of the targets; we consider this development unlikely. However, strengthening of the communist infrastructure in the northern states, which is likely, could enhance the risk of an isolated attack on the Base by the CTs.

46. The CTO might see advantage in mounting an attack on the Base in the event of large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest, perhaps involving the diversion of Security Forces. We do not, however, consider such developments likely during the period to end 1972.

47. The CTO might also conceivably decide to attack the Base if they judged that a significant psychological or propaganda advantage might result. This might occur for example if the Five Power arrangements or Australia's role in them were to come under severe criticism in Malaysia, or if the CTO were to assess that such an attack would diminish Malaysia's confidence in the support of her external partners; would result in the withdrawal of Australian aircraft; or would seriously embarrass the Australian Government or have a demoralising effect on Australian opinion. As the Five Power defence arrangements seem likely to remain firm during the period under review, the CTO would have to weigh, against any psychological/propaganda gains, the reaction that could be generated. On balance the CTO seem likely to assess that an attack on the Base for psychological/propaganda purposes would probably be counter-productive: they

might judge that such an attack would not only be likely to bring immediate attention from the Security Forces in the area but would also be likely to have broader effects in the sense of stiffening the Malaysian Government's support for the Five Power arrangements and in other areas of foreign policy.

48. The use of the Base as an airfield from which anti-terrorist air operations were being flown might prompt CTO reaction. We assume that Australian aircraft will not, during the period under review, be operated from Butterworth in an anti-terrorist role. Operations being conducted by the Malaysians from the Base would not appear at present to invite such action.

49. In the past two months, however, the Malaysians have increasingly used the Base for operations involving Tebuan strike aircraft (three of which are now on permanent deployment), and Alouette and Nuri helicopters. We know that the Alouettes and Nuris have been used in support of anti-terrorist operations in the border areas but the extent of Tebuan operations in this role is not clear (although we know that they were so used on a few occasions earlier in 1971). It is believed that a squadron of RMAF Caribou will be progressively stationed at Butterworth during 1972. With the RMAF Sabres becoming operational shortly, we expect that during 1972 the Base will be increasingly used, and known by the CTs to be used, for anti-CT operations in the border areas, and in known CT areas such as Kulim.

50. It is possible that such increased use of the Base could lead the CTO to make some form of "reaction" attack on it but, in accordance with our assessment of basic CTO intentions during the period under review, a CTO decision to make such an attack would still seem unlikely. The possibility of a "reaction" attack by CTs in the Kulim area acting on their own initiative, or by supporters or sympathisers in the Penang/Butterworth area, particularly if RMAF aircraft are increasingly used against the CTs in Kulim, could not, however, be excluded.

51. The Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF) or one of the other smaller subversive groups might well, in connection with an anniversary of significance in the communist calendar or otherwise, make some limited sabotage and booby-trap attempt against the Base as part of a nation-wide, or more restricted, campaign.

(5) Early Warning (Local Intelligence Arrangements)

52. The Formation Intelligence Officer, RAAF Butterworth, is the co-ordinating authority for local intelligence arrangements. He reports direct to the OC RAAF Butterworth, to HQ ANZUK Force and to the Australian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur, as well as to appropriate authorities in Australia. His sources are the Royal Malaysian Police at Alor Star, and reports received through the Australian Army Ground Liaison Officer at Air Base Butterworth, including fortnightly briefings from 6 Malaysian Infantry Brigade (MIB) at Sungei Patani, Kedah, and GOC West Malaysia sitreps received daily by signal from Kuala Lumpur. He also has access to reports of briefings received approximately fortnightly from Malaysian Special Branch, Penang, by the Assistant Provost Marshal (APM), RAAF Butterworth.

53. These local intelligence arrangements might give RAAF Butterworth advance warning of a reasonably large group of CTs making an approach from the border area. The CTs do not, however, usually operate in this manner and it is assessed that advance warning of any form of attempted attack, whether by CTs or members of subversive groups, would most probably not be received.

D. THREAT ASSESSMENT(1) Likelihood of Attack

54. On the basis of the factors affecting the threat discussed earlier in this paper, we make the following assessments for the period up to the end of 1972:

(a) it is unlikely that any threat to Air Base Butterworth will arise from an external overt military attack on Malaysia;

(b) there is a potential threat to the Base from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO), and related communist subversive organisations, whose aim is the establishment of a communist state in Malaysia/Singapore, ultimately by "armed struggle" - widespread guerilla/military action - and who have an estimated 1,800 to 2,000 terrorists in the Thai/Malaysian border area. Of these some 300 are estimated to be within West Malaysia, with some 60, assumed to be armed with rifles, machine guns and explosives, in the Kulim and nearby forest areas approximately 15 to 25 miles from the Base;

(c) on the basis of present evidence, CPM/CTO policy will be directed towards the consolidation of its strength, influence, infrastructure and bases within West Malaysia. Development along these lines, while likely to be substantial in view of likely deficiencies in Malaysian counter-measures, will not be advanced to the point at which a decision will be taken to launch armed struggle. It is unlikely, therefore, that the CPM/CTO will, as a deliberate act of policy, attempt an attack on Air Base Butterworth;

(d) it is possible, but we consider still unlikely, that the CPM/CTO could take a decision to attack the Base in certain circumstances, namely:

- (i) if the communist infrastructure in the northern states of West Malaysia were rapidly and progressively expanded during 1972 to the point at which the CTO judged the time ripe for attacks on substantial military targets in those states (although the risk of an isolated attack on the Base would be enhanced by such expansion);
 - (ii) if there were large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest, perhaps involving the diversion of Security Forces;
 - (iii) if the CPM/CTO were to see significant psychological or propaganda advantage in an attack either in terms of Australian or Malaysian governmental or public attitudes to the Base in the context of the Five Power defence arrangements or as a morale-boosting demonstration, possibly related to a communist anniversary; and
 - (iv) in retaliation for the increased use of the Base by the RMAF in anti-terrorist operations; and
- (e) there is definitely a risk that one or more CTs, or members of subversive groups known to be operating in the vicinity, could, regardless of CPM/CTO policy and/or acting on their own initiative, attempt an isolated attack on or within the Base at any time.

(2) Timing, Advance Warning, Method and Strength of any Likely Attack

55. As to the timing of any attack, we have earlier recorded our assessment that it is unlikely that the CPM/CTO will as a deliberate act of policy attempt an attack on Air Base Butterworth during the period to the end of 1972. As to the possible attacks referred to in paragraph 56(d), we assess that these,

if they took place at all, would be more likely towards the end of the period under review. The form of isolated attack mentioned in paragraph 56(e) could take place at any time.

56. We assess that advance warning of any form of attempted attack (other than by a large group of CTs which we assess as unlikely) would most probably not be received whether the attack were by CTs or members of subversive groups.

57. Methods and strengths which could conceivably be employed, if it were decided to attack the Base, range through a number of possibilities (or variants of these):

(a) direct frontal assault by a large group of CTs up to 60 strong using small arms fire and explosives;

(b) covert penetration, probably at night, by one or more individual CTs or small groups, totalling up to 20, with a view to surprise attack on Vital Points, especially the aircraft, by small arms fire and explosives;

(c) mortar or other indirect weapon attack, if the CTs acquired this capability, using a small force of up to ten men located in the surrounding ricefield/kampong areas, especially those to the east;

(d) sabotage by the planting of delayed-action explosives, booby-traps and other similar devices, designed to damage Vital Points and injure personnel, by one or more CTs, members of subversive groups, or sympathetic or suborned LEC/contractor personnel.

58. Of the foregoing, we assess (a) and (b) as the least likely methods, prompting as they would reaction from the Base defence system and, subsequently, the Malaysian Security Forces. Method (b) should not, however, be discounted especially in view of the relative ease of a covert approach to Vital Points through the current defences. Method (c) would be likely if the CTs acquired a mortar capability. Method (d) is assessed as currently by far the most likely.

59. In the event of a sabotage attempt as in (d) above, those making it, particularly if they were suborned LEC/contractor personnel or members of subversive groups, might well be tempted to attack "soft targets", e.g. those Vital Points outside the

Base perimeter fence and/or those which are protected only by SSP patrols and dim lighting. They would probably also act partly on an opportunity basis, depending on where they had chosen to conceal themselves or cut through/climb over the fence. If an attack were the result of a deliberate CPM/CTO policy decision, or carried out by CTs in the area acting on their own initiative, however, we would expect Vital Points within the perimeter, especially the aircraft (probably RMAF before RAAF) to be priority targets, whether the attacks were carried out by mortar, surprise assault or sabotage.

E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(1) The Base and the Target (Paragraphs 1 to 8)

60. Air Base Butterworth, an RMAF base jointly used by the RAAF and situated on the north-west coast of West Malaysia, 46 miles from the Betong Salient section of the Thai border, currently supports operations by RAAF Mirages (38), RMAF Sabres and Tebuans and other aircraft. Over 1,400 RAAF personnel work at the Base, of whom 300 live on it, as do nearly 900 Malaysian servicemen and police. Some 1,500 Locally Employed Civilians (LEC) and contractor personnel are employed at the Base. A wide range of installations, including an air defence centre, radar and navigational aids, fuel and ammunition storage, and a missile (MATRA) preparation bay, are situated on or near the Base.

(2) Current Security Arrangements (Paragraphs 9 to 15)

61. The Malaysian Special Security Police (SSP) are responsible for the security of the Base including control of entry, guarding/patrolling of Vital Points (38 of which are designated in an ANZUK/Malaysian Shared Defence Plan for the protection of the Base in an emergency) and the maintenance of a 10-man quick reaction force. At night, pairs of RAAF Security Guards, each with a dog, guard the Mirage lines which are floodlit, and RAAF Service Police carry out mobile patrols of Vital Points at irregular intervals. A company from ANZUK Brigade is stationed at the Base for approximately 10 months of the year and, when there, provides a 10-man quick reaction force from 1800 - 0600 hours daily. Static defences comprise a single 6 to 8 foot perimeter fence with barbed wire overhang, and lighting of most Vital Points.

62. The Officer Commanding, RAAF Butterworth, has drawn attention to serious weaknesses in the current defences including the ineffective performance and inexperience

of the SSP and the unco-operative attitude of their officers; the fact that the ANZUK company is not present at all times; deficiencies in the static defences, and in vetting procedures for LEC; and the parking of the Mirages in a straight line and without protection by revetments.

(2) Capability of Communist Organisations
(Paragraphs 16 to 38)

63. In the absence of an overt external threat to Malaysia, which is assessed as unlikely during the period under review, the potential threat is from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO) and related subversive groups.

64. The CTO have an estimated 1,800 to 2,000 armed terrorists in the Thai border areas, with several hundred in the Betong Salient and 300 in West Malaysia. Of these, we assess that there are some 60 in the Kulim and nearby forest areas about 15 to 25 miles east of the Base. They are assumed to have small arms (rifles and machine guns) and the capacity to use anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosives. There is no evidence that the CTs have mortar capability but we accept that this could be acquired at short notice and without our receiving advance warning. Several communist subversive organisations linked with the CPM/CTO are known to operate in the area and have the capability to commit minor acts of sabotage, using explosives and booby-traps. Recent cases of theft have shown that unauthorised persons (not necessarily CTs or supporters) have on several occasions gained access to areas within the Base, including Vital Points.

(3) CPM/CTO Policy and Intentions
(Paragraphs 39 to 44)

65. We assess that current CPM/CTO intentions are to consolidate their present position in West Malaysia by recruitment and extension of support among both Chinese and Malays; by the development of lines of communication, food supply arrangements, food caches and camps as base areas and for training; by the acquisition of arms, and by the progressive spread of their influence and presence, including that of armed groups, while avoiding other than limited contact with the Malaysian Security Forces. It is difficult to predict when and where the CPM/CTO will feel confident enough to initiate the "armed struggle" phase of communist insurgent strategy (widespread guerilla/military action including attacks on military forces and property) but, despite deficiencies in Malaysian countermeasures, we doubt that this phase will be initiated throughout West Malaysia by the end of 1972. We assess, however, that by then the communist infrastructure is likely to be well on the way

to completion in the West Coast states and in Kelantan; that there is likely to be an increase in armed terrorist activities in the border area in Kedah, Perak and Kelantan, with the possibility of isolated incidents occurring further south; and that communist subversive organisations might initiate a campaign of sabotage for propaganda purposes or to celebrate communist anniversaries.

(4) Situations in which Air Base Butterworth might be Attacked (Paragraphs 45 to 53)

66. CTO attacks on prominent installations as an introduction to the "armed struggle" phase in West Malaysia are considered unlikely during the period under review, although the strengthening of the communist infrastructure in the northern states, which is likely, could enhance the risk of an isolated attack on the Base by the CTs.

67. Large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest, which might provide occasion for a CTO "opportunity" attack, are considered unlikely.

68. The CTO could decide to attack the Base to gain psychological or propaganda advantage; on balance, we expect them to judge that such an attack would probably be counter-productive.

69. Although we expect the Base to be increasingly used by the RMAF during 1972 for anti-CT operations, a "reaction" attack by the CT is assessed as unlikely. The possibility of such an attack by CTs or supporters in the area acting on their own initiative cannot, however, be excluded.

70. Subversive groups might well make a limited sabotage attempt against the Base as part of a nation-wide, or more restricted, campaign.

(5) The Threat Assessment

Likelihood of Attack
(Paragraph 54)

71. We assess that, during the period up to the end of 1972:

- (a) it is unlikely that any threat to Air Base Butterworth will arise from an external overt military attack on Malaysia;
- (b) there is a potential threat to the Base from the CPM, the CTO, and related communist subversive organisations. The CPM/CTO have an estimated 60 terrorists armed with rifles, machine guns and explosives in the Kulim and nearby forest areas approximately 15 to 25 miles from the Base;

- (c) CPM/CTO policy will be directed towards the consolidation of its infrastructure within West Malaysia and this will not be advanced to the point at which a decision will be taken to launch armed struggle. It is therefore unlikely that the CPM/CTO will, as a deliberate act of policy, attempt an attack on Air Base Butterworth;
- (d) it is possible, but still unlikely, that the CPM/CTO could take a decision to attack the Base in certain circumstances, namely:
 - (i) if the infrastructure in the northern states were expanded to the point at which the CTO judged the time ripe for attacks on substantial military targets in those states (although the risk of an isolated attack on the Base would be enhanced by such expansion);
 - (ii) if there were large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest;
 - (iii) if the CPM/CTO were to see significant psychological or propaganda advantage in an attack either in relation to Australian or Malaysian governmental or public attitudes to the Base or as a morale-boosting demonstration, possibly related to a communist anniversary; and
 - (iv) in retaliation for the increased use of the Base by the RMAF in anti-terrorist operations; and
- (e) there is definitely a risk that one or more CTs or members of subversive groups could, regardless of CPM/CTO policy and/or acting on their own initiative, attempt an isolated attack on or within the Base at any time.

Timing, Advance Warning, Method and Strength of any Likely Attack (Paragraphs 55 to 59)

72. We assess that:

- (a) it is unlikely that the CPM/CTO will as a deliberate act of policy attempt an attack on Air Base Butterworth to the end of 1972. If, however, any of the possible attacks referred to in paragraph 71(d) took place, we assess that these would be more likely to occur towards the end of the period under review. The form of isolated attack mentioned in paragraph 71(e) of the preceding paragraph could take place at any time;

- (b) advance warning of any form of attempted attack (except attack by a large group of CTs which is assessed as unlikely) would most probably not be received whether the attack were by CTs or members of subversive groups;
- (c) methods and strengths which could conceivably be employed, if it were decided to attack the Base, range through a number of possibilities:
 - (i) direct frontal assault by a large group of CTs up to 60 strong using small arms fire or explosives;
 - (ii) covert penetration, probably at night, by one or more individual CTs or small groups totalling up to 20 with a view to surprise attack on Vital Points, especially the aircraft, by small arms fire and explosives;
 - (iii) mortar or other indirect weapon attack, if the CTs acquired this capability, using a small force of up to 10 men located in the surrounding ricefield/kampong areas, especially those to the east; and
 - (iv) sabotage by the planting of explosive devices or booby traps, designed to damage Vital Points and injure personnel, by one or more CTs, members of subversive groups, or sympathetic or suborned LEC/contractor personnel;
- (d) of these methods, sabotage is by far the most likely, although covert penetration and surprise attack by a small group should not be discounted, and a mortar attack would be likely if the CTs acquired this capability; and
- (e) a sabotage attempt, if made by suborned LEC/contractor personnel or members of subversive groups, might well be directed against those Vital Points outside the

perimeter fence or protected only by SSP patrols and dim lighting. If an attack were carried out by CTs as a result of a CPM/CTO policy decision, or by local CTs acting on their own initiative, however, we would expect Vital Points within the perimeter, especially the aircraft, to be priority targets, whether the attack were carried out by mortar, surprise assault or sabotage.

M.E. LYON
Australian Representative
(Chairman)

J.A. SANKEY
British Representative
(Co-ordinator)

D.G. HARPER
New Zealand Representative

F.E. BOLTON
(Squadron Leader)
Acting Chief Staff Officer
(Intelligence)


SINGAPORE
30 November, 1971

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Communist Insurgency in Malaysia

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22 February 1972
No. 0839/72

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 February 1972

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Communist Insurgency in Malaysia

Introduction

A year ago the Malay-controlled Razak government negotiated a delicate return to open political life ending 21 months of emergency rule imposed after the race riots of 1969. It did so with greater finesse and ease than almost anyone, the government included, expected. The predominant government party, the rejuvenated United Malay National Organization, has managed to recapture, at least temporarily, its disaffected Malay constituency without adopting extreme pro-Malay policies which would have seriously increased the level of Chinese alienation. The government is so defensive about its Chinese constituency, however, that it has not published 1970 census results which reportedly show the Chinese catching up to the Malays in population growth and accounting for 42 percent of the population compared to the Malays' 48 percent. Much of the government's political opposition comes from Chinese, but they are hamstrung by extensive government restrictions on political debate and activity. Although the government has by no means solved the basic Malaysian communal dilemma, it may have succeeded in buying the country several years of much-needed political stability and moderation.

Stability in the future may be threatened by the gradual resurgence of the Malayan Communist Party, an organization largely composed of and

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supported by indigenous Chinese. The party launched a moderately successful terrorist campaign during the British rule of Malaya in mid-1948 with some 5,000 to 6,000 guerrillas. To meet the threat, the United Kingdom banned the party, declared a state of emergency which lasted until the independent Malaya terminated it in 1960, poured in thousands of troops and, with active Malayan public and official support, broke the back of the movement by the end of 1954. In that year, the Communist political apparatus and all principal military units moved to safehavens across the Thai border. Small Communist units left behind continued resistance for a few years, but by 1960 no armed Communist groups of any consequence remained. Forces in southern Thailand were consolidated into a hard core of some 600 armed members, virtually all of them ethnic Chinese.

In 1968 the Communists decided to move out of their Thai sanctuaries and rebuild insurgent bases on Malaysian soil. Within three years they managed to emplace an estimated 200-300 armed guerrillas south of the border. Despite this progress, the insurgents face an uphill struggle in re-establishing themselves in West Malaysia. If they are to become a serious security threat, they must develop an extensive network of support areas, and to do this they must win over or intimidate substantial numbers of people. There is no evidence of a significant increase in active popular support for the guerrillas, but there are signs that support is being resumed in areas of former strength. Arms would also be a problem. Short of a major eruption of communal violence the Communists' ability to develop large-scale sustained guerrilla operations seems doubtful.

Whatever its prospects, the renewal of the Communist insurgency comes at an awkward time for the government. If the Communists succeed in moving Malaysia into a second insurgent "Emergency," the resulting drain on Kuala Lumpur's limited material and leadership resources will seriously hinder the country's economic and political development. An invigorated insurgency that is heavily dependent on support from the Chinese community will further complicate the government's efforts to construct a workable communal relationship between the Malay and Chinese populations.

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Thai Sanctuary and a Second Try

1. The reappearance of a fledging insurgent operation in West Malaysia after over ten years of quiet has raised questions concerning Kuala Lumpur's ability to protect itself against Communist subversion and guerrilla action. The government's performance in the past two years has not been totally satisfactory. The British never completely eliminated the party itself and over time, it has been able to build a foundation for renewed subversive and military activity from sanctuaries just across the border.

2. Since the Communists' combat element, the Malayan National Liberation Army (commonly known as CTs or the Communist Terrorist Organization) moved into Thailand during the 1950s, it has reorganized and grown in numbers and influence within its base area. From some 600 members, it has grown to an estimated 1,500-1,700 men armed primarily with an assortment of locally obtained World War II small arms and rifles. This force is supported by an auxiliary Malayan Communist Youth League numbering about 3,000 young men who have received ideological and paramilitary training. About 100,000 people live in the Communist area, and many regularly pay taxes to the Communist organization.


3. The party could not maintain and enhance its insurgent capability without this Thai sanctuary, which the Thai have not and the Malaysians cannot disrupt significantly. Although the Thai have been somewhat more cooperative in the past two years, Bangkok simply is not seriously concerned over an insurgency in a remote part of the country and not targeted directly against Thailand. This remains true despite increased cooperation between the Malayan Communists and Thai Communist insurgents operating nearby. Bangkok's attitude toward the Malaysian Communists has also been affected by separatist sentiment among Thai Muslims of Malay extraction, the largest ethnic group in the border areas. Despite Malaysian assurances to the contrary, the Thai fear that Kuala Lumpur has irredentist aspirations and is not above exploiting separatist feeling in the southern border provinces.

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West Malaysia: Areas of Communist Insurgent Operations



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[REDACTED]

These suspicions have limited the effectiveness of Thai-Malaysian cooperation against the insurgents.

4. The two governments hold joint border committee meetings regularly and occasionally conduct joint [REDACTED] operations. These have not been very rewarding because of Thai foot-dragging. Despite an agreement permitting Malaysian "hot pursuit" into Thailand, the Thai are reluctant to see unilateral Malaysian military operations on Thai soil. Given this attitude, a rugged border area that is almost impossible to seal, and a residue of sympathy for the Communists among the border peoples, Malaysia must live with a relatively secure guerrilla base of operations across its border for the foreseeable future. This means that the Communist insurgent threat cannot be erased, only contained. It also means that the return of the insurgents to Malaysia was almost inevitable.

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5. [REDACTED] the Malayan Communist Party appears to have decided in June 1968 to return to armed struggle in West Malaysia. This change of tactics may have been partially inspired by the influence of China's Cultural Revolution militancy within the party. The Communists must also have judged that their insurgent force was at last ready for an effort south of the border. The outbreak of communal rioting in Kuala Lumpur a year later and the Malaysian Government's subsequent difficulties almost certainly helped solidify the party's resolve to undertake its long-planned but perilous return to Malaysia.

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6. Small groups of insurgents were reported crossing the border in 1969. Much of this initial activity appeared to be reconnaissance and training. As time went by, larger groups crossed into Malaysia, stayed longer and penetrated more deeply. The first confirmation of an "in place" insurgent group came in late 1970. [REDACTED]

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7. There are good reasons why the initial Communist effort was directed against Perak and Kedah. These were previous Communist strongholds and contain a relatively high density of rural Chinese. Insurgents in these areas are thus renewing contact with old supporters, enlisting new ones, and in general attempting to gain the active or passive cooperation of the local population. Up to now they have carefully refrained from direct intimidation or terrorism against the locals. The Communists appear to be concentrating on recruiting new personnel to be sent for training in Thailand, preparing the ground for additional armed groups, and caching food supplies. Concealed stockpiling suggests that the Communists have learned from experience and are aware that the government broke the back of the earlier insurrection by resettlement programs which denied Communist access to food supplies in sympathetic villages. In this preparatory period, the Communists are doing everything they can to avoid contact with government security forces. With the exception of ambushes near the border carried out by Thai-based insurgents, government forces have started all fire fights and other contacts during the past year.

8. The insurgents have enjoyed some initial success in their effort to rebuild a mass support and logistic apparatus. Kuala Lumpur has had to accept the fact that the insurgents have been receiving some degree of support from tight-lipped rural Chinese in Perak and Kedah. Government security forces so far have obtained little useful information on insurgent activities from the local Chinese.

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9. The government is even more concerned over Communist efforts to gain support among the Malay population. For most of its history, the Malayan Communist Party has been almost exclusively Chinese, both in terms of the ethnic composition of its leadership and support and the party's strong pro-Peking ideological stance. During the past few years, however, the party has been making a considerable effort to recruit Muslims of Malay extraction in southern Thailand--an indication that it realizes it must broaden its appeal if the revolution is ever to take hold in Malaysia. Its efforts to attract Malay support in West Malaysia are currently centered in Kelantan, a heavily Malay area.

10. The present degree of communal polarization in Malaysia, however, poses a tremendous obstacle to these efforts. The average Malay, for religious and cultural reasons, resists Communist blandishments, especially if the enticers are closely associated with Chinese interests. Given the more outwardly Malay character of the present Malaysian Government and the greater expectations it has generated within the Malay community, there appears to be relatively little reason at present for Malays to turn toward the Communists. The party has attracted Malays on the Thai side of the border by playing on their separatist sentiments and numerous grievances against an indifferent government in Bangkok.

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Government Countermeasures: Identifying the Problem

12. Last September the government mounted a counterinsurgency campaign in the states of Perak and Kedah. This effort has been characterized by large-scale military operations which have proved for the most part useless and in some cases counter-productive.

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14. The need to gain local information leads directly to the core of the Malaysian insurgent problem--the government's relationship with the rural Chinese. The post-election race riots of 1969 and succeeding events presumably have made it easier for the Communists to proselytize these people. The roots of the problem, however, run far deeper. In fact the 1969 racial disorders, the subsequent restriction of parliamentary democracy, and the emergence of a more outwardly Malay government in Kuala Lumpur probably had relatively little impact in upper Perak and Kedah--areas where the rural Chinese have long been disaffected, chauvinistic, and largely unassimilated.

15. The resettlement between 1950 and 1952 of more than 400,000 people, mostly rural Chinese, into defended compounds known as "new villages" was highly successful in separating Communist insurgents from sources of food and information, but it reinforced the Chinese population's alienation from the government. With rusted remnants of barbed wire still in evidence and their reputation for disloyalty intact, the "new villages" in Perak and Kedah today present a dismal picture. The term "new village" has become cruelly misleading in the face of almost complete government neglect, particularly over the past ten years. In recent years, declining prices for rubber, the principal source of income in the area, have accelerated the process of alienation. Still, the greatest source of disaffection among the rural Chinese is the problem of land tenure. Large numbers of rural Chinese were moved into new villages with the expectation that they would be given the opportunity to gain title to surrounding state-owned

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land. This, however, has not taken place to any significant degree. In practice, discrimination and administrative red tape within the various state governments of West Malaysia have denied the Chinese the land. Instead most are working land illegally or by right of temporary occupation licenses granted by the state governments.

16. The problem of alienation in the rural areas of northern West Malaysia has been compounded by the generally low caliber of central government administration in the countryside. Because of the communal polarization and because well-qualified administrators are scarce, the central government has largely lost touch with many rural Chinese.

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
17. The renewal of Communist insurgency has, at least, had one positive effect. The government has been made aware of the gulf between it and the rural Chinese. The underlying social and economic reasons for disaffection in rural areas were frankly discussed in a government white paper on the insurgency issued last October, and Kuala Lumpur is now beginning to react. It is trying to take a broader approach to counterinsurgency. Administrators have been ordered to prepare a full survey of the long-neglected problems and needs of the new villages. "Chinese affairs" officers, tasked with explaining government policy and serving as Kuala Lumpur's eyes and ears, are being appointed in many districts. Most important, the government is starting to expedite the acquisition of land by the rural Chinese.

18. At the same time, the government is determined to improve security in the countryside. Curfews remain in insurgent areas, fences are going

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East Malaysia: Areas of Communist Insurgent Operations



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up around some villages, various schemes such as rationing and production quotas have been put in effect to deny food to the insurgents, and the government is doing a lot of blunt talking. Such measures run the risk of further alienating the new villages, but the government believes that first and foremost it must demonstrate its ability to protect the people and its determination to move against the insurgents.

East Malaysia: A Containable Problem

19. The government's counterinsurgency effort in West Malaysia is being affected by the Communist-led insurgency in the East. During the past year insurgents of the Sarawak Communist Organization (the name applied to various Communist guerrilla and front organizations in Sarawak) have become more aggressive, stepping up ambushes against security forces and assassinations of government officials and suspected informants. The movement, with some 600-1,100 insurgents, gathered enough steam over the past year to goad the government into action. Since last summer a large-scale combined military-civilian security operation has been under way in the Third Division of Sarawak. It has drained off large numbers of Malaysian Special Branch officers badly needed in West Malaysia.

20. There is no known connection between the Sarawak insurgents, spawned during the Indonesian anti-Malaysia campaign of 1963-1966, and the Communist Party of Malaya. To a large degree, however, the circumstances surrounding insurgency in East Malaysia closely resemble those in the western wing of the country. The problem in Sarawak, as in the West, is still basically the alienation of the Chinese. Malays are heavily outnumbered by both the Chinese and tribal peoples. The disaffection of the rural Chinese can again be blamed on an indifferent state government, land tenure problems, and the lack of an effective government administration in the countryside. Sarawakian Chinese in particular resent the sudden Malay political domination imposed after the formation of Malaysia in 1963.

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21. The Sarawak insurgents are poorly armed and trained, and, in this respect, the problem of containing them is less difficult than in West Malaysia. The Communist insurgent organization in Sarawak, however, enjoys some advantages. It successfully recruits among the Ibans, the largest of the non-Malay tribal groups, who chiefly inhabit rural areas. How many is uncertain, but the numbers have obviously been slowly growing over the years. In their areas of operation, the insurgents seem to have considerable public support, based on either sympathy or intimidation, among both Chinese and Ibans. Although their former safehaven across the border in Indonesia is no longer available, there are areas within Sarawak to which the insurgents can safely retreat.

22. Communist strength in Sarawak is believed to remain fairly constant, with new recruits replacing those killed or captured. The government recently did seize the initiative from the terrorists and has demonstrated its ability to contain the insurgents.

A Quiet Period Ahead in the West

23. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Communists estimate that the insurgency will have to remain in a developmental stage for another two years, during which time the insurgents will be carefully avoiding military action, building up food and supply caches, and fully developing a support system within the local population. There is indeed very little, if any, real fighting taking place in West Malaysia and now is obviously the time for the government to blunt the Communists' effort before they can marshal the resources for a costly, destructive, and lengthy insurrection.

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24. Communist strategy has led the party to turn its back on some rather enticing targets and the chance to make headlines. For example, insurgents are known to be active within 20 miles of Butterworth Air Base [REDACTED]

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25. The insurgent timetable could always be speeded up by external factors, such as dramatic Communist victories in Indochina and Thailand or by the extension of significant material assistance from North Vietnam or China. External help, however, is something that the party has had to do without for most of its history, and the insurgents can hardly be sure of such assistance in the future.

26. The historically close relationship between the Malayan and the Chinese Communists is a matter of record. A nucleus of select Malayan Communists has functioned in Peking for years, and an organization known as the Malayan National Liberation League headed by Malayan Communists has been there since 1966. A strong radio station, "The Voice of the Malayan Revolution" has been operating since November 1969 from South China, and its initial broadcast was an announcement that the station's purpose was to "prepare...for the launching of an extensive people's war in Malaya." It can be assumed that the Chinese were aware in advance of the 1968 call to arms. Communication between the

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Malayan Communists and Peking presumably is by courier and may be infrequent. Despite the combination of a close bond, liaison, and strong propaganda support, there is no evidence that Peking or any other Communist party has supplied funds or arms to the Communist Party of Malaya. Its decision to return to active insurgency should not be significantly affected by Peking's current emphasis on peaceful coexistence and conventional diplomacy, and Kuala Lumpur almost certainly does not count on eliminating the insurgent threat through diplomatic action.

27. Although there is likely to be no quick or easy solution for the Communist insurgency now developing in West Malaysia, neither is there cause for deep pessimism at this stage. Under any circumstances the insurgents face an uphill struggle. The Malaysian Army's jungle operations have provided useful training for a force that could increase in proficiency as time goes by. Furthermore, Kuala Lumpur is fully aware of the need to quash the insurgency in its early stages and is determined to do so. Progress has been made in [redacted]

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[redacted] population denial schemes, and other reactive measures. The insurgents have lost the initial advantage of surprise and must be feeling the pressure. So far they appear not to have spread out of the base areas established as much as a year ago and, as far as is known, have not significantly increased the number of insurgents operating in West Malaysia.

28. The Communists also face the problem of arms supply. Insurgents in southern Thailand and on the border are well-armed for the present level of activity, mostly with World War II weapons, arms captured from the Malaysian military, and a small number purchased in Thailand. Without foreign assistance, however, it seems unlikely that the terrorists could acquire the large quantities of arms needed to initiate relatively extensive operations.

29. The Communist Party's prospects probably hinge not so much on its own limited insurgent capabilities as on the reaction of the rural Chinese to future Malaysian political and communal developments. With Communist insurgents back in

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place, rural Malaysians are being asked to make a choice that many would probably prefer to avoid. No one suggests that significant numbers of Chinese are disaffected or desperate enough to defect to the Communists. On the other hand, many Chinese see little reason to cooperate enthusiastically with the government; such a noncommittal attitude may be all the Communists need to acquire and maintain a foothold.

30. How energetic and successful will Kuala Lumpur be in giving these people a greater sense of identity with the government? A perception of the problem and good intentions are not enough by themselves. A key indicator will be whether the government proves willing and able to better the lot of the rural Chinese by allocating significant resources under the Second Malaysian Plan, a development scheme primarily designed to increase the Malay share of the nation's economic pie.

31. The real moment of truth may be as much as two years away. By that time the insurgency's developmental phase probably will have run its course. The Razak government appears to have bought itself a period of stability in which it can work to ameliorate, if not to solve, Malaysia's basic communal dilemma. During this period the government must satisfy its demanding Malay constituency and somehow at the same time provide Malaysian Chinese with meaningful political, economic, and cultural rights. If the government fails in this precarious balancing act the likely results will be the emergence of a more chauvinistic Malay leadership in Kuala Lumpur and a dangerous rise in the level of communal tension, an atmosphere in short made to order for the growth of the Communist insurgency.

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
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Intelligence Memorandum

Insurgency in East Malaysia

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
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insurgency in east malaysia

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
10 January 1973

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

As Malaysia pursues its efforts to build a stable political order following the communal disorders of 1969, considerable attention has been focused on the renewed insurgent challenge of the Thailand-based Malayan Communist Party. Meanwhile, Communist dissidence in the East Malaysia state of Sarawak grinds on largely unnoticed by the outside world. Although limited in scope and almost certainly containable, this other insurgency is significant if only for the drain it places on Malaysian resources that are badly needed closer to home. The insurgents in Sarawak are few in number, poorly armed, primitively equipped, and lack external support. Still, in certain areas they have the capability of harassing Malaysian security forces and of intimidating and proselytizing the local population.

Kuala Lumpur's problem is compounded by distance; 400 or more miles of the South China Sea separate the Malay Peninsula (West Malaysia) from the Borneo states (East Malaysia). Moreover, Sarawak is ethnically non-Malay; less than one fifth of Sarawak's one million people are Malays; about one fourth are Muslim. Since the racial crisis of 1969, the propensity of the federal government to impose pro-Malay policies throughout the Federation has markedly increased. Although Kuala Lumpur has not implemented these policies as extensively in Sarawak as it has elsewhere, the pro-Malay measures it has taken have not been welcomed by the vast majority of Sarawak's ethnic Chinese and indigenous tribal population.

The problem is not solely an internal Malaysian matter. Overseas Chinese throughout the region are sensitive to what happens to the Chinese in Sarawak because they know what it is like to be a Chinese in this predominantly Malay part of the world. The Sarawak insurgents, of course, look to China for ideological inspiration, though they receive little if anything in return beyond an occasional word of moral encouragement.

Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have been deeply concerned about the security situation in Sarawak because of their defense

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
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ties with Malaysia. The new labor governments in both Australia and New Zealand have indicated they intend to loosen these ties and withdraw their forces from Malaysia; political interest could fade rapidly as the military presence diminishes. The outside power with the greatest continuing stake in Sarawak—and the greatest willingness to intervene there—is Indonesia. Jakarta's interest in the Sarawak insurgency stems in large part from the overlap with its own security problem in the rest of Borneo (Kalimantan). The Indonesians fear that Kuala Lumpur may some day lose control of the situation; as a result, Jakarta has stepped up its support of the Malaysian counterinsurgency effort.

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Roots of a Problem

The communist movement in Sarawak has shown remarkable tenacity and resilience over the past three decades. It began in small units of Sarawakian Chinese fighting against the Japanese during World War II. Dormant for a while, the movement was revived in the early 1950s when the Sarawak Communist Organization was formed. This organization, directed by a small, hard-core elite, operated underground, but it gained thousands of overt supporters and sympathizers in the Chinese community. By the late 1950s the party had chosen the legal, parliamentary route to power and had gained considerable influence in the left wing of the Sarawak United Peoples Party, the largest political party in the state. The other Chinese party, the Sarawak Chinese Association, was clearly an instrument of a few wealthy Chinese timbermen and their allies. The United Peoples Party was the only political party in Sarawak that appealed to the Chinese common man—hawkers, pepper farmers, wharf workers, and the like.

When Sukarno shifted to a policy of confrontation against Malaysia in 1963, the Sarawak Communist Organization shifted to armed struggle. In that period, the same Indonesian Army that is now keen on wiping out the insurgents provided the initial training in West Kalimantan for the first batch of Sarawak armed communist guerrillas—about a thousand, almost entirely Sarawakian ethnic Chinese. The guerrillas lost Indonesian support after the coup attempt in 1965, and the Indonesian Army turned against them in the anti-communist witch hunt which followed. The army's campaign was so effective that the guerrillas could not even maintain base areas in the remote and rugged jungles of West Kalimantan. By 1969, Indonesian counter-insurgency operations in the border area compelled the Sarawak Communists to return to Sarawak, retaining only a few small camps on the Indonesian side of the border.

The Communists in Sarawak

The remnants of the guerrilla bands which filtered back into Sarawak in the late 1960s provide the backbone of the communist terrorists in Sarawak today, but new blood, mainly young ethnic Chinese, has been added in recent years. For Chinese youths who see little opportunity under existing conditions in Sarawak, revolution seems to offer the only hope. Communism, moreover, provides an explanation for their problems and a program for revolutionary change. Communist propaganda in Sarawak is generally well-written and well-grounded in Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist principles. A surprising number of the terrorist recruits are articulate and

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relatively well educated; many have high school and a few have college educations. A female terrorist, recently killed on the outskirts of Kuching, was a graduate of Nanyang University in Singapore and a former teacher at a Chinese school in Kuching.

The Sarawak communists no longer call themselves the Sarawak Communist Organization; in recent years they have adopted a more pretentious title—the North Kalimantan Communist Party. In fact, there is little apparent communication and no evidence of coordinated action between the communist terrorists in the First and the Third divisions. The First Division is the domain of the Pergerakan Guerilya Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (or North Kalimantan Peoples' Guerrilla Movement), formerly known as the Pergerakan Guerilya Rakyat Sarawak (or Sarawak Peoples' Guerrilla Movement). The Third Division is the preserve of the Paraku (Paksokan Rakyat, sometimes known as the East Bureau of the North Kalimantan Communist Party).

Although the communist movement in Sarawak is likely to remain basically a Chinese phenomenon, over the last year or so the communists have been trying to make inroads among young Iban nationalists. The Ibans, also known as Sea Dayaks, are the largest ethnic group native to Sarawak. Ibans who join the communist cause are usually motivated by their dislike of the pro-Malay policies of the government. Most of the recruiting is by ethnic Chinese who speak the Iban language. Recruiters come unarmed to the Iban longhouses and do not enter unless they are specifically invited. They establish themselves nearby and try to win over the longhouse inhabitants by assisting in construction projects, distributing simple medicines, and providing basic schooling for the Iban children. The Ibans frequently do not understand communist intentions, and Iban cooperation, even collaboration, can in many cases be obtained without recourse to intimidation.


When operating among the Chinese population, the Communists



Iban Longhouse: A New Communist Target

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East Malaysia: Areas of Communist Insurgency



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revert quickly to a range of coercive and terrorist tactics. These include selective assassinations and ambushing of government security patrols, economic extortion, and propaganda activities in schools and among the population at large.

The insurgents are most active in the First and Third divisions, where 70 percent of the Sarawak people live. The best estimate of their strength runs from 200 to 300 in the First Division and from 400 to 500 in the Third Division. The latter includes the towns and cities of the lower Rejang River (Sarikei, Binatang, and Sibul), which have large Chinese populations, and the surrounding countryside. In this area the Communists are also gaining support in Iban longhouses south of the middle and upper Rejang (roughly from Kanowit and Kapit to the Indonesian border). Active Communist support from Chinese in underground Min Yuen (People's Movement) cells and from members of front organizations like the Sarawak Farmers Association and the Sarawak Advanced Youth League may run as high as 10,000. If tacit support or collaboration resulting from intimidation were included, the figure would be considerably higher.

Government Countermeasures

The Malaysian Government's counterinsurgency operations in Sarawak have increased in the past year. Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak launched a stepped-up campaign on a visit to Sarawak at the end of March 1972. The insurgents took the occasion of his visit for a show of strength, ambushing a security forces road convoy near Lundu in the First Division about 35 miles west of Kuching and killing 15 Malaysian soldiers. This was the most violent incident in recent years and imparted a certain sense of urgency to Malaysian counterinsurgency.

In response to the growing seriousness of the situation in the Third Division, the government established the Rejang Area Security Command to unify the command structure and coordinate government operations in the area. Under this command, the Third Division has been separated administratively from the rest of the state and placed under a joint military-police-civilian administration headed by Sarawak's chief minister, Abdul Rahman Yaakub. Yaakub is a Muslim of the indigenous Melanau ethnic group; as a Melanau, he is more acceptable to the Chinese, the Ibans, and the other native peoples than would be a Malay. Yaakub's deputy is a Malay, Brigadier General Ghazali Seth, who is also the local military commander. Under the new command, ten military-police-civilian civic action groups have been emplaced in isolated Iban and Chinese villages in different parts of the Third

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Division. The job of these groups is to provide advice on crops, sanitation, and development, and to train local volunteer security units to take over security duties when the civic action groups move out.

The government has taken a number of other steps to secure the support of the citizenry. To strengthen the villages against Communist intimidation, it has distributed arms to villagers in outlying areas. It has also introduced a program of voluntary resettlement of Ibans from unprotected longhouses to more secure surroundings. It is relying more and more on psychological warfare, holding mass public rallies at which the citizens are asked to pledge their support to the government, distributing leaflets that call on Communist terrorists to surrender, and establishing fairly effective means to guard terrorists who surrender against reprisal.

Another key part of the government's present campaign is the elimination of communist influence in the Chinese schools. The Sarawak state government has taken over the administration of all schools in the state, including, for the first time, Chinese private schools. The state has also cracked down on suspected communists in these schools. Between March and September, more than 230 Chinese students and teachers were arrested and detained without trial; subsequently over two thirds were released.

With these countermeasures the government, for the time being, appears to have retaken the initiative from the insurgents. Over time, however, the pressure could begin to alienate the Chinese population, especially if the pressure on Chinese schools goes too far, if irresponsible arrests are made or if the government is too blatant about its pro-Malay policies. Overly ambitious attempts to carry out the resettlement of Iban communities on a large scale will not only be very expensive, but could create as many problems as they solve. Past experience in Sarawak has shown that relocating villages usually alienates the people affected and creates islands of discontent. Moreover, arming the citizenry is a good idea only as long as their weapons—one thing the terrorists lack—do not pass from the hands of the volunteer forces to the insurgents. The Communists, equipped only with homemade, single-shot pistols and rifles, along with similar Indonesian-supplied weapons left over from the confrontation period, would be quick to try to appropriate the volunteer forces' more modern weaponry. The real test of the results of the civil action program will come when these groups are pulled out and the local volunteer forces have to stand on their own. Arrests and killings have been increasing in the past several months, and a number of new teenage recruits disillusioned with life in the jungle have surrendered, but security force operations have yet to bag a single hard-core terrorist.

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The Security Forces

More troops (approximately 9,000 to 10,000) are engaged in operations in Sarawak today than at the height of confrontation. The forces include over six battalions of the Malaysian Army (three battalions and one company of the exclusively-Malay Royal Malay Regiment and three battalions and one company of the predominantly-Malay Rangers); four battalions of the more racially mixed Police Field Forces; and perhaps 1,200 native (predominantly Iban) Border Scouts divided into Area Security Units of about 30 each. These last are based near longhouses or in the more remote border regions. Also involved are the Police, a national constabulary with long-standing law enforcement responsibilities in Sarawak.

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The large number of troops in Sarawak in relation to population creates problems. Many Sarawak citizens see the Malaysian Army more as an army of occupation than a force for their protection. The vast majority of Malaysian Army troops in Sarawak are Malays from West Malaysia. They are essentially "foreigners"; they care little about Sarawak per se; they are at best indifferent toward the Ibans and other native peoples; and they have a visceral hostility to all things Chinese. To the ordinary Chinese or Iban, Malaysian soldiers appear arrogant and domineering as they move about in battle gear with machine guns at the ready. Arguments involving Chinese civilians and Malay soldiers have on occasion led to brawls, and brawls to violent clashes not only between soldiers and civilians but between soldiers and policemen. The police are generally respected in Sarawak; most are Sarawakians and a fair number are ethnic Chinese.

The Broader Context: Economic Conditions

The insurgency directly affects only a small portion of Sarawak's population. For most of the people, social and economic life goes on much as usual. Indeed, the aura of "business as usual" has over the years provided fertile soil for the communists. At first glance, the over-all economic condition of the country looks favorable. In 1972, mainly as a result of oil exports, the balance of trade ran up a surplus of several million dollars—well ahead of the surplus achieved in 1971. Kuching and Sibü are bustling commercial centers with a number of prospering small merchants and manufacturers. Sibü, in particular, is thriving with fairly modern facilities for

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riverine, coastal, and ocean-going trade. There are said to be at least 40 millionaires in Sibuan alone.

Nevertheless, when compared with the other states of northern Borneo, Sarawak runs a poor third. Its oil wealth cannot compare with that of the tiny British protectorate of Brunei. Its timber resources do not compare with those of the other East Malaysian state, Sabah. The great majority of the inhabitants of Kuching and Sibuan are by no means rich. Poverty and squalor exist side by side with wealth and privilege. In the countryside, where the vast majority of the people of Sarawak live, poverty is prevalent. The rural population scratches out a living from a sterile and desolate land of swamp, jungle and slow-moving rivers. Next to oil, Sarawak's principal export is timber but the timber concessions are held by relatively few Chinese businessmen who are not inclined to share their wealth. For the rest, there is rubber, but prices are so low that most Sarawakian farmers have given it up; sago, which also suffers from low prices; pepper, the price of which fluctuates greatly; palm oil, which is grown only on a few large estates outside Miri; and rice, which has brought lean harvests in recent years.

The government has provided some development assistance and has promised more, but the over-all economic outlook is not bright. One persistent obstacle to development is the government's land policy, which prohibits Malays from selling their land to Chinese and other non-indigenous people. These circumstances contribute to the frustration of educated, ambitious, and politically conscious young people, many of whom turn to the Communists.

Delicate Political Balance

The political picture has some positive aspects. The government in Kuching is still a representative government, something that can scarcely be said of Sabah or Brunei—or most other political entities in Southeast Asia. Still, the footing of representative government in Sarawak is unsure. After the racial rioting in Kuala Lumpur in May 1969, the National Operations Council that took over in Kuala Lumpur turned the state government over to a Sarawak Operations Committee headed by a Malay from West Malaysia. Scheduled state elections were indefinitely postponed, and only after tensions subsided and Kuala Lumpur's moderate Malay leadership regained its composure was the decision made to revert to politics as usual.

The commitment of Kuala Lumpur's British-educated leadership to parliamentary politics reasserted itself, and elections were held in the

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summer of 1970. The elections highlighted the weakness of the Sarawak Alliance and its three components—the Sarawak Chinese Association, predominantly Malay Party Bumiputra, and the predominantly Iban Party Pesaka. The Alliance did well to command 40 percent of the vote.

To organize a government, the Alliance was forced to form a coalition with one of the two opposition parties. The Sarawak National Party was not a likely candidate. Although it won almost a fourth of the total vote and was the strongest Iban party in the state, its earlier membership in the Alliance had ended on a sour note when Kuala Lumpur deposed its leader Stephen Ningkan as chief minister in 1966 and replaced him with a more tractable Iban from Party Pesaka. The Alliance's only alternative was to ally with the Sarawak United People's Party, a leftist party made up for the most part of Chinese.

This coalition party still governs in Kuching. It took some courage and persuasion for the leadership of the United People's Party to bring its Chinese constituency into a coalition with the conservative, Malay-oriented Alliance. Although the coalition has endured for almost two and a half years, it is an uneasy marriage of convenience and there is no assurance it will last. If, for example, Kuala Lumpur were to turn to blatantly pro-Malay and/or anti-Chinese policies, the United People's Party would find it difficult to stay in. While most Sarawakian Chinese have accepted the intensified security measures invoked by the government, the party could not tolerate an indiscriminating anti-Communist crusade that tended to brand all Chinese as Communists or Communist sympathizers.

Many Chinese already view government counterinsurgent efforts, like curfews, as general punitive measures aimed at Chinese rather than as a means of restricting insurgent activity. They resent the fact that Chinese are still confined to the fenced-in, restricted villages where they were resettled during the time of confrontation. They are aware that Chinese make up the great bulk of the more than 1,300 persons in political detention in Sarawak, some for ten years or



Chinese Detention Center

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more. These fears and frustrations make it difficult for Sarawak's Chinese to give their whole-hearted support to either the government or its anti-communist campaign.

The Indonesian Perspective

The Indonesians take a much more pessimistic view of the situation in Sarawak than does Kuala Lumpur. The presence of the United People's Party in the Sarawak coalition government is not seen in Jakarta as a hopeful sign of reconciliation and accommodation, but rather as proof of communist infiltration. This gloomy perspective is rooted in the fundamental Indonesian distrust of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. To an Indonesian, the Chinese are actual or potential agents of subversion, and Jakarta is convinced that the insurgency in Sarawak is directed and supplied from Peking. The lack of evidence to support this thesis does not dim the fervor of the Indonesian conviction.

The Indonesian approach to Sarawak has, of course, been shaped by their experience with the large ethnic Chinese population in West Kalimantan. Chinese in West Kalimantan have been a source of recruits and sustenance for insurgent operations on either side of the border. The Indonesians attacked the problem by resettling or eliminating all rural Chinese. The process began in late 1967, when the Indonesian Army turned the indigenous Dayak population (both Ibans and Land Dayaks) loose against the Chinese. The result was the massacre of an estimated 1,000 and the forced removal of over 60,000 others from the interior to the coastal cities of Pontianak and Singkawang. Phase two was carried out by the Indonesian Army in October 1970; virtually all of the some 15,000 Chinese living in the country to the north of the Kapuas River were forced to move south to small bazaars along the river. It is believed that no more than 20 or 30 terrorists survived on the Indonesian side of the border.

The Indonesians realize that such ruthless methods would not be politically palatable in Sarawak. They were feasible in West Kalimantan because the Chinese comprised only a fifth of the total population and because the Indonesian Army was in a position to eliminate any opposition. In Sarawak, on the other hand, the support of the proportionately larger Chinese population is essential for the Alliance's coalition with the United People's Party. Moreover, the West Malaysian forces in Sarawak do not enjoy the close rapport with the Iban population enjoyed by the Indonesian Army.

Despite the differences between West Kalimantan and Sarawak, the Indonesians believe that at least some of their methods could be adopted

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profitably by the Malaysians. For one thing, they would like the Malaysians to rely more on the army and less on civilians in their counterinsurgency operations. The Indonesians would also like the Malaysian Army to drop its fairly conventional British-oriented approach in favor of the Indonesian doctrine of "territorial warfare"—i.e., recruit and station army units in their home areas among their own people.

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Indonesian-Malaysian Cooperation

Despite these different approaches, the Indonesians have increased their support of the counterinsurgency effort in Sarawak. Cooperation has improved in facilitating "hot pursuit"; there are coordinated patrols and combined operations; communications in the border area and between Pontianak and Kuching are much better.

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A new joint Border Security Agreement was negotiated in April 1972, and in late July senior Indonesian and Malaysian military commanders and Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Ismail attended the first meeting of the General Border Committee established under the agreement. Regional border committees for both "east" and "west" have been established; in fact, Indonesian-Malaysian security cooperation has been extended beyond their common border regions to the entire territory of both countries. Jakarta clearly views Kuala Lumpur as the junior partner in these arrangements—an attitude which rests on the nebulous, but nonetheless deeply felt premise that Indonesia is the natural leader of all peoples of the Malay race.

Although the antecedents of this broad cooperation date almost from the end of confrontation, the sense of urgency with which Kuala Lumpur

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and Indonesia have lately been drawing together reflects their growing uncertainty over the course of events in Southeast Asia and the shifting relationships between the Great Powers. The security problem in Sarawak gives impetus to, but is hardly the cause of, the new Indonesian-Malaysian collaboration.

A Lingering Problem

Isolated from the older and better defined Communist movements of Southeast Asia, the insurgency in Sarawak is not wholly typical of the pattern of revolt and subversion found elsewhere in the region. Despite its Communist trappings, the insurgency is basically a domestic product grown from the seeds of unassimilated and resentful Chinese almost continually at odds with political authority. There is no ready solution to this basic problem and there is little reason to believe that Kuala Lumpur, short of adopting the draconian anti-Chinese measures of Indonesia, stands much chance of significantly reducing the present level of insurgency.

The security situation in Sarawak is obviously worse than it was three years ago when the bulk of the Communist insurgents first returned from West Kalimantan. In recent months government countermeasures have improved, and although Communist terrorists have by no means been checked, a certain equilibrium has been reached. It is unlikely that a real insurgent threat will develop unless the over-all political situation turns sour. A breakdown of the present Sarawak coalition government, a heightening of racial tension, or a serious deterioration of the economy would significantly nourish disaffection and alienation among the two thirds of the population which is not Malay. In such circumstances, Kuala Lumpur's capability to maintain its authority in Sarawak would be severely tested. If the government then resorted to armed coercion using Malay soldiers, a bad situation would be made worse.

That the situation will unravel in such a way is only a possibility, not a probability. Certainly the languor with which history tends to move in this part of the world makes a clear-cut denouement unlikely. Sarawak's insurgency, like its fragile political structure and unhappy social order, will not go away, but similar problems on the Malay Peninsula will pose more of a threat to the general stability of Malaysia.

DEPARTMENT OF AIR
MINUTE PAPER

(This is only to be written on)

Subject

1. At 0230 hours 12 May 1974, a sweeper driver at Air Base Butterworth discovered 50 feet of loosely rolled fencing wire on the centre line halfway mark of the runway. This incident was considered to be deliberate, as the wire was found on the runway since the last aircraft movement on 1 May.

2. On the 27th, the sweeper picked up about 100 feet of electrical cable, and this was considered to have been inadvertently left behind by a local contractor.

3. Two railway bridges on the Bukit Mertajam-Alor Star line were attacked on 9 May. The bridges, which are 15 km from Butterworth, were only slightly damaged due to the bad placement of the charges.

4. Operation 'Setia Seven' has resulted in one CT killed and one wounded on 6 May in the Lenggong area (40 miles NE of Butterworth). During May the security forces taking part in 'Setia Seven' found 10 large CT camps, 22 resting places, six food dumps and large supplies of food and medicine.

5. The Communist Terrorists carried out their most successful ambush so far on 18 June, when they attacked a joint Thai-Malaysian survey team. The attack took place just inside Thai territory adjoining the border with Kedah. Six Thai border patrol police, eight Malaysian field force police and three Malaysian civilians were killed. Several other persons were wounded. The CT, who escaped without loss, were believed to be of the Communist Party of Malaya's Revolutionary Faction. So far this year 21 Malaysian security personnel have been killed in such encounters, about double the figures for the whole of 1974. (CT deaths have been negligible compared with 31 last year.)

6. During the period 20 to 22 June air strikes were mounted from Air Base Butterworth involving four Sabres, each armed with 38 x 2.75 rockets and about 200 rounds of 30mm cannon shells, and four Tebuan aircraft armed with 2 x 500lb bombs. The target was a 10 km square area situated on the lower half of a ridge north of the town of Grik (44.5NM on Radial 087° from Butterworth). It is believed that the operation achieved little results except to boost the morale of the pilots.

7. It has been reported that the CT have been training with mortars in Southern Thailand. The type of mortar is not yet known, but it is possibly 81/82mm. Possession of mortars would greatly increase the capability of CT, they are man-portable, deployed with relative ease and the range (81mm effective range 3000m) allows reasonable accuracy from a safe distance.

8. A number of factors are likely to contribute to a further increase in the level of terrorist activity. These include the rivalry between the splinter groups of CT, the psychological impact of the recent communist victories in Indo-China, and the availability of more arms. Plans have been announced by the Malaysian government to strengthen the security forces, but the latter will need to markedly improve their standards of leadership and professional skill to be able to deal effectively with the terrorists.

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/9. The possibility

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9. The possibility of the CC possessing operational mortars adds to the threat against Air Base Butterworth. However, it is most unlikely that any warning of impending attack would be received prior to the attack taking place.

R. S. Royston

(R. S. ROYSTON)
GPCAPT
DAFI

3 Jul 75

13

MINUTE PAPER

INFORMATION

Subject:

SECURITY SITUATION - AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH - MALAYSIA

SR(50)

1. According to an ANZUK intelligence report, 6 Malaysian Infantry Brigade (MIB) has mounted a five battalion operation in the Gunung Inas and Gunung Kongsu forest reserves. The operation commenced on 23 October. Units confirmed as taking part in the operation are 7, 10 and 12 Royal Malay Regiments, 2 Rangers and 13 Malaysian Territorial Army with a total strength of about 2,000. The strength of the command and control element for the operation is about 400. One other battalion is thought to be involved but this is not yet confirmed.
2. The press reported that Security Forces (SF) engaged in the Operation killed two communist terrorists (CTs) on 18 November. Two sub-machineguns, two handgrenades, an automatic pistol, a large quantity of ammunition and three packs containing rice, foodstuffs, clothing and communist documents were recovered. Shortly before the incident SF had encountered an unknown number of terrorists in the same area and following an exchange of fire had recovered three packs and a pistol.
3. Other incidents reported so far for November were on 3 November when one SF was killed and another wounded in a clash with CTs in the Kroh area and on 4 November when one CT was killed in the Betong area of Southern Thailand when a reported 50 CTs attacked a joint BPP/PFP outpost.
4. There were three belated reports for October concerning incidents in Province Wellesley. On 15 October two CTs were sighted near Bukit Mertajam, on 19 October 25 CTs of both sexes were sighted in the same area and on 24 October one CT was sighted near Bukit Chempedak, two and a half miles east of Valdor village.
5. CT action against the East/West highway project continued in October with the following incidents being reported:
 - a. On 15 October 10 CTs fired on an SF base camp in the Banding area 16 miles north-east of Grik. There were no CT casualties.
 - b. On 8 October SF detonated a CT booby trap five miles south-west of Batu Melintang, Kelantan wounding one SF; and
 - c. On 19 October an SF patrol contacted an unknown number of CTs in the Banding area resulting in one SF killed.
6. There is no change to the assessed threat to Air Base Butterworth.

(V. K. HOLLEY)
SQUAD
for DAFI

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DEPARTMENT OF AIR

MINUTE PAPER

(This side only to be written on)

33
15/10/74
INT 8/10/3(74)

Subject: SECURITY SITUATION - AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH - REPORT NO 16

SR(GD)

1. Activity involving CTs in the northern provinces of Peninsular Malaysia continues at a low level however, three incidents occurred in late August and early September in the Operation Sedar area, approximately 18 miles east of KULIM.
2. On 26 Aug, one SF was wounded in a clash with CTs in the BALING district. On 2 Sep, SF contacted an unknown number of CTs but there were no casualties. On 8 Sep, a clash between SF and 20 CTs in the KULIM/BALING border area resulted in a death of one CT and one SF officer and one SF soldier wounded. Blood trails left by the CTs indicated that others may have been wounded. All of these contacts occurred as part of an operation following the discovery of a camp for 60 persons in the area on 2 Aug.
3. 'Official sources' have been quoted as saying that 70 CTs were in the Operation Sedar area at the time and the Minister of Defence has been quoted as saying that SF were tracking about 30 CTs in the Sedar area following the clash on 8 Sep.
4. Although no details are available at present a possible increase in CTO activity along the Kedah/Southern Thailand border area has been predicted.
5. The assessed threat to Air Base Butterworth remains unchanged.

John C. Scotland
(J.C. SCOTLAND)
Wg Cdr
for DAFI

28 Sep 73

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13/75
Issued Oct. 1975

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JIO AUSTRALIA

THE SECURITY OF AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

*In Bk
In Ltr
& Scale
(F) 3027/2/9*

BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED UP TO 31ST AUGUST 1975

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14/11/75
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MALAYSIATHE SECURITY OF AIR BASE BUTTERWORTHDESCRIPTION OF THE BASEGeneral

1. Air Base Butterworth is a Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) base that is jointly used by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). It occupies an area of about 4530 hectares in Province Wellesley on the north-west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, eight kilometres north of Butterworth town (on both sides of the main north-south road) and about 65 kilometres from the Betong Salient section of the Thailand/Malaysia border. The Base has a major all-weather airfield capable of supporting sustained bomber and fighter operations. The runway is 2440 metres by 46 metres and has asphalt overruns of 137 metres on the northern end and 158 metres on the southern end. Air photographs showing the layout of the Base are at Annexes A and B.

2. A wide range of installations, including an air-defence centre, radar and navigational aids, fuel and ammunition storage, and a Matra missile preparation bay are on or near the Base. Functional elements on the Base include:

- (a) Headquarters RAAF Butterworth.
- (b) Headquarters RMAF Butterworth.
- (c) Base Squadron RAAF Butterworth.
- (d) Technical Wing RMAF Butterworth.
- (e) No. 478 (Maintenance) Squadron RAAF.
- (f) No. 3 Squadron RAAF
- (g) No. 75 Squadron RAAF.
- (h) No. 12 Squadron RMAF F-5E.
- (i) No. 3 Squadron RMAF.
- (j) Transport Support Flight RAAF.
- (k) No. 4 RAAF Hospital.
- (l) Special Security Police (element of 26 Company Malaysian Military Police).

and 150 Royal Malaysian Navy personnel who are employed at the Butterworth dockyard. There are about 2200 dependants living within the confines of the Base.

Security Measures to Protect the Base

7. To support the operational function of Air Base Butterworth in addition to aircraft and personnel there are considerable installations and equipment at areas that have been designated Vital Points for defence in an ANZUK/Malaysia Shared Defence Plan for the protection of the Base in an emergency. Broadly speaking, the Officer Commanding RMAF has overall responsibility for the protection of the Base throughout each 24-hour period, and the Officer Commanding RAAF is responsible for the point defence of RAAF aircraft and operational facilities and the protection of RAAF families.

8. To assist the OC RAAF an ARA Infantry Company is permanently available at Butterworth as a quick-reaction force. The Company is usually rotated by airlift, direct from Australia, every three months. It is available as a quick-reaction force, but it may from time to time be engaged in local training. The Company is not permitted to operate outside the base perimeter. Other support is provided by RAAF defence flights made up of RAAF non-specialist ground-defence personnel. Static defences comprise a single two-metre perimeter fence with barbed-wire overhang, and lighting of most Vital Points.

Present Base Security Arrangements

9. The Royal Malaysian Military Police, 26 Company, SSP, is responsible for the security of the Base, including control of entry, the vetting of locally-employed civilians, the guarding on a 24-hour basis of eight Vital Points, and the patrolling of the other Vital Points at irregular intervals throughout the period. It maintains a quick-reaction force of section strength (about 10 men). The role of the SSP is security only, not defence of the base, and the CO RMAF has no command or control over the SSP.

10. The RAAF Mirage flight lines are not guarded during working hours, when they are under normal surveillance by RAAF personnel; outside these hours they are floodlit and are guarded by pairs of armed RAAF Security Guards, each with a dog. RAAF Service Police carry out patrols in radio-equipped vehicles at irregular intervals every night, and during the patrol they check the security of Vital Points. They make reports to the Duty Security Controller located in the RAAF guardroom.

11. The ARA Company assists with the protection of RAAF personnel, property, and shared facilities within the Base. It provides a section (normally 10 men) as a quick-reaction force from 1600 to 0800 hours daily and irregularly provides squads to guard various Vital Points on the airfield during these hours. Except that fire and medical services are available for day-to-day operations, there are no special passive defence arrangements to mitigate the effects of sabotage or of mortar or rocket attacks.

External Security Arrangements

12. The security of Pinang, Province Wellesley, and the states of Kedah and Perlis is the responsibility of 6 Malaysian Infantry Brigade (MIB) based at Sungai Petani. The Brigade's units are stationed at Pinang, Sungai Petani and Alor Setar, and the Brigade is continuously committed to anti-terrorist operations within its area of responsibility. A map showing brigade unit locations is at Annex C. No security posts are permanently manned by the Security Forces in the area immediately surrounding Butterworth, and there are no artillery units in the area. We do not know of any Security Force contingency plan for the reinforcement of the Base but, on the request of the OC RMAF Butterworth to 6 MIB, troops would be deployed from Pinang or Sungai Petani. Such deployment was made in 1975 but its effectiveness in an emergency depends on the immediate availability of troops, who may be involved in other operations. Arrangements may be made for the area surrounding the Base to be patrolled if a VIP is visiting or if the Malaysian authorities have issued a security warning for the Base.

Families Protection Plan

13. Under customary international law the Malaysian Government has a duty to protect all persons in Malaysia; however, under the provisions of the Australian/Malaysian Defence Accord, Commonwealth forces have the right to take additional measures for the protection of dependants of Service members and families of employees of Australian Government Departments attached to the RAAF including visitors resident with those families.

14. There is always a risk of racial communal disturbances that could affect families resident in Base married quarters, housing estates, and hirings in Butterworth and Pinang. Because of this a Families Protection Plan has been instituted to ensure the protection of service personnel and dependants, including visitors of dependants resident with families, in the Butterworth/Pinang area.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Allegiance</u>
5th CTO Regiment	118	Central Committee
8th CTO Regiment	170	Revolutionary Faction
10th CTO Regiment	500+	Central Committee
12th CTO Regiment (less 2nd District)	700+	Central Committee
2nd District, 12th CTO Regiment	150	Marxist-Leninist
6th Assault Unit	37	Central Committee
8th Assault Unit	62	Central Committee

A map showing the locations of these units is at Annex D.

19. The CTO is supported by several front organizations in southern Thailand and Peninsular Malaysia. The Central Committee Faction has the support of the two largest organizations, the Malayan Communist Youth League (MCYL) and the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MYCL is based in southern Thailand and has between 3000 and 6000 members. It is particularly active in the Betong Salient, where members supply the communist terrorists with food and act as their agents among the local population. The Malaysian authorities consider the MNLF the best organized and most effective of the communist front organizations acting in support of the CTO throughout Peninsular Malaysia (including Singapore). The MNLF has a strength of between 2000 and 3000 and has demonstrated a capability for coordinated acts of minor sabotage and terrorism on the anniversaries of events significant to the CTO. Other organizations that support the Central Committee Faction are the Malayan Patriotic Front (MPF), the All-Pinang Revolutionary Youth League, the National Liberation League, the Kelantan Communist League, and the National Communist League, although they are not as well known and as effective as the MNLF.

20. The Marxist-Leninist Faction is supported by the Malayan People's Liberation League (MPLL), formerly the Selangor National Independence League (SNIL). The strength of the MPLL is only about 200, but it has demonstrated its capability to conduct country-wide activities in support of the Marxist-Leninist Faction. The Revolutionary Faction is supported by the Malayan People's Liberation Front, which has between 50 and 100 members and is based in Kedah and Pinang.

21. There have been reports that members of the communist front organizations, particularly the MNLF, have received short periods of military training in the jungle from the CTO and have then returned to their

unless there were other factors such as widespread public disorder. The CTO has sought to re-establish its presence throughout Peninsular Malaysia by sending groups of experienced cadres from the Thai border bases back to the areas in which they used to operate during the First Emergency in order to re-form the local CTO armed unit with local recruiting. In December 1973 and January 1974 a group of 58 such terrorists attempted to re-establish the 6th Assault Unit in southern Pahang. Although it was broken up by Security Forces' action and some communist terrorists starved to death, most of the group have remained in the area and are presumably trying to cultivate local support. The CTO can be expected to continue efforts to extend the presence of its armed units throughout Peninsular Malaysia.

25. A secondary factor influencing the conduct of the CTO campaign is the desire to maintain a presence in the public eye in order to prevent the Government from claiming that it has the situation completely under control. Success for the Government, as for the CTO, depends on public support and confidence. The CTO cannot afford to allow the Malaysian Government to be seen to be gaining complete control of the situation and so to win the confidence of the people. The legitimacy of the Federal Government is the principal target of the CTO propaganda, and an unquestioned ability by the Government to ensure the security of society would contribute to that legitimacy. The terrorists have shown that they will attack government positions and individual officials in retaliation for reverses suffered as a result of government operations, and they will try to maintain the impression that their influence is steadily expanding and effectively working towards the overthrow of the Government. In May 1974, after a successful government operation in the Ipoh area, more than 100 communist terrorists from the 12th CTO Regiment destroyed road plant used on the construction of the East-West Highway near Gerik, demonstrating a formidable capability to conduct large-scale sabotage operations — a factor that is relevant to this Study. There was also a significant increase in CTO successes against the Security Forces in the first six months of 1975; the increase was probably inspired partly by the communist victories in Indochina and by a desire to exploit the favourable publicity from these victories in the context of the Malaysian situation. The CTO has demonstrated a willingness to clash with Security Forces who penetrate its base areas, but so far not to the point of a protracted defence of those areas.

26. The CTO could easily adopt tactics used by other terrorist organizations, notably those in South America, of murdering or kidnapping important foreign residents in order to embarrass the Government publicly and to obtain concessions, such as the release of political prisoners, as part of a wider campaign of urban terrorism. The CPM Central Committee faction is concerned mainly with controlling the rural areas in line with the orthodox Maoist doctrine of revolutionary warfare, and it is unlikely that the MNLF would be capable of conducting a widespread and sustained terror campaign

against foreign interests in urban areas. There have been indications, however, that the Marxist-Leninist and Revolutionary factions differ from the Central Committee faction over this question and might seek to implement a campaign of urban guerrilla warfare. The increase in the numbers of incidents in 1975 points in this direction, but it is doubtful whether the factions have the resources to conduct an extended urban campaign, although they have demonstrated a capability for coordinated action throughout Peninsular Malaysia. If this situation did arise, however, Australian personnel and their dependants stationed at Butterworth could be threatened; it is impossible to say whether they would be primary targets in preference to other foreigners in Malaysia, such as members of diplomatic missions.

27. The CTO seems to have accepted with resignation the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China. The blow has been softened by the continued support of the VMR broadcasts and by the pledge of solidarity from the Communist Party of China in a recent congratulatory message on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the CPM. The recent communist victories in Indochina, however, will have boosted the morale of the CPM and its sympathizers considerably, while giving rise to doubts in the community as to the Malaysian Government's ability to contain the terrorist problem. There is some evidence that the Chinese community, in particular, was considerably affected by the communist victories and now believes that a CPM victory against the Government is inevitable.

28. We assess that the CTO's intentions are to consolidate and extend its present position in Peninsular Malaysia by recruiting and building up mass support among the rural population, particularly in areas where there were large numbers of terrorists in the First Emergency; to cultivate the support of Malay peasants and Orang Asli (aborigines); to develop lines of communication and establish base areas; to consolidate supply links between armed units and the support infrastructure, and to progressively extend CTO influence and presence, especially that of armed groups, while avoiding major contacts with the Security Forces unless the CTO has an advantage at the time. The CTO seems sensitive to adverse publicity, and it can be expected to carry out retaliatory action for any significant government success. We consider that, at present, in spite of the encouraging example of Indochina, the CTO assesses that it would be premature, and possibly counter-productive, to try to move into the second phase of widespread confrontation, and we also consider that such an attempt is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Arms and Equipment

29. Until 1969 arms used by the CTO were mainly of British origin, having been obtained during World War II or captured during the First Emergency. They include British .303 rifles (short-magazine Lee Enfield); .303 Bren light-machine-guns; .45 US Thompson sub-machine-guns; 9-mm Sten guns; .38 Smith and Wesson revolvers; 9-mm Browning pistols; and shot-guns of various kinds. Other weapons have since been captured from the Thai and Malaysian Security Forces or purchased in southern Thailand, including: US carbines; 7.62 SLR (self-loading rifle); 9-mm sub-machine-gun; US M-16 rifles (Armalite); M-79 grenade launchers; and shot-guns. Ammunition for all weapons, but particularly the earlier range, is difficult to obtain.

30. The CTO has shown a capability to manufacture and use both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosive devices. Although these are home-made they are technically effective and have inflicted severe damage on soft-skinned vehicles such as Landrovers and 3-ton trucks. Electrical detonation is frequently used, and delayed timing devices were reported to have been used in the raid near Gerik in May 1974. The CTO's use of booby-traps and mines has improved considerably and has resulted in a greatly increased casualty rate among the Security Forces in 1975. The MNLF and other such organizations have also used electrically-detonated charges in booby-traps. The CTO probably obtains explosives and detonation equipment from supporters working in the mines of northern Perak and southern Thailand.

31. There has been a noticeable increase in the types of weapons used by the CTO in the last 12 months. M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers have been used in small quantities in northern Malaysia since November 1974, and there have been unconfirmed reports of the CTO's use of rocket launchers in contacts. At about the same time VMR broadcasts began to claim that the CTO had used mortars in contacts with the Security Forces, although there has been no reflection of this in official Malaysian reports. The Malaysian authorities, however, claim to have a photograph of the CTO training with mortars in southern Thailand. It is quite possible that the CTO has mortars but has refrained from using them until the situation is ready for the initiation of phase two of revolutionary warfare. Under these circumstances the CTO could deploy and use the weapons with very little warning. The mortars, if of the 81/82-mm type with an effective range of 3000 metres, could be used against area targets such as headquarters and parked aircraft. The North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong forces in Vietnam frequently used mortars against area targets in surprise attacks. The CTO has also used makeshift rockets in attacks on military installations and airfields on 31st March, 1st April and 16th August. The rockets were manufactured from 3.5-inch rocket launcher rounds and were fired from

unmanned positions, using welded fixed tubular pipe launchers and crude timing devices. These devices are unsophisticated and should not be confused with the modern rockets used by insurgent forces in Indochina. Nevertheless, the incidents attracted considerable publicity; a Caribou aircraft parked at Sempang airfield, Kuala Lumpur, was damaged, and this may encourage the CTO to stage similar incidents.

32. One possible source of modern arms for the CTO is the surplus weapons from Indochina. These may be supplied to insurgent organizations by the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia or may gradually filter into the area in the hands of gun-running or smuggling organizations. Access to a reliable and continuous supply of modern weapons and ammunition would considerably increase the CTO's capability, but this possibility will be subject to the future policy of the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia towards providing assistance in materiel to foreign insurgent groups.

CTO Activities in Butterworth Area

33. The nearest major CTO unit to Butterworth is the 8th Assault Unit in the Kulim area, about 25 kilometres east. This was declared a "black area" (an area of strong terrorist activity) during the First Emergency, and the return of an armed unit logically follows the CTO pattern for expanding its influence throughout Peninsular Malaysia. The unit has been involved in contacts with Security Forces in the area since January 1971, but all have been within Kedah State. (A list of recent sightings and contacts is at Annex E.) Captured documents have indicated that the unit intended to establish contact with supporters inside Province Wellesley but, although armed communist terrorists have been sighted within the Province, we do not know the extent of their support among the peasants in the area. The appearance of booby-trapped red flags in Pinang and Butterworth on several occasions since 1970 indicates the presence of elements of the MNLF or some other subversive organizations. Acts of sabotage within the Province, such as the destruction of railway bridges south of Butterworth on 9th May this year, may have been the work of either the 8th Assault Unit or the local MNLF.

Incidents on the Base

34. In June 1971 about 12 metres of copper-core cable was stolen from the Mirage engine run-up bay near the Matra site and a locked building was forcibly entered. This area is within 15 metres of an SSP guard

position. Between 6th and 10th August 1971 copper earth strips were stolen from the roof of a building in the bomb dump. A week later eight one-metre lightning arrestors and some fire-extinguisher caps were stolen from the bomb dump. The building from which the metal strips were removed is in full view of the SSP guardroom at the gate to the dump. There have been other thefts from inside the base area, some outside working hours. In mid-September 1971 two Malays were seen on a platform in a tree outside, but close to, the eastern perimeter fence near the bomb dump. They were apprehended and handed over to the SSP and then to the Malaysian Police, Special Branch in Pinang has informed RAAF Butterworth that it believes that those apprehended were engaged in surveillance of the Base.

35. On 19th May 1975 a 9-metre piece of heavy-gauge fencing wire was found on the centre line at a point two-thirds of the way along the runway. On 29th May, a 43-metre piece of copper wire was picked up by the runway sweeper from the airfield hardstanding. The latter was probably accidentally left behind by contractors working in the area but, in the case of the former, the runway had been checked after contract personnel left the area. It may have been abandoned by thieves who were alarmed by the approach of a security patrol, but the possibility remains that it was an attempt to damage aircraft during take-off and landing. There was, however, no night flying at the time, and the runway is checked every morning before air operations begin. On 4th and 5th August security patrols found two holes in the southern and eastern perimeter fences; both had been camouflaged and did not appear to have been used for several months. Base authorities believe that they had been made by individuals entering the base area to steal materials and equipment. Another eight holes were discovered in the fence, but none that appeared to have been recently made. These incidents are not necessarily attributable to the CTO or to its supporters; the thefts were probably carried out by local, perhaps locally-employed, civilian or contractor personnel, or even by members of the SSP. The incidents do, however, reveal that unauthorized personnel have on several occasions been able to gain access to areas within the Base, including Vital Points.

Operations by Security Forces

36. In April 1974 the Security Forces conducted a division-sized operation, Operation Gonzales, near Ipoh, which resulted in the killing of 11 communist terrorists and the discovery of a large training camp. The operation was widely publicized and its success caused some increase in morale among the Security Forces. At the time we assessed that, with the release of units from Sarawak, Malaysia would conduct more such operations and that, if they were as well planned as Operation Gonzales, she could expect similar success. This, however, has not been the case. The CTO effort against the East-West Highway and Temengor Dam has drawn a

considerable number of troops into static-guard duties and close-patrolling operations to protect the extended construction sites. The dismissal of several senior Malaysian Army officers for corrupt practices in December 1974, and subsequent appointment changes, may have disrupted plans for operations. The increase in CTO activity in early 1975 seems to have placed the Security Forces on the defensive, and there have been few signs of initiative in Malaysian operations this year. In April 1975 the General Officer Commanding Peninsular Malaysia said that the Security Forces planned to conduct a large operation north of Ipoh in "the near future". To September 1975 this had not yet materialized, and, although the Malaysian High Command obviously recognizes the possible advantages of large-scale operations, it has so far been unable to concentrate its resources for such activities. The relatively heavy casualties of the Security Forces, particularly from mines and booby-traps, and the lack of success against the CTO, have probably had some effect on the morale of members of the Security Forces, further contributing to their indifferent performance in 1975.

37. As we said previously, there are no continually-manned military posts close to the Air Base that could hinder the reconnaissance and approach of any CTO assault groups. Reaction operations conducted by 6 MIB after an incident would be belated and probably ineffective. Special Branch personnel have the best chance of detecting the presence of a CTO group in the area, but they are likely to wait and try to identify the entire network rather than move immediately against one or two low-level cadres. Although RMAF authorities realize that an improvement of the security measures and protective installations on the Base would impede any CTO action against the Base, difficulties of finance, manpower, legal control over squatters, and lack of RMAF command over 26 SSP Company are likely to hamper any immediate Malaysian efforts to effectively improve base security.

Summary of CTO Capability

38. The CTO has a total strength of more than 2000 terrorists based in the Thai border area and in Peninsular Malaysia. The terrorists have expanded their influence considerably since 1968 and have successfully established armed units and base areas in Malaysia as far south as the Kuala Lipis-Raub area of Pahang. The MNLF and other subversive organizations have cells throughout Peninsular Malaysia that are capable of conducting minor acts of sabotage and terrorism. They have a variety of small-arms and have experimented in the use of small rockets for attacks on military installations. There is evidence that the CTO has mortars; we assess that, although these have not yet been used, they could be brought into action without warning. The CTO has also used mines and booby-traps with considerable effect; it displayed a significant capability in conducting large-scale sabotage operations in its attack near Gerik in May 1975.

39. The Kulim area appears to be a centre for CTO movement between the Betong Salient and villages east and south-east of Kulim in Kedah and Perak States. We assess about 63 terrorists of the 8th Assault Unit are based in the Kulim-Baling area and are supported by cells of various subversive organizations in Province Wellesley and the adjacent areas of Kedah State.

40. As far as we know there are no armed terrorists on Pinang Island, but there are branches of the MPF and MYCL there. They have planted flags and banners in various places on significant CTO anniversaries, have conducted a rocket attack at a military target there, and could pose a threat to RAAF families if the CPM initiated a terror campaign against foreign residents.

POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTACK ON AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

Situations in which Base might be Attacked

41. The CTO may have refrained from attacking the Base because it fears that Commonwealth forces would be reintroduced into the Government's anti-terrorist campaign. There is no way of determining whether this, in fact, is the case.

42. If the CTO succeeded in substantially expanding its infrastructure and area of influence in Peninsular Malaysia to the point where it was able to launch a widespread campaign of attacks on prominent installations as an introduction to the second phase of revolutionary warfare, Air Base Butterworth could be one of the targets; we consider, however, that CTO development to this stage is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

43. The CTO might see advantage in mounting an attack on the Base in the event of large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest, perhaps involving the diversion of Security Forces. We do not, however, consider such developments likely at present.

44. The CTO might decide to attack the Base if the presence of Australian aircraft and troops on Malaysian soil became a major public issue in Malaysian politics. It seems, however, that the question still has little potential to be an important public issue in spite of recent events in Indochina. In May 1975 in parliament the leader of the Democratic Action Party criticized the Australian military presence at Butterworth, but the question was dismissed by the Prime Minister, who claimed that there were no foreign bases on Malaysian soil and that the Australian presence was only at the invitation of the Malaysian Government. The matter received little coverage in the press, and we consider that it is not likely to become a major issue.

45. The CTO might decide to attack the Base if it believed it would gain a significant psychological or propaganda result. This might occur as retaliation for a major success against the terrorists by the Security Forces, especially as a result of an operation in the Butterworth area. The Base contains a concentration of relatively lightly-guarded, very expensive equipment, the destruction of which would impose no direct inconvenience or hardship on the local population. The CTO could expect to gain prestige for attacking the Security Forces in their own bases. The CTO force, with surprise and a rapid completion of the action, might escape with light casualties. Protection of such a large target against mortar and rocket attacks is virtually impossible; a perimeter of 3000 metres would have to be manned by ground troops (viz. two battalions) to guarantee its security against 81/82-mm mortars. A successful attack on the RMAF installation would gain a great deal of publicity for the CTO and would considerably weaken the Government's claims that it is winning the campaign against the terrorists. We do not believe that the CTO would attack the Base solely because of the presence of Australian aircraft, except if the Australian presence became a political issue; in the event of an attack, however, it is unlikely that the CTO would try to discriminate between RAAF and RMAF targets, and Australian personnel and equipment would be endangered. The destruction of RMAF aircraft and equipment would make attractive propaganda.

46. Although we assume that Australian aircraft would not be deployed from Butterworth in an anti-terrorist role, the use of the Base by RMAF units for anti-terrorist air operations might prompt a CTO reaction. RMAF aircraft operating from Butterworth have been used in air-strike operations near the Thailand-Malaysia border. We do not know the results, but if the RMAF were to score some successes against the CTO that were well publicized the CTO might retaliate against Air Base Butterworth. The accidental killing of civilians in these RMAF operations would also give the CTO good propaganda that could be fully exploited by a retaliatory raid on the Base.

47. The MNLF or one of the other smaller subversive groups might make some limited sabotage or booby-trap attempt against the Base as part of a nation-wide, or local, campaign.

Possible Forms of Attack by the CTO

48. The possible forms of attack by the CTO on Air Base Butterworth include:

- (a) An open conventional assault on the Base by day or night, by a large group of communist terrorists using small-arms and explosives. This would run the risk of meeting the superior

fire-power of Base defence personnel and could result in severe casualties for the terrorists. An air photograph showing likely approaches for CTO assault groups is at Annex F.

- (b) Covert penetration by night by separate groups of terrorists using explosives, with the object of attacking Vital Points and aircraft. The CTO has demonstrated its capability to carry out such operations, and such a plan offers the prospect of destroying a large amount of expensive equipment with a relatively low risk of casualties among the terrorists.
- (c) An attack by fire using mortars or other indirect fire weapons from the surrounding paddy-field/kampong areas, especially those to the east. Crude rockets have already been used in attacks on military installations, and it is likely that the CTO has a mortar capability; this form of attack is quite likely.
- (d) Sabotage, by the planting of delayed-action explosives, booby-traps, and other similar devices designed to damage equipment and to injure personnel, by members of subversive groups or sympathetic locally-employed civilians or contract personnel. In this case targets outside the Base might be chosen, as there would not be as much danger of detection by security patrols. Minor acts of sabotage committed within the Base by such personnel would result in their detection and in a tightening of security with no significant gains for the CTO cause. Nevertheless, the use of booby-traps and minor acts of sabotage by subversive groups are relatively common throughout Peninsular Malaysia and pose a distinct threat, both to the Base and to Australian personnel and their dependants.
- (e) Acts of terrorism against RAAF married quarters adjacent to the Base (Tan Sai Gin and Rubina Park).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Base

49. Air Base Butterworth, an RMAF base jointly used by the RAAF, is on the north-western coast of Peninsular Malaysia, 65 kilometres from the Betong Salient section of the Thai border, and supports operations by RAAF Mirages, RMAF Sabres, and other aircraft. Of the 1380 RAAF personnel who work at the Base 480 live on it, as do nearly 900 Malaysian servicemen and 600 RAAF dependants and police. An ARA company of 123 men is also stationed at the Base. A large percentage of the 1400 locally-employed civilians and contract personnel work at the Base. A wide range

of installations, including an air-defence centre, radar and navigational aids, fuel and ammunition storage, and a Matra missile preparation bay are on the Base.

Present Security Arrangements

50. The Malaysian Special Security Police (SSP) is responsible for the security of the Base, including control of entry, guarding/patrolling of critical points, and the maintenance of a 10-man quick-reaction force. At night pairs of RAAF security guards, each with a dog, guard the Mirage flight lines, which are floodlit, and at irregular intervals RAAF Service Police carry out mobile patrols of Vital Points. An ARA Infantry Company is available at Butterworth as a quick-reaction force within the base perimeter, but it may from time to time be engaged in local training. This company is usually rotated by airlift, direct from Australia, every three months. It has a section of about 10 men on stand-by from 1600 to 0800 hours daily. Static defences comprise a single two-metre perimeter fence with barbed-wire overhang, and lighting of most Vital Points.

51. In the past attention has been drawn to serious weaknesses in the defences, including the ineffective performances of the SSP, deficiencies in the static defences, and the parking of Mirages in a straight line without the protection of revetments. Cases of theft have shown that unauthorized persons have been able to enter areas within the Base, including Vital Points.

52. The security of Province Wellesley, Pinang, Kedah, and Perlis is the responsibility of 6 Malaysian Infantry Brigade (MIB), based at Sungai Petani. No security posts are permanently manned in the area immediately surrounding Butterworth, and there are no artillery units in the area. We do not know of any Security Force contingency plan for the reinforcement of Butterworth, but troops from 6 MIB may be deployed to the area on the request of the OC RMAF Air Base Butterworth. The effectiveness of the Brigade's response would depend on the availability of troops, who may be involved in operations.

Capability of the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO)

53. In the absence of an overt external threat to Malaysia, which we assess to be unlikely during the period under review, the principal threat to the Base is from the CTO and its related subversive organizations.

54. The CTO has an estimated strength of more than 2000 terrorists in the Thai border area and the northern States of Peninsular Malaysia.

The 8th Assault Unit has a strength of 63 and is based in the Baling and Kulim districts east of the Base. The CTO is armed with small-arms and is proficient in the use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. Communist terrorists have used makeshift rockets in attacks against military installations, and they probably have mortars that could be deployed without warning. The CTO has also demonstrated a capability to conduct large-scale sabotage raids against targets that are supposed to be protected by Security Force patrols.

CTO Policies and Intentions

55. We believe that the CTO intends to consolidate its present position in Peninsular Malaysia by recruiting among Chinese and Malays, by developing base areas and extending the presence of armed units, by establishing communication with its underground supporters, and by maintaining its image as a serious, active threat to an illegitimate government. These aims should be common to all three factions, and there is likely to be continued competition among them for the leadership of the anti-government revolutionary movement. It is difficult to predict when the second phase of revolutionary warfare (open attacks on government installations and actively contesting control of the countryside with the Security Forces) might start, but we doubt whether this phase will be initiated in the foreseeable future. We assess, however, that the CTO presence and activity within Peninsular Malaysia will continue to increase.

The Threat Assessment

56. Likelihood of Attack. We assess that:


- (a) It is unlikely that any threat to Air Base Butterworth will arise from an external military attack on Malaysia.
- (b) There is a potential threat to the Base from the CTO and related communist, subversive organizations.
- (c) CTO policy will be directed towards consolidating the infrastructure in Peninsular Malaysia, but this will not be taken to the point at which a decision is made to launch the second phase of revolutionary warfare. It is therefore unlikely that the CTO will, as a deliberate act of policy, try to attack Air Base Butterworth.
- (d) It is possible that the CTO could decide to attack the Base if the presence of Australian Forces became a major political issue in Malaysia or if there were large-scale civil disturbances and industrial unrest. We consider this development unlikely for the present.

- (e) There is a danger that the CTO may decide to attack the Base to achieve a psychological and propaganda victory over the Government in retaliation for a major success by the Security Forces. Such an attack may also be encouraged by RMAF strike aircraft using the Base against the CTO.
- (f) There is some risk that members of subversive groups could, regardless of CTO policy or acting on their own initiative, attempt an isolated attack on or within the Base at any time.

7. Likely Methods of Attack. If the CTO did attack the Base, the attack could be likely to take one of the following forms:

- (a) An attack by fire, using mortars or other indirect fire weapons from the surrounding kampong/paddy-field areas, especially those to the east.
- (b) Covert penetration at night by separate groups of communist terrorists using explosives, with the object of attacking Vital Points and aircraft.
- (c) The planting by subversive groups of delayed-action explosives, booby-traps, and other devices to damage equipment and to injure personnel. Targets outside the base perimeter may be chosen in order to avoid detection by security patrols.

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SECRET


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SECRET



PENINSULAR MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE

BASE AREAS OF CTO UNITS



SECRET

- DI -

List of Incidents in the Area Surrounding Air Base Butterworth

Brief details of activity between July 1974 and August 1975 are as follows:

Date	Location	Details
12th July 1974	9 kilometres south of Kulim	Four terrorists sighted.
13th July 1974	9 kilometres south of Kulim	Four terrorists sighted.
15th July 1974	9 kilometres south of Kulim	Four terrorists sighted.
16th July 1974	2 kilometres north-west of Kulim	Four terrorists sighted.
18th July 1974	Bukit Degong area	Three terrorists sighted.
18th July 1974	3 kilometres north-west Val d'Or village	Three terrorists sighted.
21st July 1974	Bukit Degong area	Six armed terrorists sighted.
22nd July 1974	Sungai Bakap area	Two terrorists sighted.
8th August 1974	Kampong Tawar Besar	RELA unit had contact with two terrorists.
10th August 1974	2½ kilometres north-west of Lubok Buntar	Four terrorists sighted.
12th August 1974	5½ kilometres east of Bukit Mertajam	Four terrorists sighted.
21st August 1974	Bukit Besar	One armed terrorist sighted.

Date	Location	Details
14th September 1974	Gunong Inas forest reserve	Rest area for four or five terrorists found.
19th September 1974	9 kilometres south-west of Kulim	Eight armed terrorists seen.
27th September 1974	3 kilometres north of Kampong Machang Bubok	Four terrorists sighted.
5th October 1974	Anak Kulim, 11 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Resting place for four or five terrorists found.
12th October 1974	Anak Kulim	One terrorist sighted.
14th October 1974	Ayer Puteh area	Four armed terrorists sighted.
14th October 1974	3 kilometres north of Kampong Machang Bubok	Four terrorists sighted.
14th October 1974	Pagar Teras	Four armed terrorists sighted.
15th October 1974	Bukit Seraya area	Two armed terrorists sighted.
19th October 1974	Bukit Seraya area	25 armed terrorists sighted.
24th October 1974	Bukit Chempedak area	One terrorists sighted.
24th/25th October 1974	Ayer Puteh area	Three terrorist groups sighted (up to 10 strong).
24th October to 5th November 1974	Kulim area	Four small sightings (up to five strong).
31st October 1974	Gunong Inas forest reserve	Security Forces found old terrorist camp (for 15 terrorists).

Date	Location	Details
6th to 10th November 1974	Karangan area	Three terrorist bases found.
13th November 1974	Padang Serai	Security Forces sentry opened fire on two terrorists (no casualties).
16th November 1974	3 kilometres north-east of Kampong Machang Bubok	Three armed terrorists sighted.
18th November 1974	2 kilometres north-west of Kulim	Two armed terrorists sighted.
18th November 1974	6 kilometres north of Kulim	PFF patrol in contact with three terrorists — two killed, one wounded. Security Forces — one wounded.
19th November 1974	3 kilometres north-east of Kampong Machang Bubok	Three armed terrorists sighted.
25th November 1974	6 kilometres east of Kulim	Three terrorists sighted.
27th November 1974	13 kilometres east of Kulim	Three terrorists sighted.
29th November 1974	Kampong Machang Bubok area	Two armed terrorists sighted.
3rd December 1974	2 kilometres west of Val d'Or village	Eight armed terrorists sighted.
12th December 1974	5½ kilometres south-east of Kulim	Five armed terrorists sighted.
30th December 1974	12 kilometres south-west of Kulim	Five armed terrorists sighted.
1st January 1975	18 kilometres north-east of Kulim	Six terrorists sighted.

Date	Location	Details
2nd January 1975	22½ kilometres north-east of Kulim	Four armed terrorists sighted.
7th January 1975	3 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Four armed terrorists sighted.
9th January 1975	11 kilometres south of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
20th January 1975	4 kilometres south of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
27th January 1975	Bukit Mertajam and Sungai Puyu	Flags and banners found.
28th January 1975	Bukit Mertajam	Three armed terrorists sighted.
19th February 1975	7 kilometres north-east of Kulim	Three armed/uniformed terrorists sighted.
20th February 1975	2 kilometres north-west of Kulim (Pondok Labu)	Two armed/uniformed terrorists sighted.
21st February 1975	19 kilometres north-east of Kulim	Three armed/uniformed terrorists sighted.
1st March 1975	Bukit Chempedak area	Two terrorists sighted.
29th March 1975	Pagar Teras — 3 kilometres east of Bukit Mertajam	Three armed terrorists sighted.
31st March 1975	Sungai Ular estate — 8 kilometres south of Kulim	Six terrorists sighted.
31st March 1975	Batu Uban camp, Pinang	Rockets fired into camp.
1st April 1975	5 kilometres south of Kulim	Six terrorists sighted.

Date	Location	Details
2nd April 1975	4 kilometres south-east of Tasek Gelugor, Butterworth	Four armed Chinese sighted.
5th April 1975	4 kilometres south-east of Bukit Mertajam	Two terrorists sighted.
11th April 1975	Anak Kulim estate — 13 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Three terrorists sighted.
7th April 1975	27 kilometres north-east of Kuala Nerang	13 armed Chinese sighted.
7th April 1975	Gubir — near Muda Dam	Between 50 and 60 terrorists ambushed convoy; 7 Security Forces killed, 10 wounded.
7th April 1975	11 kilometres north-east of Nami in Kampong Gurun	Rockets, then shots, fired into Local Defence Corps base.
10th April 1975	Kota Ayer-Naka-Gubir road	Terrorist ambush — 13 killed, 22 wounded.
10th April 1975	3 miles south-east of Gubir	Security Forces clash with terrorists.
10th/12th April 1975	Gubir area	Two rest areas located.
10th to 14th April 1975	Kedah	Security Forces located seven terrorists caches.
11th April 1975	40 kilometres north-east of Baling	One Security Force personnel wounded by mine.
11th April 1975	Muda Dam area, 2 kilometres east of Gubir	Rocket fired into Local Defence Corps camp.

Date	Location	Details
11th April 1975	Kedah	Contact during follow-up operations.
13th April 1975	45 kilometres north of Baling	Security Forces discovered fortified base camp.
14th April 1975	11 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Five terrorists distributed pamphlets and a letter to workers.
15th April 1975	32 kilometres south-east of Kuala Nerang	Contact with terrorists; no casualties.
16th April 1975	5 kilometres south-east of Gubir, 11 kilometres north-east of Kampong Batu Lapan	Security Forces located two rest areas.
18th April 1975	Anak Kulim estate	Two terrorists sighted.
18th April 1975	Sungai Ular estate	Five terrorists sighted.
18th April 1975	Alor Setar	Two wounded terrorists captured.
18th April 1975	Ulu Muda forest reserve	Two Security Forces wounded by mine.
20th April 1975	4 kilometres south-east of Tasek Gelugor	Four terrorists seen crossing Ara Kuda Road.
20th April 1975	11 kilometres south of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
20th April 1975	11 kilometres south of Kulim	Five terrorists sighted.
20th April 1975	8 kilometres south of Butterworth	Four terrorists sighted.

ANNEX 1 TO AIR BASE
DEFINITION OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 100 SEPTEMBER 1971

LEGAL ASPECTS OF A HOSTAGE SITUATION
SITUATION IN THE DEFENSE OF
AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

1. General. The use of force in the defense of Air Base Butterworth is governed by Malaysian Law. The following instructions give the circumstances under which the Malaysian Law allows personnel (both Malaysian and Australian) to protect the Base, themselves, their property and dependants.

2. Legal Powers of Service Personnel.

a. The legal powers of personnel at Butterworth are set out in the following legislation:

- (1) The Penal Code of the Federated Malay States;
- (2) The Criminal Procedure Code of the Federated Malay States;
- (3) The Protected Areas and Protected Places Ordinance of 1955 (this applies only to that part of the Base east of the main road).

b. These powers are set out in detail in the paragraphs which follow.

Legal Powers of Defence Available at All Times.

1. Right of Self Defence. Any person who is lawfully in possession of the Base and its contents at any time may use such force as is necessary to protect himself or herself or any other person in the Base from any unlawful attack or from any other unlawful act.

Right of Defence of the Base.

- (1) Any person who is lawfully in possession of the Base and its contents at any time may use such force as is necessary to protect the Base and its contents from any unlawful attack or from any other unlawful act.
- (2) This right may be exercised only when there is a reasonable apprehension of danger to the Base and its contents or when such apprehension has been caused.
- (3) In the exercise of this right any force which may be used must be necessary, provided that no more force than is necessary is used for the purpose of defence.
- (4) In the following instances only the right of self defence, or the right of defence of the Base, may be exercised:

- a. If there is an assault causing reasonable apprehension of death.

b. If there is an assault.

2. ANNEX A

Where the defender in the case of such an assault is so situated that he cannot effectively exercise the right of private defence without the risk of harm to an innocent person, the right extends to the running of that risk.

- (b) If there is an assault causing reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt.
- (c) If there is an assault with intent to abduct, kidnap or wrongfully confine or to commit rape or an unnatural sexual offence.

b. Defence of Property.

- (1) Every person has a right to defend the property, movable or immovable, of himself or any other person against any act or attempted act of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.
- (2) This right may be exercised only when there is reasonable apprehension of danger to property and ceases as soon as assistance is obtained from the public authorities or property is recovered or the offender has retreated with the property.
- (3) In the exercise of this right any harm other than death may be caused to the assailant, provided that no more harm than is necessary is inflicted for the purpose of defence.
- (4) In the following instances only, the right may extend to the causing of death to the assailant:
 - (a) Robbery - is theft or extortion in the process of which death, hurt or wrongful restraint is caused or attempted.
 - (b) House-breaking by night.
 - (c) Mischief by fire - or arson - committed on any building used as a human dwelling or as a place for the custody of property.
 - (d) Theft, mischief or house-trespass - but only where there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt will result if the right of private defence is not exercised.

.../Note: (1) 'Mischief'

3.

ANNEX A

- Note: (i) 'Mischief' means destroying or injuring property with the intent to cause or with knowledge that it is likely to cause wrongful loss or damage to property.
- (ii) 'House-trespass' means entering into or remaining in any place used as a dwelling or any building used as a place of worship or for the custody of property with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property.

c. Restrictions. The right of private defence does not apply:

- (1) Against an act committed or attempted by or at the direction of a public servant acting as such in good faith - unless there is reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt.
- (2) Where there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.
- (3) Where more harm is inflicted than is necessary for the purpose of defence.

4. Legal Powers of Arrest Available At All Times Powers of arrest are contained in sections 11 and 27 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Under these powers:

- a. Every person is bound to assist a Magistrate, Justice of the Peace or Police Officer reasonably demanding his aid in arresting or preventing the escape of any other person whom the Magistrate, Justice of the Peace or Police Officer is authorised to arrest.
- b. Any person may arrest any other person who, in his view, commits a non-bailable and seizureable offence (for example, theft, rape, kidnapping or murder) and shall hand him over to the nearest police officer or police station as soon as possible.

5. Legal Powers of Arrest and Search on Base East of the Main Road. In a protected place designated as such (as the Base East of the main road is) any member of the Forces performing the duties of a guard or sentry or any commissioned officer may search any person in or seeking to enter that place and may detain any such person for the purpose of such search. Any person refusing to submit to such a search may be arrested. Any person who attempts to enter or who is in a protected place and fails to stop after being challenged three times so to do may be arrested by force which may extend to the voluntary causing of death.

Note: The power to arrest, other than the power to arrest after the challenge is repeated three times, arises from section 3 of the Federation Protected Areas and Protected Places Ordinance

...which makes every

4.

ANNEX A

which makes every offence against the provisions of the Ordinance a seizable and non-bailable offence for the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Code.

6. Summary. Under the local laws regarding Criminal Trespass and Internal Security all ranks have certain rights. These rights are as follows:

- a. We can defend ourselves, our families and friends against any form of violence but in doing so we are not permitted to use more than necessary force. None of us can use firearms unless it is the only way of saving our own life or lives of others or of preventing serious injury to ourselves or them.
- b. We can all of us defend our own and Service property but again we must not use more than necessary force. We can only use firearms to prevent persons actually breaking into dwelling houses at night or to prevent the attempted destruction of dwelling houses or Service stores or property.
- c. If you are acting as a guard or sentry in the Protected Place area of the Base you will receive orders regarding extra powers you have. The most important of these extra powers is that anyone who attempts to enter or who is in a Protected Place and who fails to stop after being challenged three times by you can be arrested by force and if necessary, you can use firearms to effect his arrest.

7. Under the local Criminal Procedure Code we are all bound as individuals to go to the assistance of any police officer who is having difficulty in arresting a wrong-doer and who asks for our assistance.

ANNEX B TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
GROUND DEFENCE OPERATIONS CENTRE

1. The Ground Defence Operations Centre at Butterworth (GDOC) is established in room 7, building 56 and has four main tasks as follows:

- a. to provide a staff and communications system through which the Officer Commanding Air Base Butterworth (Ground Defence Commander) can exercise his function of operational control of the Air Base Butterworth area for shared defence purposes;
- b. to provide a staff and communications system through which the Deputy Ground Defence Commanders can direct operations to safeguard Service property at Air Base Butterworth and its associated installations on the mainland;
- c. to maintain contact with and relay orders or information to or from various higher authorities as well as subordinate Units/Sections that may be involved in a shared defence situation affecting Air Base Butterworth;
- d. to maintain a record of all information, messages and action relating to shared defence operations.

2. The GDOC will be skeleton manned on the declaration of Security Green, and will maintain a watch on events. On the declaration of Security Amber it will be fully manned, and will assume control of all mainland shared defence operations.

3. During working hours the Senior Ground Defence Officer is responsible to initiate manning of the GDOC in accordance with the appropriate Security state. During stand-down hours the Duty Staff Officer has this responsibility. He is to assume the functions of Senior Ground Defence Officer during Security Green, and the Duty Controller from Security Amber until relieved. In non-working hours, information leading to the declaration of a security state would normally be expected to be made available to either Assistant Provost Marshal, Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal (DAPM) or Duty Staff Officer RAAF, the GIC SSP and the Orderly Officer RMAF. The Duty Staff Officer should evaluate information, and if necessary:

a. inform:

- (1) Commanding Officer Base Squadron;
- (2) Commanding Officer RMAF;
- (3) Assistant Provost Marshal;
- (4) Senior Ground Defence Officer;
- (5) Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal;

/(6) Officer in Charge

2.

ANNEX D

- (6) Officer in Charge Special Security Police
- (7) Administrative Staff Officer RAAF;
- (8) CO Admin Wing RAAF; and
- (9) RAAF Radio Officer.

- b. collect the keys to GDOC from the Duty Operations Officer and open up the GDOC (building 56 room 7);
- c. recall to the GDOC a skeleton staff (see paragraph 4) from the manning list held on the Duty Controller's desk;

(NOTE: If the Senior Ground Defence Officer has been contacted, he will assume duty as Ground Defence Adviser.)

- d. take any message coming into the GDOC and make a record in the log book (but extension 555 is to remain switched through to the Guard Room)
- e. maintain close liaison with RAAF Police Section and OIC SSP to see if there has been any change in the situation, checking at least hourly
- f. continue to man the GDOC until relieved by a Ground Defence Adviser;
- g. if notified of the declaration of Security Amber or if in his opinion the situation warrants such action, he is to:

- (1) inform those listed at sub-paragraph a. of the change of state;
- (2) if he has not already done so, collect the keys to the GDOC from the Duty Operations Officer and open up the GDOC (building 56 room 7);
- (3) recall for duty in the GDOC a full staff (see paragraph 5) from the manning list held on the Duty Controller's desk;

(NOTE: If the Administrative Staff Officer has been contacted, he will assume the duty as Duty Controller.)

- (4) record all his action in the GDOC log book
- (5) cancel the switching of the GDOC switchboard to the Guard room;
- (6) take all calls coming into the GDOC and record all messages; and
- (7) continue to man the GDOC until relieved by a Duty Controller.

If the Duty Staff Officer needs assistance to man the GDOC before being relieved by the GDOC duty staff, he is to call on the Orderly Officer RAAF/RMAF and the Orderly Sergeant RAAF/RMAF.

4. GDOC skeleton

[illegible][illegible]

14. The Deputy United Nations Commissioner for the 1975
 15. Central and South Africa a larger degree of security than the
 16. 1974-1975 period, including 1975-1976.

1. The exhibit being requested to act on behalf of the Deputy Chief of Police Commander is to be signed by the late Commander. The following have signed will be:

1. Administrative Staff Officer Contracting Department
2. Senior Assistant Officer Base Operations
3. Air 1 Forward Headquarters
4. Senior Base Officer Base Operations and
Forward Headquarters Base Operations

[illegible]

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the situation.

1.

APPENDIX B

The Senior Ground Defence Officer is to be the Senior Ground Defence Adviser and is to prepare the duty roster.

10. The following details are set out in Appendixes:

- a. Organisation Chart - Appendix 1; and
- b. Duty Statements GDCO staff - Appendix 2.

11. The Senior Ground Defence Officer is responsible for the state of readiness of the GDCO including provision of furniture, wall displays, stationery and documentation and preparation of all registers for running the GDCO.

12. Arming. Staff of the GDCO will not normally be armed. Personnel who are issued on the orders of the Deputy Ground Defence Commander or Duty Controller are to be retained by the person to whom they are issued at all times.

13. Guarding. The GDCO is a Vital Point (VP) within the FORT Sturges Defence Flight Area. The officer in charge of that defence flight is to provide guards for the GDCO from the declaration of Security Red.

14. Emergency Lighting. The Senior Ground Defence Officer is to hold six pressure lamps in the Ground Defence Section to provide emergency lighting for the GDCO in the declaration of Security Red and is to arrange for them to be held in the GDCO.

15. Arm Conditioning. Until such time as suitable is provided, the GDCO is to provide and install a water-resistant secure room from the declaration of Security Red.

16. Organisation

- a. All staff are to be available at all times.
- b. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- c. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- d. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- e. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.

17. General Ground Defence Officer's Duties

- a. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- b. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- c. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- d. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- e. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.

18. General Ground Defence Officer's Duties

- a. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- b. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- c. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- d. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- e. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- f. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- g. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- h. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- i. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- j. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- k. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- l. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- m. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
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- o. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- p. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- q. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- r. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- s. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- t. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- u. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- v. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- w. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- x. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- y. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.
- z. The GDCO staff will be available at all times.

1. Personnel
 2. Equipment
 3. Supplies
 4. Medical
 5. Communications
 6. Transportation
 7. Food
 8. Water
 9. Sanitation
 10. Security
 11. Weather
 12. Navigation
 13. Intelligence
 14. Logistics
 15. Administration
 16. Public Affairs
 17. Legal
 18. Religious
 19. Recreation
 20. Other

COMPONENTS OF THE UNIT

1. Commander (Officer Commanding)

2. Executive Officer

3. Adjutant

4. Quartermaster

5. Medical Officer

6. Communications Officer

7. Transportation Officer

8. Food Officer

9. Water Officer

10. Sanitation Officer

11. Security Officer

12. Weather Officer

13. Navigation Officer

14. Intelligence Officer

15. Logistics Officer

16. Administration Officer

17. Public Affairs Officer

18. Legal Officer

19. Religious Officer

20. Recreation Officer

21. Other

1. Personnel
 2. Equipment
 3. Supplies
 4. Medical
 5. Communications
 6. Transportation
 7. Food
 8. Water
 9. Sanitation
 10. Security
 11. Weather
 12. Navigation
 13. Intelligence
 14. Logistics
 15. Administration
 16. Public Affairs
 17. Legal
 18. Religious
 19. Recreation
 20. Other

APPENDIX 2 TO
 ORDER NO. 10 AIR BASE
 BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO. 1/72
 DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1971

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES - BASE STAFF

1. Deputy Ground Defence Commanders. The Deputy Ground Defence Commanders are responsible to the Officer Commanding for the security of Service installations and property at Air Base Butterworth and associated mainland installations. Their duties include:

- a. command and control of their respective national forces allocated to shared defence at Air Base Butterworth unless special exception is made;
- b. preparation and up-dating of shared defence plans and orders; and
- c. ensuring that the RRAF and ground defence units can be activated at short notice at any time and can perform their allotted tasks, including the conduct of exercises for the purpose as necessary.

2. RRAF Duty Controller. The RRAF Duty Controller is responsible to the Deputy Ground Defence Commanders for the day-to-day functioning of the RRAF and the routine operations of RRAF forces deployed for shared defence purposes. RRAF forces are only to be deployed after liaison with the RRAF Assistant Controller. He is to be familiar with all shared defence plans and instructions held in the RRAF. He is to:

- a. obtain all messages as quickly as possible and ensure that information is passed to units for action on information where applicable, including changes in security status;
- b. inform the Deputy Ground Defence Commanders immediately of all action developments which should be known to their office, or if there is a likelihood of such developments;
- c. allocate special tasks to the Mobile Reserve or independent units;
- d. allocate special tasks to the RRAF Police as appropriate, in provision of security;
- e. ensure that he fully understands the situation before making any decisions and brief his staff;
- f. ensure that the RRAF is continuously alert at all times;
- g. ensure that there are always up-to-date copies of the RRAF Base Order; and
- h. ensure that the RRAF staff are fully conversant with their duties.

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3.

ATTACHED 2 TO
ANNEX 1

3. RAF Assistant Controller. The RAF Assistant Controller is to help the RAF Duty Controller in the execution of his duties and is responsible for the deployment of Malaysian forces. He is to be familiar with the functions and operating procedures of the AOC and he is to undertake any outstanding action before taking over duty. He is to brief his relief before going off duty.

4. Ground Defence Adviser. The Ground Defence Adviser is responsible to advise the Deputy Ground Defence Commander and the Duty Controller on all matters relating to the protection of property and persons in a shared defence situation. He is also responsible to advise all commands and unit defence flight commanders as is necessary. He is to:

- a. provide specialist advice when required, including interpretation of reports from other Services;
- b. supervise the recording of relevant incidents on display charts and maps and seek to establish a picture of incidents as they affect the security of persons and property covered by this Order;
- c. ensure that all relevant plans and charts are familiar with the situation on the day;
- d. provide advice for transmission to higher commands;
- e. participate with unit and defence flights in the defence of the area and in the defence of the area.

5. RAF Duty Controller. The RAF Duty Controller is responsible for the execution of his duties and is responsible for the deployment of Malaysian forces. He is to be familiar with the functions and operating procedures of the AOC and he is to undertake any outstanding action before taking over duty. He is to brief his relief before going off duty.

- a. provide specialist advice when required, including interpretation of reports from other Services;
- b. supervise the recording of relevant incidents on display charts and maps and seek to establish a picture of incidents as they affect the security of persons and property covered by this Order;
- c. ensure that all relevant plans and charts are familiar with the situation on the day;
- d. provide advice for transmission to higher commands;
- e. participate with unit and defence flights in the defence of the area and in the defence of the area.

6. RAF Duty Controller. The RAF Duty Controller is responsible for the execution of his duties and is responsible for the deployment of Malaysian forces. He is to be familiar with the functions and operating procedures of the AOC and he is to undertake any outstanding action before taking over duty. He is to brief his relief before going off duty.

7. RAF Duty Controller. The RAF Duty Controller is responsible for the execution of his duties and is responsible for the deployment of Malaysian forces. He is to be familiar with the functions and operating procedures of the AOC and he is to undertake any outstanding action before taking over duty. He is to brief his relief before going off duty.

8. RAF Duty Controller. The RAF Duty Controller is responsible for the execution of his duties and is responsible for the deployment of Malaysian forces. He is to be familiar with the functions and operating procedures of the AOC and he is to undertake any outstanding action before taking over duty. He is to brief his relief before going off duty.

- d. take incoming messages to a duty controller on receipt;
 - e. check communications every two hours on the odd hour if traffic is light or when ordered to do so by the Duty Controller; and
 - f. understand the state of communications before taking over duty and brief the following operators before going off duty.
6. Driver/Passenger. The Driver/Passenger is responsible to drive and maintain the JMW vehicle, and to deliver messages as required by the Duty Controller. He is to collect the vehicle from WI Section on the opening of the TRO.
7. Ground Liaison Officer. It is a major responsibility of the Ground Liaison Section at Air Base Butterworth to collect, evaluate and disseminate intelligence information affecting the internal security situation within Malaysia. This responsibility remains with the Section in a shared defence strategy.
8. RAF Intelligence Officer. The RAF Intelligence Officer is to work closely with the Ground Liaison Officer for the overall intelligence function and he may also be required to attend the Deputy Ground Liaison Officers' daily briefings in the TRO.
9. The Ground Liaison Section. This section is located in the TRO and is responsible for the preparation of routine intelligence information for the Ground Liaison Officer. The Ground Liaison Section is also responsible for the preparation of intelligence information for the TRO. The TRO is a daily requirement for the Ground Liaison Section and is provided from the TRO.

CONFIDENTIAL

REF ID: A72
SUBJECT: R. T. R. CASE
NOTIFICATION OF ORDER NO. 1, 1
DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1971

ILLINOIS TTTI RURAL RELAYING POINT

1. On declaration of Security Level, the CCWAF is to maintain a liaison officer in the headquarters of the CCWAF Butternorth.

2. Duties of Liaison Officer.

a. To keep Duty Controller EDOE advised of the situation in the Butternorth Police District, and

b. to report all other information of an internal security value as may be released to him.

3. The Liaison Officer will make his reports directly to the CCWAF.

4. Equipment.

(a) When the CCWAF is responsible to provide the Liaison Officer with a vehicle and an alternative radio link to the Butternorth Security Controller.

DATE: 10/10/77
TIME: 10:00 AM
FILE: 100-441100-1000
DATED: 10/10/77

1. CO No 4 RAAF Hospital will implement a satisfactory medical plan within the restrictions imposed by cholera etc. He will.

- a. Prepare an estimate of medical plan to meet shared defense situation.
- b. Keep the Grand Alliance Commander, Deputy Grand Alliance Commander informed of any aspects of his long range planning which requires co-ordination with other activities listed in this order.
- c. If considered feasible, have a medical facility at these Camps and
- d. an Assistant or Security Agent appoint an officer responsible for close liaison with the City Controller H.Q.. This officer will co-ordinate:
- (1) The activities of mobilization of a medical team which meets the current situation in force and is not coordinated within the present H.Q. plan and
- (2) The City's day liaison necessary in implementation of this medical plan in provision of security, transport for patients and care on arrival and visit.

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

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SECRET 3 OF AIR BASE
CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER NO. 100
DATED 31st SEPTEMBER 1971

PROTECTION OF SERVICE IMPROVEMENT
AIR BASE DEFENCE

1. In the event of any deterioration in the local situation GPOC will notify Ground Defence Flights and units of increasing states of readiness by declaring Security Green, to be followed as tension increases by status Amber and Red.

a. Action to be taken on declaration of Security Green. The GPOC is to be opened by the Senior Ground Defence Officer or Duty Staff Officer. The GPOC is to be station sound and is to maintain a watch on events as directed by the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.

b. Action to be taken on declaration of Security Yellow. The GPOC is to be activated and is to be directed by the Deputy Ground Defence Commander. The Ground Defence Officers (GPOC) are to maintain their mobile readiness. The Ground Defence Officers are to maintain a watch on information for the Duty Controller GPOC.

c. Action to be taken on declaration of Security Red. The GPOC is to be activated and is to be directed by the Senior Ground Defence Officer or Duty Staff Officer. The GPOC is to be station sound and is to maintain a watch on events as directed by the Deputy Ground Defence Commander. The Ground Defence Officers (GPOC) are to maintain their mobile readiness. The Ground Defence Officers are to maintain a watch on information for the Duty Controller GPOC.

d. The GPOC is to be activated and is to be directed by the Senior Ground Defence Officer or Duty Staff Officer. The GPOC is to be station sound and is to maintain a watch on events as directed by the Deputy Ground Defence Commander. The Ground Defence Officers (GPOC) are to maintain their mobile readiness. The Ground Defence Officers are to maintain a watch on information for the Duty Controller GPOC.

PROTECTION OF SERVICE IMPROVEMENT

a. The GPOC is to be activated and is to be directed by the Senior Ground Defence Officer or Duty Staff Officer. The GPOC is to be station sound and is to maintain a watch on events as directed by the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.

b. The GPOC is to be activated and is to be directed by the Senior Ground Defence Officer or Duty Staff Officer. The GPOC is to be station sound and is to maintain a watch on events as directed by the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.

c. The GPOC is to be activated and is to be directed by the Senior Ground Defence Officer or Duty Staff Officer. The GPOC is to be station sound and is to maintain a watch on events as directed by the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.

d. The GPOC is to be activated and is to be directed by the Senior Ground Defence Officer or Duty Staff Officer. The GPOC is to be station sound and is to maintain a watch on events as directed by the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.

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- b. From the Declaration of Security under this control is to be exercised through the JMO.
- c. Detailed arrangements for the operational deployment of the company are contained at Appendix 6.
- 7. Organization and Responsibilities. The organization and responsibilities of ground defence elements are set out as follows:

- a. RMF Mobile Reserve Flight - Appendix 7
- b. No 1 Squadron RMF Defence Flight - Appendix 8
- c. No 75 Squadron RMF " " - Appendix 9
- d. No 473rd Squadron RMF " " - Appendix 10
- e. RMF Mobile Reserve Flight - Appendix 11
- f. No 1 Squadron RMF Defence Flight - Appendix 12
- g. No 11 Squadron RMF " " - Appendix 13
- h. No 1 Air Defence Centre RMF Defence Flight - Appendix 14
- i. Arrangements for RMF Service Police - Appendix 15

The areas of responsibility of each element is defined in the Appendices 7, 8 and 9.

Weapons and Ammunition. The RMF Armament Officer is responsible for the issue of weapons and ammunition to the units concerned at the Declaration of Security, including to ground defence elements and the Royal Air Force units that are concerned. The Armament Officer is responsible for ensuring that the Declaration of Security is signed by the appropriate personnel and that the necessary arrangements are made for the issue of weapons and ammunition to the units concerned. The Armament Officer is also responsible for ensuring that the necessary arrangements are made for the issue of weapons and ammunition to the units concerned.

Deployment. The Ground Defence Officer (GDO) is responsible for the deployment of the units concerned at the Declaration of Security. The GDO is responsible for ensuring that the units are deployed in accordance with the requirements of the Declaration of Security. The GDO is also responsible for ensuring that the units are deployed in accordance with the requirements of the Declaration of Security.

Communication. The primary means of communication is by radio. The units concerned are to be equipped with the necessary radio equipment to ensure that they can communicate with each other and with the command and control elements.

Support. The units concerned are to be supported by the necessary personnel and equipment to ensure that they can carry out their duties.

Training. The units concerned are to be trained in the necessary skills and techniques to ensure that they can carry out their duties.

- b. when an unusual incident occurs;
- c. when a change in the state of alert has been effected; and
- d. Reports of Opening Fire. All instances where firearms have been used are to be reported to Duty Controller (DCO) at once. The detail required is:

- (1) unit or units concerned
- (2) location of incident by reference to the grid shown on the map or appendix or otherwise as necessary;
- (3) brief description of incident to include surrounding circumstances and persons involved;
- (4) number of rounds fired; and
- (5) detail of any casualties or damage, both military and civilian.

The Duty Controller (DCO) is to report the incident by priority message if life and limb are endangered as directed by the ground command element.

Supplies: 1. Reinforcement

2. Vital Points

3. Areas

4. Lines of the Base

5. Areas of Interest and Priority Targets

6. Areas of Interest

7. Areas of Interest - Night

8. Areas of Interest - Day

9. Areas of Interest - Night

10. Areas of Interest - Night

11. Areas of Interest - Night

12. Areas of Interest - Night

13. Areas of Interest - Night

14. Areas of Interest - Night

15. Areas of Interest - Night

16. Areas of Interest - Night

17. Areas of Interest - Night

18. Areas of Interest - Night

19. Areas of Interest - Night

APPENDIX B
ANNEX C

1. Transport. Requests made by the reinforcements for transport are to be channelled through the HHC Duty Controller who is to co-ordinate the request through the appropriate transport officer, HAF or HAF.

2. Briefing. The Ground Liaison Officer is to brief the commander of the reinforcements. This briefing is to include:

- a. the current situation;
- b. location of salient features (such as VLA, other airfield installations, boundaries of protected area, off-base installations and quarters);
- c. geography of the Eastworth area;
- d. disposition of other ground defence forces;
- e. probable enemy, including, if applicable, status of readiness;
- f. transport and communication facilities; and
- g. administrative matters relating to ground defence/security (see para 3 and definition of ground defence).

3. Allocation. The Ground Defence Commander is to allocate reinforcements to the reinforcements. The Deputy Ground Defence Commander is to allocate specific tasks. In allocating roles and tasks the principles set out in paragraph 2, Annex C must be observed.

4. Reinforcement Allocation. Reinforcements are to be allocated to the reinforcements. It is not normally to be expected that reinforcements will be allocated to the reinforcements. However, it is probable that, in the event of rapid reinforcement, reinforcements will be allocated to the reinforcements. The Ground Defence Liaison Officer is to ensure that the officer in charge of the reinforcements receives a brief briefing.

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APPENDIX 2 TO

ORDER C 10 AIR BASE

BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71

DATED 3TH SEPTEMBER 1971

DM

VITAL POINTS

VP NO	DESCRIPTION	BLDG NO	GRID REF	RESPONSIBILITY FROM SECURITY RED
1	Missile Preparation Bay		6J	3SQN RAAF
2	Fuel Installation	47	8J	3SQN RAAF
3	3SQN Maintenance Hangar	49	9H, J	3SQN RAAF
4	Fuel Installation	47A	11J	75SQN RAAF
5A	3SQN Aircraft		9J	3SQN RAAF
5B	75SQN Aircraft		11J	75SQN RAAF
6	Motor Transport Compound	45 45A	11 12G, H	75SQN RAAF
7	Plinth K		3K	SSP & RAAF Police Incre- ment
8	Explosives Store	92	8J	3SQN RAAF
9	Operations Building	54	14 15J	11SQN RAAF
10	Plinth N	56D	14J	11SQN RAAF
11	Fuel Installation	77	15G	11SQN RAAF
12	TST Aircraft		12 13J	478(M)SQN
13	478SQN Maintenance Hangar	51	13J	478(M)SQN
14A	Visiting and RMAF Aircraft		16H, G	11SQN RMAF
14B	Helicopters		17C, H, J	3SQN RMAF
14C	Helicopters	111A, B	20K	3SQN RMAF
15	Telephone Switchboard	58E	12 13F	478(M)SQN
16	Emergency Power Supply	74	15T	478(M)SQN
17	Power Supply	20	13E	SSP
18	Armoury	65	14F	478(M)SQN
19	Plinth G	78L	20F	SSP & RAAF Police Increment
20	Water Tower	69	14F	478(M)SQN
21	Explosives Area		9 10 11, 12M, N	SSP
22	PAR	123E	11M	SSP)
23	Plinth P		12M	SSP) & RAAF
24	CADF Installation	76A	19L	SSP) Police
24A	Surveillance Radar	123D	7N	SSP) Incre-
24B	SSB Receivers	123C	6P	SSP) ment
25	75SQN Maintenance Hangar	50	12J	75SQN RAAF
26	Transmitter Station	89, 89A	8C	SSP
27A	4RAAF Hospital		10D	RAAF Police Sect
27B	Auxiliary Power Station		10D	RAAF Police Sect
27C	4RAAF Hospital Water Tower		10D	RAAF Police Sect

/28 Air Defence Centre

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2.

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX C

VP NO	DESCRIPTION	BLDG NO	GRID REF	RESPONSIBILITY FROM SECURITY RED
28	Air Defence Centre Hq. IAS / ADC AND AIR DEFENCE CENTRE	147/148	17, 19, 0, - P, Q	No 1 ADC/ RMAF
29	Pumping Station, Reservoir and Wells		19D	RAAF Police Sect
30	Ground Defence Operations Centre	56	14H	478(M)SQN
31	MARINE BEACON AND EMERGENCY POWER	106B/106C	off Base North of KUNAI	SSP
32	TACAN	106E	" " " "	SSP

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APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORDERS FOR SENTRIES AND PATROLS - GENERAL

1. Sentries guarding VIPs and other Service property may be static or mobile (patrols). In areas where there are other members working, static sentries may be mounted singly by day. In all other circumstances they are to be mounted in pairs; mobile sentries may exceed this number if necessary.
2. When sentries are mounted in pairs one is to be nominated as the sentry for the point to be guarded, the other is to be nominated as the tactical sentry. The duty of the tactical sentry is to cover the sentry and he is to be concealed.
3. Sentries will normally be armed with a rifle or SMG. Tactical sentries are to be armed with a rifle or SMG. The rifle is the best weapon for a sentry. However, where there is a possibility of self-inflicted damage to our installations, eg around aircraft, the SMG is useful.
4. Sentries are to be fully briefed on each occasion that they are mounted, using the specimen orders which follow as a guide. Briefing may be verbal or verbal and written.
5. The tour of duty of a sentry should not exceed two hours. The relief of a sentry and his tactical sentry should be staggered, eg the sentry is posted and relieved on the even hour, his tactical sentry on the odd hour.

SPECIMEN ORDERS FOR SENTRIES OR PATROLS
MOUNTED IN A PROTECTED PLACE

Responsibility

6. If you do not understand any part of these orders you are to tell the Guard/Patrol Commander at once.
7. You are Sentry/Patrol Number _____.
8. You are to guard (or patrol) _____ which is part of a Protected Place.
9. Your area of responsibility is the area enclosed within the security fence, but you have a special responsibility for _____ which is an installation vital to the operational effectiveness of the Base.
10. Your period of duty is from _____ hours to _____ hours and you are not to leave your post (or area) until duly relieved.
11. You are to be thoroughly alert at all times.

Arming.

12. You have had _____ rounds of ammunition issued to you.
13. If you are armed with:

.. /a. Rifle.

RESTRICTED

2.

APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX C

- a. Rifle. The bayonet is to be fixed and the magazine charged with 20 rounds. No round may be fed into the breech until you are preparing to fire. Your safety catch is to be applied.
- b. Sub-machine Gun. The recoiling parts are to be forward and no round is to be fed into the chamber until you are preparing to fire. The safety device is to be applied.
- c. Pistol. The pistol is to be fully loaded, (no round in the breech in an automatic pistol), the safety catch applied (if fitted), and the pistol is to remain in the holster until you are preparing to fire.

Challenging and Use of Force

14. If any person either enters the wire surrounding the Protected Place or is seen by you to be attempting to make his way through, over or under the wire or is in an area in which you suspect his presence to be unauthorised or is acting in a manner to arouse suspicion of unauthorised presence, you are to act as follows:

- a. Adopt the "on guard" position and challenge in a loud clear voice: "HALT WHO GOES THERE?" and "BERHENTI SIAPA ITU?"
- b. If the person fails to halt or to stop his efforts to enter the Protected Place, challenge again in a loud clear voice: "HALT OR I FIRE!" and "BERHENTI ATAU SAYA TEMBAK".
- c. If the person fails to halt or stop his efforts to enter the Protected Place adopt instant position, challenge again: "STAND FAST! I AM READY TO FIRE" and "BERDIRI TEGAK! SAYA SEDIA MANEMBAK".
- d. If the person still fails to halt, or stop his efforts to enter the Protected Place you will, using as little force as necessary, but including firing as a last resort, force him to halt and hold him covered with your weapon until help arrives.
- e. If a suspect person/s or intruder/s or would-be intruder/s halts on any of your challenges say in a loud clear voice:
 - (1) "ADVANCE AND BE RECOGNIZED" and "MARA UNTOK DI-KENALI", or
 - (2) "ADVANCE ONE AND BE RECOGNIZED" and "MARA SA-ORANG UNTOK DI-KENALI".
 - (3) "HALT!" "BERHENTI!"
 - (4) "PASS FRIEND" "BOLEH TALU, SAUDARA" or hold him covered with your weapon until help arrives.

.../f. If a would-be

3.

APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX C

- f. If a would-be intruder does not persist in trying to enter and runs away on being challenged, let him go and report the occurrence as soon as possible, but without leaving your post unguarded to do so.

15. Any person you arrest within the Protected Place is to be warned that if he attempts to escape he may be shot, but before shooting you must remember:

- a. Only as little force as may be necessary to effect his re-arrest may be used.
- b. If it is necessary to fire, you must, before firing, carry out the procedure of para 14b. and c. above.
- c. Once a person escaping arrest gets outside the Protected Place you must not fire to prevent his escape and you are not to pursue him beyond the perimeter fence.

When You May Fire

16. You are permitted to fire only in the following cases:

- a. If the person fails to halt or stop his efforts to enter the Protected Place and there is no other effective way of stopping him.
- b. If any person you have arrested escapes and, provided he is not outside the boundaries of the Protected Place, provided that there is no other way of re-arresting him and if it is necessary to fire you must, before firing, carry out the procedures of para 14 b. and c. above.
- c. If a person is in the act of destroying or damaging by fire, explosives or other violent means the Protected Place or any part of it or any property in it that you are guarding, or is in the act of removing any property that you are ordered to guard, you may fire only if there are no other means available to prevent such destruction, damage or removal. Before firing you must first shout "STAND FAST I AM READY TO FIRE" and "BERDIRI TEGAK SAYA SEDIA MANEMBAK", and allow the person a reasonable time to halt before firing.
- d. If you yourself, or any other person authorised to be in the Protected Place are being attacked from inside or outside the Protected Place in such a way as to give you no time to challenge, and you have reason to fear that death or grave bodily injury will result, you may fire without challenging.

.../17. Before firing

APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX C

17. Before firing at all remember:
- a. You must not fire, unless firing is the least force necessary.
 - b. Shoot to wound and not to kill.

SPECIMEN ORDERS FOR TACTICAL SENTRIESNotes

- a. Armed sentries are normally to operate in pairs, although this may be waived during daylight hours. The second sentry is referred to as the Tactical Sentry.
- b. Orders for the Tactical Sentry follow those for the other (No 1) sentry or Patrol except that the Tactical Sentry will normally adopt a tactical position as described in the subsequent paragraphs.

Responsibility

18. You are responsible for safeguarding the sentry you is given posted to cover and for making sure that the alarm in any way. You are also jointly responsible for the protection of your post and for the safety and security of the equipment and property which you have been ordered to guard.

Arming

19. If you are armed with:
- a. Rifle. The bayonet is to be fixed and the magazine charged with 20 rounds. No round may be fed into the breech until you are preparing to fire. Your safety catch is to be applied.
 - b. Sub-machine Gun. The recoiling parts are to be forward and no round is to be fed into the chamber until you are preparing to fire. The safety device is to be applied.

Challenging and Use of Force

20. Throughout your tour of duty you are to be in a tactical firing position. You are to watch all persons approaching your post (or area) and the other sentry's post and are to be ready to protect the sentry you are covering if it should be necessary. The other sentry is responsible for challenging. You are not responsible for challenging, but you are to warn the other sentry if you see any person approaching the post whose manner you suspect and whom you consider the other sentry may not have seen.

21. If the other sentry challenges a person and that person does not halt after the second challenge, you are to call for assistance (or give any other appropriate warning) and adopt

.../the on guard position.

5.

APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX C

the on guard position. If, after the third challenge the person still does not halt but is not attacking you or the other sentry or destroying property you are to assist the other sentry to stop and detain him, remembering that you must use only as little force as is necessary, and that you may fire only as a last resort.

22. If a person runs away you are not to open fire. You or the other sentry are to report the incident at once to your flight headquarters, but without leaving your post unguarded to do so.

When You May Fire

23. You may open fire at a person or persons in the following circumstances and then only if you have no other means of stopping him or them:

- a. if they are in the act of forcibly destroying or damaging or removing property which you or the other sentry are ordered to guard; or
- b. if you yourself or the other sentry or any other person authorised to be in the area you are ordered to guard are being attacked in such a way as to give you reason to fear that death or grave bodily injury will result.

24. Remember that at all times in carrying out your duty and should you or the other sentry be attacked, you must only use such force as is reasonably necessary, and if in doubt you must summon assistance.

APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ANZUK INFANTRY COMPANY

1. This Appendix details the actions to be taken by the ANZUK Company, when deployed to Air Base Butterworth, during a shared defence emergency.

2. Security Green. On the declaration of Security Green the company comes under the operational control of the Ground Defence Commander. The company commander is to:

- a. return the company to Butterworth, if away;
- b. check all stores and procedures;
- c. refresh all loaders down to section commander in their probable tasks, and the geography of the area including the location of VPs; and
- d. bring one platoon to two hours readiness, including drawing RAAF-supplied extra radios and vehicles for this platoon.

3. Security Amber. On the declaration of Security Amber the GDOC is activated and operational control of the Company will be exercised through this Centre. The company commander is to:

- a. bring his platoon at two hours notice up to immediate readiness and place it under the command of the Ground Defence Commander or his Deputy;
- b. as soon as possible bring his remaining platoons to full readiness, including the drawing of RAAF-supplied extra radios and vehicles if necessary;
- c. establish liaison in GDOC for duties as Ground Defence Adviser and Company Liaison Officer;
- d. maintain communications between company HQ and GDOC; and
- e. cancel all leave.

4. Security Red. As for Security Amber.

5. Tasks. The company will be employed as far as possible on tasks commensurate with their training and specialist skills. Dependant on the situation, tasks could include:

- a. deployment of platoons, if considered appropriate for the task at the discretion of the Ground Defence Commander

.../b. a quick reaction

APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX C

- b. a quick reaction force capable of responding to any incident as required; deployment may be effected by vehicle, foot or helicopter;
 - c. patrols for the prevention of illegal entry, or the apprehension of persons who have entered;
 - d. cordon an area for a search;
 - e. the provision of a road block;
 - f. crowd control and dispersal;
 - g. establish additional protection of VPs as required; and
 - h. provide additional protection as required to secure points of entry to the Base and/or VPs.
6. Transport. The RAAF Motor Transport Officer will provide additional vehicles for the use of infantry company during an emergency if necessary. The company commander may arrange collection from the RAAF MT Section as follows:
- a. ON THE DECLARATION OF SECURITY GREEN
Two x 3 Ton Vehicles; And
 - b. on the declaration of Security Amber, four x 3-ton vehicles.
7. Communications. The RAAF Ground Defence Officer will make available radio equipment as follows:
- a. at all times a suitable set to act as a company rear link to Air Base Butterworth;
 - b. on the declaration of Security Green, four AN PR025 sets to provide a platoon net; and
 - c. on the declaration of Security Amber, four AN PR0 sets to provide another platoon net.
- The company commander is to arrange the drawing of these radios at the appropriate times from the RAAF Ground Defence Section.
8. Arms and Ammunition. Only personal weapons will be used during shared defence operations. Soldiers armed with the L1A1 SLR, and F1 SMG, or the AR15 are to carry twenty rounds of ammunition, ten in each of two magazines. Every round of ammunition issued must be accounted for. The company second in command is to report as soon as possible to the Duty Controller any rounds fired or missing.
9. General Compliance with this Order. Orders for guards sentries and orders for opening fire as detailed in Appendix 5 to Annex C, forming part of this Operation Order apply equally to Army members. The company commander is to comply generally with all directions and instructions in this Order; if there is any conflict with Army operating or administrative procedures he should ensure that full detail is made known to the Duty Controller GDOC as soon as possible, but in the meantime endeavour to comply in the best way possible.

APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 3TH SEPTEMBER 1971

MOBILE RESERVE FLIGHT - RAAF

1. Command. The RAAF Ground Defence Officer is appointed to command the Mobile Reserve Flight. He is responsible to the Commanding Officer Base Squadron for the organization, manning, training and equipment of the flight, and is to ensure that the flight is capable of carrying out its allotted tasks at all times. He is to prepare a detailed plan for the discharge of responsibilities under this Annex, and is to submit it for approval of the Commanding Officer Base Squadron RAAF.
2. Location. Mobile Reserve Headquarters is located at the RAAF Ground Defence Training Section.
3. Manning. The Mobile Reserve is manned by members of Base Squadron RAAF.
4. Organization. Flight organization is as follows:

MOBILE RESERVE FLIGHT

FLIGHT HQ

Flt Cdr : Gr Def O
2 I/C : F Sgt ADG
Controller : Sgt ADG
Drivers : 3 LAC/AC's
Radio Ops : 3 LAC/AC's

1 x 1/2 ton or 3/4 ton 4 x 4
6 x AN FRC25 Sets
9 x FL SMG

Sect Comd: 1 Sgt
2 I/C : 1 Cpl
Riflemen : 8 LAC/AC's

As for 1 Sec

As for 1
& 2 Sec

Vehicles

2 x 1/2 ton or 3/4 4x4
2 x FL SMG
8 x LLAL SLR



5. Tasks. The Mobile Reserve is to provide:
 - a. a quick reaction capability to respond to any incident within the perimeter of the Air Base as directed by the Duty Controller GDOC;
 - b. patrols within the perimeter of the Air Base as directed by the Duty Controller GDOC;
 - c. assistance to ground defence flights as directed by the Duty Controller GDOC; and
 - d. assistance

APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX C

d. assistance to the SSP as directed by the Duty Controller GDOC.

6. Equipment. The RAAF Ground Defence Section will hold equipment for all RAAF ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The RAAF Ground Defence Officer is to draw the equipment for the mobile reserve on the declaration of Security Amber. The equipment is specified at Appendix 17.

7. Scales of Issue of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Ground Defence Officer is to draw arms and ammunition on the declaration of Security Amber. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.

8. Transport. On the declaration of Security Amber the RAAF Motor Transport Officer is to withdraw seven $\frac{3}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{2}$ ton 4 x 4 vehicles from other users and carry out a full A service. He is to inform the RAAF Ground Defence Officer when this is complete, and RAAF Ground Defence Officer is to arrange the collection of the vehicles from the Motor Transport Section.

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Page 1 of 2


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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

NO 3 SQUADRON RAAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

1. Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron RAAF is to provide a defence flight for the close protection of squadron operational assets, and other service property in the same locality in accordance with the information contained in this Annex. The Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron RAAF is to appoint an officer to command the Defence Flight No 3 Squadron. This officer is to be responsible to the Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron for the organization, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located at Hangar 49, Room 13 unless otherwise directed by the Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron. If a change of location is ordered, Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron is to ensure that Commanding Officer Base Squadron is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of No 3 Squadron Defence Flight is the protection of VPs 1, 2, 3, 5A and 8. Insofar as is compatible with this primary commitment the flight is to protect all Service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. The Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron is to organize No 3 Squadron Defence Flight as he sees fit. The following is a suitable outline organization:

Flight Commander (Flt Lt/Flg Off)



(Note: This organization is based on the allocation of responsibilities as follows:

- a. 1 Section. VP 1.
- b. 2 Section. VPs 2 and 8.
- c. 3 Section. VPs 3 and 5A.)

.../5. Equipment.

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APPENDIX 8 TO
ANNEX C

5. Equipment. The Ground Defence Section will hold equipment for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The flight commander, No 3 Squadron Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red. The equipment is specified at Appendix 17.

6. Issue of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The flight commander No 3 Squadron Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.


7. Transport. On the declaration of Security Red the RAAF Motor Transport Officer is to withdraw and A-service the vehicles for this flight. He is to inform the flight commander when this is complete, and the flight commander is to arrange the collection of vehicles from the Motor Transport Section.

APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 31ST SEPTEMBER 1971

NO 75 SQUADRON RAAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

1. The Commanding Officer No 75 Squadron RAAF is to provide a defence flight for the close protection of squadron operational assets, and other Service property in the same locality in accordance with the information contained in this Annex. The Commanding Officer No 75 Squadron is to appoint an officer to command No 75 Squadron Defence Flight. This officer is responsible for the organization, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located at Room 27, Building 55, No 75 Squadron Headquarters unless otherwise directed by Commanding Officer No 75 Squadron. If a change is ordered Commanding Officer No 75 Squadron is to ensure that Commanding Officer Base Squadron is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of the No 75 Squadron Defence Flight is the protection of VEs 4, 5B, 6 and 25. Insofar as is compatible with the primary commitment the flight is also to protect all Service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. The Commanding Officer No 75 Squadron is to organize No 75 Squadron Defence Flight as he sees fit. The following is a suitable outline organization:

Flight Commander (Plt Lt/Flg Off)



(Note: This organization is based on the allocation of responsibilities as follows:

- a. 1 Section. VEs 4, 5B and 25.
- b. 2 Section. VP 6.)

.../5. Equipment.

APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX C

5. Equipment. The Ground Defence Section will hold equipment for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flight Commander No 75 Squadron Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red. The equipment is specified at Appendix 17.

6. Issue of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flight Commander No 75 Squadron Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.

7. Transport. On the declaration of Security Red the RAAT Motor Transport Officer is to withdraw and A-service the vehicles for this flight. He is to inform the Flight Commander when this is complete, and the flight commander is to arrange the collection of vehicles from the Motor Transport Section.

APPENDIX 10 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 3TH SEPTEMBER 1971

NO 478(M) SQUADRON RAAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

1. The Commanding Officer No 478(M) Squadron RAAF is to provide a defence flight for the close protection of certain operational installations and other Service property in the vicinity of those installations. The area where No 478(M) Squadron is required to provide protection is as far as possible the area where the unit normally works, but it includes other locations. The Commanding Officer No 478(M) Squadron is to appoint an officer to command the No 478(M) Squadron Defence Flight. This officer is responsible for the organization, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located at Room 2, Building No 55B, No 478(M) Squadron Headquarters unless otherwise ordered by Commanding Officer No 478(M) Squadron. If a change is ordered, Commanding Officer No 478(M) Squadron is to ensure that Commanding Officer Base Squadron is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of No 478(M) Squadron Defence Flight is the protection of VPs 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20 and 30. Subject to this over-riding commitment, the flight is to protect all Service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. The Commanding Officer No 478(M) Squadron is to organize No 478(M) Squadron Defence Flight as he sees fit. A suitable outline organization for the purpose is shown at Attachment 1.
5. Equipment. The Ground Defence Section will hold equipment for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flight Commander No 478(M) Squadron Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red. The equipment is specified at Appendix 17.
6. Issues of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flight Commander No 478(M) Squadron Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.
7. Transport. On the declaration of Security Red the RAAF Motor Transport Officer is to withdraw and A-service the vehicles for this flight. He is to inform the flight commander when this is complete, and the flight commander is to arrange the collection of vehicles from the Motor Transport Section.

Attachment: 1. Organization of No 478(M) Squadron
Defence Flight

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ATTACHMENT 1 TO
APPENDIX 10 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORGANIZATION OF NO 476(M) SQUADRON RAAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

Flight Commander (Flt Lt)

Flt HQ

2 IC (7 Off)
Radio Operator (2AC)
Runner/Clerk (4AC)
2 x light vehicles
1 x truck cargo 3 ton
1 x ANPRC 25 radio set
2 x Fl SMG
6 x LL41 SIR

No 1 Section	No 2 Section	No 3 Section	No 4 Section
Sect Comd (Sgt)	Sect Comd (P Sgt)	Sect Comd (Sgt)	Sect Comd (P Sgt)
2 IC (Cpl)	2 IC (Sgt)	2 IC (Cpl)	2 IC (Sgt)
Riflemen (12AC)	Riflemen (12AC)	Riflemen (SAC)	Riflemen (16AC)
1 x Fl SMG	5 x Fl SMG	1 x Fl SMG	1 x Fl SMG
13 x LL41 SIR	9 x LL41 SIR	9 x LL41 SIR	17 x LL41 SIR

(Note: This organization is based on the assumption that the responsibility for the protection of VPs will be allocated by the Flight Commander as follows:

- 1 Section. VPs 15 and 12.
- 2 Section. VPs 30 and 13.
- 3 Section. VPs 18.
- 4 Section. VPs 20 and 16.

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APPENDIX 11 TO

ANNEX C TO AIR BASE

BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71

DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

MOBILE RESERVE FLIGHT - RMAF

1. Command. The Officer Commanding Supply Squadron RMAF is to form up a Mobile Reserve Flight RMAF whose tasks are outlined in para 5 below. He is to appoint an officer to command the Mobile Reserve Flight RMAF. This officer is responsible for the organization, administration, manning, training and equipment of the flight, and is to ensure that the flight is capable of carrying out its allotted tasks at all times. The Officer Commanding Supply Squadron RMAF is to prepare a detailed plan for the discharge of responsibilities under this Annex.
2. Location. Mobile Reserve Flight Headquarters is to be located at Supply Squadron Building 63.
3. Manning. The Mobile Reserve Flight is to be manned by members of Supply Squadron and Admin Wing as detailed by OC Supply.
4. Organization. Flight organization is as follows:

FLIGHT HQ

Flt Cdr : Junior Officer
 2 IC : SNCO
 Runner/Clerk : LAC
 1 x Land Rover/Mini Coach
 1 x Pistol Browning 9 mm
 3 x L2A3 SMG

Sect Comd : Sgt
 2 IC : Cpl
 Rifleman : L2AC
 14 x L2A3 SMC

5. Tasks. The Mobile Reserve is to provide:
 - a. a quick reaction capability to respond to any incident within the perimeter of the Air Base as directed by the Assistant Controller GDOC.
 - b. patrols within the perimeter of the Air Base as directed by the Assistant Controller GDOC.
 - c. assistance to ground defence flights as directed by the Assistant Controller, GDOC; and
 - d. assistance to the SSF as directed by the Assistant Controller GDOC.
6. Equipment. Supply Squadron RMAF is to hold appropriate equipment and accommodation stores for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flight Commander is to draw the equipment for the mobile reserve on the declaration of Security Amber.

7. Issue of Arms,

APPENDIX 11 TO
ANNEX C

7. Issue of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flight Commander is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Amber. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.

8. Transport. On the declaration of Security Amber, the RMAT Motor Transport Officer is to provide the flight with 1 x land rover/mini coach and driver.

APPENDIX 12 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERNORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

NO 3 SQUADRON RMAF DEFENCE FLIGHT


1. The Officer Commanding No 3 Squadron RMAF is to form up a defence flight for the close protection of certain operational installations and other service property in the vicinity of those installations in accordance with the information contained in this Annex. OC 3 Squadron is to appoint an officer to command the No 3 Squadron Defence Flight. This officer is responsible for the organization, administration, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located in Building 140, No 3 Squadron Headquarters, unless otherwise ordered by OC 3 Squadron. If a change is ordered, OC 3 Squadron is to ensure that OC Admin is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of No 3 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is the protection of VPs 14B and 14C. Subject to this over-riding commitment, the flight is to protect all service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. OC 3 Squadron is to organize No 3 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight as he sees fit. A suitable outline organization for the purpose is shown at Attachment 1.
5. Manning. OC Tech is to provide all the airmen required for the Defence Flight.
6. Equipment. Supply Squadron RMAF is to hold appropriate equipment and accommodation stores for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flt Cdr No 3 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red.
7. Issues of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flt Cdr No 3 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.
8. Transport. On the declaration of Security Amber the RMAF Motor Transport Officer is to provide the flight with 1 x land rover/mini coach and driver.

Attachment: 1. Organization of No 3 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight

ATTACHMENT 1 TO
APPENDIX 12 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORGANIZATION OF NO 3 SQUADRON RMAF
DEFENCE FLIGHT

Flight Commander (Junior Officer)



(Note: This organization is based on the assumption that the following tasks can be accomplished:

- a. Protection of VPs 14B and 14C
- b. foot patrols of Grid Ref J18 and 19
Appendix 4, to Annex C.

APPENDIX 13 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO. 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

NO 11 SQUADRON RMAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

1. The Officer Commanding No 11 Squadron RMAF is to form up a defence flight for the close protection of certain operational installations and other service property in the vicinity of these installations in accordance with the information contained in this Annex. OC 11 Squadron is to appoint an officer to command the No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight. This officer is responsible for the organization, administration, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located in Building 60A, No 11 Squadron Headquarters, unless otherwise ordered by OC 11 Squadron. If a change is ordered, OC 11 Squadron is to ensure that OC Admin is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is the protection of VPs 9, 10, 11 and 14A. Subject to this over-riding commitment, the flight is to protect all service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. OC No 11 Squadron is to organize No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight as he sees fit. A suitable outline organization for the purpose is shown at Attachment 1.
5. Manning. OC Tech is to provide all the airmen required for the Defence Flight.
6. Equipment. Supply Squadron RMAF is to hold appropriate equipment and accommodation stores for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flight Commander No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red.
7. Issues of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flight Commander No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armory on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.
8. Transport. On the declaration of Security Amber the RMAF Motor Transport Officer is to provide the flight with 1. Land rover/mini coach and driver.

Attachment: 1. Organization of No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight

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ATTACHMENT 1 TO
APPENDIX 13 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR EUSE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORGANIZATION OF NO 11 SQUADRON REAF
DEFENCE FLIGHT

Flight Commander (Junior Officer)

Flt HQ

2 IC (SMCO)
Runner/Clerk (LAC)
1 x land rover/mini coach
1 x Pistol Browning 9 mm
3 x L2A3 SMG

Sect Comd (Sgt)
2 IC (Cpl)
Riflemen (24 AC)
2 x L2A3 SMG
24 x L1A1 SLR

(Note: This organization is based on the assumption that
VPs 9, 10, 11 and 14A can be adequately protected.

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NO 1 AIR DEFENCE CENTRE RMAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

1. The Officer Commanding No 1 Air Defence Centre is to provide a defence flight for the close protection of No 1 ADC operational assets and other service property in the same locality in accordance with the information contained in this Annex. OC 1 ADC is to appoint an officer to command this flight, and he is responsible for the organization, administration, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located in Building 149, No 1 ADC Headquarters, unless otherwise ordered by OC 1 ADC. If a change is ordered, OC 1 ADC is to ensure that OC Admin is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of No 1 ADC RMAF Defence Flight is the protection of its operational installations *And HQ 149/*. Subject to this over-riding commitment, the flight is to protect *Assets* all service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. OC 1 ADC is to organize No 1 ADC RMAF Defence Flight as he sees fit. A suitable outline organization for the purpose is shown at Attachment 1.
5. Manning. OC 1 ADC is to provide all the personnel required for the Defence Flight.
6. Equipment. Supply Squadron RMAF is to hold appropriate equipment and accommodation stores for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flight Commander No 1 ADC RMAF Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red.
7. Issues of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flight Commander No 1 ADC RMAF Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.
8. Transport. On the declaration of Security Imper, the RMAF Motor Transport Officer is to provide the flight with 1 x land rover/mini coach and driver.

Attachment: 1. Organization of No 1 Air Defence Centre
RMAF Defence Flight


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ATTACHMENT 1 TO
APPENDIX 14 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORGANIZATION OF NO 1 AIR DEFENCE CENTRE REAF
DEFENCE FLIGHT

Flight Commander (Junior Officer)



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APPENDIX 15 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

INCREMENT TO RAAF SERVICE POLICE

1. In addition to unit defence flights and the mobile reserve, the Commanding Officers of No 3 Squadron, No 75 Squadron, No 478(M) Squadron and Base Squadron RAAF are to provide an increment to the RAAF Police Section. This increment is to be used by the RAAF DAPM to assist the SSP in the guarding of VPs or other installations outside the areas of responsibility of defence flights.
2. This force is to comprise one SNCO, provided by Base Squadron, and 24 junior airmen, six from each of the nominated units. The DAPM is to keep an up-to-date nominal roll of members, in conjunction with Senior Ground Defence Officer. He is to administer the increment, although he may delegate routine tasks to the SNCO who is supplied for this purpose. The Senior Ground Defence Officer and the DAPM are jointly responsible for the training of members allocated to the increment to the RAAF Police Section.
3. The members will be armed with L1A1 SLR and will carry two magazines. The initial ammunition scale is 1,000 rounds of 7.62 mm ball. The DAPM is to arrange the drawing of weapons and ammunition from the RAAF Armoury on the declaration of Security Red, and he is to arrange storage facilities in the RAAF Police Sub-armoury. The issues and return of arms and ammunition from the sub-armoury is to follow normal procedure.
4. The DAPM is to arrange the drawing of 27 kits, combat, from the RAAF Ground Defence Section on the declaration of Security Red. He is to hold adequate number of the standard grid map of the Base, at all times.

APPENDIX 16 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

SCALES OF ISSUE OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND PYROTECHNICS,
AND ORDERS FOR STORAGE AND ACCOUNTING

1. Scale of Issue of Arms and Ammunition.

a. Mobile Reserve Flight - RAAF

1 1/2 inch Signal Pistol	1
F1 SMG	16
F1 Magazines	32 (2 per F1)
LLA1 SLR	32
SLR Magazines	96 (3 per LLA1)
9 mm ball	1 088 rounds
9 mm ball - reserve	2 520 rounds (1 'H60' Box)
7.62 mm ball	1 920 rounds
7.62 mm ball - reserve	1 800 rounds (2 'H60' Boxes)

b. No 3 Squadron RAAF Defence Flight

F1 SMG	10
F1 Magazines	20 (2 per F1)
LLA1 SLR	26
SLR Magazines	52 (2 per LLA1)
9 mm ball	680 rounds
7.62 mm ball	1 040 rounds

c. No 75 Squadron RAAF Defence Flight

F1 SMG	10
F1 Magazines	20 (2 per F1)
LLA1 SLR	24
SLR Magazines	48 (2 per LLA1)
9 mm ball	680 rounds
7.62 mm ball	960 rounds

d. No 478(M) Squadron RAAF Defence Flight

F1 SMG	10
F1 Magazines	20 (2 per F1)
LLA1 SLR	54
SLR Magazines	108 (2 per LLA1)
9 mm ball	680 rounds
7.62 mm ball	2 160 rounds

e. Increment to RAAF Police Section

LLA1 SLR	25
SLR Magazines	50 (2 per LLA1)
7.62 mm ball	1000 rounds

f. No 3 Squadron RAAF Defence Flight

Pistol Browning 9 mm	1 (2 magazines)
L2A3 SMG	5
L2A3 Magazines	10
LLA1 SLR	18
SLR Magazines	36
9 mm ball	450 rounds
7.62 mm ball	1000 rounds

.../g. No 11 Squadron RAAF

APPENDIX 16 TO
ANNEX Cg. No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight

Pistol Browning 9 mm	1 (2 magazines)
L2A3 SMG	5
L2A3 Magazines	10
LLA1 SLR	24
SLR Magazines	48
9 mm ball	450 rounds
7.62 mm ball	1300 rounds

h. No 1 Air Defence Centre RMAF Defence Flight

Pistol Browning 9 mm	1 (2 magazines)
L2A3 SMG	5
L2A3 Magazines	10
LLA1 SLR	12
SLR Magazines	24
9 mm ball	450 rounds
7.62 mm ball	650 rounds

i. Mobile Reserve Flight - RMAF

1 1/2 Signal Pistol	1
Pistol Browning 9 mm	1
Pistol Browning 9 mm Magazine	2
L2A3 SMG	17
SMG Magazines	34
9 mm ball	1300 rounds

2. The RAAF Base Armoury will issue the appropriate arms ammunition and magazines in accordance with the instructions contained in this Order.

3. Storage and Accounting. Arms are to be stored in sub-armouries when not in use. Ammunition is to be stored in lockable ready-use lockers. Arms are to be signed out and in, in an arms register (exercise book) each time a weapon leaves or returns to a sub-armoury: serial numbers are to be recorded for each outward movement, and checked for each inward movement. Similarly, ammunition is to be accounted for by signing out and in, a particular number of rounds in an ammunition register (exercise book) each time ammunition is drawn or returned. Any deficiencies in ammunition are to be explained in the register, and reported to GDOC in the next SITREP.

4. Scale of Issue Pyrotechnics.a. Mobile Reserve Flights

Flares Tripwire Mk 2 - as required

(Note: To be issued only on instructions from the Duty Controller GDOC.)

Cartridges signal 1 1/2 in red	16
Cartridges signal 1 1/2 in yellow	16
Cartridges signal 1 1/2 in green	16
Cartridges smoke puff white	16

RESTRICTED

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APPENDIX 17 TO
ANNEX C TO ATR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

EQUIPMENT FOR GROUND DEFENCE FLIGHTS

Ident No.	Item	Mobile Reserve RAAF	3SQW Def Flt RAAF	75SQW Def Flt RAAF	478(M) SQW Def Flt RAAF	Mobile Reserve RAAF	3SQW Def Flt RAAF	3SQW Def Flt RAAF	113QN Jef Flt RAAF	LADO
5820-357-0759	ANPRO 25 Radio	9	5 *	4 *	6 *					
6135-858-5712	Batteries Dry	12	8 *	6 *	10 *					
6650-019-9546	Binoculars Prismatic	7	2	2	4					
6230-014-5733	Flashlight	14	7	7	14					
6230-014-5207	Flashlight, pencil type	6	3	3	4					
Q12/2624	Lamp, pressure **	4	2	2	2					
Q12/3199	Clock, 8 day	1	-	-	-					
7105-018-2673	Cot Folding	25	24	23	44					
Q14/57	Sheet	39	36	34	64					
Q14/21	Pillowslip	39	36	34	64					
8415-RAF-220 1396	Cape, monsoon	39	14	14	30					
7210-010-1897	Pillow	25	24	23	44					
7105-024-5361	Table, folding	3	1	1	1					
Q12/3346	Chair, tubular, folding	12	12	12	20					
Q12/318	Urn, electric (2 gallon)	1	1	1	1					
	Teapot	1	1	1	1					
	Cups	30	35	34	64					
	Teaspoon	30	30	30	30					

As required by RAAF

.../DIA/20418

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RESTRICTED

APPENDIX 17 TO
ANNEX C

2.

Ident No.	Item	Mobile Reserve RAAF	3SQN Def Flt RAAF	75SQN Def Flt RAAF	478(M) SQN Def Flt RAAF	Mobile Reserve RMAF	3SQN Def Flt RMAF	115SQN Def Flt RMAF	LADG
DLA/20418	Cutters Wire	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	
8415-023-3802	Gloves, leather	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	
8465-000-0035	Kit Combat ***	39	36	34	64	-	-	-	
	Message pads Form A224	4	2	2	2	-	-	-	
	Clip Boards	6	6	6	10	-	-	-	
	Ruled foolscap (in pads)	10	4	4	4	-	-	-	
	Plain foolscap (reams)	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	
	Large exercise book	4	4	4	4	-	-	-	
	Pen, ball-point, blue	6	4	4	4	-	-	-	
	Pen, ball-point, red	6	4	4	4	-	-	-	
	Pencil, black, lead	6	4	4	4	-	-	-	
	Pencil, chinagraph, assorted	6	6	6	6	-	-	-	
	Ruler 15"	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	
	Envelopes - large (pkts)	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	
	Envelopes - foolscap (pkts)	3	2	2	2	-	-	-	
	Envelopes - small (pkts)	3	2	2	2	-	-	-	
	Standard grid maps of Butterworth	10	6	6	6	-	-	-	
	Weapon cleaning material	-----	as required	-----	-----	-	-	-	

As required by RMAF

..5340-014-7365

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APPENDIX 17 TO
ANNEX C

3.

Ident No.	Item	Mobile Reserve RAAF	3SQN Def Flt RAAF	75SQN Def Flt RAAF	478(M) SQN Def Flt RAAF	Mobile Reserve RAAF	3SQN Def Flt RAAF	11SQN Def Flt RAAF	IADO
5340-014-7365	Padlock, large	2	2	2	2				
7125-014-0905	Cabinet, storage 18½" x 42" x 36"	1	1	1	1				
	Whistle	8	7	6	13				
5830-016-8701	Megaphone Hailer	2							
1095-RAF-7B982	Pistol Signal No 4 Mk 1 1 Star	1							
132B/409	Cotton tape plain 2 ins	100 yds							
5660-022-0471	Barbed wire steel Gannert (coils)	12							
J12Q/152	Flares Tripwire Mk 2 Banner IS		See Appendix 16				As required	by RMAF	
6135-014-3454	Battery Dry 1.5V (for flashlight)	1							
6135-120-1030	Battery Dry 1.5V (for pencil flashlight)	42	21	21	42				
6240-155-8675	Globe, bayonet type (for flashlight)	18	9	9	12				
6240-995-1156	Globe, screw type (for pencil flashlight)	14	7	7	14				
	Acetate Sheet (for map Overlays)	6	3	3	4				
		-----	As required		-----				

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./.* To be drawn

12

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4.

APPENDIX 17 TO
ANNEX C

- * To be drawn from Ground Defence Section on declaration of Security Amber.
- ** An additional 6 lamps, pressure, are to held for the GDOC.
- *** An additional 27 kits, combat are to be held for the RAAF Police Section Increment.
- Ø RAAF Police Section to hold a quantity of these maps at all times.

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Page 1 of 2

APPENDIX 18 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OP ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

(SPECIMEN SITREP)

.....
(Issuing Headquarters)

.....CH
(Date/Time Group)

Situation Report No

Situation as at 0730 hours on

1. Situation.

a. Manning.

..... Officers, SNCOs Cpls, LACs.

b. Casualties.

..... Officers, SNCOs Cpls, LACs.

c. Vehicle State.

Total strength

Number serviceable

Number unserviceable

d. Radio State.

Total number

Number serviceable

Number unserviceable

e. Battery State. (AN-PRC 25)

Number held serviceable

Number required

f. Ammunition State.

Authorized stock held? YES/NO

Resupply required rounds 7.62 mm,

..... rounds 9 mm.

g. Incidents.

Number of incidents which occurred during period
of this report (If this is first
SITREP stipulate period of report.)

.../Brief

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2.

9
APPENDIX 13 TO
ANNEX C

Brief summary of incidents

h. Reports of Enemy Sightings or Enemy Movement.

i. Administration. Administrative and other factors
affecting operations (eg messing, accommodation
welfare, etc)

(NB: This SITREP is prepared for ease of transmission by
radio or telephone.)

.....
Officer in Charge
.....

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Page 1 of 3

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ANNEX D TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OP ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

NEFARIOUS DEVICES

1. Dissident elements may use "home-made" explosive or acid devices. Such devices can be initiated by:
 - a. burning fuse;
 - b. electric fuse operated remotely.
 - c. delay mechanism including watch mechanism;
 - d. sensitive contacts (possibly light actuated) in an electrical mechanism;
 - e. acid delay; and
 - f. mechanical means, including percussion and trip mechanisms.
2. To deal with such devices a Bomb Disposal Team is formed under the control of the RAAF Armament Officer. The RAAF Armament Officer is responsible for ensuring that the team is qualified for the duty, for initiating action on equipment scaling, and holding at readiness appropriate equipment for the team's use. External assistance may be sought from HQ 28th Commonwealth Brigade, the Malaysian Police through OCPD Butterworth, or 6th Malaysian Infantry Brigade, Sungai Petani.
3. On declaration of Security Amber the RAAF Armament Officer is to report to the Duty Controller GDOC on the readiness state of the Bomb Disposal Team. The Bomb Disposal Team will be activated under the control of the Duty Controller GDOC from the declaration of Security Red and is to be on immediate standby as far as practicable. At any time when immediate standby cannot be achieved, the RAAF Armament Officer is to ensure that the Duty Controller GDOC is informed of the circumstances and arrangements for calling out the team.
4. Malaysian authorities are responsible for the disposal of all devices found outside Service property: except that devices in or near hirings or close enough to Service property to have operational effect, will be actioned as appropriate to the circumstances.
5. The disposal of any nefarious device found on or below the high water mark is the responsibility of Malaysian Naval authorities, but if devices are found on the beachfront adjacent to Air Base Butterworth the member finding is responsible to report immediately to GDOC or RAAF/SSF Security Controller and is to take action as in paragraph 7.
6. Immediate Reporting. All reports of nefarious devices on Air Base Butterworth are to be made to GDOC or the Guard Room (extension 444) by the fastest available means. If a report is made to the Guard Room, the Security Controller is to notify Duty Controller GDOC or Duty Staff Officer if the GDOC is not manned and OIC SSF at once. Duty Controller GDOC or the Duty Staff Officer as appropriate, is to notify the RAAF Armament Officer at the earliest opportunity, giving the fullest available description of the device.

..7. Safety Precautions

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7. Safety Precautions. The senior member present when knowledge of or suspicion of the presence of a nefarious device arises is responsible to:

- a. notify GDOC (extension 555) or Security Controller RAAF/SSP (extension 444) by the fastest available means.
- b. seek local assistance to clear all persons from the immediate area and cordon it off as far as practicable.
- c. minimize danger to material surroundings as far as practicable and take prudent action to limit the device's effect.
- d. retire to a safe distance (normally at least 100 yards);
- e. await qualified assistance.
- f. prevent any attempt to move the device; and
- g. remain in charge of the situation until he hands over his responsibilities to another member or until the arrival of the Bomb Disposal Team when he is to hand over his responsibilities to the team leader.

8. Disposal. Unless the device can be positively identified and can be disposed of by an approved method it will normally be exploded in-situ after taking suitable precautions for the safety of property.

9. Follow-up Reports. The Duty Controller GDOC is to report all incidents of nefarious devices to the respective RAAF/RMAP Headquarters, describing:

- a. exact location where found
- b. details of mechanism if known
- c. type of device, including a general description.
- d. details of disposal action and
- e. approximate nett explosive content (NEC) or other dangerous feature.

If possible the device is to be photographed by the photographer on call. Photographs are to be delivered to the RAAF Armament Officer who is responsible to ensure their appropriate distribution.

10. Search For Nefarious Devices. All defence element and unit commanders are to ensure that their deployed forces are constantly alert for the possible presence of nefarious devices and are to initiate routine search checks in their area of responsibility at regular intervals. Unit commanders are, from

.../declaration of

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3.

ANNEX D

declaration of Security Red, to arrange for the routine pre-flight checks of aircraft to include special precautions against the possibility of nefarious devices. RAAT Movement Control Officer and Commanding Officer RAAT are to ensure that the opportunity for locally employed civilians being in the vicinity of or having access to visiting aircraft is minimized and strictly controlled from the declaration of Security Red, and that careful search for nefarious devices is made before departure. The OIC SSP is, on instructions from Asst Controller CDCC, to initiate search of locally employed civilians and other non-Service persons entering the Protected Place. He is to ensure that he has a capacity to cordon off and exercise control of entry to any area in which the presence of a nefarious device is known or suspected.

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ANNEX E TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH CI ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

POL

1. On the first declaration of a security state, officers responsible for maintaining fuel supplies at the Air Base are to raise and maintain POL stocks to the highest practicable level. Particular responsibilities in relation to security states are as follows:

a. Security Green.

- (1) Air Base Fuels Officer is to raise holdings of AVGAS, AVTUR and aircraft and MT oils and lubricants to maximum levels.
- (2) Transport Officers are to raise MT and diesel fuels to maximum holding levels.

b. Security Amber.

- (1) Fuels Officers are to provide GDOC with a daily status of all fuel stocks on the Air Base and operational reserve at contractors' premises.
- (2) Fuels Officers are to notify GDOC of any requirements for armed escort of bridging tankers.
- (3) RAAF Fuels Officer is to obtain the keys to the AVGAS installation and provide members to operate this installation if necessary.
- (4) RAAF Fuels Officer is to fill with AVTUR 100 drums for emergency deployment of helicopters.

2. Fuel Installations - Vital Points. Each of the bulk fuel installations on the Air Base is a vital point and is to be afforded protection in accordance with Annex 'C'.

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ANNEX F TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH CT ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Officers delegated the responsibility for the communications of their respective national forces are to ensure that these facilities are in working order at all times and are to carry out communication checks at least once every calendar month.

Radio Communications

2. General. Communications between GDOC and Defence Flights will be effected by means of land line and radio transceivers.

3. Circuits/Nets. Radio circuits/nets are shown diagrammatically at Appendix 1.

4. Radio Frequencies. Radio frequencies and frequency designators are shown at Appendix 1. These frequencies are not to be disclosed over any communication channel. If it is necessary to refer to radio frequencies the relevant designators must be used.

5. Call Signs. Station call signs are listed at Appendix 1. Stations are to be referred to by their call sign and not by name.

6. Telephone facilities. Important telephone numbers are listed at Appendix 2.


Appendices: 1. Radio communications diagram

2. Important telephone numbers

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX F TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 3TH SEPTEMBER 1971

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS



Net Identification - Mat Digger
Net Call Sign - Dingo

Serial No.	Frequency	Callsign	Frequency Designator
1	73.25	Hawk	01
2	To be provided by RMAF		
3	73.25	Eagle	01
4	73.25	Magpie	01
5	73.25	Swan	01
6	To be provided by RMAF		
7	To be provided by RMAF		
8	To be provided by RMAF		
9	40.80	Rover	02
10	To be provided by RMAF		
11	49.10	Wombat	03

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX F TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 9TH SEPTEMBER 1971

IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS

<u>Air Base</u>	Penang 32101		
<u>RAAF</u>		<u>Office</u> <u>Ext</u>	<u>Home</u> <u>Ext</u>
Officer Commanding		200	651
Deputy Ground Defence Commander/ CO Base Squadron		220	667
Assistant Provost Marshal		212	Pg 84373
Deputy Asst Provost Marshal		272	
Senior Ground Defence Officer		239	655
Ground Defence Officer/ OIC Mobile Reserve		240	380
Barracks Officer		340	
Armament Officer		626	Pg 32320
Radio Officer		340	Pg 61458
CDW Area Manager		450	Pg 61084
Ground Defence Operations Centre		555	
3SQN Defence Flight		614	
75SQN Defence Flight		602	
478(M)SQN Defence Flight		620	
Mobile Reserve Flight		240	
ANZUK Support Company		784/786	
Fire Section		235/319	
No 4 RAAF Hospital		737/739	
Guardroom		444	
Operations Room (Air)		207	
CDW Chief Engineer		453	406

.. / RMAF

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2.

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX F

RAAF

Penang 32231

For internal calls dial 213/214 and
ask the operator for the extension.

	<u>Office</u> <u>Ext</u>	<u>Home</u> <u>Ext</u>
Commanding Officer	110	120
Deputy Ground Defence Commander	110	120
OC Administrative Wing	113	Pg 62604
3SQN Defence Flight	127	
11SQN Defence Flight	136	
1ADC Defence Flight	772(RAAF Exchange)	
Mobile Reserve Flight	163	
OIC Special Security Police	163	
Guardroom	213	

CIVIL POLICE


Contingent Police HQ	Pg 64444
Duty Officer Police HQ Penang	Pg 64444 Ext 123
CCPD Police District Butterworth	Pg 31222

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SECRET

SECRET

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Copy No 3 of 46

Headquarters
RAAF
Air Base Butterworth
C/- GPO Penang
MALAYSIA

DIA
ASEC
17/6
HQ 12/49/Air

20th April 1972

done
filed 8/E 8689

Operation Order No 1/72

W. J. K.

FAUL-SAGE PLAN FOR
OPERATION ORDER 1/71

Reference: A. Air Base Butterworth Operation Order
No 1/71 dated 18th September 1971

Time Zone used throughout the Order: GOLF HOTEL

Task Organization

Headquarters RAAF Butterworth
Base Squadron
No 478 Squadron
No 75 Squadron
No 3 Squadron
No 4 RAAF Hospital

Attached

ANZUK Company

Detached

Fighter Squadron to SAF Tengah

1. Situation.

a. Outline. In the event of the Malaysian Armed Forces being unable to meet their commitments within the provisions of Reference A., the Task Organization and Attached Units as specified in this Order must be prepared to undertake the additional responsibility for securing our operational assets and providing the necessary protection for personnel and property.

- 1. D Coes
- 2. Ind
- 3. Sajo
- 4. R. K. A.
- 5. H. M. A.
- 6. D. S. A.

b. Delegation of Responsibility.

(1) For the purpose of this order the operating procedures and instructions affecting ANZUK personnel, as detailed in the appropriate sections of Reference A, are to be observed.

../(2) The Officer



International Institute of Humanitarian Law
Institut International de Droit Humanitaire
Istituto Internazionale di Diritto Umanitario

SANREMO HANDBOOK ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Prepared under the auspices of the International Institute of
Humanitarian Law, Sanremo

Drafting Team

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Professor Dennis Mandsager
Captain, JAGC, U.S. Navy (Retired)
U.S. Naval War College
Editor and Project Coordinator

Sanremo, November 2009

This handbook does not necessarily represent the views of either the International Institute of Humanitarian Law or the government of any member of the drafting team

FOREWORD

The Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement is intended to continue in the same vein as previous well-known Sanremo publications such as the Sanremo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, published in 1995 and the Sanremo Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, published in 2006.

Published by the Institute as a working tool, the booklet is not intended to state the official opinions or positions of individual governments nor of specific international organisations on the different issues considered. Its only aim is to guide the reader – and in particular the participants in the military courses of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law – through the intricacies of the generally accepted and widespread concept of rules of engagement.

The Handbook reflects the results of a three-year project initiated by Professor Dennis Mandsager of the United States Naval War College, with the full support of the Institute, who identified the need for a common Rules of Engagement reference that could be used by any nation for training and/or operations. The Handbook was informed by several workshops conducted at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, plus numerous multinational exercises and courses, which drew input from highly qualified experts from different regions of the world. The Handbook, in its current form, reflects best practice from nations across the globe.

The text has been prepared by Commander Alan Cole RN, Major Phillip Drew, Canadian Forces, Captain Rob McLaughlin, RAN and Professor Dennis Mandsager, Captain, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.). The final draft has been reviewed by a team of Council members of the Institute, composed of Brigadier General Erwin Dahinden, Dr. Baldwin de Vidts, Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Professor Marie Jacobsson, Dr. Michael Meyer and Professor Michel Veuthey, with the cooperation of Colonel Darren Stewart, Director of the Military Department of the Institute.

There are no other Handbooks of its type in existence; it has been designed so that it can be used by any nation or group of nations without reference to security caveats or restrictions. Of course this was always the intent, to provide a tool that could be used to facilitate and enhance multinational cooperation and mutual understanding while ensuring that military forces are in compliance with national security and policy concerns.

As the political control on the use of force and with that, the use of Rules of Engagement to regulate the conduct of armed forces by individual nations, alliances and coalitions around the world continue to grow, so too the need to be able to train on and understand Rules of Engagement similarly gains importance. It is essential that a clear understanding exists that whilst Rules of Engagement are often a mix of military and political policy requirements, these must be bounded by extant international and domestic legal parameters. Such legal constraints may never be exceeded, but are quite often restricted further by the effect of Rules of Engagement. Too often national or multinational security classifications mean that

the publication and sharing of Rules of Engagement experience and best practice is problematic. The ability for militaries to share their experiences as well as for academics, students and the public to consider the subject is critical in order to promote awareness of the practical implementation of International Humanitarian Law through Rules of Engagement.

The new Handbook will meet the requirements of our military courses, but it will be equally available to other interested institutions and parties. It is my sincere hope that the Handbook will find a use either in those areas of the world where Rules of Engagement doctrine does not currently exist or as a vehicle to aid in the creation of realistic and meaningful exercises at the national and multi-national level. The Handbook is intended to be of assistance to those working both at the strategic level, to aid in the preparation of clear and unambiguous rules of engagement, as well as for those involved in their implementation in order that Rules of Engagement are issued in a language that is easily understood and that assists military personnel's ability to accomplish the mission.

Given that this is an area which is constantly changing, reflecting the nature and manner in which nations participate in military operations, we fully expect users of the Handbook to come up with suggestions to refine and hone the practice articulated in the Handbook in future editions of the text.

I should very much like to thank Professor Dennis Mandsager, who was the originator of the initiative, the Drafting Committee of the Handbook, as well as all the members of the Institute (including Professor Natalino Ronzitti and Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte) who, on a personal basis, gave useful comments and suggestions. Finally, my thanks go to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Its substantial financial contribution facilitated not only the fast publication of the Handbook and its translation into other languages, but also allows the IIHL to distribute the Handbook to all interested students and institutions.

Ambassador Maurizio Moreno

President, IIHL

PREFACE

The U.S. Naval War College, like many similar schools, conducts unclassified and classified research, teaching, war games, and conference and has an international student body. When the topic involves rules of engagement (ROE) and when the participants represent multiple nations, meaningful discussion is problematic. Participants often arrive with either little knowledge of ROE, or with knowledge of a classified national set of ROE that is not releasable to other nations, or with knowledge of a set of classified multinational ROE that is not releasable outside a coalition. The goal of this ROE Handbook project was to alleviate that problem by developing a realistic, comprehensive, and unclassified ROE Handbook that is usable by all nations for training, education, exercises, war games, and real world operations.

The first step in the drafting process was to identify counterparts in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, with whom the College already had a close working relationship, to join the drafting team. The second step was to join forces with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL) and its large international student body to test Handbook drafts in teaching and workshop environments.

The challenges for the drafting team were considerable. Many questioned the feasibility of developing an ROE that would be acceptable to the international community. Nations have different treaty obligations, different views on international law, different views on policy, and different views on the authority and responsibility of commanders. Additionally, almost all reviewers believe that real world ROE must be classified.

The drafting team produced multiple drafts, which were critiqued at many varied venues, including two multinational ROE workshops and two naval operations courses held at IIHL. The result at each event was robust ROE play. After three years of drafting and testing, the IIHL Council approved publication of the Handbook in September of 2009.

The format of the Handbook is unique in that, in addition to ROE measures, it includes formats for a wide range of ROE-related matters, including ROE cards, warnings, responses to warnings, and other matters. The drafting team recognises that many nations have their own formats for these items; however, many do not, and students often do not have access.

The Handbook contemplates that, in a multinational force, higher authority in each nation will approve ROE for its forces and that each multinational partner will comply with national law and policy. Accordingly, the Handbook provides multiple, and often inconsistent, options for ROE measures. Consensus on each measure is not critical. Sharing ROE information with the multinational force commander, however, is critical.

The drafters request that users of the Handbook share constructive criticism, questions, and comments, as well as any lessons-learned from ROE exercises. Please email them to sanremo@iihl.org

Dennis Mandsager
U.S. Naval War College

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The drafting team expresses its thanks to the International Institute of Humanitarian Law and to the countless students, workshop participants, and counterparts who have used the Handbook and have provided constructive criticism and recommendations for improvement.

Alan Cole thanks Commodore Neil Brown, Royal Navy for his support both through making him available from his staff and for his own personal contribution notably in the drafting of sections related to pre-planned targeting. He also thanks Captain Andrew Jameson Royal Navy who contributed on maritime security matters.

Rob McLaughlin could not have been involved in this project without the strong support of Rear Admiral Allan du Toit, Major General David Morrison, and Commodore Trevor Jones, to whom he expresses his thanks. He also expresses his thanks to the many operations and legal officers within the ADF, and in particular, Wing Commander Ian Henderson, for their reviews and comments.

Phillip Drew would like to extend his thanks to the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, Major-General Daniel Gosselin and the Judge Advocate General of the Canadian Forces, Brigadier-General Kenneth Watkin, for their strong support from the inception of this project through to its completion. He would also like to thank his colleagues who assisted him by providing advice and guidance, particularly Colonel Kirby Abbott, Lieutenant-Colonel Tim Bishop and Commander Mary Gardam.

Dennis Mandsager thanks the drafting team for the many hours of writing, debating, negotiating, and compromising that went into the development of this Handbook. For their support of this project, he thanks the leadership of the Naval War College, including former and current Presidents, Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, USN (Retired) and Rear Admiral James P. (Phil) Wisecup, USN, former and current Provosts, Professor James Giblin and Ambassador Mary Ann Peters, and Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Professor Robert (Barney) Rubel. Finally, he thanks his colleagues in the Naval War College's International Law Department and Naval Reserve International Law Unit, all of whom were key players on the team that produced the Handbook.

Alan Cole

Phillip Drew

Rob McLaughlin

Dennis Mandsager

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Series

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| 10 | Use of Force in <i>Individual Self-Defence</i> |
| 11 | Use of Force in <i>Unit Self-Defence</i> |
| 12 | Use of Force for the Protection of Others |
| 13 | Use of Force in <i>National Self-Defence</i> |
| 14-19 | SPARE |

GROUP 20-29: MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

Series

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| 20 | Use of Force for Mission Accomplishment |
| 21 | Protection of Freedom of Movement of Persons |
| 22 | Prevention of Interference with Ships and Aircraft |
| 23 | <i>Warning Shots</i> |
| 24 | <i>Disabling Fire</i> |
| 25 | Search and <i>Detention</i> of Persons |
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GROUP 30-39: TARGETING IN ARMED CONFLICT

Series

- 30 Engagement of Military Objectives Including Hostile Forces
- 31 Identification of Targets
- 32 Neutrals
- 33-39 SPARE**

GROUP 40-49: OPERATIONS RELATED TO PROPERTY

Series

- 40 Use of Force to Protect Property
- 41 Protection of Vital/Mission Essential/Specified Property
- 42 Inspection, Seizure, and Destruction of Property
- 43-49 SPARE**

GROUP 50-59: GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONING

Series

- 50 Geographic Positioning of Force Units and Cross-Border Incursions
- 51 Ground Reconnaissance
- 52 Aerial Reconnaissance
- 53 Relative Positioning of Force Units
- 54 Exercising in the Presence of a Potential Adversary
- 55 Diversions
- 56 Use of Obstacles and Barriers
- 57 Zones
- 58 Freedom of Navigation
- 59 SPARE**

GROUP 60-69: WARNINGS, HARASSMENT, *SHADOWING*, ILLUMINATION

Series

60	Warnings
61	Harassment
62	<i>Shadowing</i> , Surveillance, and <i>Marking</i>
63	Sensors and Illumination
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GROUP 70-79: CARRYING OF WEAPONS

Series

70	Authority to Carry Weapons
71-79	SPARE

GROUP 80-89: LAND MINES, *CLUSTER MUNITIONS* AND BOOBY TRAPS

Series

80	Use of Land Mines
81	Use of <i>Cluster Munitions</i>
82	Use of Booby Traps
83-89	SPARE

GROUP 90-99: MARITIME OPERATIONS

Series

90	Maritime Law Enforcement
91	Submarine Contacts
92	<i>Naval Mines</i>
93	Boardings

94 Suppression of *Piracy*

95-99 SPARE

GROUP 100-109: AIR OPERATIONS

Series

100 Use of Air to Surface Munitions

101 Use of Air to Sub-surface Munitions

102 Air to Air Engagements

103-109 SPARE

GROUP 110-119: ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Series

110 Use of Force in Assistance to Civil Authorities, including Law Enforcement

111 Search, *Detention* and Arrest of Persons

112 Treatment of Detained and Arrested Persons

113-119 SPARE

GROUP 120-129: CROWD AND RIOT CONTROL

120 Crowd and Riot Control

121 Riot Control Agents

122 Riot Control Munitions/Water Cannons

123-129 SPARE

GROUP 130-139: *INFORMATION OPERATIONS*

Series

130	<i>Electronic Warfare Measures</i>
131	<i>Computer Network Operations</i>
132	<i>Psychological Operations</i>
133	<i>Military Deception</i>
134-139	SPARE

GROUP 140-149: OUTER SPACE OPERATIONS

Series

140	Interference With Satellite Communications
141	Neutralization/Destruction of Satellites
142-149	SPARE

GROUPS 150 PLUS: SPARE

PART I: INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this Handbook is to assist in the drafting of Rules of Engagement (ROE) and related legal and operational guidance for use in training, exercises, war games, and operations. The Handbook is not a manual on the Law of Armed Conflict. The Handbook takes into account the requirement to identify and manage the respective legal and policy positions of nations participating in a multinational operation and promotes an understanding of national ROE policies. The Handbook also sets out suggested ROE for a number of selected environments and tasks, and procedures for approving and implementing ROE in single service, *joint*, or multinational operations.

STRUCTURE OF THE HANDBOOK

2. This Handbook adopts the following structure:

- a. Parts I to VI provide an introduction to the Handbook, the key legal considerations impacting upon the use of force, the concept of *self-defence*, the policy factors that influence the development of ROE, the ROE methodology adopted in this Handbook, and ROE procedures.
- b. Annex A provides guidance on the planning and drafting of ROE, specific guidance on ROE for selected operational environments and operational tasks, guidance on *hostile intent* and the escalation of force in *self-defence*, and information on the relationship between targeting and ROE.
- c. Annex B provides a menu of ROE provisions that may be tailored as necessary to accomplish various missions.
- d. Annex C and its Appendices provides sample ROE and ROE-related documents.
- e. Annex D provides definitions for a number of terms used in this Handbook. These terms are italicized wherever they appear (e.g. *opposed boarding*), thus indicating that reference should be made to the definition in Annex D.

DEFINITION AND STATUS

3. ROE are issued by competent authorities and assist in the delineation of the circumstances and limitations within which military forces may be employed to achieve their objectives. ROE appear in a variety of forms in national military doctrines, including execute orders, deployment orders, operational plans, or standing directives. Whatever their form, they provide authorisation for and/or limits on, among other things, the use of force, the positioning and posturing of forces, and the employment of certain specific capabilities. In some nations, ROE have the status of guidance to military forces; in other nations, ROE are lawful commands.

ROE are not used to assign missions or tasks nor are they used to give tactical instructions. Missions and tasks are assigned through Operations orders and other similar instruments of command and control.

APPLICABLE LAW AND POLICY

4. International Law. The conduct of military operations is governed by international law, including the law of armed conflict (LOAC) (also referred to as the “law of war,” or “international humanitarian law”), and applicable international human rights law. Both nations and individuals are obliged to comply with LOAC. All nations are obliged to train their forces to comply with LOAC and with other provisions of international law that impact upon military operations. This Handbook is intended to facilitate the creation of ROE to provide for the judicious use of force in compliance with international law. Nations are bound by Geneva Law and Hague Law. Nations may have different treaty obligations and differing interpretations and/or application of both treaty and customary international law. In multinational operations these differences need to be identified and factored into the planning and conduct of operations.

5. National Laws. The armed forces of each nation must comply with their own national laws. For example, the national laws of some nations may restrict the ability of forces to use force, in particular *deadly force*, to protect others or to defend property. Accordingly, some nations may issue restrictions or amplifying instructions to supplement the ROE for multinational operations. To the greatest extent possible, such restrictions or instructions should be shared with multinational partners. It is particularly important to ensure that commanders operating in multinational operations are aware of any such restrictions so that they may employ forces in an efficient and effective manner.

6. National Policy. In the same way that nations may have different legal positions on certain issues, the planning and conduct of military operations must take into account differing national policy positions. Some military options, available under both international and national law, may not come within national policy intent, either generally or with respect to a specific operation. For example, some nations in some circumstances may limit permissible levels of incidental injury or collateral damage to levels below that acceptable under LOAC, while others may not allow their military to conduct law enforcement activities. In multinational operations, such policy differences need to be identified and factored into the planning and conduct of operations. This Handbook allows for the creation of ROE that provide for the conduct of operations in compliance with national policy.

7. Multinational Operations. In multi-national operations participating nations should operate under coherent ROE arrangements. Policy and legal differences can lead to different ROE among the members of a multinational force. Different ROE can be a source of friction in conducting operations. Problems of this sort are best resolved through negotiations rather than through a process that leads to an ROE that reflects the lowest common denominator. If there are irreconcilable differences in ROE, those differences should be shared with other members of the force whenever feasible.

PART II: SELF-DEFENCE

8. Categories of Self-Defence. International law and the domestic laws of all nations recognise a right of *self-defence*, which is the use of force to defend against *attack* or imminent *attack*. *Self-defence* is available in all situations, including armed conflict. National laws differ on the definition and content of the right of self-defence. As a consequence, individuals and units will exercise this right in accordance with their respective national law. For some nations, self-defence is not governed by ROE. For some nations, the terms “hostile act” and “hostile intent” are related to mission-accomplishment, rather than self-defence. The Handbook has adopted what the drafters view as the more generally accepted view, while recognizing that nations may have different approaches. In any event, the Handbook is intended for use by all nations. For the purposes of this Handbook, the right of *self-defence* is considered on four levels.

a. Individual self-defence. This refers to the right of an individual to defend himself or herself (and in some cases other individuals) from an *attack* or imminent *attack*. Some nations permit commanders to limit *individual self-defence* in the same way as for *unit self-defence* (See Annex B, series 10).

b. Unit self-defence. Unit commanders have the right to defend their unit and other units from their nation in the face of an *attack* or imminent *attack*. For some nations, the concept of *unit self-defence* is both a right and an obligation; whereas for others the concept is only a right. Some nations permit the right of *unit self-defence* to be limited by orders from *higher authority*. *Unit self-defence* may be extended to units and individuals from other nations when authorised by the applicable ROE. (See Annex B, series 11).

c. Protection of Others. This refers to the right to defend specified persons (who are not part of the *Force*) against an *attack* or imminent *attack*. For some nations, the right of *individual self-defence* or *unit self-defence* may not include the right to use force to defend another nation’s citizens. (See Annex B, series 12).

d. National self-defence. As recognised in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, refers to the right of a nation to defend itself against armed *attack*, and for most nations, the threat of imminent armed *attack*. (See Annex B, series 13). Decisions on whether or not *national self-defence* will be invoked are retained at the highest levels of governmental or executive authority.

9. Hostile Act and Hostile Intent. For the purposes of this Handbook, the right to use force in *self-defence* arises in response to a *hostile act (attack)* and/or demonstrated *hostile intent* (threat of imminent *attack*). Appendices 4 and 5 to Annex A provide guidance on the determination of *hostile intent* and the magnitude and duration of force that may be employed in *self-defence*. *Higher authority* may provide mission-specific guidance on indicators of *hostile act* and *hostile intent*.

10. Use of Force in Self-Defence. Subject to any limitations promulgated in ROE (either series 10 or 11), all necessary and proportional means and actions may be used in *self-defence*. Where time and operational circumstances permit, military forces should warn the threatening entity in order to give it an opportunity to withdraw or cease its threatening

actions. Military forces are permitted to use force in *self-defence* only if non-forceful alternatives to prevent or deter the *attack* or imminent *attack*:

- a. Have been exhausted,
- b. Are unavailable, or
- c. Are deemed insufficient to defend forces in those circumstances.

The use of force is generally authorised so long as the *hostile act* or *hostile intent* continues. The use of force must be proportional, which means that the nature, duration, and scope of force used should not exceed what is required. (Note: The concept of “proportionality” in self-defence should not be confused with the concept of “proportionality” in international armed conflict, which is related to attempts to minimize collateral damage.)

11. Pursuit. *Self-defence, unit self-defence, protection of others, and national self-defence* include the authority to pursue and engage forces that continue to demonstrate *hostile intent*. ROE may limit the extent to which pursuit is authorised, depending upon the military and political situation. Pursuit in *self-defence* should be distinguished from “hot pursuit,” which, for the purposes of this Handbook, is a measure that applies only in a maritime law enforcement context and is defined in customary international law and in Article 111 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

12. Relationship between Self-Defence and Mission Accomplishment ROE. Individuals and units have the right to defend against *attack* and imminent *attack*. As a general rule, ROE issued for a mission do not limit this right. Because national laws and policies differ, there will not always be consistency in a multinational force as to when the right to use force in *self-defence* ends and the use of force for mission accomplishment begins. Inconsistencies should be clarified in the planning process.

PART III: THE USE OF FORCE DURING OPERATIONS

13. Broadly speaking, during peacetime, the use of force is permitted in *self-defence*, in the exercise of law enforcement authority, and to accomplish operations or missions specifically authorised by a higher national authority or other governing body, such as the U.N. Security Council.

- a. It is universally recognised that individuals and units have a right to defend themselves against *attack* or imminent *attack*. Nevertheless, because national laws and policies differ with respect to the application of *self-defence* to military operations, Series 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Annex B provide specific ROE intended to clarify the extent of the authorisations granted for the application of force in *self-defence*. For example, some nations permit commanders to restrict the exercise of the right of *individual self-defence* and/or *unit self-defence*, while others do not.
- b. Where the use of force is not justified by *self-defence*, but is nonetheless necessary for accomplishment of an assigned military mission, reasonable force may

be exercised within the constraints of the relevant national and international law. Series 20 to 140 of Annex B provide measures for mission accomplishment.

c. Deadly force can be used against persons posing an imminent threat to life. National views on other circumstances in which deadly force is permitted vary widely among nations. The Handbook provides multiple ROE measures, the use of which will depend upon national laws and policies.

14. During armed conflict, and in addition to *self-defence*, commanders may be authorised to engage an enemy in accordance with LOAC.

a. The extent to which different aspects of LOAC might apply depends in the first instance on whether a conflict is an international or non-international armed conflict. Generally, the political leadership of a nation determines the characterization of an armed conflict to be applied by its armed forces. This characterization is based on a legal analysis of the factual situation. When planning operations and crafting ROE for multinational operations, senior commanders and their legal advisors need to be aware of how other nations characterize the conflict, as those characterizations will affect which LOAC framework is applied by those nations.

b. In international armed conflicts situations, only combatants (unless *hors de combat*) and civilians directly participating in hostilities and military objectives may be the object of attack. In non-international armed conflicts situations, only *fighters* (unless *hors de combat*) and civilians directly participating in hostilities and military objectives may be the object of attack.

c. Commanders, planners, and legal advisors must recognise the fact that not all nations are parties to the same LOAC treaties. Further, even those who are parties to the same treaties do not all have the same interpretations of the law embodied in those treaties. However, ROE language is generally crafted to reflect a number of recurring LOAC rules and principles concerning the use of force:

i. Military necessity - the requirement whereby a belligerent has the right to apply any measures that are required to bring about the successful conclusion of a military operation and which are not forbidden by LOAC.

ii. Distinction - the requirement to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and to direct operations only against combatants and military objectives.

iii. Proportionality - the prohibition of an *attack* that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

iv. Humanity - the prohibition of the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.

- v. Precaution - in the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.
 - vi. Weapon prohibitions - the prohibition of weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
15. Detailed discussion of LOAC is beyond the scope of this ROE Handbook.

PART IV: POLICY DIRECTION TO MILITARY AUTHORITIES

16. *Higher authority* within a nation or in a multinational *force* will provide direction on the goals to be achieved when undertaking a military mission. This may include direction on force posture as well as authorisations or limitations on the scope of action a commander may take to accomplish the mission. Policy direction from government, including conclusions of legal analysis, may limit the operational freedom of military commanders and prevent them taking all the actions available to them under the law. Policy direction does not however provide a legal authority for use of force in the conduct of operations where such use of force is outside the law.

17. The ROE authorised for a mission will typically include specific instructions regarding the use of force. In addition to *self-defence*, ROE will therefore generally reflect multiple components, including political guidance from higher authorities, the tactical considerations of the specific mission, and LOAC. Succinct and unambiguous rules are essential.

18. Political leadership may also provide narrative guidance on its policy aims and objectives so as to enable commanders to respond appropriately as a situation develops. Such guidance should be explained in plain language, and supporting ROE should reflect this guidance within the context of the mission. Such guidance may change as mission objectives and ROE authorisations mature to reflect changes in policy and mission context.

PART V: DRAFTING METHODOLOGY

19. The ROE in this Handbook are drafted as a series of prohibitions, restrictions, and permissions set out in the Compendium of Rules at Annex B. This Handbook adopts a “restrictive” approach to authorisation. This means that if an ROE measure is not addressed in the ROE, commanders must assume that they have no authority (beyond *individual self-defence* and *unit self-defence*) to carry out that action. In respect of the exercise of freedoms of navigation and overflight (e.g. high seas freedoms, innocent passage, transit passage, and *assistance entry*), specific ROE provisions are not required unless those rights are to be restricted. Nevertheless, measures that either authorise or prohibit such actions are included to facilitate clarity.

20. Annex B provides a menu of ROE options that may be tailored to a specific mission. The nature of the operation(s) may dictate that planners or commanders propose rules not listed in this Handbook. In such cases, the “spare” rules in the relevant series or a new

series may be employed. Sample ROE for an operation are contained in Appendix 1 to Annex C.

21. When the term “SPECIFY” is included in the ROE measure, the term refers to a need to add specific parameters that focus the application of the rule. Such parameters might be in relation to ranges, particular weapon types, specific nationalities, or certain actions or conduct. Accordingly, where this term appears, specific words must be inserted into the ROE measure to clarify and tailor the meaning of the provision.

22. When the ROE authorise the use of *deadly force*, this authorises the use of all lesser degrees of force permitted by law, up to and including *deadly force*. The actual tactics, techniques and procedures for applying force or utilizing *non-deadly force* will vary based upon factors such as environment, weapons systems available, the prevailing threat, and applicable law. The tactical employment of approved ROE is a matter of command judgment.

23. Specific rules may be retained for activation by a specified command authority. This means that the rule is only able to be used upon specific positive approval by the specified commander. This approval will generally be sought and granted by the quickest appropriate means and confirmed formally. Furthermore, such approval may be on a case by case basis, or given for a specified period of time, geographical area, or mission. Retention of a rule is indicated by amplification to the rule that states the approval level. The format adopted in this Handbook is as follows:

AMPN: This rule is retained by (SPECIFY level of authority e.g. *Force Commander*).

24. While commanders may restrict the use of issued ROE measures, they cannot authorise their forces to exceed them. Commanders at all levels who are uncertain about the suitability of ROE must immediately request a change or clarification. Additionally, if the ROE are considered unclear or insufficient, commanders must immediately seek clarification from *higher authority*.

PART VI: ROE PROCEDURES

25. Approval. ROE are authorised either by national authorities or by the governing body of an international organisation in accordance with its procedures and with national agreement (e.g. UN). ROE are developed and staffed as part of the operational planning process, either parallel to or as part of the development of the relevant operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORDER). They may be included in these documents or published separately by message or otherwise. The OPLAN or OPORDER will also set out the geographical area (Area of Operations) to which the ROE apply. Some nations include their request for mission specific ROE directly in the draft OPORDER.

26. Review. ROE must be continuously reviewed to ensure that they are clear and lawful, that they are sufficient to address the requirements of the mission, and that they provide the commander with the necessary powers to deal effectively with the threat. Message formats for requesting ROE (ROEREQ), for authorising ROE (ROEAUTH), and for implementing ROE (ROEIMP) are provided in Appendix 2 to Annex C.

27. Security. While ROE for training and exercises often may be unclassified, the ROE for actual operations are generally classified at the same level as the OPLAN or OPORDER.

GUIDANCE ON PLANNING AND STAFFING

1. This Annex provides recommended procedures for the development, staffing and publication of ROE.

2. The following appendices are included:

Appendix 1	Planning Procedures
Appendix 2	Environment-Specific Guidance
Appendix 3	Task-Specific Planning Considerations
Appendix 4	Guidance on <i>Hostile Intent</i>
Appendix 5	Escalation of Force in <i>Self-defence</i>
Appendix 6	Targeting and ROE

PLANNING PROCEDURES

1. The development and implementation of effective ROE is critical to mission accomplishment. This Appendix provides suggested guidelines for incorporating ROE development into operational planning.
2. ROE are authorised by national authorities (individually or collectively) or sometimes by the governing body of a multinational force operating under the umbrella of an international organisation (e.g. UN, NATO, AU or EU). ROE development should take place as part of the operational planning process.
3. The establishment of an ROE Planning Cell should be considered. The Cell should be led by operational staffs and include legal advisors, policy advisers and officers with specialist expertise in land, air, maritime, *outer space*, and/or *cyberspace* operations, as appropriate. In multinational operations, early engagement with other multinational force nations is essential.
4. Responsibility for drafting ROE usually sits with current operations or plans and policy staff, but this varies among nations. The legal advisor should play a significant role in assisting with ROE development and should serve as a principal assistant to the operations staff that drafts ROE.
5. Legal advisers will ensure that ROE are consistent with the relevant law and reflect the political mandates and the national policies of nations contributing to the *Force*. Therefore legal advisers will need to analyse the legal basis for the mission and the legal framework that will regulate the application of force, taking into account the characterization of the conflict. This includes identifying the nature of the operation, including whether it is an armed conflict and, if so, the nature of the armed conflict (international or non-international).
6. Once ROE have been drafted and approved (see the ROE DRAFTING CHECKLIST at Annex B), they are published to the *Force*. ROE will normally be contained within or linked to an operational planning document or order. In addition, guidance on the use of force may also be contained or referred to in other sections of planning documents or orders. Where this occurs, particular care must be taken to ensure that different sections containing ROE guidance are harmonized.
7. Consideration should be given to creating ROE products (cards, briefs, etc.) that summarize key ROE provisions for distribution to and training of operational forces. Additionally, an ROE matrix that summarizes the ROE of each multinational partner is a useful tool (see Appendix 3 to Annex C).
8. ROE should be continually assessed by both tactical and operational level commanders so that appropriate adjustments can be made as missions develop, as the intelligence picture changes (in particular, threats to tactical level units), and, where applicable, as the enemy's tactics, techniques and procedures evolve. New measures should be requested or implemented as necessary so as to ensure the ROE remain consistent with the mission, the operational situation (especially the threat), political and policy guidance, and the law. Proposing or implementing changes is achieved through

Appendix 1 to Annex A

ROEREQ, ROEAUTH, and ROEIMP procedures (see Appendix 2 to Annex C). Whenever ROE are believed to be unclear, clarification should be sought from higher headquarters.

9. Scenario based ROE training will ensure that ROE are understood and applied properly by all units and members of the *Force*. Multinational *Force* commanders should meet with subordinate commanders to ensure a common understanding of ROE.

ENVIRONMENT-SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

2.1 Land Operations

a. Introduction

The distinctive feature of land operations is that they take place on sovereign territory, with or without the permission of the sovereign government.

b. Legal Considerations

The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE for land operations are:

- i. The legal basis for presence and activities in the sovereign territory of another nation: in particular whether the military activity has the consent of the nation(s) in which it is taking place.
- ii. Where the nation has given consent, whether or not the law of the nation in which the forces are present applies, in particular the extent of any *Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)*, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other international arrangement.
- iii. Whether there is a legal basis to arrest or detain.

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, the following ROE should be considered:

- Protection of Freedom of Movement of Persons (Series 21)
- Warning Shots (Series 23)
- Search and Detention of Persons (Series 25)
- Neutrals (Series 32)
- Use of Force to Protect Property (Series 40)
- Inspection, Seizure, and Destruction of Property (Series 42)
- Geographic Positioning of *Force* Units and Cross Border Incursions (Series 50)
- Relative Positioning of *Force* Units (Series 53)
- Exercising in the Presence of a Potential Adversary (Series 54)
- Diversions (Series 55)
- Use of Obstacles and Barriers (Series 56)
- Zones (Series 57)
- Harassment (Series 61)
- Sensors and Illumination (Series 63)
- Use of Land Mines, *Cluster Munitions*, and Booby Traps (Series 80-82)
- Assistance to Civil Authorities (Series 110)
- Crowd and Riot Control (Series 120)

- *Information Operations* (Series 130 - 133)

2.2 **Maritime Operations**

a. **Introduction**

The distinctive feature of the maritime environment is that it includes areas subject to the territorial sovereignty of nations (*national waters* and *national airspace*) and areas not subject to the territorial sovereignty of any nation (*international waters* and *international airspace*).

b. **Legal Considerations**

The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE for maritime operations are:

- i. The sea area where operations are to take place and the legal regime that applies, including navigation and overflight rights, the duties and rights of the coastal and flag states, and the rights and duties of neutrals or other non-participants.
- ii. The legal basis for the operation, including any specific legal authority for conducting operations in *national waters* or for conducting *maritime interdiction operations*.
- iii. The principle of sovereign immunity.

c. **Applicable ROE**

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, the following ROE should be considered:

- Prevention of Interference with Ships and Aircraft (Series 22)
- *Warning Shots* (Series 23)
- *Disabling Fire* (Series 24)
- Search and *Detention* of Persons (Series 25)
- Neutrals (Series 32)
- Inspection, Seizure and Destruction of Property (Series 42)
- Geographic Positioning of *Force Units* and Cross-Border Incursions (Series 50)
- Diversions (Series 55)
- Zones (Series 57)
- Harassment (Series 61)
- Sensors and Illumination (Series 63)
- Maritime Law Enforcement (Series 90)
- Submarine Contacts (Series 91)
- *Naval Mines* (Series 92)
- Boardings (Series 93)
- Suppression of *Piracy* (Series 94)

2.3 Air Operations

a. Introduction

The distinctive feature of air operations is that they take place in both *national airspace* and *international airspace*.

b. Legal Considerations

The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE for air operations are:

- i. The area where operations are to take place and the legal regime that applies, including the rights of overflight.
- ii. The interception and use of force against civil aircraft or any other specifically protected aircraft, such as medical aircraft.

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, the following ROE should be considered:

- Prevention of Interference with Ships and Aircraft (Series 22)
- *Warning Shots* (Series 23)
- Identification of Targets (Series 31)
- Neutrals (Series 32)
- Inspection, Seizure, and Destruction of Property (Series 42)
- Geographic Positioning of *Force* Units and Cross-Border Incursions (Series 50)
- Relative Positioning of *Force* Units (Series 53)
- Diversions (Series 55)
- Zones (Series 57)
- Harassment (Series 61)
- *Shadowing*, Surveillance and *Marking* (Series 62)
- Submarine Contacts (Series 91)
- Use of Air to Surface Munitions (Series 100)
- Use of Air to Sub-surface Munitions (Series 101)
- Air to Air Engagements (Series 102)

2.4 Outer Space Operations

a. Introduction

The distinctive features of *outer space* are that it is beyond the sovereignty of any nation and that all nations enjoy freedom of equal access and use.

b. Legal Considerations

The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE for space operations are:

- i. It is prohibited to place conventional weapons on the moon and celestial bodies and to station nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction anywhere in *outer space*.
- ii. No nation can claim jurisdiction or sovereignty over any portion of *outer space*.
- iii. The use of satellites for surveillance, communication and navigation for military purposes, over-flight by missiles, and the stationing of conventional weapons on satellites are not prohibited activities.
- iv. The determination of where *national airspace* ends and *outer space* begins is not yet settled.

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, the following ROE should be considered:

- Interference with Satellite Communications (Series 140).
- Neutralization/Destruction of Satellites (Series 141).

2.5 Cyberspace Operations

a. Introduction

The distinctive feature of *cyberspace* is that it is a notional environment and beyond the jurisdiction of any single nation. *Computer network operations (CNO)* are the principle form of operations in *cyberspace* and are often non-kinetic, making the determination of *hostile act* and *hostile intent* difficult.

b. Legal Considerations

The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE for cyberspace operations are:

- i. Domestic and international civil and criminal laws and national policies vary widely on the legal aspects of *CNO*. Further, multilateral and bilateral communications treaties have provisions that impact the conduct of *computer network operations*.
- ii. Despite being non-kinetic, operations in *cyberspace* may constitute a *hostile act* or *hostile intent*. Factors in the determination of both include the severity, immediacy, directness and effects of the operation.

Appendix 2 to Annex A

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, the following ROE should be considered:

- *Computer Network Operations* (Series 131)
- *Interference with Satellite Communications* (Series 140)
- *Neutralization/Destruction of Satellites* (Series 141)

TASK-SPECIFIC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3.1 Peace Operations

a. Introduction

The distinctive features of *Peace Operations* are that they involve a mixture of military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are designed to achieve a peaceful resolution or other specific conditions.

b. Legal Considerations

The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE are:

- i. The legal basis for presence in the sovereign territory (including national waters and airspace) of another nation, in particular whether the military activity has the consent of the nation(s) in which it is taking place.
- ii. Where the legal basis for presence includes a UNSC Resolution, whether that resolution is under Chapter VI or Chapter VII.
- iii. Whether any Chapter VII resolution gives the authority to use “all necessary means” and whether the basis for the use of force is restricted to *self-defence*, which may include the defence of designated persons.
- iv. The extent of any *Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)*, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other international arrangement.

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, the following ROE should be considered:

- Protection of Freedom of Movement of Persons (Series 21)
- *Warning Shots* (Series 23)
- Search and *Detention* of Persons (Series 25)
- Use of Force to Protect Property (Series 40)
- Inspection, Seizure, and Destruction of Property (Series 42)
- Geographic Positioning of *Force* Units and Cross-Border Incursions (Series 50)
- Relative Positioning of *Force* Units (Series 53)
- Diversions (Series 55)
- Use of Obstacles and Barriers (Series 56)
- Sensors and Illumination (Series 63)
- Use of Force in Assistance to Civil Authorities, Including Law Enforcement (Series 110)
- Search, *Detention*, and Arrest of Persons (Series 111)
- Treatment of Detained and Arrested Persons (Series 112)

- Crowd and Riot Control (Series 120)
- Riot Control Agents (Series 121)
- Riot Control Munitions/Water Cannons (Series 122)

3.2 **Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)**

a. Introduction

The distinctive feature of *Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)* is that they assist other government departments in evacuating nationals and selected others from threatening circumstances in a foreign or *host nation*. NEOs are fundamentally defensive in nature.

b. Legal Considerations

The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE are:

- i. The legal basis for presence in the sovereign territory (including *national waters* and *national airspace*) of the nation from which the NEO is taking place; in particular whether the NEO is conducted with or without *host nation* consent and, accordingly, whether the context is permissive, uncertain, or hostile.
- ii. The extent of any *Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)*, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other international arrangement.

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, the following ROE should be considered:

- Protection of Freedom of Movement of Persons (Series 21)
- *Warning Shots* (Series 23)
- Search and *Detention* of Persons (Series 25)
- Inspection, Seizure, and Destruction of Property (Series 42)
- Geographic Positioning of *Force Units* and Cross-Border Incursions (Series 50)
- Relative Positioning of *Force Units* (Series 53)
- Diversions (Series 55)
- Use of Obstacles and Barriers (Series 56)
- Sensors and Illumination (Series 63)
- Use of Force in Assistance to Civil Authorities, Including Law Enforcement (Series 110)
- Crowd and Riot Control (Series 120)
- Riot Control Agents (Series 121)
- Riot Control Munitions/Water Cannons (Series 122)
- *Electronic Warfare Measures* (Series 130)

3.3 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR)

a. Introduction

The distinctive features of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) are that they are generally short-term programs to alleviate suffering caused by natural or man-made disasters, and they complement the efforts of local civil authorities or other agencies with the consent of the *host nation*.

b. Legal Considerations

The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE are:

- i. Whether the carriage of weapons is necessary and whether the *host nation* has given consent to do so.
- ii. The extent of any *Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)*, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other international arrangement.
- iii. The operational restraints imposed by the *host nation*.

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, the following ROE should be considered:

- Freedom of Movement of Persons (Series 21)
- Geographic Positioning of *Force Units* and Cross-Border Incursions (Series 50)
- Use of Force in Assistance to Civil Authorities, including Law Enforcement (Series 110)
- Crowd and Riot Control (Series 120)
- Riot Control Agents (Series 121)
- Riot Control Munitions/Water Cannons (Series 122)

3.4 Assistance to Civil Authorities

a. Introduction

The provision of assistance to civil authorities involves domestic operations in which military forces perform civilian functions normally the responsibility of other government agencies.

b. Legal Considerations

The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE are:

- i. Whether the carriage of personal weapons is necessary.

ii. Whether a power of arrest or *detention* is required.

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, the following ROE should be considered:

- Use of Force to Protect Property (Series 40)
- Authority to Carry Weapons (Series 70)
- Use of Force in Assistance to Civil Authorities, including Law Enforcement (Series 110)
- Search, *Detention*, and Arrest of Persons (Series 111)
- Treatment of Detained and Arrested persons (Series 112)
- Crowd and Riot Control (Series 120)
- Riot Control Agents (Series 121)
- Riot Control Munitions/Water cannons (Series 122)

3.5 Maritime Interdiction Operations

a. Introduction

The distinctive feature of *maritime interdiction operations* is that they involve the assertion of jurisdiction by warships (and/or military aircraft) over the vessels and/or aircraft of other states. Each participating nation will have a national position on what they are permitted to do (both as a matter of law and policy) in *international waters* and *international airspace* in respect of other nations' vessels and aircraft.

b. Legal Considerations

The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE are:

- i. The sea area where operations are to take place and the legal regime that applies, including navigation and overflight rights, the duties and rights of the coastal and flag states, and the rights and duties of neutrals or other non-participants.
- ii. The legal basis for the operation, including any specific legal authority for conducting operations in *national waters* or for conducting *maritime interdiction operations*.
- iii. The principle of sovereign immunity.
- iv. Different national legal and policy positions on the right to visit on the basis of a master's consent.

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, the following ROE should be considered:

- Prevention of Interference with Ships and Aircraft (Series 22)
- *Warning Shots* (Series 23)
- *Disabling Fire* (Series 24)
- Search and *Detention* of Persons (Series 25)
- Inspection, Seizure, and Destruction of Property (Series 42)
- Geographic Positioning of *Force* Units and Cross-Border Incursions (Series 50)
- Diversions (Series 55)
- Zones (Series 57)
- Harassment and Counter-Harassment (Series 61)
- Sensors and Illumination (Series 63)
- Maritime Law Enforcement (Series 90)
- Boardings (Series 93)
- Suppression of *Piracy* (Series 94)

GUIDANCE ON *HOSTILE INTENT*

4.1 Defining *Hostile Intent*

a. *Hostile intent* is the threat of the imminent use of force. A determination of *hostile intent* is based on the existence of an identifiable threat recognizable on the basis of both of the following conditions:

i. Capability.

ii. Intention.

b. The right to use force in *self-defence* arises either when forces have been *attacked* and/or when there is demonstrated *hostile intent*. Demonstrated *hostile intent* exists when there is a reasonable belief that an *attack* or use of force is imminent, based on an assessment of all the facts and circumstances known at the time. Some nations permit the right of *individual self-defence* and *unit self-defence* to be limited by a force commander (see Series 10 and 11 in Annex B).

4.2 Ascertaining *Hostile Intent*. In determining whether an entity is demonstrating *hostile intent*, forces will use their best judgment and consider available intelligence, political and military factors, indications and warnings, and all other relevant information concerning the capabilities of possible threats in the area of operations.

4.3 Indicators of *Hostile Intent*. There is no checklist of indicators that will conclusively determine *hostile intent*. The following are examples of actions that may, depending on the circumstances, demonstrate *hostile intent*:

- a. Aiming or directing weapons.
- b. Adopting an *attack* profile.
- c. Closing within weapon release range.
- d. Illuminating with radar or laser designators.
- e. Passing targeting information.
- f. Laying or preparing to lay *naval mines*.
- g. Failing to respond to the proactive measures listed below in 4.4.

4.4 Proactive Measures that may Assist in Ascertaining *Hostile Intent*. In addition to the above indicators of *hostile intent*, time and circumstances permitting, forces should take proactive measures to assist in determining the intent of an opposing entity or force, including, but not limited to:

- a. Verbal query (see Appendix 7 to Annex C).

Appendix 4 to Annex A

- b. Verbal warning (see Appendix 7 to Annex C).
- c. Visual signals.
- d. Noise signals.
- e. Physical barriers.
- f. Changing course and speed to determine if continuing to maintain an *attack* profile.
- g. Illuminating with fire control radar.
- h. Firing *warning shots*.

ESCALATION OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE

5.1 Introduction. In all *self-defence* situations, when confronted with circumstances in which the use of force may become necessary, it is appropriate to exercise control over the application of force so as to ensure that the use of force is justifiable. Consequently, when time and circumstances permit, use of force must always be graduated (also referred to as escalation). Escalation of force (EOF) may involve sequential actions that begin with *non-deadly force* measures and may graduate to *deadly force* measures. EOF procedures are designed to avoid unjustifiable use of force. EOF procedures also may assist in the determination of *hostile intent* (see Appendix 4 to Annex A).

5.2 Graduated use of force. Graduated use of force requires that individuals confronted with a need to use force should always aim to use the least harmful option available in those circumstances. Indeed, one principal purpose of graduated use of force is to create operational time and space in the hope that there will be no need to escalate to use of *deadly force* in *self-defence*.

5.3 Use of force options. A variety of options for use of force may be available in any given situation. The options available will often include:

- a. Presence.
- b. Verbal and visual warnings, including display of weapons.
- c. Soft physical pressure.
- d. Hard physical pressure.
- e. Non-lethal weapons (such as batons).
- f. Lethal weapons (such as firearms).

5.4 General Considerations. There are a number of general considerations that should be taken into account in relation to EOF policy, options, and training:

- a. EOF is concerned with employing the necessary option. Use of force options must be read within their context on every occasion – that is, the assessment as to what the minimum first response shall be should be made on a case-by-case basis. Use of an excessive option, where a less harmful option could reasonably have achieved the aim of neutralizing or removing the threat in the circumstances encountered, may have legal consequences for individual users of force.
- b. Where time and circumstances permit it is expected that less harmful options (for example, warnings or *warning shots*) will be exercised before more harmful options are used.
- c. On some occasions, for operational reasons, ROE may limit access to certain less harmful EOF options. For example, ROE may prohibit use of *warning shots*. However, it must be remembered on all occasions that ROE and EOF procedures do

Appendix 5 to Annex A

not limit the right of *self-defence*. Subject to any limitations promulgated in ROE (either series 10 or 11), all necessary and proportional means and actions may be used in *self-defence*.

d. *Force* preparation should include scenario-based training in EOF situations that members of the *Force* are likely to encounter during the operation, such as checkpoint or access control operations.

e. Use of proactive measures to determine *hostile intent* (see paragraph 4.4 of Appendix 4 to Annex A) and EOF measures are similar and may serve the same purpose.

TARGETING AND ROE

6.1 Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities, applicable ROE, and LOAC.

6.2 The relationship between ROE and targeting is summarized as follows:

- a. Forces may target only those military objectives permitted to be targeted in the relevant ROE.
- b. ROE may impose policy restrictions on targeting that go beyond the requirements of the LOAC.
- c. ROE must never permit targeting that is not consistent with LOAC.

6.3 Targeting Directives for a mission may set out limitations such as *restricted target lists* and *no-strike lists*. Additionally, commanders may be restricted from taking certain actions by their ROE.

6.4 In order to conduct targeting for any mission, planners, often referred to as a “targeting cell”, must have ROE for mission accomplishment (Series 20) that permit the use of force, up to and including *deadly force*. These ROE measures will reflect the effects that the commander intends to achieve. If there are no permissions under Series 20, then *attacks* cannot be conducted.

6.5 ROE will reflect the LOAC requirement that under no condition will an *attack* be permitted where the expected incidental injury or death of civilians and collateral damage to civilian objects is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated to be gained by the *attack*. In exceptional cases, *higher authority* or a commander (through an operation order or statement of commander’s intent) may direct that more restrictive standards be applied. For example, a commander may:

- a. prohibit *attacks* in which any collateral damage is a foreseeable consequence;
- b. prohibit *attacks* where incidental injury or death of specified classes of persons (such as children) or a specified number of persons is expected;
- c. prohibit *attacks* where otherwise permissible collateral damage to specified civilian objects is expected; or
- d. direct that selected military objectives be disabled rather than destroyed.

The above restrictive standards, as a general rule, would be applicable to mission accomplishment situations and not to use of force in *self-defence* situations.

MODEL TARGETING CHECK-LIST

Target Description:

Grid Ref:

1	Do you have authority under ROE / Orders to conduct <i>attack</i> ? <i>If yes proceed to 2. If no DO NOT ATTACK</i>
2	Is the objective on a <i>No Strike / Restricted Target List</i> ? <i>If no proceed to 3. If yes DO NOT ATTACK</i>
3	Does the target make an effective contribution to enemy military action? <i>If yes proceed to 4. If no DO NOT ATTACK</i>
4	Will its destruction or neutralization, in current circumstances, offer a definite military advantage? <i>If yes proceed to 5. If no DO NOT ATTACK</i>
5	Is the <i>attack</i> expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof (i.e. collateral damage)? <i>If yes proceed to 6. If no proceed to 11.</i>
6	Do your targeting directive and ROE permit collateral damage? <i>If yes proceed to 7. If no DO NOT ATTACK</i>
7	Is there an alternative military target available with the same military advantage, with less risk of collateral damage? <i>If no proceed to 8. If yes return to 1 for new target</i>
8	Have all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of <i>attack</i> with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects been taken? <i>If yes proceed to 9. If no, do so, and then reassess 8.</i>
9	Where circumstances permit, has an effective advance warning been given of <i>attacks</i> that may affect the civilian population? <i>If yes proceed to 10. If no, issue warning before proceeding to 10.</i>
10	Is the <i>attack</i> expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated? <i>If yes DO NOT ATTACK. If no proceed to step 11.</i>
11	ATTACK PERMITTED - BUT CONTINUE TO MONITOR. IF CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE - DUTY TO REASSESS ATTACK.

COMPENDIUM OF ROE

1. This Compendium provides rules for the drafting of ROE. The rules are divided into groups that deal with different areas of military activity. Within these groups there are a number of series of rules, each of which regulates a distinct activity. Individual rules are selected from the series as required. Spare numbers are provided for the drafting of rules not included in the Compendium. Some of the rules include the term “(SPECIFY).” This means that detail must be inserted to clarify the meaning of the rule.
2. The Handbook is constructed on the basis that the right to use force in *individual self-defence* or *unit self-defence* is not limited unless a rule in Groups 10-19 specifically does so.
3. The process for drafting ROE from this Compendium is set out below and summarized in the ROE Drafting Check List.
 - a. Analyse the mission. Pay particular attention to the policy, operational and legal considerations that may affect ROE, including *higher authority* intent or guidance. Determine the character of the operation as involving armed conflict (international or non-international) or as falling outside armed conflict in order to determine the applicable rules.
 - b. Identify tasks from Mission Statement in OPORD. The OPORD will contain the mission statement and military tasks that are to be completed to accomplish the mission. These tasks need to be identified before any consideration can be given to drafting ROE.
 - c. Identify any current ROE. This is necessary to determine if changes will be required.
 - d. Prepare the ROE. .
 - i. Identify Compulsory Rules. The first ROE to be considered are the compulsory rules. The compulsory rules deal with matters that are fundamental to any mission and must be present in every ROE, even if the rule selected is one that prohibits the military activity. Every ROE is to include a rule from each of series 10, 11, 12, 60 & 70. For any mission beyond *self-defence*, a rule from series 20 is required. In situations involving armed conflict, measures from series 30 and 32 are required.
 - ii. Identify Environment-Specific Rules. Appendix 2 to Annex A provides guidance for drafting ROE for environments including land, maritime, air, *outer space*, and *cyberspace* operations. The rules that are most likely to be required are set out for each environment but are not compulsory.
 - iii. Identify Task Specific Rules. Appendix 3 to Annex A provides guidance for drafting ROE for specific tasks including *peace operations*, *non-combatant evacuation operations*, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief,

and assistance to civil authorities. The rules that are most likely to be required are set out for each environment but are not compulsory.

iv. Review remaining rules in Compendium. Each mission is unique so the environment and task specific guidance will not always be sufficient. ROE drafters should check all the series in the Compendium to see if any other rules are required to accomplish the mission.

v. Draft rules. The ROE message should be drafted with ROE listed in numerical order. It is possible, and sometimes necessary, to have two rules chosen from the same series.


vi. Draft spare rules, if required. The Compendium cannot anticipate every possible mission and rule that may be required. Where a rule is not provided, it can be drafted under a spare number using the same format as other rules in that series or as part of a new group or series.

vii. Determine Retained Rules. Decide which rules, if any, are to be retained at a higher level. These rules will remain dormant until a ROEIMP message is issued.

e. Validate ROE by comparing to tasks. The ROE must be checked against the mission and task to ensure that it supports mission accomplishment within the limitations set out by *higher authority*. Rectify shortfalls, if any.

f. Obtain approval. Seek approval from the appropriate level of authority.

ROE DRAFTING CHECKLIST



GROUP 10-19: USE OF FORCE IN THE DEFENCE OF SELF AND OTHERS		
Note: For purposes of <i>self-defence</i> , <i>Force</i> includes persons accompanying the <i>Force</i> , Prisoners of War, internees and detainees under the control of the <i>Force</i> .		
Series 10	Use of Force in <i>Individual Self-Defence</i>	
Purpose:	To regulate the right to use force in <i>individual self-defence</i> .	
	Rule	
	10 A	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , in <i>individual self-defence</i> is permitted, except as follows: (SPECIFY).
	10 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> in <i>individual self-defence</i> is permitted.
	10 C	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , in <i>individual self-defence</i> is permitted.
	10 D	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> in defence of property where there is likelihood that destruction of, or damage to, that property will lead to the injury of (SPECIFY persons) is permitted.
	10 E	<p>Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i>, in defence of property where there is a likelihood that destruction of, or damage to, that property will lead to an imminent threat to life of (SPECIFY persons) is permitted.</p> <p>Note: Defence of property in such situations is an exercise of the right of <i>individual self-defence</i>, <i>unit self-defence</i>, or the right to protect the specified persons. Specified persons might include members of the <i>Force</i>, own state nationals, all civilians, etc. See Series 40 for measures regarding the use of force to protect property where no imminent threat to life exists.</p>
	10 F-Z	Spare.
Series 11	Use of Force in <i>Unit Self-Defence</i>	
Purpose:	To regulate the right to use force in <i>unit self-defence</i> .	
	Rule	
	11 A	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , is permitted in <i>unit self-defence</i> , except as follows: (SPECIFY).
	11 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> in <i>unit self-defence</i> is permitted.

Annex B

	11 C	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , in <i>unit self-defence</i> of (SPECIFY groups or units, e.g. the <i>Force</i> , civilians) is permitted.
	11 D	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> in <i>unit self-defence</i> of (SPECIFY groups or units) is permitted.
	11 E	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> where there is likelihood of damage to property that will lead to injury of persons in own unit or other units of own nation is permitted.
	11 F	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> where there is likelihood of damage to property that will lead to injury of persons in (SPECIFY groups or units, e.g. the <i>Force</i> , civilians) is permitted.
	11 G	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , where there is a likelihood of damage to property that will lead to an imminent threat to life in own unit or other units of own nation is permitted. Note: Defence of property in such situations is an exercise of the right of <i>unit self-defence</i> in situations where the unit or persons in the unit are in peril. See Series 40 for measures regarding the use of force to protect property.
	11 H-Z	Spare.
Series 12	Use of Force for the Protection of Others	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of force for protection of persons who are not members of the <i>Force</i> .	
	Rule	
	12 A	Use of force for the protection of others is prohibited.
	12 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> for the protection of others in (SPECIFY group) is permitted.
	12 C	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , for the protection of others of (SPECIFY group) is permitted.
	12 D	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to prevent the commission of a <i>serious crime</i> against (SPECIFY) persons is permitted.
	12 E-Z	Spare.
Series 13	Use of Force in <i>National Self-Defence</i>	

Annex B

Purpose:	To regulate the use of force in <i>national self-defence</i> .	
	Rule	
	13 A	Use of force in <i>national self-defence</i> is prohibited.
	13 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> in <i>national self-defence</i> of (SPECIFY nation) is permitted.
	13 C	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> in <i>national self-defence</i> of (SPECIFY nation) when authorised by (SPECIFY authority) is permitted.
	13 D	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , in <i>national self-defence</i> of (SPECIFY nation) is permitted.
	13 E	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , in <i>national self-defence</i> of (SPECIFY nation) when authorised by (SPECIFY authority) is permitted.
	13 F-Z	Spare.
Series 14-19	SPARE	
GROUP 20-29: MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT		
Series 20	Use of Force for Mission Accomplishment	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of force for the purposes of mission accomplishment. Note: Where there is no armed conflict, some nations will only <i>deadly force</i> only in <i>self-defence</i> .	
	Rule	
	20 A	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to accomplish the mission is permitted.
	20 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to counter force used to interfere with the mission is permitted.
	20 C	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to accomplish the mission is permitted.
	20 D	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to counter force used to interfere with the mission is permitted.
	20 E-Z	Spare.

Annex B

Series 21	Protection of Freedom of Movement of Persons	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of force in providing freedom of movement of personnel.	
	Rule	
	21 A	Use of force to prevent interference with the freedom of movement of persons belonging to the <i>Force</i> is prohibited.
	21 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> , to prevent interference with the freedom of movement of persons belonging to the <i>Force</i> , is permitted.
	21 C	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to prevent interference with the freedom of movement of persons belonging to the <i>Force</i> , is permitted.
	21 D	Use of force to prevent interference with the freedom of movement of (SPECIFY persons) is prohibited.
	21 E	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> , to prevent interference with the freedom of movement of (SPECIFY persons), is permitted.
	21 F	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to prevent interference with the freedom of movement of (SPECIFY persons), is permitted.
	21 G-Z	Spare.
Series 22	Prevention of Interference with Ships and Aircraft	
Purpose:	To regulate the circumstances in which force may be used to prevent unauthorised boarding or seizure of ships or aircraft.	
	Rule	
	22 A	Use of force to prevent unauthorised boarding of ships/aircraft is prohibited.
	22 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to prevent unauthorised boarding of (SPECIFY ships/aircraft) is permitted.
	22 C	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> to prevent unauthorised <i>boarding</i> of (SPECIFY ships/aircraft), is permitted.
	22 D-Z	Spare.
Series 23	Warning Shots	

Annex B

Purpose:	To regulate the use of <i>warning shots</i> other than in <i>self-defence</i> . Note: For use of warnings other than <i>warning shots</i> see Series 60.	
	Rule	
	23 A	Firing of <i>warning shots</i> is prohibited.
	23 B	Firing of <i>warning shots</i> in the vicinity of (SPECIFY elements) is permitted.
	23 C	Firing of <i>warning shots</i> to compel compliance with (SPECIFY instructions) is permitted.
	23 D	Firing of <i>warning shots</i> is permitted.
	23 E-Z	Spare.
Series 24	<i>Disabling Fire</i>	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of <i>disabling fire</i> .	
	Rule	
	24 A	Use of <i>disabling fire</i> is prohibited.
	24 B	Use of <i>disabling fire</i> to compel compliance with (SPECIFY instructions) is permitted.
	24 C	Use of <i>disabling fire</i> is permitted.
	24 D-Z	Spare.
Series 25	Search and <i>Detention</i> of Persons	
Purpose:	To regulate the circumstances in which persons may be searched and detained, other than in Assistance to Civilian and Law Enforcement Authorities (see Series 111).	
	Rule	
	25 A	Search of (SPECIFY persons) is prohibited.
	25 B	Search of (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	25 C	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to search (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.

Annex B

	25 D	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to search (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	25 E	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to disarm (SPECIFY persons) is permitted.
	25 F	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly-force</i> to disarm (SPECIFY persons), is permitted.
	25 G	<i>Detention</i> of (SPECIFY persons) is prohibited.
	25 H	<i>Detention</i> of (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	25 I	<i>Use of non-deadly force to detain</i> (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	25 J	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to detain (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances), is permitted.
	25 K	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to prevent the escape of (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	25 L	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to prevent the escape of (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances), is permitted.
	25 M-Z	Spare.
Series 26	Use of Force to Secure the Release of Persons	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of force in securing the release of persons.	
	Rule	
	26 A	Use of force to secure the release from custody of persons belonging to the <i>Force</i> is prohibited.
	26 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to secure the release from custody of persons belonging to the <i>Force</i> is permitted.
	26 C	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to secure the release from custody of persons belonging to the <i>Force</i> , is permitted.
	26 D	Use of force to secure the release from custody of (SPECIFY persons) is prohibited.
	26 E	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to secure the release from custody of (SPECIFY persons) is permitted.

Annex B

	26 F	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to secure the release from custody of (SPECIFY persons), is permitted.
	26 G-Z	Spare.
Series 27	<i>Indirect Fire (Unobserved Indirect Fire and Observed Indirect Fire)</i>	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of <i>indirect fire</i> Notes: 1. Definitions of the terms <i>direct fire</i> , <i>observed indirect fire</i> , and <i>unobserved indirect fire</i> vary among nations. Annex D provides generally accepted definitions. If national policy dictates a different definition, that definition should be published with the ROE. 2. For the purposes of this Handbook, <i>direct fire</i> and <i>observed indirect fire</i> are permitted unless restricted by a rule. <i>Unobserved indirect fire</i> is not permitted unless authorised by a rule.	
	Rule	
	27 A	Use of (SPECIFY <i>unobserved fire</i> , <i>observed indirect fire</i> , or all <i>indirect fire</i>) is prohibited (in the following situations: SPECIFY situations, e.g. populated areas).
	27 B	Use of <i>unobserved indirect fire</i> is permitted (in the following situations: SPECIFY situations).
	27 C-Z	Spare.
Series 28 –29	Spare	
GROUP 30-39: TARGETING IN ARMED CONFLICT		
Series 30	ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES INCLUDING HOSTILE FORCES	
Purpose:	To regulate the engagement of military objectives including hostile forces.	
	Rule	
	30 A	<i>Attack on declared hostile forces</i> and other military objectives within (SPECIFY area) is permitted. AMPN: <i>Declared hostile forces</i> are: a. Combatants of the armed forces of (SPECIFY nation), b. Civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, and/or

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		c. (SPECIFY others e.g. group/vessel.)
	30 B	Non-destructive <i>attack</i> on (SPECIFY property) is permitted.
	30 C	<i>Attack</i> on (SPECIFY property) is prohibited.
	30 D-Z	Spare. Note: All actions under this series are to be conducted in accordance with the LOAC. For example, medical personnel, chaplains of the armed forces and those who are hors de combat may not be <i>attacked</i> . Series 30 should be considered in conjunction with Series 31 - Identification of Targets.
Series 31	Identification of Targets	
Purpose:	To regulate the means of identification required in using force against a target.	
	Rule	
	31 A	Identification of a target must be by visual means. Note: For the purpose of this rule, visual includes the use of image magnifiers such as binoculars, telescopes and periscopes.
	31 B	Identification of a target must be by visual means and (SPECIFY number and/or combination of the following means): a. Identification friend or foe (IFF) b. Other means requiring a response c. Thermal imaging d. Electro-optical e. Electronic intercept intelligence f. Data link information g. Passive acoustic analysis h. Track origin and behaviour i. Flight path correlation j. Magnetic signature k. EW support measures l. Other identification means not requiring a response
	31 C	Identification of a target must be by (SPECIFY number and/or combination of the following means): a. Visual b. Identification friend or foe (IFF) c. Other means requiring a response

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> d. Thermal imaging e. Electro-optical f. Electronic intercept intelligence g. Data link information h. Passive acoustic analysis i. Track origin and behaviour j. Flight path correlation k. Magnetic signature l. EW support measures m. Other identification means not requiring a response
	31 D	Use of information from (SPECIFY force/sources) for target identification is prohibited.
	31 E	Use of (SPECIFY means) information from (SPECIFY force/sources) for target identification is permitted.
	31 F	Use of information from (SPECIFY force/sources) for target identification is permitted.
	31 G-Z	Spare.
Series 32	Neutrals	
Purpose:	To regulate the interaction of own force with neutrals.	
	Rule	
	32 A	Interference with the activities of neutrals is prohibited.
	32 B	Interference with the activities of neutrals in accordance with the law of armed conflict for the purposes of (SPECIFY actions, e.g. to conduct visit and search, instructing the vessel/aircraft to depart from the immediate area of operations, etc) is permitted.
	32 C	Conduct of (SPECIFY operation) in (SPECIFY neutral states) territorial sea, archipelagic waters or airspace is permitted.
	32 D-Z	Spare.
Series 33 – 39	Spare	
GROUP 40-49: OPERATIONS RELATED TO PROPERTY		
Series 40	Use of Force to Protect Property	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of force to protect property.	

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	Rule	
	40 A	Use of force to protect property belonging to the <i>Force</i> is prohibited.
	40 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to protect property belonging to the <i>Force</i> is permitted.
	40 C	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to protect property belonging to the <i>Force</i> is permitted.
	40 D	Use of force to protect property is prohibited.
	40 E	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to protect property is permitted.
	40 F	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> to protect property is permitted.
	40 G-Z	Spare.
Series 41	Protection of Vital/Mission Essential/Specified Property	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of force in the protection of vital property, mission essential property, and other specified property.	
	Rule	
	41 A	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to protect (SPECIFY) property is permitted.
	41 B	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to protect (SPECIFY property) is permitted.
	41 C-Z	Spare.
Series 42	Inspection, Seizure, and Destruction of Property	
Purpose:	To regulate the circumstances in which property may be inspected, seized, and destroyed.	
	Rule	
	42 A	Inspection of (SPECIFY property) is prohibited.
	42 B	Inspection of (SPECIFY property) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	42 C	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to inspect (SPECIFY property) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.

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	42 D	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to inspect (SPECIFY property) in (SPECIFY circumstances), is permitted.
	42 E	Seizure of (SPECIFY property) is prohibited.
	42 F	Seizure of (SPECIFY property) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	42 G	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to seize (SPECIFY property) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	42 H	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to seize (SPECIFY property) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	42 I	Use of force to secure the release of property following its seizure is prohibited.
	42 J	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to secure the release of property belonging to the <i>Force</i> following the seizure of such property is permitted.
	42 K	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to secure the release of (SPECIFY) property belonging to the <i>Force</i> following its seizure, is permitted.
	42 L	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to secure the release of (SPECIFY property) is permitted.
	42 M	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to secure the release of (SPECIFY property), is permitted.
	42 N	Destruction of (SPECIFY property) is prohibited.
	42 O	Destruction of (SPECIFY property) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	42 P-Z	Spare.
Series 43 – 49	Spare	
GROUP 50-59: GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONING		
Series 50	Geographic Positioning of Force Units and Cross-Border Incursions	
Purpose:	To regulate the position of <i>Force</i> units in relation to the territory, maritime zones or airspace of others. Note: Except to the extent excluded, restricted, modified, or amplified by a measure in Series 58, <i>Force</i> units may exercise freedoms of navigation and over-flight in accordance with international law (see Part V, paragraph 19).	

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	Rule	
	50 A	Entry into (SPECIFY area) of (SPECIFY nation or area) is prohibited.
	50 B	Approach closer than (SPECIFY distance / range) to (SPECIFY area) is prohibited.
	50 C	Entry into (SPECIFY area) except for the following circumstances (SPECIFY e.g. for transit passage, when rendered necessary by force majeure or distress, in <i>assistance entry</i> , in <i>self-defence</i> , etc.) is prohibited.
	50 D	Entry into (SPECIFY area) for (SPECIFY purpose or task, e.g. innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage, and assistance entry, SAR, NEO) is permitted.
	50 E	Entry into (SPECIFY area) is permitted.
	50 F-Z	Spare.
Series 51	Ground Reconnaissance	
Purpose:	To regulate the conduct of ground reconnaissance.	
	Rule	
	51 A	Conduct of ground reconnaissance in (SPECIFY area) is prohibited.
	51 B	Conduct of ground reconnaissance in (SPECIFY area) is permitted.
	51 C-Z	Spare.
Series 52	Aerial Reconnaissance	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of aerial reconnaissance	
	Rule	
	52 A	Aerial reconnaissance over (SPECIFY area) is prohibited.
	52 B	Aerial reconnaissance against (SPECIFY force) is prohibited.
	52 C	Aerial reconnaissance at altitudes of less than (SPECIFY altitude above ground level) over (SPECIFY force/area) is prohibited.

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	52 D	Aerial reconnaissance against (SPECIFY force) is permitted.
	52 E	Aerial reconnaissance over (SPECIFY area) is permitted.
	52 F	Aerial reconnaissance is permitted.
	52 G-Z	Spare.
Series 53	Relative Positioning of <i>Force</i> Units	
Purpose:	To regulate the position of <i>Force</i> units in relation to other forces or assets.	
	Rule	
	53 A	Approaching closer than (SPECIFY distance / range) to (SPECIFY forces / contacts of interest) is prohibited.
	53 B	Approaching (SPECIFY forces / contacts of interest) within (SPECIFY distance) for (SPECIFY purpose—e.g. to establish identity) is permitted.
	53 C	Approaching (SPECIFY forces / contacts of interest) within (SPECIFY distance) is permitted.
	53 D	Unrestricted approach of (SPECIFY forces / contacts of interest) is permitted.
	53 E-Z	Spare.
Series 54	Exercising in the Presence of a Potential Adversary	
Purpose:	<p>To regulate the conduct of exercises in the presence of a potential enemy.</p> <p>Note: While the conduct of an exercise is a lawful activity, such activity in the presence of a potential enemy, could be viewed as provocative.</p>	
	Rule	
	54 A	Conduct of exercises in the presence of (SPECIFY) units is prohibited.
	54 B	Conduct of (SPECIFY) exercises in the presence of (SPECIFY) units is permitted.
	54 C	Aiming of weapons in the direction of (SPECIFY) is prohibited.
	54 D	Aiming of weapons in the direction of (SPECIFY) is permitted.

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	54 E-Z	Spare.
Series 55	Diversions	
Purpose:	To regulate the use and enforcement of diversions.	
	Rule	
	55 A	Ordering of diversions is prohibited.
	55 B	Advising (SPECIFY persons/objects) on land to avoid (SPECIFY) areas is permitted.
	55 C	Advising (SPECIFY) aircraft to avoid (SPECIFY) areas is permitted.
	55 D	Advising (SPECIFY) ships to avoid (SPECIFY) areas is permitted.
	55 E	Ordering of diversions to (SPECIFY person/objects) on land for (SPECIFY) purpose is permitted.
	55 F	Ordering of diversions to (SPECIFY) aircraft for (SPECIFY) purpose is permitted.
	55 G	Ordering of diversions to (SPECIFY) ships for (SPECIFY) purpose is permitted.
	55 H	Ordering of diversions and other instructions to ships suspected of operating in breach of UNSCR (SPECIFY) is permitted.
	55 I	Use of (SPECIFY actions) to compel compliance with (SPECIFY diversion instructions) is permitted.
	55 J	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to compel compliance with (SPECIFY diversion instructions) is permitted.
	55 K	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to compel compliance with (SPECIFY diversion instructions), is permitted.
	55 L-Z	Spare.
Series 56	Use of Obstacles and Barriers	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of obstacles and barriers.	
	Rule	
	56 A	Use of obstacles and barriers is prohibited.

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	56 B	Use of non-explosive obstacles and barriers in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	56 C	Use of a <i>counter-terrorist warning boom</i> is prohibited.
	56 D	Use of a <i>counter-terrorist warning boom</i> in (SPECIFY circumstances/location) is permitted.
	56 E-Z	Spare.
Series 57	Zones	
Purpose:	To regulate enforcement mechanisms for declared zones in land, maritime, and air environments.	
	Rule	
	57 A	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> against (SPECIFY units) entering (SPECIFY area) without permission for (SPECIFY purpose e.g. reconnaissance) is permitted.
	57 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> within (SPECIFY area) to disarm (SPECIFY groups or individuals) is permitted.
	57 C	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , within (SPECIFY area) to disarm (SPECIFY groups or individuals) is permitted.
	57 D	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> on (SPECIFY units) entering (SPECIFY area) without permission is permitted.
	57 E	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> on (SPECIFY units) who have entered (SPECIFY area) and failed to depart when warned is permitted.
	57 F-Z	Spare.
Series 58	Freedom of Navigation	
Purpose:	<p>To regulate the exercise of freedom of navigation.</p> <p>Note: These rights are to be exercised with due regard for the legitimate rights of the Coastal State in the relevant zone. Unless otherwise directed, this Rule permits exercise of applicable rights in <i>international waters</i> that are subject to excessive maritime claims – both geographical (such as excessive straight baselines) and jurisdictional (such as over security in the CZ or EEZ).</p>	
	Rule	

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	58 A	Exercise of freedom of navigation in the (SPECIFY claimed security zone or other excessive maritime claim) of (SPECIFY nation / nations) is prohibited.
	58 B	Exercise of freedom of navigation in the (SPECIFY claimed security zone or other excessive maritime claim) of (SPECIFY nation / nations) is permitted.
	58 C	Exercise of freedom of navigation in the Contiguous Zone (CZ) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of (SPECIFY nation / nations) is permitted.
	58 D-Z	Spare.
Series 59	Spare	
GROUP 60-69: WARNINGS, HARASSMENT, <i>SHADOWING</i>, ILLUMINATION		
Series 60	Warnings	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of warnings. Note: For use of <i>warning shots</i> refer to Series 23 – <i>Warning Shots</i> . Nothing in this Series prohibits an individual/vehicle/vessel or aircraft from communicating or displaying a <i>warning signal</i> .	
	Rule	
	60 A	Use of warnings is prohibited.
	60 B	Use of warnings is permitted.
	60 C	Use of (SPECIFY warnings) directed towards (SPECIFY elements) is permitted.
	60 D	Energizing fire control radar as a means of warning is permitted.
	60 E-Z	Spare.
Series 61	Harassment	
Purpose:	To regulate harassment. Note: A specific definitions of “harassment” should be included if there is doubt as to the definition of the term.	
	Rule	
	61 A	Harassment is prohibited.

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	61 B	Harassment that will not result in physical damage is permitted.
	61 C	Harassment that may result in physical damage is prohibited.
	61 D	Harassment that may result in physical damage is permitted.
	61 E	Harassment to a similar extent and, in a similar fashion, to harassment received by any element or unit of the <i>Force</i> is permitted.
	61 F-Z	Spare.
Series 62	<i>Shadowing, Surveillance, and Marking</i>	
Purpose:	To regulate or restrict the conduct of <i>shadowing</i> , surveillance, or <i>marking</i> .	
	Rule	
	62 A	<i>Shadowing</i> is prohibited.
	62 B	<i>Shadowing</i> of (SPECIFY) forces is permitted.
	62 C	<i>Marking</i> is prohibited.
	62 D	<i>Marking</i> of (SPECIFY) forces is permitted.
	62 E	Conduct of surveillance is permitted.
	62 F-Z	Spare.
Series 63	Sensors and Illumination	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of sensors and means of illumination. Note: Care shall be taken not to illuminate the bridge, cab, or cockpit in such a way as to blind persons in control of ships, vehicles, or aircraft being illuminated.	
	Rule	
	63 A	Illumination is prohibited.
	63 B	Illumination of (SPECIFY) by (SPECIFY equipment) is permitted.
	63 C	Use of laser designators in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	63 D	Use of laser range finders in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.

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		Note: It is unlawful to use laser targeting systems to deliberately cause blindness.
	63 E	Energizing fire-control radars in the direction of (SPECIFY) permitted.
	63 F	Use of all illuminants and illumination systems is permitted.
	63 G	Use of active sensors is prohibited.
	63 H	Use of active sensors is permitted.
	63 I	Unrestricted use of sensors is permitted.
	63 J-Z	Spare.
Series 64-69	Spare	
GROUP 70-79: CARRYING OF WEAPONS		
Series 70	Authority to Carry Weapons	
Purpose:	To regulate carrying of weapons.	
	Rule	
	70 A	Carrying of weapons by members of the <i>Force</i> is prohibited.
	70 B	Carrying of weapons by members of the <i>Force</i> in (SPECIFY location) is prohibited.
	70 C	Carrying of weapons by members of the <i>Force</i> in (SPECIFY area) is permitted.
	70 D	Carrying of (SPECIFY type of weapons, e.g. crew served weapons) by members of the <i>Force</i> in (SPECIFY area) is permitted.
	70 E	Carrying of weapons except in (SPECIFY location) is permitted. Note: Measure 70E is to be used when <i>Force</i> members are permitted to carry weapons in the area of operations, but are restricted from carrying weapons in places such as in the vicinity of cities, in <i>host nation</i> government buildings, etc.
	70 F	Carrying of weapons by members of the <i>Force</i> is permitted.
	70 G-Z	Spare.

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Series 71 –79	Spare	
GROUP 80-89: LAND MINES, <i>CLUSTER MUNITIONS</i> AND BOOBY TRAPS Note: Treaty law and national policies, which go beyond the requirements of customary international law, have placed limitations on the use of these weapon systems by some nations.		
Series 80	Use of Land Mines	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of land mines (including <i>anti-personnel mines</i>).	
	Rule	
	80 A	Use of land mines (including <i>anti-personnel mines</i>) is prohibited.
	80 B	Use of <i>anti-personnel mines</i> is prohibited.
	80 C	Use of surface laid anti-vehicle mines in (SPECIFY area) is permitted.
	80 D	Use of concealed anti-vehicle mines in (SPECIFY area) is permitted.
	80 E	Use of land mines (including <i>anti-personnel mines</i>) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	80 F	Use of command-detonated mines is permitted.
	80 G	Use of land mines (except <i>anti-personnel mines</i>) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	80 H	Use of <i>land mines</i> (except <i>anti-personnel mines</i>) is permitted.
	80 I	Use of <i>land mines</i> (including <i>anti-personnel mines</i>) is permitted.
	80 J-Z	Spare.
Series 81	Use of <i>Cluster Munitions</i>	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of <i>cluster munitions</i> .	
	Rule	
	81 A	Use of <i>cluster munitions</i> is prohibited.
	81 B	Use of <i>cluster munitions</i> against (SPECIFY objectives) is permitted.
	81 C	Use of <i>cluster munitions</i> in (SPECIFY area) is permitted.

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	81 D-Z	Spare.
Series 82	Use of Booby Traps	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of booby traps.	
	Rule	
	82 A	Use of booby traps is prohibited.
	82 B	Use of explosive booby traps is prohibited.
	82 C	Use of explosive booby traps in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	82 D	Use of booby traps against (SPECIFY objectives) is permitted.
	82 E-Z	Spare.
Series 83-89	Spare	
GROUP 90-99: MARITIME OPERATIONS		
Series 90	Maritime Law Enforcement	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of force in the conduct of maritime law enforcement operations in own maritime zones, or in the maritime zones of other states where appropriately authorised.	
	Rule	
	90 A	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to enforce resource-related legal regimes and relevant domestic law in the exclusive economic zone and on the outer continental shelf is permitted.
	90 B	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to enforce resource-related legal regimes and relevant criminal law in the exclusive economic zone and outer continental shelf is permitted.
	90 C	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to enforce fiscal, immigration, sanitary, and customs legal regimes and relevant domestic law in the contiguous zone is permitted.
	90 D	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> to enforce fiscal, immigration, sanitary, and customs legal regimes and relevant domestic law in the contiguous zone is permitted.

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	90 E	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to effect hot pursuit is permitted.
	90 F	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> to effect hot pursuit is permitted.
	90 G	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to halt non-innocent passage in the territorial sea is permitted.
	90 H	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to halt non-innocent passage in the territorial sea is permitted.
	90 I	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to conduct law enforcement in <i>national waters</i> is permitted.
	90 J	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to conduct law enforcement in <i>national waters</i> is permitted.
	90 K-Z	Spare.
Series 91	Submarine Contacts	
Purpose:	To regulate the interaction of <i>Force</i> units with submarine contacts. Note: The use of <i>deadly force</i> against a submarine contact would be authorised under Group 10-19 (<i>SelfDefence</i>) or Rule 30A (Armed Conflict).	
	Rule	
	91 A	(SPECIFY action) against (SPECIFY) submarine contacts in (SPECIFY area or circumstances) is prohibited.
	91 B	Continued tracking of (SPECIFY) submarine contacts by (SPECIFY means e.g. passive/active sonar, magnetic anomaly detection, sonobuoy) is permitted.
	91 C	Use of warnings to induce (SPECIFY) submarine contacts to (SPECIFY result e.g. surface, leave the area) in (SPECIFY circumstances e.g. when located within xxx range of own forces) is permitted.
	91 D	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to induce (SPECIFY) submarine contacts to (SPECIFY result e.g. surface, leave the area) in (SPECIFY circumstances e.g. when located within (SPECIFY range) of own forces) is permitted.
	91 E	Use of use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> to induce (SPECIFY) submarine contacts to (SPECIFY result e.g. surface, leave the area) in (SPECIFY circumstances e.g. when located within xxx range of own forces) is permitted.

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	91 F	Use of warnings to induce (SPECIFY submarine contacts) to (SPECIFY result e.g. surface, leave the area) is permitted.
	91 G	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to induce (SPECIFY submarine contacts) to (SPECIFY result e.g. surface, leave the area) is permitted.
	91 H	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> to induce (SPECIFY submarine contacts) to (SPECIFY result e.g. surface, leave the area) is permitted.
	91 I-Z	Spare.
Series 92	Naval Mines	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of, and response to, <i>naval mines</i> .	
	Rule	
	92 A	Use of <i>naval mines</i> is prohibited.
	92 B	Use of <i>armed naval mines</i> in (SPECIFY areas) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	92 C	Use of <i>controlled naval mines</i> in (SPECIFY areas) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	92 D	Stopping, <i>boarding</i> and searching of (SPECIFY vessels) in (SPECIFY areas) when there are reasonable grounds to suspect they are carrying or laying <i>naval mines</i> is permitted.
	92 E	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> against (SPECIFY vessels) engaged in (SPECIFY activity) in (SPECIFY areas) is permitted.
	92 F	The removal, sweeping or neutralization of <i>naval mines</i> in (SPECIFY areas) is permitted.
	92 G-Z	Spare.
Series 93	Boardings	
Purpose:	To regulate the <i>boarding</i> of ships.	
	Notes: 1. See also Series 23 <i>Warning Shots</i> and Series 24 <i>Disabling Fire</i> . 2. International law recognises a number of legal bases for <i>boarding</i> of ships by warships. The issue of whether the <i>boarding</i> is compliant, non-compliant or opposed is a separate issue. For example, a lawful <i>boarding</i> may nevertheless	

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	<p>be opposed when a master seeks to prevent the <i>boarding</i> despite the legal right of the warship to conduct it.</p> <p>3. <i>Compliant boardings, non-compliant boardings, and opposed boardings</i> must each be authorised by separate measures.</p>	
	Rule	
	93 A	<i>Boarding</i> of ships is prohibited.
	93 B	<i>Compliant boarding</i> of (SPECIFY ships) is permitted.
	93 C	<i>Compliant boarding</i> of (SPECIFY ships) where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the ship is (SPECIFY e.g. engaged in <i>piracy</i> , slave trading, ship without nationality, or ship of the same nationality as the warship refusing to show flag, or ship engaged in unauthorised broadcasting) is permitted.
	93 D	<i>Compliant boarding</i> of (SPECIFY ships) in accordance with UNSCR (SPECIFY) is permitted.
	93 E	<i>Non-compliant boarding</i> of (SPECIFY ships) is permitted.
	93 F	<i>Non-compliant boarding</i> of (SPECIFY ships) where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the ship is (SPECIFY e.g. engaged in <i>piracy</i> , slave trading, ship without nationality, or ship of the same nationality as the warship refusing to show flag, or ship engaged in unauthorised broadcasting) is permitted.
	93 G	<i>Non-compliant boarding</i> of (SPECIFY ships) in accordance with UNSCR (SPECIFY) is permitted.
	93 H	<i>Opposed boarding</i> of (SPECIFY ships) is permitted.
	93 I	<i>Opposed boarding</i> of (SPECIFY ships) where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the ship is (SPECIFY e.g. engaged in <i>piracy</i> , slave trading, ship without nationality, or ship of the same nationality as the warship refusing to show flag, or ship engaged in unauthorised broadcasting) is permitted.
	93 J-Z	Spare.
Series 94	Suppression of <i>Piracy</i>	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of force to suppress <i>piracy</i> .	
	<p>Notes:</p> <p>1. See paragraph 2.2 in Appendix 2 to Annex A for guidance on drafting rules of engagement for maritime operations.</p>	

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	<p>2. For protecting individuals from piratical attacks, refer to Series 12 – Use of Force for the Protection of Others.</p> <p>3. For rules for accomplishing the piracy mission, refer to Group 20-29: Mission Accomplishment.</p>	
	Rule	
	94 A	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> is permitted in suppression of <i>piracy</i> in the following situations: (SPECIFY situations)
	94 B	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , in suppression of <i>piracy</i> is permitted in the following situations: (SPECIFY situations).
	94 C	Continued pursuit of a fleeing pirate ship or pirate aircraft that proceeds into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters or airspace of a coastal state is permitted. Note: Every effort should be made to obtain the consent of the coastal state prior to continuation of the pursuit.
	94 D	Continued pursuit of a fleeing pirate ship or pirate aircraft that proceeds into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters or airspace of (SPECIFY) is permitted. Note: Every effort should be made to obtain the consent of the coastal state prior to continuation of the pursuit.
	94 E	Continued pursuit of a fleeing pirate ship or pirate aircraft that proceeds into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters or airspace of a coastal state is prohibited.
	94F	Destruction of pirate equipment, including (SPECIFY equipment), is permitted.
	94 G-Z	Spare.
Series 95 –99	Spare	
GROUP 100-109: AIR OPERATIONS		
Series 100	Use of Air to Surface Munitions	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of air to surface munitions.	
	Rule	

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	100 A	Use of air to surface munitions is prohibited.
	100 B	Use of non-precision air to surface munitions is prohibited.
	100 C	Use of non-precision air to surface munitions in (SPECIFY areas) is prohibited.
	100 D	Use of precision-guided air to surface munitions in (SPECIFY areas) is permitted.
	100 E	Use of air to surface munitions against (SPECIFY objectives) is permitted.
	100 F-Z	Spare.
Series 101	Use of Air to Sub-surface Munitions	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of air to sub-surface munitions	
	Rule	
	101 A	Use of air to sub-surface munitions is prohibited.
	101 B	Use of air to sub-surface munitions against targets belonging to (SPECIFY force) is permitted.
	101 C	Use of air to sub-surface munitions in (SPECIFY areas) is permitted.
	101 D-Z	Spare.
Series 102	Air to Air Engagements	
Purpose:	To regulate air to air engagements	
	Rule	
	102 A	Beyond visual range air-to-air engagement is prohibited.
	102 B	Beyond visual range air-to-air engagement of hostile aircraft is permitted.
	102 C-Z	Spare.
Series 103 –109	Spare	
GROUP 110-119: ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES		

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Series 110	Use of Force in Assistance to Civil Authorities, Including Law Enforcement	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of force in support of civilian authorities.	
	Rule	
	110 A	Law enforcement assistance to (SPECIFY civilian authorities) is prohibited.
	110 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to prevent the commission of a crime against (SPECIFY person and/or property) in the absence of civilian law enforcement officials is permitted.
	110 C	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to prevent the commission of a crime against (SPECIFY person and/or property) is permitted.
	110 D	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to prevent the commission of a <i>serious crime</i> in the absence of civilian law enforcement officials is permitted.
	110 E	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to prevent the commission of a <i>serious crime</i> is permitted.
	110 F	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to prevent the commission of a crime against (SPECIFY) property is permitted.
	110 G-Z	Spare.
Series 111	Search, <i>Detention</i> and Arrest of Persons	
Purpose:	To regulate search, <i>detention</i> and/or arrest of persons during law enforcement related operations. Note: For search <i>and detention</i> of persons in non-law enforcement operations, refer to series 25 – Search and <i>Detention</i> of Persons.	
	Rule	
	111 A	Search of (SPECIFY persons) is prohibited.
	111 B	Search of (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	111 C	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to search (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	111 D	<i>Detention</i> or arrest of persons is prohibited.

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	111 E	<i>Detention</i> of persons found committing a <i>serious offense</i> is permitted.
	111 F	<i>Detention</i> of persons found committing an offense is permitted.
	111 G	<i>Detention</i> of persons found escaping from having committed a <i>serious offense</i> is permitted.
	111 H	Arrest of persons found committing a <i>serious offense</i> is permitted.
	111 I	Arrest of persons found committing an offense is permitted.
	111 J	Arrest of persons reasonably believed to be about to commit a <i>serious offense</i> is permitted.
	111 K	Arrest of persons reasonably believed to be about to commit an offense is permitted.
	111 L	Arrest of persons reasonably believed to have committed a <i>serious offense</i> is permitted.
	111 M	Arrest of persons who are reasonably believed to have committed an offense is permitted.
	111 N-Z	Spare.
Series 112	Treatment of Detained and Arrested Persons	
Purpose:	To regulate actions taken against persons who have been detained or arrested during law enforcement related operations. Note: For <i>detention</i> of persons in non-law enforcement operations, refer to Series 25 - Search and <i>Detention</i> of Persons.	
	Rule	
	112 A	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to search a detained or arrested person for weapons or other items that could pose a threat to the safety of any person is permitted.
	112 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to disarm (SPECIFY persons) is permitted.
	112 C	Use of (SPECIFY restraints e.g. handcuffs) on (SPECIFY persons) is permitted.
	112 D	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> to prevent any (SPECIFY persons) from escaping is permitted.

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	112 E	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , to prevent any (SPECIFY persons) from escaping is permitted.
	112 F-Z	Spare.
Series 113-119	Spare	
Series 120	Crowd and Riot Control	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of force in riot control.	
	Rule	
	120 A	Use of force during riot control is prohibited.
	120 B	Use of <i>non-deadly force</i> during riot control in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	120 C	Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> , during riot control in (SPECIFY circumstances), is permitted.
	120 D-Z	Spare.
Series 121	Riot Control Agents	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of riot control agents.	
	Rule	
	121 A	Use of (SPECIFY riot control agents, e.g. all) is prohibited in (SPECIFY circumstances).
	121 B	Use of (SPECIFY riot control agents) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.
	121 C-Z	Spare.
Series 122	Riot Control Munitions/ Water Cannons	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of riot control munitions and use of water cannons	
	Rule	
	122 A	Use of riot control munitions is prohibited.
	122 B	Use of riot control munitions is permitted.

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	122 C	Use of (SPECIFY riot control munitions e.g. baton rounds, bean bags etc.) is permitted.
	122 D	Use of water cannons is prohibited.
	122 E	Use of water cannons is permitted.
	122 F-Z	Spare.
Series 123-129	Spare	
GROUP 130-139: INFORMATION OPERATIONS		
Series 130	Electronic Warfare Measures	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of <i>electronic warfare</i> measures.	
	Rule	
	130 A	Use of <i>electronic warfare</i> measures is prohibited.
	130 B	Use of (SPECIFY <i>electronic warfare</i> measures) against (SPECIFY) is permitted.
	130 C	Use of <i>electronic warfare</i> measures is permitted.
	130 D-Z	Spare.
Series 131	Computer Network Operations (Comprised of <i>computer network attack</i> , <i>computer network defence</i> , and related <i>computer network exploitation</i> enabling operations).	
Purpose:	To regulate the conduct of <i>computer network operations</i> .	
	Rule	
	131 A	<i>Computer network attacks</i> are prohibited.
	131 B	When authorised by (SPECIFY), <i>computer network attacks</i> to (SPECIFY effect, e.g. destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny) against (SPECIFY target system(s) - e.g. information on computers and or networks, or the computers and or networks themselves) of (SPECIFY target state, actor or system e.g. governmental systems, commercial systems, military systems) are permitted.
	131 C	When authorised by (SPECIFY), use of active <i>computer network defence</i> in response to unauthorised activity within friendly

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		information systems or computer networks is permitted.
	131 D	When authorised by (SPECIFY), <i>computer network exploitation</i> against (SPECIFY target) automated information systems or computer networks is permitted.
	131 E-Z	Spare.
Series 132	<i>Psychological Operations</i>	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of <i>psychological operations</i> . Note: This Series is to be read with the relevant rules relating to Series 53 - Relative Positioning of <i>Force Units</i> .	
	Rule	
	132 A	<i>Psychological operations</i> are prohibited.
	132 B	<i>Psychological operations</i> broadcasts to (SPECIFY target audience) over (SPECIFY medium e.g. radio channels, television channels, web pages) are permitted.
	132 C	Use of (SPECIFY method e.g. computer, email and telephone systems) to communicate approved messages to (SPECIFY approved target audiences) is permitted.
	132 D	Leaflet distribution to communicate approved messages is permitted.
	132 E-Z	Spare.
Series 133	<i>Military Deception</i>	
Purpose:	To regulate the use of <i>military deception</i> . Note: <i>Perfidy</i> is prohibited at all times.	
	Rule	
	133 A	<i>Military deception</i> is prohibited.
	133 B	When authorised by (SPECIFY), use of (SPECIFY physical <i>military deception</i> e.g. dummy or decoy equipment) against (SPECIFY) is permitted.
	133 C	When authorised by (SPECIFY), use of (SPECIFY technical means e.g. electronic deception) against (SPECIFY) is permitted.

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	133 D	When authorised by (SPECIFY), use of (SPECIFY administrative means e.g. convey/deny oral, pictorial, documentary, or other physical evidence) against (SPECIFY) is permitted.
	133 E-Z	Spare.
Series 134 –139	Spare	
GROUP 140-149: OUTER SPACE OPERATIONS		
Series 140	Interference With Satellite Communications	
Purpose:	To regulate interference against satellite communications.	
	Rule	
	140 A	Interference with satellite communications is prohibited.
	140 B	Interference with strategic early warning sensors and core communications systems is prohibited.
	140 C	Interference with communications for (SPECIFY satellite type e.g. communications, reconnaissance, global positioning etc.) belonging to (SPECIFY state/organisation) for (SPECIFY scope, intensity and duration of time) is permitted.
	140 D	Interference with communications for satellites belonging to (SPECIFY state/organisation) is permitted.
	140 E-Z	Spare.
Series 141	Neutralization/Destruction of Satellites	
Purpose:	To regulate actions taken to <i>neutralise</i> or destroy satellites.	
	Rule	
	141 A	<i>Neutralization</i> of satellites is prohibited.
	141 B	<i>Neutralization</i> of (SPECIFY satellite type e.g. communications, reconnaissance, navigation, global positioning etc.) belonging to (specify state/organisation) is permitted.
	141 C	<i>Neutralization</i> of (SPECIFY satellite type e.g. communications, reconnaissance, navigation, global positioning etc.) belonging to (SPECIFY state/organisation) for (SPECIFY scope, intensity and duration of time) is permitted.

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	141 D	Destruction of satellites is prohibited.
	141 E	Destruction of (SPECIFY satellite type e.g. communications, reconnaissance, navigation, global positioning, etc.) belonging to (SPECIFY state/organisation) is permitted.
	141 F-Z	Spare.
Series 142-149	Spare	
GROUP 150 plus: SPARE		

FORMATS FOR ROE AND ROE-RELATED MATERIALS

1. This Annex provides a selection of documents to serve as models.

Appendix 1	ROE Annex to OPCODE
Appendix 2	ROEREQ, ROEAUTH and ROEIMP Messages
Appendix 3	ROE Matrix for Multinational Operations
Appendix 4	ROE Cards
Appendix 5	<i>Maritime Warning Zone</i> Announcements
Appendix 6	Requests for Identification and Warnings
Appendix 7	Responses to Queries, Warnings and Challenges at Sea

2. These models are samples only. They may or may not be appropriate for any particular operation. If used, they must be tailored to the specific circumstances of the operation.

ROE ANNEX TO OPORDER

ROE ANNEX TO OPORDER FOR OPERATION RESTORE STABILITY *MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS (MIO)*

References: A. UNSCR XXXX (20XX)
B. Multi-National ROE Handbook

1. Reference A established sanctions against the nation of ALPHA. Military forces participating in OPERATION RESTORE STABILITY have been authorised to use all necessary means to enforce these sanctions.

2. OPERATION RESTORE STABILITY forces will conduct this operation in accordance with References A and B and the ROE implemented in this ROE directive.

3. Nothing in these ROE negates the right of *individual self-defence*. Nothing in these ROE negates a commander's right to take all necessary and appropriate action in *unit self-defence*.

4. The following ROE have been authorised for use by the *Force* when conducting the *MIO* within the Area of Operations:

10 C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force* in *individual self-defence* is permitted.

11 C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, in *unit self-defence* of Operation RESTORE STABILITY units is permitted.

12C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, for the protection of persons on boarded vessels is permitted.

20 C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, to accomplish the mission is permitted

23 C Firing of *warning shots* to compel compliance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted.

24 B Use of *disabling fire* to compel compliance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted. AMPN: This rule is retained by Commander Operation Restore Stability.

55 H Ordering of diversions and other instructions to ships suspected of operating in breach of UNSCR XXXX is permitted.

93 G *Non-compliant boarding* of suspect ships in accordance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted. AMPN: This rule is retained by Commander Multinational Force.

ROE REQUEST (ROEREQ), ROE AUTHORISATION (ROEAUTH), AND ROE IMPLEMENTATION (ROEIMP) MESSAGES

2.1 Introduction. The following types of formatted message may be used to request, authorise, or deny ROE:

- a. ROE Request (ROEREQ).
- b. ROE Authorisation or denial (ROEAUTH).
- c. ROE Implementation (ROEIMP).

ROEREQ and ROEAUTH messages should contain the entire text of each ROE being requested/authorised. Message formats are provided below. For each operation, each message should be numbered sequentially.

2.2 ROEREQ Messages. ROEREQ messages are used by a commander to seek the implementation, modification or cancellation of ROE by a superior commander. They can be originated by any commander in the operational chain of command. Each ROEREQ must include an explanation of why the ROE are required and the consequences should that ROE not be approved.

2.3 ROEAUTH Messages. ROEAUTH messages are used by the appropriate higher headquarters to authorise or deny ROE. Each message should be numbered sequentially.

2.4 ROEIMP Messages. ROEIMP messages are used by a commander to control the application of ROE that has been authorised by higher headquarters. It may contain additional guidance or restrictions, or may withhold certain ROE which has been authorised.

2.5 Amplification to ROE. Amplification (AMPN) are instructions contained within a ROEAUTH or ROEIMP message that provide additional information and guidance with respect to one or more of the ROE measures that have been authorised. Clarification for any or all of the ROE within any of these messages may be included in AMPN lines.

2.6 Message Formats. All ROEREQ, ROEAUTH and ROEIMP messages should be numbered sequentially (i.e. ROE REQUEST SERIAL ONE, ROE REQUEST SERIAL TWO, ROE REQUEST SERIAL THREE, etc.) and should include the following paragraphs:

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| Paragraph 1 | Background/justification. An explanation of why the ROE rules are being requested, authorised or denied. |
| Paragraph 2 | New rules requested or authorised. |
| Paragraph 3 | Previous measures cancelled (if any). |
| Paragraph 4 | Previous measures remaining in force (if any). Paragraph 4 must contain an accurate, up to date list of all authorised rules. |
| Paragraph 5 | Additional remarks (if any). |

Appendix 2 to Annex C

Each ROE message will contain all appropriate paragraphs so that commanders need only retain the latest message in order to have the complete current listing of all rules in force for the mission. If it is necessary to request or authorise ROE rules not found in the Compendium, the text of the requested rules should be set out in plain language in paragraph 2 of the ROE message utilizing an unassigned (SPARE) rule number from the most appropriate Series.

2.7 Sample ROEREQ message:

From Commander Operation Restore Stability
To Commander Multinational Forces
Info (Appropriate Information Addressees)
Subj/ROEREQ Serial One/Operation Restore Stability
Ref/A/ Multinational ROE Handbook

1. Background/justification: BRAVO warships are disrupting operations in relation to ALPHA by harassing *Force* units. BRAVO is allowing smuggling operations to be conducted in its territorial sea in violation of UNSCR XXXX.

2. New rules requested:

20 D Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, to counter force used to interfere with the mission is permitted.

50 F Entry into the territorial sea of BRAVO to disrupt smuggling operations is permitted.

3. Previous rules cancelled: None.

4. Previous rules remaining in force:

10 C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force* in *individual self-defence* is permitted.

11 C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, in *unit self-defence* of Operation RESTORE STABILITY units is permitted.

12C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, for the protection of persons on boarded vessels is permitted.

20 C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, to accomplish the mission is permitted

23 C Firing of *warning shots* to compel compliance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted.

24 B Use of *disabling fire* to compel compliance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted. AMPN: This rule is retained by Commander Operation Restore Stability.

55 H Ordering of diversions and other instructions to ships suspected of operating in breach of UNSCR XXXX is permitted.

93 G *Non-compliant boarding* of suspect ships in accordance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted. AMPN: This rule is retained by Commander Multinational Force.

5. Additional remarks: Request approval of ROE rules 20 D and 50 F to facilitate effective *MIO*.

2.8 Sample ROEAUTH message:

<p>From Commander Multinational Force To Commander Operation Restore Stability Info (appropriate information addressees) Subj/ROEAUTH Serial One/Operation Restore Stability Ref/A/ Commander Operation Restore Stability ROEREQ Serial One</p> <p>1. Background/justification: Reference A requested new ROE measures to counter BRAVO interference with <i>MIO operations</i>. Rule 20C is authorised. Rule 50 F is not authorised.</p> <p>2. New rule authorised:</p> <p>20 D Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i>, to counter force used to interfere with the mission is permitted.</p> <p>3. Previous rules cancelled: None.</p> <p>4. Previous rules remaining in force:</p> <p>10 C Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i> in <i>individual self-defence</i> is permitted.</p> <p>11 C Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i>, in <i>unit self-defence</i> of Operation RESTORE STABILITY units is permitted.</p> <p>12C Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i>, for the protection of persons on boarded vessels is permitted.</p> <p>20 C Use of force, up to and including <i>deadly force</i>, to accomplish the mission is permitted</p> <p>23 C Firing of <i>warning shots</i> to compel compliance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted.</p> <p>24 B Use of <i>disabling fire</i> to compel compliance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted. AMPN: This rule is retained by Commander Operation Restore Stability.</p> <p>55 H Ordering of diversions and other instructions to ships suspected of operating in breach of UNSCR XXXX is permitted.</p> <p>93 G <i>Non-compliant boarding</i> of suspect ships in accordance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted. AMPN: This rule is retained by Commander Multinational Force.</p> <p>5. Additional remarks:</p> <p>50 F (Entry into the territorial sea of BRAVO to disrupt smuggling operations is permitted.) is NOT authorised at this time due to pending diplomatic action by the UN Secretary General.</p>	
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2.9 Sample ROEIMP message:

From Commander Operation Restore Stability
 To Combined Task Force Restore Stability
 Info (appropriate information addressees)
 Subj/ROEAUTH Serial One/Operation Restore Stability
 Ref/A/ Commander Operation Restore Stability ROEREQ Serial One
 Ref/B/ Commander Multinational Force ROEAUTH Serial One

1. Background/justification: Reference A requested new ROE measures to counter BRAVO interference with *MIO operations*. Reference B responded to that request. Measure 20 D is authorised. Measure 50 F is not authorised.

2. New rule authorised:

20 D Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, to counter force used to interfere with the mission is permitted.

3. Previous rules cancelled: None.

4. Previous rules remaining in force:

10 C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force* in *individual self-defence* is permitted.

11 C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, in *unit self-defence* of Operation RESTORE STABILITY units is permitted.

12C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, for the protection of persons on boarded vessels is permitted.

20 C Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, to accomplish the mission is permitted

23 C Firing of *warning shots* to compel compliance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted.

24 B Use of *disabling fire* to compel compliance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted. AMPN: This rule is retained by Commander Operation Restore Stability.

55 H Ordering of diversions and other instructions to ships suspected of operating in breach of UNSCR XXXX is permitted.

93 G *Non-compliant boarding* of suspect ships in accordance with UNSCR XXXX is permitted. AMPN: This rule is retained by Commander Multinational Force.

5. Additional remarks:

50 F (Entry into the territorial sea of BRAVO to disrupt smuggling operations is permitted.) is NOT authorised at this time due to pending diplomatic action by the UN Secretary General.

ROE MATRIX FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

3.1 An ROE matrix provides a summary of the ROE rules in effect for each nation in a multinational force. The matrix provides a quick reference for planners and commanders in determining which unit or units may engage in specific actions.

3.2 This Appendix provides a sample matrix for *maritime interdiction operations*. Four participating nations (A, B, C, and D) are listed at the top of the matrix. ROE series are listed on the left side. A block with the word “YES” indicates the nation’s unit has the ROE rule available. A block with a footnoted “YES” indicates the nation’s unit has the ROE rule available, but with some limit or qualification listed in the footnote. A block with “NO” indicates the ROE rule is not available.

Rule	ROE	Nation A	Nation B	Nation C	Nation D
11A	<i>Unit self-defence of other nations' units</i>	YES	YES	YES	YES (1)
23A	<i>Warning shots</i>	YES (1)	YES	NO	YES
24C	<i>Disabling Fire</i>	YES (1)	NO	NO	YES
25B/J	<i>Search and Detention of Persons</i>	YES (1)	NO	NO	YES (1)
93B	<i>Compliant boarding</i>	NO	NO	NO	YES
93E	<i>Non-compliant boarding</i>	NO	NO	NO	YES
93H	<i>Opposed boarding</i>	NO	NO	NO	YES (2)

1. Only with permission from *higher authority*
2. Only if low threat of resistance

ROE CARDS

4.1 In general, ROE cards (sometimes referred to as soldiers' cards) provide summaries of the key ROE principles regulating the use of force by individuals for a particular mission. They are not a substitute for training.

4.2 ROE cards must be concise and easy to understand.

4.3 Model ROE cards are provided for 3 situations:

- a. *Self-defence*
- b. *Peace Operations, and*
- c. Armed Conflict, including a code of conduct.

4.4 The use of force in *self-defence* by individuals is governed by the domestic law of their nations. Cards issued to individuals must not authorise the use of force beyond that permitted by their domestic law.

SELF-DEFENCE CARD

NOTHING IN YOUR ROE LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO TAKE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE.

USE OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE

1. You have the right to use force only in *self-defence*.
2. You may use force, up to and including *deadly force*, in response to a *hostile act* or *hostile intent* directed against:
 - You
 - Members of your unit
 - (SPECIFY Other individuals) (**Note:** See ROE Group 10-19)
3. A warning is to be given before opening fire in *self-defence*, if time and circumstances permit.
4. You are to warn by shouting: (SPECIFY e.g. "STOP OR I WILL FIRE").

USE OF FORCE

5. If you have to open fire, you must:
 - Fire only aimed shots
 - AND**
 - Use no more force than is necessary to *neutralise* the threat
 - AND**
 - Take all reasonable precautions not to injure anyone other than your target.

PEACE OPERATIONS CARD

NOTHING IN YOUR ROE LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO TAKE ACTION IN *SELF-DEFENCE*.

MISSION

1. Your Mission is (SPECIFY).

USE OF FORCE IN *SELF-DEFENCE*

2. You have the right to use force in *self-defence*.

3. You may use force, up to and including *deadly force*, in response to a *hostile act* or *hostile intent* directed against:

- You
- Members of your unit
- (SPECIFY Other individuals) (**Note:** See ROE Group 10-19)

4. You may use necessary and proportional force, up to and including *deadly force*, in order to:

- (SPECIFY task)

5. A warning is to be given before opening fire *in self-defence*, if time and circumstances permit.

6. You are to warn by shouting: (SPECIFY e.g. "STOP OR I WILL FIRE").

USE OF FORCE

7. If you have to open fire, you must:

- Fire only aimed shots
- AND**
- Use no more force than is necessary to *neutralise* the threat
- AND**
- Take all reasonable precautions not to injure anyone other than your target.

ARMED CONFLICT CARD

NOTHING IN YOUR ROE LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO TAKE ACTION IN *SELF-DEFENCE*.

MISSION

1. Your Mission is (SPECIFY).
2. You have the right to use force both in *self-defence* and against the enemy.

USE OF FORCE IN *SELF-DEFENCE*

3. You have the right to use force in *self-defence* at all times.
4. You may use force, up to and including *deadly force*, in response to a *hostile act* or *hostile intent* directed against:
 - You
 - Members of your unit
 - (SPECIFY Other individuals) (**Note:** See ROE Group 10-19)
5. A warning is to be given before opening fire in *self-defence*, if time and circumstances permit.
6. You are to warn by shouting: (SPECIFY e.g. "STOP OR I WILL FIRE").
7. If you have to open fire, you must:
 - Fire only aimed shots

AND

 - Use no more force than is necessary to *neutralise* the threat

AND

 - Take all reasonable precautions not to injure anyone other than your target.

USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ENEMY

8. Within (SPECIFY area), the following may be *attacked*:
 - (SPECIFY military objectives and *declared hostile forces*) (**Note:** See ROE Group 30-39).
9. Minimize incidental injury or death of civilians and collateral damage to civilian objects.

CODE OF CONDUCT (REVERSE SIDE OF MODEL ARMED CONFLICT CARD)

1. Comply with the law of armed conflict and report suspected breaches to your superiors.
2. Do not *attack* those who surrender. Turn them over to your superiors.
3. Treat all detainees humanely.
4. Collect and care for all wounded, sick, and shipwrecked.
5. Respect civilians and their property.
6. Do not take war trophies.

MARITIME WARNING ZONE ANNOUNCEMENTS

5.1 *Maritime Warning Zones* are an operational issue. Properly established and appropriately implemented *maritime warning zones* provide operational commanders with the means to enhance the *self-defence* and *force protection* posture of their assets, and with the means to announce potential hazards to other users of the water space. However used, *maritime warning zones* cannot and do not absolve commanders of their responsibility for the safety of the forces they command or for their duty to comply with LOAC and other rules of international law.

5.2 *Maritime Warning Zones* are typically announced through a Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR), Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), or similar announcement.

5.3 Model announcements are provided for two types of zones:

- a. *Warning Area* in *International Waters*.
- b. *Warning Area* and *Exclusion Zone* in the Territorial Sea.

5.4 Where the term “(SPECIFY)” is included, detail must be inserted to clarify the meaning of the provision.

MODEL ANNOUNCEMENT - WARNING AREA

1. Due to (SPECIFY event or circumstances), (SPECIFY forces) are operating at a heightened state of readiness and taking additional defensive precautions against (SPECIFY threat). Consequently, all aircraft, surface vessels, and subsurface vessels approaching (SPECIFY object e.g. oil platform, warship) are requested to maintain radio contact with (SPECIFY force) on bridge-to-bridge channel 16, international air distress (121.5 MHZ VHF) or military air distress (243.0 MHZ UHF).
2. (SPECIFY force) will take appropriate measures in *self-defence* if warranted by the circumstances. Aircraft, surface vessels, and subsurface vessels approaching (SPECIFY force) will, by making prior contact as described above, help make their intentions clear.
3. (SPECIFY force), when operating in confined waters, shall remain mindful of navigational considerations of aircraft, surface vessels, and subsurface vessels in their immediate vicinity.
4. Nothing in this warning is intended to impede or otherwise interfere with the freedom of navigation or overflight of any vessel or aircraft, or to limit or expand the right of *self-defence* of (SPECIFY force). This warning is published solely to advise of the heightened state of readiness of (SPECIFY force) and to request that radio contact be maintained as outlined above.

MODEL ANNOUNCEMENT – WARNING AREA AND EXCLUSION ZONE IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA

1. A *warning area* and an *exclusion zone*, as described below, are established due to (SPECIFY event that lead to the declaration of the zones).
2. All mariners are advised to remain clear of (SPECIFY forces) and to identify themselves and make their intentions known when operating in the vicinity of (SPECIFY forces). If queried, mariners should clearly identify themselves and state their intentions and if given directions from (SPECIFY forces), they should promptly execute such directions so as to make their intentions known. Mariners are reminded that (SPECIFY forces) are prepared to take defensive measures, including if necessary the use of *deadly force*, against any contact whose identity or intentions are unknown and which poses a threat.
3. Effective immediately, a *warning area* is established around (SPECIFY geographic coordinates).
4. The *warning area* extends (SPECIFY distance) from (SPECIFY point). This *warning area* is distinct from and in addition to, the *exclusion zone* established later in this announcement.
5. Vessels are advised to remain clear of the *warning area* for all but essential transits. If transit requires entry into the zone, vessels are advised to contact (SPECIFY contact) via marine vhf channel 16, identify themselves and make transit intentions known. If (SPECIFY forces) advise a vessel to depart the *warning area*, the vessel should immediately depart. Such direction will be given only when necessary to keep the vessel from standing into danger.
6. Additionally, effective immediately, an *exclusion zone* is established, and the right of innocent passage is temporarily suspended in accordance with international law around (SPECIFY geographic coordinates) within (SPECIFY territorial sea). The *exclusion zone* extends (SPECIFY distance) from (SPECIFY point).
7. Only (SPECIFY vessels) and (SPECIFY forces) are allowed to enter the *exclusion zone*. Vessels attempting to enter the zone without authorisation may be subject to defensive measures, including when necessary, the use of *deadly force*. All reasonable efforts will be taken to warn vessels away before employing *deadly force*. However, *deadly force* will be employed when necessary.
8. Questions regarding this advisory may be directed to (SPECIFY point of contact and contact information).

REQUESTS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND WARNINGS

6.1 Where time and circumstances permit, forces or individuals presenting a threat should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or otherwise cease threatening actions. This appendix provides sample language for use in issuing such warnings.

6.2 Failure to respond to warnings may be considered as evidence of *hostile intent*.

6.3 In the maritime and air environments, requests for identification and warnings to aircraft are generally communicated via Military Air Distress (243 MHZ) and International Air Distress (121.5 MHZ) circuits. Warnings to surface ships are generally transmitted via Channel 16 bridge-to-bridge circuit.

6.4 Land operations examples:

“(SPECIFY identity)! Stop or I will fire!”

“Attention! Unless you disperse/stop, I will use a (SPECIFY device) against you.”

6.5 Air operations examples:

Query: “Attention, unidentified air contact (at SPECIFY position and IFF squawking SSR/call sign number___), at (SPECIFY altitude), you are *approaching* a (SPECIFY nation) (SPECIFY warship or military aircraft). Request you establish communications, identify yourself, and state your intentions.”

Warning: “Unidentified (use identity if known) air contact (at SPECIFY position and squawking SSR/call sign number___), at (SPECIFY altitude), (SPECIFY course), and (SPECIFY speed), you are approaching a (SPECIFY warship or military aircraft). Your (identity is unknown and/or your) intentions are not clear. You are standing into danger. Request you establish communications now or alter course immediately to (SPECIFY course) to remain clear.

6.6 Maritime examples:

Query: “Attention, unidentified surface (or submerged) contact (SPECIFY position), you are approaching a (SPECIFY nation) warship. Request you establish communications, identify yourself, and state your intentions.”

Warning: “Unidentified (use identity if known) surface (or submerged) contact (at SPECIFY position and/or IFF squawk), at (SPECIFY course), and (SPECIFY speed), you are approaching a (SPECIFY warship or military aircraft). Your (identity is unknown and/or your) intentions are not clear. You are standing into danger. Request you establish communications now or alter course immediately to (SPECIFY course) to remain clear.

RESPONSES TO QUERIES, WARNINGS AND CHALLENGES AT SEA

7.1 This Appendix provides sample responses to queries or challenges received by warships and military aircraft in the maritime environment.

7.2 As a general rule, military units are authorised by national authorities to provide limited information in response to challenges or queries from foreign warships and military aircraft. Hull or side number, and course and speed are usually provided. Ship or aircraft type, name, previous ports of call, destination, current operations, and other information not related to the safe transit of the unit are not usually provided.

7.3 Suggested language for a response to a challenge:

- a. First part of the response should include "This is (SPECIFY nationality) warship (or military aircraft) (SPECIFY number)."
- b. Second part of the response depends on the location and transit mode of the unit. Options include:
 - "I am conducting routine operations in *international waters*."
 - "I am engaged in innocent passage."
 - "I am engaged in transit passage."
 - "I am engaged in archipelagic sea lanes passage."
- c. If asked for information not authorised for disclosure, the following response is suggested: "This is (SPECIFY nationality) warship (or military aircraft) (SPECIFY number). I am not authorised to provide that information."

GLOSSARY

anti-personnel mine a land mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle (as opposed to a person) that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered *anti-personnel mines* as a result of being so equipped.

armed naval mine a naval mine laid either with all safety devices withdrawn or armed when laid so as to detonate when pre-set conditions are met.

assistance entry the entry into the territorial sea by *ships* or aircraft without permission of the coastal state to engage in *bona fide* efforts to render emergency assistance to those in danger or distress at sea. This right applies only when the location of the danger or distress is reasonably well known. It does not extend to a search, which requires the consent of the coastal state.

attack acts of violence or *computer network attack* in which there is a reasonable expectation that death, bodily harm or damage to property may occur.

cluster munition in general, a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions with lethal effect. National definitions vary depending upon national policy and treaty obligations.

compliant boarding a boarding where the master and crew of the vessel cooperate.

computer network attack actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. Also called *CNA*.

computer network defence actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect, monitor, analyse, detect and respond to unauthorised activity within information systems and computer networks. Also called *CND*.

computer network exploitation enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. Also called *CNE*.

computer network operations comprised of *computer network attack*, *computer network defence*, and related *computer network exploitation* enabling operations. Also called *CNO*.

controlled naval mine a naval mine with no destructive capability until affirmatively activated by some form of arming order (whereupon they become *armed naval mines*).

counter-terrorist warning boom device placed in the water around ships to warn and prevent small vessels from approaching the ship.

cyberspace a global domain characterised by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange data via networked systems including the internet, telecommunications systems, and associated infrastructure.

deadly force force intended or likely to cause death, or serious injury resulting in death, regardless of whether death or serious injury results.

declared hostile force any civilian, paramilitary, or military force or terrorist organisation that has been declared hostile by appropriate authority.

detention the act of holding a person against their will for lawful purposes such as prosecution, maintenance of public safety, or pursuant to a lawful order.

direct fire fire directed at a target that is visible to the aimer. The target itself is used as a point of aim for either the weapon or the director.

disabling fire fire directed at a vessel, aircraft or vehicle so as to impair its manoeuvrability but not its survival.

electronic warfare a core capability of *information operations* that includes any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum, to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment, or to *attack* the enemy. Also called *EW*.

exclusion zone a zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specific activities in a specific geographic area. See also *maritime warning zone* and *warning area*.

fighters members of armed forces and dissident armed forces or other armed groups participating in a non-international armed conflict.

Force the military unit or organisation operating under these Rules of Engagement. For purposes of *self –defence*, *Force* includes persons accompanying the *Force*, Prisoners of War, internees and detainees under the control of the *Force*.

force protection actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. *force protection* does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.

higher authority authority within a nation that is senior to the commander of the *Force* or units of the *Force*.

hostile act an *attack* or other use of force against a nation, the *Force* or other designated persons or property.

hostile intent the threat of an imminent *hostile act*.

host nation a nation that receives with its consent the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, and/or *coalition* partners, to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.

indirect fire fire directed at a target that cannot be seen by the aimer and that is not itself used as a point of aim for the weapons or the director. *Indirect fire* includes *observed indirect fire* and *unobserved indirect fire*.

individual self-defence the right of an individual to defend himself or herself (and in some cases other individuals) from *hostile act* or *hostile intent*.

information operations the integrated employment of the core capabilities of *electronic warfare*, *computer network operations*, *psychological operations*, *military deception*, and *operations security*, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called *IO*.

international airspace airspace over the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, the high seas, and territories not subject to national sovereignty.

international waters all ocean areas not subject to the sovereignty of a nation. All waters seaward from the territorial sea are *international waters* in which high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight are reserved to the international community. *International waters* include only contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and high seas.

joint activities, operations organisations, etc, in which two or more armed services participate.

maritime interdiction operations operations to enforce restrictions on the movement of persons/material on and over the maritime environment within a defined geographical area.

maritime warning zone a designated ocean area and superjacent air space in which a nation purports to restrict the freedom of navigation and/or overflight of other users or otherwise impacts the exercise of those freedoms. See also *exclusion zone* and *warning area*, which are types of *maritime warning zones*.

marking to maintain contact of a target from such a position that the *marking* unit or *marker* has an immediate offensive capability.

military deception actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly force's mission.

national self-defence the defence of a nation, a nation's forces, and a nation's persons and their property. Generally, unit commanders may exercise the right of *national self-defence* only when authorised by *higher authority*.

national airspace airspace above the territory, internal waters, territorial sea, and archipelagic waters of nations.

national waters waters subject to the territorial sovereignty of coastal nations. *National waters* include only internal waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic waters.

naval mines an explosive device laid in the water, on the sea bed or in the subsoil thereof, with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring ships from entering an area.

neutralise to render ineffective, either temporarily or permanently.

non-combatant evacuation operations operations directed by national authority whereby non-combatants are evacuated from foreign countries to safe havens when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster..

non-compliant boarding a *boarding* where agreement to board has not been obtained.

non-deadly force force not intended or likely to cause death, or serious injury resulting in death.

observed indirect fire *indirect fire* for which the point of impact or burst can be seen by an observer. The fire can be controlled and adjusted on the basis of observation.

opposed boarding a *boarding* where the master or crew has made it clear that steps will be taken to prevent the *boarding*.

outer space this region begins at the undefined upper limit of *national airspace* and extends to infinity. International law recognises freedom of transit by man-made satellites and other objects at earth orbiting altitude and beyond.

peace operations a broad term that encompasses conflict prevention, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of efforts to establish or maintain peace.

perfidy the use of unlawful deceptions. Acts of *perfidy* are deceptions designed to invite the confidence of the enemy to believe that protected status under the law of armed conflict must be accorded, with the intent to betray that confidence. Feigning surrender in order to lure the enemy into a trap is one example of an act of *perfidy*. National LOAC manuals should be consulted for more detailed definitions and examples.

piracy an illegal act of violence, depredation (e.g. plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or *detention* in or over *international waters* committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft.

psychological operations planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to target audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of governments, organisations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of *psychological operations* is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviour favourable to the originator's objectives.

self-defence the use of necessary and proportional force, including *deadly force*, to defend forces, personnel, or property against *attack* or imminent *attack*.

serious crime murder, rape, aggravated assault or any other crime that could reasonably be expected to kill or cause serious bodily harm.

shadowing observing and (not necessarily continuously) maintaining contact with an object.

Shadowing may be carried out either overtly or covertly.

status of forces agreement (SOFA) an agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of another state.

unit self-defence the right of unit commanders to defend their unit, other units of their nation, and other specified units against *hostile act* or *hostile intent*.

unobserved indirect fire indirect fire for which points of impact or burst are not observed.

warning area an announcement that provides notice of potential hazards at sea, such as weapons testing, exercises, combat, or other operations. See also *exclusion zone* and *maritime warning zone*.

warning shot a shot fired in the vicinity of a person, vessel, or aircraft as a signal to immediately cease activity, but not intended to cause damage or injury.



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11

COMMANDING OFFICER'S REPORT
BASE SQUADRON - AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
UNIT HISTORY SHEET - SEPTEMBER 1978

RAAF Centre

1. Accommodation. A total of 30 families were accommodated at the RAAF Centre plus 34 single members, 2 SLI (RAAF) and 6 SLI with 2 wives (NZ Sports Team) during the month of September 1978. The breakdown of Service personnel is as follows:

		<u>Members</u>	<u>Wives</u>	<u>Children</u>
RAAF	Duty	20	18	3
	Leave	20	3	2
RAF	Leave	1	1	1
Britarm	Leave	2	1	1
Austarm	Leave	11	-	-
RNZIR	Duty	6	2	-
	Leave	<u>10</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTAL:		<u>70</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>10</u>

Defence Section

2. Operational.

- a. Defence Section was manned on 4 - 5 Sep 78 to make available facilities and briefings for B Coy 6 RAR during the Company's settling in period.
- b. A liaison visit to Kulim Police District was made on 8 Sep 78 by CO BSBUT, SPROVO and GRDEFO.
- c. Standby manning of the GDOC was maintained during the period of the Communist Party of Malaysia Anniversary on 9 Sep 78.
- d. A liaison visit to HQ 6 MIB Sungai Patani was made on 12 Sep 78 by GLO and GRDEFO.
- e. A ground security co-ordinating conference was held in GDOC on 15 Sep 78 with representatives from HQ RMAF, SSP, AUSTRFLCOY and SPROVO to co-ordinate arrangements for the period of Major Adex 4/78 including a security exercise concurrently with the Adex.
- f. Increased security measures were implemented at Air Base Butterworth 18 - 21 Sep 78 as a part of base activities associated with Major Adex 4/78. GDOC was fully manned on 20 - 21 Sep 78 and on standby manning after hours during a warm-up phase on 18 - 19 Sep 78. Manning included a liaison officer from AUSTRFLCOY and HQ RMAF 20 - 21 Sep 78.

/Fire Section

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COMMANDING OFFICER'S REPORT
BASE SQUADRON - AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
UNIT HISTORY SHEET - APRIL 1978

RAAF CENTRE:

1. ACCOMMODATION. A total of 9 families and 6 single persons were accommodated at the RAAF Centre during the month of April 1978. Overall accommodation figures were:

Members 15, Wives 9 and Children 15.

2. ANZAC DAY ANNIVERSARY: A total of 160 persons were seated for the traditional 'Gunners Breakfast' following the 'Dawn Service' at the Penang Cenotaph.

DEFENCE SECTION:

3. OPERATIONAL.

- a. GDOC Conference with IADS to discuss aspects of ADEX No 1/78 was held on 12APR78.
- b. Preparation of lectures, administrative planning and site reconnaissance by defence section staff for No 139 COMSURY Course took place during the period 1 - 24APR78.
- c. Increased Security Measures were adopted at Air Base Butterworth on 22 - 23APR78 for the anniversary of the MNLF April Movement, then again on the 30APR78 for the CPM Inauguration Day.

FIRE SECTION

4. TRAINING. P4 Truck Fire Aircraft training for firemen continued throughout the month conducted by the Instructors attached from RAAF Base Laverton.

HOUSING SECTION

During April there were 808 Hirings in Penang, 269 in Butterworth and 45 'On Base Hirings administered by housing section. At the end of the month there were 19 Vacant Hirings in Penang and 2 vacant Hirings in Butterworth.

ELECOMMUNICATIONS FLIGHT

GTEMS

NAVAID Flight Testing. The AN/TRN - 17 transportable TACAN successfully flight tested using a TSF Dakota and a theodolite equipped ground party. The TACAN is classified Restricted in accordance with a DEFAIR Directive until such time as a full CADFCU flight test is performed.

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COMMANDING OFFICER'S REPORT
BASE SQUADRON - AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
UNIT HISTORY SHEET - MARCH 1978.

RAAF CENTRE:

1. ACCOMMODATION. A total of 11 families and 25 single persons were accommodated at the RAAF Centre during the month of March 1978. Overall accommodation figures were:

Members 36, Wives 11 and Children 5.

DEFENCE SECTION:

2. OPERATIONAL.

- a. A communications exercise to test SAR SSB Radios was made to Alor Star via Sungei Petani on 11 Mar 78.
- b. GDOC co-ordinated increased security measures from 1500 hours 10 Mar 78 to 1500 hours 19 Mar 78 during the visit of the F111 Flight from RAAF Amberley. A ground exercise was conducted concurrent to the ADEX 14/15 Mar 78 to test security and emergency procedures.
- c. The RAAF SPs, the SSPs and the Butterworth Rifle Coy carried out increased security on the Communist Anniversary 22 Mar 78.

FIRE SECTION:

3. Three Oshkosh P4 Truck Fire Aircraft arrived in Butterworth on 17 Mar 78 to update the fire fighting fleet. Training for RAAF and LEC Firemen is to be conducted during Apr - Jun 78.

HOUSING SECTION:

4. During March there were 782 hirings in Penang, 269 in Butterworth and 45 'On Base' hirings administered by Housing Section. At the end of the month there were ten vacant hirings on Penang, and one vacant hiring in Butterworth.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS FLIGHT:

GTEMS

5. NAVAID Flight Testing. As the result of an antenna changeover on the Kuantan AN-TRN17 transportable TACAN, TSF were authorized by DEFAIR to perform a limited flight test in accordance with Appendix J of AAP1132. The test revealed a 40° bearing error and this fault has been ascribed to the replacement antenna. The original antenna is being repaired by 478 Maintenance Squadron MTMS and the intention is to replace the suspect antenna with the repaired item; TSF will then perform further flight testing.

/COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE

COMPARING OFFICER'S REPORT
BASE SQUADRON - AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
UNIT HISTORY SHEET - FEBRUARY 1978.

RAAF Centre:

1. Accommodation. A total of 7 families and 8 single persons were accommodated at the RAAF Centre during the month of February 1978. Overall accommodation figures were:

Members 15, Wives 7 and Children 3.

Defence Section:

2. Operational.

- a. Defence Section and 'B' Coy 1RAR carried out increased security on the 1 and 2 Feb during the anniversary of Army Day of MNLA.
- b. A liaison visit was made to ALOR STAR by CO BSBUT, GPCAPT R.W. Bradford, SQNLDR G.W. Foskett and FLTLT R.J. Coopes on 3 Feb 78.
- c. 'B' Coy 1RAR carried out increased security on a reduced scale on 15 and 16 Feb during the anniversary of the split of the CPMRF from the CPM.
- d. Advance party from 'B' Coy 2/4 RAR arrived from Australia on the 17 Feb 78.
- e. A liaison visit was made to 6 MIB HQ at Sungei Petani on 21 Feb 78.

3. Pistol Competition. The RAAF Vs KULIM pistol competition was held at Air Base Butterworth on 24 Feb 78. The RAAF team won the shoot by a narrow margin.

Highest Score RAAF	-	CPL G. Brownrigg
2nd Highest Score RAAF	-	SGT N. Marxsen
3rd Highest Score RAAF	-	LAC Dunne.

Fire Section.

4. Training. A team of firemen visited RAAFSUTG from 14 to 17 Feb 78, to conduct fire inspections, service appliances and to train personnel.

5. Five additional LEC Posts were upgraded to Fireman/Driver to assist with the roster. Training and trade testing is currently underway.

Education Section.

6. WOCTF Brock was attached to MQKL from 21 to 24 Feb 78 to report on the RMAF publications system.

7. SEDCO was appointed technical adviser and BS representative to the new Base Magazine 'RECON'.

/ Meteorological

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COMMANDING OFFICER'S REPORT
BASE SQUADRON AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
UNIT HISTORY SHEET - NOVEMBER 1977

RAAF Centre

1. Accommodation. A total of 46 families and 16 single persons were accommodated at the RAAF Centre during November. Overall accommodation figures were: members 62, wives 46 and children 30.

Defence Section

2. Operational

- a. Defence Section and 'A' Coy 3RAR carried out increased security on 25 November 1977 to cover a possible threat to Air Base Butterworth.
- b. 'A' Coy 3RAR marched out pm hours 29 November 1977.
- c. 'B' Coy 1RAR marched in pm hours 29 November 1977.
- d. Defence Section has been re-located from building 18 to building 56.

3. Training. The inter-unit weapons competition was conducted on 24 November and 25 November 1977. The winning team being 3SQN followed by BSBUT, 478SQN, 4HOSP, 75SQN and TSF.

Housing Section

4. During November there were 798 hirings in Penang, 271 in Butterworth and 45 'on base' hirings administered by Housing Section. At the end of the month there were three vacant hirings on Penang, two vacant hirings in Butterworth and two 'on base' vacant quarters.

Telecommunications Flight

5. Interim ATC UHF Replacement - TEP2904. The replacement of BRAP ATC UHF equipment with AF/GRT-802, AF/GRR-804 and AN/ARC-51EX equipments was completed by the HQSC installation party on 29 November 1977. Locations fitted with the replacement equipments were ATC Tower, ATC Transmitting Station, Penang Airport, Song Song AWR and the Southern ORP.

6. Quadradar Deployment - Butterworth. The AF/TPN-801 Quadradar deployed to Butterworth during the overhaul of the precision approach radar which was returned to Australia on 24 November 1977.

/7. System Control

COMMANDING OFFICER'S REPORT
BASE SQUADRON AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
UNIT HISTORY SHEET - OCTOBER 1977

RAAF Centre

1. Accommodation. A total of 28 families and 15 unaccompanied persons were accommodated at the RAAF Centre during October. Overall accommodation figures were: Members 43, wives 28 and children 22.

Defence Section

2. Operational

a. Defence Section was on standby on the following two occasions:

- (1) on 29 October 1977 a hijacked Vietnam Air DC3 passed through Malaysian Air Space and eventually landed in Singapore; and
- (2) increased security on a lower level than normal on 30 October 1977 to cover a possible threat to Air Base Butterworth.

Housing Section

3. During October there were 798 hirings in Penang, 272 in Butterworth and 45 'on base' hirings administered by Housing Section. At the end of month there was one vacant hiring in Penang, two vacant hirings in Butterworth and no vacant 'on base' married quarters.

Telecommunications Flight

4. Precision Approach Radar (PAR) Antenna Overhaul. The overhaul was commenced on 19 October 1977 and was completed by 31 October 1977. No major problems were experienced and preliminary tests indicate a marked improvement in performance. Flight testing is programmed for 7 November 1977.

System Control Centre

5. Landlines Butterworth/Tengah. Outages and outage times have increased from 28.30 minutes in September to 111.40 in October. Singapore Telecoms are undertaking major rewiring in Singapore area. One outage at was 65 hours 15 minutes on 210850Z October - 240240Z October 1977. A cable had been broken and telecoms (Singapore) were unwilling to work on the weekend.

/Welfare/Sports

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COMMANDING OFFICER'S REPORT
BASE SQUADRON AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
UNIT HISTORY SHEET - SEPTEMBER 1977

RAAF Centre

1. Accommodation. A total of 25 families and nine single persons were accommodated at the RAAF Centre during September plus five SLI (3RAR MP's). Overall accommodation figures were: members 39, wives, 25 and children 27.

Defence Section

2. Operational

- a. Defence Section and A Coy 3RARCOYGP manned GDOC 26 September 1977 (Possible ground threat to Air Base Butterworth).
- b. FLTLT R.J. Coopes 061815GHDEF took over duties from FLTLT R.J. Matthews 0316508 GRDEF on 5 September 1977.

Housing Section

3. During the month of September there were 800 hirings in Penang, 273 hirings in Butterworth and 45 'on base' married quarters administered by Housing Section. At the end of the month there was one vacant hiring in Penang, three vacant hirings in Butterworth and one 'on base' vacant married quarter.

Welfare/Sports

4. RAAF men's and women's teams participated in the 5th Malaysian Softball Championships. The men's team was defeated by Selangor in the final.

Provost Flight

5. SQNLDR F.J. Bellochambers 025968 PROVO was attached to RAAFSUCAN wef 19 September 1977 to 23 September 1977 inclusive, to attend a Crime Prevention and Security Seminar conducted at Air Force Office.

Discipline

6. There were two charges during the month, one under AFA Section 15 (1) and one under AFA Section 138 (4). Morale remained at a satisfactory level.

[Signature]
(T.H. THORPE)

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COMMANDING OFFICER'S REPORT
BASE SQUADRON AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
UNIT HISTORY SHEET - AUGUST 1977

RAAF Centre

1. Accommodation. A total of 25 families and 12 single persons were accommodated at the RAAF Centre during August plus 10 SLI (3RAR MP's). Overall accommodation figures were: Members 47, wives 25 and children 35.

Education Section

2. The two additional class rooms for the RAAF School Annex, mentioned in the unit history report for March, were completed and occupied by kindergarten classes on the 18 July 1977.

Housing Section

3. During the month of August there were 801 hirings in Penang, 273 hirings in Butterworth and 45 'on base' married quarters administered by Housing Section. At the end of the month there were two vacant hirings in Penang, one vacant hiring in Butterworth and no vacant 'on base' married quarters.

Defence Section

4. Operational

- a. Defence Section and C Coy 3RARCOYGP manned GDOC 1 - 2 August 1977 (Possible ground threat Air Base Butterworth).
- b. FLTLT R.J. Coopes arrived on 16 August 1977 to take over Defence Officer's duties from FLTLT R.J. Matthews on 5 September 1977.
- c. A Coy 3RARCOYGP marched in p.m. hours on 24 August 1977.

Training

5. On 10 August 1977 a RAAF Pistol team went to Kulim for the Annual RAAF vs Kulim Police Pistol Shoot. Kulim Police won the shoot by a narrow margin.

Discipline

6. There were two charges during the month, one under AFA Section 40 and one under AFA Section 15(1). Morale remained at a satisfactory level.

COMMANDING OFFICER'S REPORT
BASE SQUADRON AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
UNIT HISTORY SHEET - JULY 1977

Telecommunications Flight

1. Staff Visits. During July, staff visits by DCE-AF (GPCAPT Rowell), DTELENG (GPCAPT Benson) and DMP-AF (GPCAPT Sansum) occurred. DTELENG-AF was part of the CAFOPS team which studied the need to replace obsolete ATC and NAVAID equipment and held discussions with the Malaysian Ministry of Defence.
2. Interim Replacement of Butterworth ATC UHF Facilities. A project team from TELENG2 HQSG visited Butterworth on 28 June 1977 to 7 July 1977 to carry out preliminary engineering planning and site survey on the interim replacement of ATC UHF facilities at Butterworth. Anticipated completion date for the project is 30 August 1977.

RAAF Centre

3. Accommodation. A total of 30 families and 6 single persons were accommodated at the RAAF Centre during July plus one SLI (RAAF) and ten SLI (3RAR SPs). Overall accommodation figures were: Members 47, wives 30 and children 42.

Housing Section

4. During July there were 804 hirings in Penang, 272 hirings in Butterworth and 45 'on base' married quarters administered by Housing Section. At the end of the month there were no vacant hirings in Penang, two vacant hirings in Butterworth and one 'on base' vacant hiring.

Defence Section

5. Operational
 - a. Defence Section and C COY 3RARCOYGP manned GDOC 20 July 1977 (possible ground threat Air Base Butterworth).
 - b. A shared defence briefing was given to the DGM-AF AIRCDRE Parker on 25 July 1977.

Accounting Flight

6. In accordance with AOD 6/77 of 27 April 1977 Accounting Flight was disbanded wef 1 July 1977 and its duties and responsibilities transferred, as appropriate, to the Administrative Flight and the Equipment Flight. The post of SACCTO is retained temporarily to provide advice and assistance at the discretion of the Commanding Officer.

/Discipline

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Defence Section

6. Operations:

- a. DCOY 7/8RARCOYGP marched out at PM hours on 28 February 1977.
- b. BCOY 3RARCOYGP marched in at PM hours on 28 February 1977.
- c. Defence Section and DCOY 7/8RAR manned GDOC on 1 and 2 February 1977 (possible ground threat to Air Base Butterworth).

Welfare and Sports Section

7. RAAF personnel participated in 59 organized sporting events during the month. RAAF Physical Training Instructors assisted the Australian Army in conducting physical training classes and Army personnel participated in some of the organized sporting events.

Discipline

8. There were no charges during the month. Discipline and morale remained at a satisfactory level.

11 March 1977

T.H. Thorpe
(T.H. THORPE)
Group Captain
Commanding Officer
Base Squadron Butter

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COMMANDING OFFICER'S REPORT
BASE SQUADRON AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
UNIT HISTORY SHEET JANUARY 1977

RAAF Centre

1. A total of 37 families and 10 single personnel were accommodated at the Centre during the month plus 1 SLI (RAAF) and 11 SLI (RAR SPs). The breakdown is as follows:

		<u>Members</u>	<u>Wives</u>	<u>Children</u>
RAAF	Duty	28	26	5
	Leave	9	9	20
AUSTARM	Duty	11 SPs		
	Leave	5		
RNZIR	Leave	6	2	5
	Total	59	37	30

2. Occupancy Ratio. Twenty-seven rooms x 31 days = 837. Rooms occupied for a total of 428 days.

3. The revarnishing of all furniture in the accommodation rooms at the Centre has now been completed.

Defence Section


4. Defence Section and 'D' COY 7/8RARCOYGP manned GDOC on 31 January 1977 (possible ground threat to Air Base Butterworth).

Discipline

5. There were two charges under Sections 11 and 40 heard during the month.

Morale

6. Morale is satisfactory but has been adversely affected by the increase in married quarter rentals.


(T.H. THORPE)
Group Captain
Commanding Officer
Base Squadron Butterworth

11 February 1977

Stock Control Section

17. Local purchase action for the month totalled 627 with an expenditure of M\$245,685.23.

Warehouse Section

18. Warehouse Section handled 5143 cases inwards and outwards totalling 200,016 lbs.

Defence Section

19. Operational. Defence Section and BCOY 8/9RARCOYGP manned GDOC as a co-ordination centre on 1 August 1976 (possible ground threat Air Base Butterworth).

20. Mobile Reserve Flight. Mobile Reserve Flight training was not conducted during the month of August.

Defence and Fire Flight Survey - RAAFSUTG

21. A Defence and Fire Flight Team visited RAAFSUTG from 10 - 13 August 1976. A separate report was submitted.

Fire Section

22. The following incidents were attended by Fire Section:

a. Refuel/defuel standbys	15
b. RAAF aircraft incidents	5
c. RMAF aircraft incidents	6
d. Domestic incidents	32

23. The following training was completed for firecrews:

	<u>Total Periods</u>
a. Practice rescues	3
b. On-the-Job training lectures	24
c. Aircraft familiarization	20
d. Practice domestic	3
e. Practice fire drills	12
f. Practice foam paths	4
g. Unit familiarization	12

Stock Control Section

18. Local purchase action for the month totalled 662 with an expenditure of M\$1,378,905.19.

Warehouse Section

19. Warehouse Section handled 2832 cases inwards and outwards totalling 535,579 lbs.

Education Section20. Professional, Academic & Trade Training:

a. Trade Tests - 8 RAAF and 6 SAD tests were administered.

Defence Section21. Operational

- a. Defence Section and BCOY 8/9RARCOYGP manned GDOC as a co-ordination centre on 7-8 July 1976 and 30-31 July 1976 (possible ground threat Air Base Butterworth); and
- b. shared defence briefings were given to Lieutenant-General A.L. MacDonald CB, CBE, Chief of the General Staff, on 8 July 1976, His Excellency The Australian High Commissioner to Malaysia, Mr G.B. Feakes BA on 23 July 1976 and RAAF Commanding Officers on 30 July 1976.

22. Mobile Reserve Flight. Training in minor tactics, tobias, starligh and tactical light operation was deferred from 21 July to 29 July owing to unavailability of MRF members. Training scheduled for 29 July was cancelled owing to lack of attendance.

Fire Section

23. The following incidents were attended by Fire Section:

a. Refuel/defuel standbys	16
b. RAAF aircraft incidents	6
c. RMAF aircraft incidents	3
d. Domestic incidents	13

24. The following training was completed for firecrews:

	<u>Total Periods</u>
a. Practice rescues	12
b. On-the-Job training lectures	12

Warehouse Section

16. Warehouse Section handled 5960 cases inwards and outwards with a total of 604,924 lbs during the month.

Education Section

17. Professional, Academic & Trade Training:

- a. Trade Tests. 16 RAAF and 13 SAD tests administered.
- b. Airmens Promotion Examinations. Results of the April series:

C1 - 41 passed 4 failed

S1 - 38 passed 5 failed

18. Officers Extension Tutorial Course (OETC). SQNLDR G.P. WADE 0317600 RAAF Staff College visited the Section from 25-28 May 1976 and held discussion with OETC students.

19. Civil Schooling. Four applications for civil schooling were submitted.

Defence Section

20. Operational.

- a. GDOC was manned by Defence Section and 6RARCOYGP personnel (reason - possible ground threat to Air Base Butterworth).
- b. 2ADGs were provided to guard downed RAAF helicopter 25 kms east of Butterworth from 1600 hrs 17 May 1976 to 1600 hrs 19 May 1976.

Training.

- a. 'A' COY 6RARCOYGP carried out normal training from 3 May until 31 May 1976 as per company programme.
- b. During the period the following courses were conducted by this Section:

Senior Continuation	2
Junior Continuation	2
Arrivals	1

/c. The following

Stock Control Section

29. Local purchase action for the month totalled 414 with an expenditure of M\$1,168,364.17.

Warehouse Section

30. Warehouse Section handled 3952 cases inwards and outwards with a total of 275944 lbs during the month.

Education Section

31. Professional, Academic & Trade Training:

- a. Trade Tests. 21 RAAF and 3 SAD tests administered.
- b. SGCE. First series of examinations for 1976 conducted 6-12 Apr 76. 11 candidates sat.
- c. Officers Promex. "B" exams conducted 6-8 Apr 76. 8 candidates sat.

32. Visits. Senior class of St. Theresa's School, Butterworth, visited section on 15 Apr 76.

33. Library. Technical publications office clerk training course conducted 29 - 30 Apr 76 for two members of 3SQN.

Defence Section

34. Operational.

- a. GDOC was manned by Defence Section and 6RARCOYGP personnel (reason - possible ground threat to Air Base Butterworth).

Training.

- a. 'A' COY 6RARCOYGP carried out normal training from 1-20 Apr 76 and 26-29 Apr 76 as per company programme.
- b. During the period the following courses were conducted by this Section:

Senior Continuation	1
Junior Continuation	1
Arrivals	1

/c. The following pe

b. 323 negatives were exposed and registered; and

c. 3494 enlargements were produced from the exposed negatives.

In addition, 40 personnel were photographed for pass, identification and visa purposes, resulting in 180 prints being produced.

RAF Centre

Sporting and Social. There were a total of 37 sporting and social events during the period.

Accommodation. A total of 7 families and 3 single personnel were accommodated at the Centre during the period, plus 3 SLI (RAAF), and 2 SLI (6RAR SP).

Stock Control Section.

Local purchase action for the month totalled 431 with an expenditure of £191,599.82.

Warehouse Section

Warehouse Section handled 6312 cases inwards and outwards with a total weight of 20 lbs during the month.

Education Section

Professional, Academic & Trade Training:

- a. Trade Tests - 29 RAAF, 15 SAD, and 2 LEC;
- b. SVETS - 1 new enrolments; supervision of 2 External examinations.
- c. Officers' Promotion Examinations - Officers promoted to 'C' were conducted on 16, 17MAR76.
- d. Airmen's Promotion Examinations - Airmen's promotion examinations were conducted on 23MAR76. 41 members sat for the Sergeants Exam and 41 members sat for the Corporals exam.

Visits. 18 Grade 10 students from RAAF School visited the Base to contribute to an Anzac Day project.

Elections. Voting facilities were provided for members and dependants to vote in the Victorian State elections.

Security Section

Operational.

- a. GDOC was manned by Defence Section and 6RARCOYGP personnel (reason - possible ground threat to Air Base Butterworth).

In addition, 40 personnel were photographed for pass, identification and visa resulting in 180 prints being produced.

RAAF Centre

26. Sporting and Social. There were a total of 37 sporting and social held during the period.

27. Accommodation. A total of 7 families and 3 single personnel were at the Centre during the period, plus 3 SLI (RAAF), and 2 SLI (6RAR SP).

Stock Control Section.

28. Local purchase action for the month totalled 431 with an expenditure of M\$1,191,599.82.

Warehouse Section

29. Warehouse Section handled 6312 cases inwards and outwards with a total of 335320 lbs during the month.

Education Section

30. Professional, Academic & Trade Training:

- a. Trade Tests - 29 RAAF, 15 SAD, and 2 LEC;
- b. SVETS - 1 new enrolments; supervision of 2 External examinations
- c. Officers' Promotion Examinations - Officers promoted ex 'C' were conducted on 16, 17MAR76.
- d. Airmen's Promotion Examinations - Airmen's promotion examinations were conducted on 23MAR76. 41 members sat for the Sergeants exam and 41 members sat for the Corporals exam.

31. Visits. 18 Grade 10 students from RAAF School visited the Base to obtain information for an Anzac Day project.

32. Elections. Voting facilities were provided for members and dependents desiring to vote in the Victorian State elections.

Defence Section

Operational.

- a. GDOC was manned by Defence Section and 6RARCOYGP personnel (reason - possible ground threat to Air Base Butterworth).
- b. 1MAR76 'D' COY 6RARCOYGP marched out and 'A' COY 6RARCOYGP marched in.

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RAAF Centre

20. Sporting and Social. There were a total of 28 sporting and social events held during the period.

21. Accommodation. A total of 20 families and 8 single personnel were accommodated at the Centre during the period, plus 6 SLI (RAAF), and 1 RNZIR attached to IADS.

Stock Control Section

22. Local purchase action for the month totalled 426 with an expenditure of M\$1188581.24.

Warehouse Section

23. Warehouse Section handled 3816 cases inwards and outwards with a total of 249229 lbs during the month.

Education Section

24. Professional, Academic & Trade Training:

a. Trade Tests - 17 RAAF, 13 SAD, and 7 LEC.

b. SVETS - 4 new enrolments.

25. Correspondence Students. Two new enrolment for Form 5 NSW and one for Form 6.

26. RAAF School. New teachers briefed on legal, PR, security and general aspects of their stay in Malaysia.

27. SUPMAN Courses. Abbreviated Supervisor and Management Courses commenced on 23FEB76. Each course consists of two phases of three days each phase with a maximum of 20 NCOs per course.

Defence Section

28. Operational

a. GDOC was manned by Defence Section and 6RARCOYGP personnel until 4FEB76. (reason - possible ground threat to F111 aircraft).

29. Training

a. D GOY 6RARGOYGP carried out normal training from 5-29FEB76 as per company programme.

b. During the period the following courses were conducted by this Section:

Arrivals	1
Senior Continuation	1
Junior Continuation	1

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Warehouse Section

46. Warehouse Section handled 10,517 cases inwards and outwards with a total of 422,994 lbs during the period.

Education Section

47. Professional, Academic & Trade Training:

a. Trade Tests - 10 RAAF, 14 SAD, and 5 LEC.

b. SGCE - 27 new enrolments.

48. Correspondence Students - One new enrolment for Form 5 NSW.

49. RAAF School - 11 new teachers arrived from Australia and made an orientation visit to the Base on 30JAN76.

50. RAAF Library - A training course for TPO clerks was conducted on 27 and 28JAN76.

FIRE AND DEFENCE FLIGHT

Defence Section (For December 1975 and January 1976)

51. Operational

a. GDOC was manned by Defence Section and 6RARCOYGP personnel during the period 21JAN76 to 31JAN76 (reason - possible ground threat to F111 aircraft).

52. Training

a. D COY 6RARCOYGP carried out normal training as per company programme to the 21JAN76, and were trained by Defence Section staff in the use of Tobias and tactical lights.

b. During the period the following courses were conducted by this Section:

Arrivals	-	3
Senior Continuation	-	2
Junior Continuation	-	2
3SQN Aircrew	-	1

c. The following personnel were trained:

OFFs	51
WOFFs	4
FSGTs	5
SGTs	9

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COMMANDING OFFICER'S REPORT

BASE SQUADRON AIR BASE HUTTERTWORTH

UNIT HISTORY SHEET FOR THE MONTH MAY 1976

tion

Catering Section prepared 46961 meals during the month

ection

Meteorology Section provided a total of 52 flight forecasts and 726 aerodrome and landing forecasts during the month as well as services to Military and Civil Aviation, the public weather forecasts and statistics to RAAF Base Penang Port Commission, Malaysian Meteorology Service Penang, Fraser and Neave.

on

There were no reports of leakage of information or gain of official information.



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Official Committee Hansard

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

STANDING COMMITTEE ON PETITIONS

Petition on reclassification of service by the Rifle Company Butterworth 1970-89

WEDNESDAY, 29 OCTOBER 2014

CANBERRA

BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
STANDING COMMITTEE ON PETITIONS

Wednesday, 29 October 2014

Members in attendance: Mr Broadbent, Mr Buchholz, Mrs Elliot, Dr Jensen, Mrs Prentice.

To inquire and report on:

Petition on reclassification of service by the Rifle Company Butterworth 1970-89

WITNESSES

COOPER, Ms Jacqueline, Director Nature of Service Branch, Department of Defence	1
ROBERT, The Hon. Stuart, Assistant Minister for Defence, Commonwealth Parliament	1
THOMPSON, Colonel Murray, Acting Director General Military Strategic Commitments, VCDF Group, Department of Defence.....	1

COOPER, Ms Jacqueline, Director Nature of Service Branch, Department of Defence

ROBERT, The Hon. Stuart, Assistant Minister for Defence, Commonwealth Parliament

THOMPSON, Colonel Murray, Acting Director General Military Strategic Commitments, VCDF Group, Department of Defence

Committee met at 10:43

CHAIR (Dr Jensen): I welcome all witnesses and members of the public to the Petitions Committee hearing today, where we will discuss a selected petition. Under the rules of the House of Representatives, the Petitions Committee is required to consider if petitions comply with the requirements for petitioning the House. If so, the petition may then be presented to the House, and the committee may refer it to the relevant government minister for a response. We may also hold public hearings into petitions, allowing both principal petitioners and government agencies to further consider the concerns raised in petitions and the response made.

I remind participants and interested parties that, in undertaking hearings on a petition, the committee is not endorsing or advocating on the contents of a given petition, nor are we able to grant the requests made in petitions. It is not the committee's practice to make any recommendations based on hearings of this kind. These hearings are an opportunity for participants to cover in more detail the issues raised in petitions which, as we know, are restricted to 250 words, and for the committee to hear about people's experiences of engaging with the petitions process.

Today we will be hearing from representatives from the Department of Defence to discuss a petition which calls for the reclassification of the military service of Rifle Company Butterworth between 1970 and 1989. I now invite representatives from the Department of Defence to discuss the petition. I remind witnesses that, although the committee does not require you to give evidence under oath, this hearing is a legal proceeding of parliament and therefore has the same standing as proceedings of the chambers themselves. The evidence given today will be recorded by Hansard and will attract parliamentary privilege. If you would like to make a brief opening statement, we can then go straight to questions.

Mr Robert: Thanks Chair, and thank you for the opportunity to come along as the responsible minister and to bring Colonel Thompson, Director General of Military Strategic Commitments, and Ms Cooper. It was interesting speaking to Colonel Thompson before; he actually spent three years of his life—I think you said as a 'RAAF brat', Colonel—

Col. Thompson: I did.

Mr Robert: on RAAF Base Butterworth in the 1970s. It is good that we can bring someone along who is not only a military professional but who can also speak firsthand on what it was like there at the time, with mum and dad, at Butterworth.

I would like to make an opening statement. I thank the committee for its interest in the matter of the nature of service classification for Army's Rifle Company Butterworth, and for the opportunity to address you. On 3 March, the committee referred to me a petition seeking reclassification of the service of Rifle Company Butterworth between 1970 and 1989. The petition contends that because those troops were deployed to provide a protective and quick reaction force, this service should be reclassified from 'peacetime' to 'warlike'.

In preparing a response to the petition, a senior research officer with no prior involvement in earlier Defence reviews of Rifle Company Butterworth's service has reviewed and extended prior research. The research undertaken has been considerable and it has been thorough, including re-examining all available official documentation held at the War Memorial and the National Archives of Australia, encompassing opened, closed and not-yet-examined documents. Defence records were also examined, including RAAF Base Butterworth commanding officer reports, RAAF unit history records, and commanders' diaries for those Australian battalions which provided an infantry rifle company for rotation through Butterworth. This research sought to define roles and responsibilities of the infantry rifle company which rotated through Royal Australian Air Force Base Butterworth, and the environment in which members of the Australian Defence Force served, including the level of exposure to the risk of harm.

By way of background, approximately 9,000 Australian Defence Force personnel served on infantry rifle company rotations between 1970 and 1989. It is estimated that up to 19,000 members of the Royal Australian Air Force also served at Butterworth during the same period. In addition, there were Australian public servants and teachers working at or near the base. For RAAF personnel, these were accompanied postings, with families living in married quarters located outside the base perimeter fence in the nearby area and on Penang. There were no restrictions placed on movement by car, taxi or bus in the Butterworth area, or on travel via ferry to Penang.

Island. During the Vietnam conflict, which ended in 1972, Penang was a formal rest and recuperation leave centre. Also, at least from the 1960s to now, Penang has been an unrestricted international holiday destination. While Australian forces remained in Malaysia following the confrontation ceasefire on 11 August 1966, no state of war or emergency existed and, accordingly, the Malaysian government made no further requests for assistance in security operations. Therefore, there were no allotments of Australian forces for special duty in Malaysia after 14 September 1966, and Australian forces were not engaged in any operations against hostile forces or dissident elements.

Ownership of the Butterworth Air Base was transferred to the Malaysian government on 31 March 1970. Until 1970, security at Butterworth was provided by the Royal Air Force, but responsibility transferred to the Malaysian authorities with the transfer of ownership. The program for rotating an infantry rifle company to Butterworth was implemented on 15 November 1970 by the Australian, New Zealand and British battalions from the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, which was located in Singapore. Interestingly, New Zealand also deployed a company on rotation from 1971 to 1973. With the withdrawal of the Australian battalion from Singapore in September 1973, a company group was provided from the Australian base battalion, deploying on three-month rotations. It was around January 1980 that the infantry rifle company located at Butterworth on rotation assumed the title of 'Australian Army Rifle Company Butterworth', or RCB. The roles of the infantry rifle company were to provide a ground force presence in Malaysia; to conduct training; and, as claimed in the petition, to assist in the security of Butterworth, if required, and to provide a quick reaction force, if required. However, importantly the infantry rifle company was not to be involved in local civil disturbances or to be employed in operations outside the perimeter of the air base. The Malaysian armed forces were responsible for the security of the base, and RAAF personnel had primary responsibility for internal base security. The infantry rifle company provided a quick reaction force, normally a section size of 10 diggers, outside of normal weekday working hours—1800 hours at night through to 0600 hours. RAAF property and assets were not guarded during normal working hours when they were under surveillance of air force personnel working on the flight line or elsewhere on the air base.

The rules of engagement and the orders for opening fire for the infantry rifle company, which also applied to all RAAF personnel, were defensive in nature and were to be applied within the air base only. In the event of a security emergency being declared, the infantry rifle company was to assist with the protection of facilities, personnel and families under the direction of the officer in command in the air base. The ground defence operations centre was established to manage all emergencies at the air base, including security related emergencies. While this operation centre was manned on a regular basis, such as during air defence exercises, simulations of a declared emergency and during the movement of highly flammable material as a precaution in response to local disturbance or potential threat, no security emergency was ever declared at RAAF Base Butterworth.

No attempt has been made by Defence to conceal the fact that there was a level of threat to RAAF Base Butterworth, but the level of threat was assessed as low. To give you some credence, the level of threat in Iraq for combat operations now is assessed as high. Defence has acknowledged that there were instances of elevated concern over possible threats to the base from communist terrorists, as they were known at the time, and local racial disturbances that gave cause to the GDOC, which is the Ground Defence Operations Centre, to be manned at times and for security practices to be changed. However, the daily routine of the air base continued unabated throughout the period.

Whilst communist terrorists were active at various times and in various parts of the Malaysian Peninsula, life continued as normal for the local population, as well as those posted to Butterworth and their families who lived outside the wire. Instances of the perimeter fence being cut were not attributed at the time to communist terrorists, but considered to be done for the purpose of petty theft. There was never an attack on RAAF Base Butterworth by communist terrorists. While the period of 1966 to 1989 has been referred to as the second emergency, this title appears to have been applied retrospectively—there is no historical record of the Malaysian government ever declaring a second emergency.

Submissions seeking review of a nature of service classification of past service are considered in the context of the legislation and policies that applied at the time of the service under review. The applicable legislation was for the period of RCB service, 1970 to 1989, was the Repatriation (Special Overseas Service) Act 1962. Special overseas service, which is equivalent to the contemporary classification of warlike service, required that personnel be allocated for special duty within a declared special area. Special duty was defined under that legislation as 'duty relating directly to the warlike operations or state of disturbance by reason of which the declaration in respect of the specific or the special areas was made'. Because no state of war or emergency existed in Malaysia after the end of confrontation on 11 August 1966 and because the Malaysian government made no request to the

Australian government for military assistance after this date, ADF personnel were not engaged in duty relating to warlike operations or a state of disturbance in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989.

As a result, ADF service, including those at Butterworth, cannot be considered to be the special service under this act at the time, the Repatriation (Special Overseas Service) Act 1962. Therefore, instead of seeking reclassification of their service under the Special Overseas Service Act, Butterworth claimants are seeking a warlike classification under the current framework, which was incorporated into the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986, and they were seeking this in 1997. Warlike operations under this current framework, since 1997, are defined as 'those military activities where the application of force is authorised to pursue specific military objectives and there is an expectation of casualties'. These operations can encompass, but not are not limited to, a state of declared war, conventional combat operations against an armed adversary, and peace enforcement operations, which are military operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention and may be engaged in combat and activities. No ADF service at Butterworth through the period 1970-1989 including those of Butterworth meets any of these criteria. The Butterworth—or the RCB, the Rifle Company Butterworth—were not pursuing any specific military objectives, were not authorised to use force beyond the minimum required for self-defence and there was definitely no expectation of any casualties.

Importantly, at no time throughout the period 1970 to 1989 did any Australian government consider it necessary or appropriate to reconsider or reclassify the Rifle Company Butterworth or any ADF service at Butterworth. As advised earlier, 28,000 ADF personnel or there about served at Butterworth during the period. Since 2006, Defence has provided responses to 40 submissions from 17 claimants seeking reclassification of this service from 1970 to 1989 and one claimant for the reclassification of other ADF services at RMAF Base Butterworth. Many of these claims have been form letters generated by simply one or two individuals. There is no evidence to suggest that the views of the 17 individual claimants seeking reclassification of Butterworth service are supported by the majority of the estimated 28,000 personnel who served at Butterworth between 1970 and 1989.

RCB service has been considered by several independent reviews, which have consistently found it to be peacetime service. The 1994 Committee of Inquiry into Defence and Defence Related Awards concluded that:

Neither does the Committee consider that service at Butterworth was clearly and markedly more demanding than normal peacetime service...

Despite noting that service at Butterworth in Malaysia was one of the specific areas of ADF service that the review was asked to advise on, the *Review of service entitlement anomalies in respect of South-East Asian service* by Justice Mohr in 1999 made no recommendation of the reclassification of service at Butterworth.

The 2003 *Review of veterans' entitlements* by a committee led by Justice Clarke stated that training and protection of Australian assets are normal peacetime garrison duties. The committee considered that peacetime service, whether rendered in Australia or overseas, can be arduous and even hazardous. But these factors alone do not warrant consideration of that duty as operational or qualifying service for veterans under the Veterans' Entitlement Act 1986. The Clarke committee concluded that no evidence was found that service at South-East Asia currently established as peacetime service should be considered warlike. No operational area was prescribed, no specific armed threat was present and there were no rules of engagement to pursue specific military objectives.

The 2011 *Inquiry into recognition for members of Rifle Company Butterworth for service in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989*, concluded by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, recommended that no change be made to the current medallic entitlements, as there was no convincing evidence that the service of the RCB was warlike. A nature of service review board in 2011 considered RCB service and found that it was appropriately classified as peacetime service. The board—consisting of senior executive service band 2 representatives in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Department of Veterans' Affairs, Department of Finance and Department of Defence—was established to consider claims for the reclassification of past service.

The final report by Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group: Service in South-East Asia 1950-2011 in 2013, sponsored by the New Zealand government, stated that the service of its rifle infantry company between those three years—which served similarly to the RCB at Butterworth—was not operational service. The New Zealand JWG, joint working group, found that the communist terrorist activity was of very slight significance to the New Zealand deployment to Butterworth and did not characterise the tours in anyway.

I do not that the petition contends that Defence, in assessing the claims, has not apply consistent standards, been misleading with its facts, not considered key data provided, denied natural justice, rewritten history in retrospect and based decisions on budgetary constraints rather than recognising service at the appropriate level.

Defence has comprehensively examined and re-examined the available official documentation to confirm the roles of the infantry rifle companies that rotated through Butterworth and to assess the extent of exposure to the risk of harm.

Defence is confident that all records and other evidence provided by claimants has also been considered. No attempt has been made to conceal the fact that there was a level of threat to RMAF Base Butterworth, but the levels assessed as low. The daily routine of the air base continued unabated throughout the period. Service personnel and their accompanying families had no restrictions on movements and nearby Penang was a popular tourist destination.

I acknowledge that the roles of the Rifle Company Butterworth were to provide a ground-force presence in Malaysia to conduct training to assist in the security of Butterworth if required and to provide a quick reaction force if required. However, these roles in themselves do not constitute a warlike classification.

CHAIR: I am sorry to interrupt. Can I get a member to move that a subcommittee consisting of me and Mr Buchholz be formed for the purposes of holding this roundtable on petitions? We would not have a formal quorum without moving that. To move it allows the hearing to continue.

Mrs PRENTICE: I so move.

Mr Robert: It is a fact that RCB service does not meet the essential criteria for classification as special overseas service or as warlike service, because Australian forces were not engaged in any operations against hostile forces or dissident elements after the end of confrontation on 11 August 1966. The Defence review is consistent with several independent reviews that considered RCB service, including the external New Zealand review. I also note that at no time throughout the period 1970 to 1989 did any Australian government consider it appropriate to change the classification of any ADF service at Butterworth from peacetime service. The decision not to retrospectively reclassify RCB service is not based on budgetary constraints. Whereas all matters presented to government, including those dealing with past ADF service, must include consideration of any costs associated with the proposal, the decision to maintain the peacetime classification is based on the review of the nature of RCB service.

In conclusion, the service of Rifle Company Butterworth has been reviewed comprehensively by Defence and by several independent reviews, including a review by New Zealand. Reviews of service have found consistently that this service does not meet the essential criteria for reclassification as special overseas service or as warlike service. The role and responsibilities of the RCB, and all evidence of the exposure to the risk of harm, support the extant peacetime classification. At no time throughout the period 1970 to 1989 did any Australian government consider it necessary or appropriate to reconsider or change the classification of RCB or any other ADF service at RMAF Base Butterworth. I take this opportunity to acknowledge the valuable contribution of all ADF service at Butterworth, including that of the Rifle Company Butterworth. The peacetime classification in no way denigrates the sometimes difficult and arduous nature of these deployments. Once again, I am grateful for the opportunity to address you on this matter and am happy for me or the Defence team to take any questions that the committee may have.

CHAIR: First, in response to this petition, which states that no state of war emergency existed in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989, how would you characterise the activities of communist insurgents from Sarawak or the official peace between the Malaysian government and Malaysian communists?

Mr Robert: I will pass that to Colonel Thompson (a) because he is the subject matter expert and (b) because he was a child growing up there at the time.

Col. Thompson: There was a communist insurgency, but it was extremely low level. It was actually along the border areas of what is now Thailand, and certainly by the mid-seventies it would be characterised as banditry more than a comprehensive insurgency. There were very limited attacks on any Malaysian constabulary, because it was a police action. The military were not deployed against them—only very occasionally. By 1989 it had ended. The communist terrorist Chin Peng, who had been living the jungle, was an old man and he finally came out and effectively ended the communist insurgency.

CHAIR: Former RCB personnel have stated that they and their families expected that combat would occur and that casualties would be sustained and have argued that it is not relevant whether actual combat occurred if there was an expectation that combat would occur. Is that consistent with the practice during the period 1970 to 1989?

Col. Thompson: It is all a matter of perspective. There were certainly no orders given and, although certain orders to Rifle Company Butterworth may well have heightened the risk in their order of training and raising people's awareness, I can tell you firsthand that the everyday expectation, especially of families, was one of an

idyllic and peaceful lifestyle rather than any threat ever. I will pass to Ms Cooper, who can categorise some of those.

Ms Cooper: The point the claimants are making is the concept of perception of harm, which was discussed by Justice Moore when he did his review. It has also been tested in the courts. Many people have claimed they have warlike service, because they perceived danger and they all felt danger; however, the conclusion from the courts was that there had to be a real and objective danger, not just a perception of danger.

Mr Robert: Chair, if you look through the commanders' diaries and look to the evidence of government and military at the time, there was never an expectation of casualties occurring. If I look at my time as a military officer in 1998 in Bougainville during the crisis there, we were unarmed—the first unarmed mission. It was seen as a peace-making operation and while there was an Australian Service Medal issued, not an Active Service Medal—no-one was claiming it was war-like, but it was quite common for us to be confronted by weapons and knives and weapons in faces, there were confronting issues in reconciliation and disarming rebels, but no-one was claiming that Bougainville should be increased to war-like service.

Mrs PRENTICE: So Bougainville was non-war-like?

Mr Robert: Absolutely. It is a peace-monitoring group which comes under deployment allowance as opposed to international campaign allowance. We faced consistent issues in danger, engaging with hostile rebel groups, challenging banditry and theft across the area and helicopters engaged by weapons fire. And that is a peace-monitoring arrangement.

Mr BUCHHOLZ: To your knowledge, have the petitioners sought an audience with you or with the Department of Defence?

Mr Robert: I cannot remember offhand. It would not surprise me if they had. Most claimants who want me to exercise ministerial discretion on these issues always want to come to present their case. As a general rule, I do not do it because we have established processes in place—notwithstanding the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, the professional body which seeks to explain that. It is a bit like me getting involved in a court case, which we would not do. Because we have DHAAT as a tribunal which sits on these matters, I tend not to entertain discussion outside of—

Mr BUCHHOLZ: Are you aware of any other claims of a similar nature by a different group or any other organisation?

Mr Robert: I am going to pass that to Jackie who is head of nature of service.

Ms Cooper: Other claims by a different group regarding the—

Mr BUCHHOLZ: Regarding the similar claim which has been made in—

Mr Robert: Are there any other operations, Jackie—Somalia, Rwanda?

Ms Cooper: We are constantly getting claims for reclassification of past service going back as far as to pre-Vietnam. A similar one would be 4RAR after the end of confrontation. When they returned to their barracks at Terendak in Malacca they sought to have war-like service for the period after confrontation for 12 months after that. That is the most similar.

Mr BUCHHOLZ: Are you able to advise the committee whether there is any precedent where there has been a reclassification?

Ms Cooper: Yes. We have reclassified, as the minister said, Rwanda. We have reclassified a short period in UNTSO service, the UN observers in Israel and Palestine. That was only a 33-day period. Over such a long period, not any major ones. We have reclassified mainly service of individuals who may not have been recognised at the time as having been contributing to a war-like operation.

Mr BUCHHOLZ: Can you give an oversight as to the reasoning for the reclassification in those instances, so we can draw a comparison?

Ms Cooper: Rwanda was reclassified as war-like due to exposure to the risk of harm and primarily there was exposure to the risk of psychological harm.

Mr BUCHHOLZ: And the risk rating in that conflict?

Ms Cooper: That was high all the way through. Those people were out in the areas where the warring factions were operational.

Mr Robert: Did that include the massacre?

Ms Cooper: Yes. It was classified as non-war-like in the first instance because it was considered a humanitarian mission. As it became obvious, they were at risk there and the soldiers did have to defend some of the local citizenry. It was reclassified as war-like.

Mr BUCHHOLZ: Is there any way that the defence force could see any light of this being reclassified? Is the evidence you have given us conclusive?

Mr Robert: Yes.

Mr BUCHHOLZ: I am just asking for the *Hansard* record, because I have no doubt our petitioners will troll through Hansard looking to make sure that we have gone as hard as we can.

Mr Robert: That is a question the government should answer. Based on all the available evidence we have, written and otherwise, there is nothing that would at present indicate that the risk level would move from low.

Mrs PRENTICE: Has there been any request from the Bougainville people to have their service reclassified?

Mr Robert: Not that I have seen. Jacqueline, anything from the department?

Ms Cooper: Yes, we have had one or two. I believe they have also had a request through the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal to have the medallic recognition raised to a AASM.

Mrs PRENTICE: Am I allowed to ask where it is going?

Ms Cooper: It has been denied.

Mrs PRENTICE: It has been denied?

Ms Cooper: We have reviewed the service and it is—

Mr Robert: It was an unarmed operation. I was in the middle of it at the very start.

Mrs PRENTICE: It was not friendly.

Mr Robert: No. I ran the force protection element of it—out there every single day in it. However, it was still unarmed. We were unafraid with our little yellow hats on.

CHAIR: Former RCB personnel have likened their service to that undertaken by Defence Force personnel in East Timor between 1999 and 2003. Is this a reasonable comparison? If not, how does the service of RCB differ from that undertaken by Australians in East Timor?

Col. Thompson: I would say that the nature of service was considerable. East Timor was an armed operation with an expectation of casualties, with a real threat from the insurgents at the time. Combat patrols were extensively taken and force protection measures—which you would expect in a warlike circumstance—were undertaken. The Rifle Company Butterworth—it would be difficult to draw any comparisons with what went on in East Timor.

CHAIR: Any further questions? Are there any concluding remarks that you would like to make? Okay. Thank you very much for your evidence. If the committee has further questions for you, the secretariat will contact you. We have now come to the end of our public hearing session. I thank all participants for their contribution. It has been a most interesting public hearing. As our participants today know, it is not the committee's practice to make recommendations on the basis of this kind of public hearing, nor is it the committee's role to investigate petition issues beyond hearing from relevant ministers and petitioners. The aim of today's hearing is to amplify the issues raised by petitions and to look into them, particularly in the light of any government response. There will be an official transcript which will be published on the committee's website in due course.

Resolved that these proceedings be published.

Committee adjourned at 10:13



Australian Government

Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal

**INQUIRY INTO UNRESOLVED RECOGNITION ISSUES FOR
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WHO SERVED
AT UBON BETWEEN 1965 AND 1968**

LETTER OF TRANSMISSION

Inquiry into Unresolved Recognition Issues for Royal Australian Air Force personnel who served at Ubon between 1965 and 1968


Senator the Hon David Feeney
Parliamentary Secretary for Defence
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600

Dear Parliamentary Secretary,

I am pleased to present the report of the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal on the *Inquiry into Unresolved Recognition Issues for Royal Australian Air Force Personnel who served at Ubon between 1965 and 1968*.

The inquiry was conducted in accordance with the Terms of Reference. The panel of the Tribunal that conducted the inquiry arrived unanimously at the findings and recommendations set out in its report.

Yours sincerely



Professor Dennis Pearce AO
Chair

18 February 2011

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal shall inquire into and report on unresolved concerns regarding service of Australian Defence Force members at the Royal Thai Air Force Base Ubon between 25 June 1965 and 31 August 1968.

In conducting its inquiry the Tribunal shall:

- (a) make findings and recommendations as to the eligibility of Australian Defence Force members who served at Ubon for the Vietnam Logistic Support Medal or the granting of any other form of recognition for their service, and
- (b) consider any other material relevant to these claims, including, but not limited to, any previous reviews conducted with regard to recognition for this service.

The Tribunal is to examine relevant documentary evidence, and consider the nature and context of the service in relation to the criteria for Australian and Imperial awards that existed at that time, in order to arrive at a fair and sustainable response to claims for recognition.

The Tribunal may interview such persons as it considers appropriate and consider material provided to it that is relevant to these terms of reference.

The Tribunal is to report to the Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Support on its findings in regard to the above and any recommendations that arise from the inquiry.

In making its findings and formulating its recommendations the Tribunal is required to maintain the integrity of the Australian honours system and identify any consequential impact any finding or recommendation may have on that system.

The Tribunal is to determine its own procedures, in accordance with the general principles of procedural fairness, when conducting its inquiry as set out in these Terms of Reference.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) is established under the *Defence Act 1903*. Its functions are set out in s 110UA of the Act. The Minister may direct the Tribunal to hold an inquiry into a specified matter concerning honours or awards and the Tribunal must hold an inquiry and report, with recommendations, to the Minister.

2. On 16 July 2010, the then Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Support, the Hon Dr Mike Kelly AM MP, directed the Tribunal to inquire into and report on unresolved recognition issues for Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel who served at Ubon (Thailand) between 1965 and 1968. A full copy of the Terms of Reference (TOR) is at the commencement of this report.

3. The inquiry was undertaken by the following members of the Tribunal:

Professor Dennis Pearce, AO (Chair)
Air Commodore Mark Lax, OAM, CSM (Retd)
Mr Kevin Woods, CSC, OAM

Summary of RAAF service at Ubon

4. Ubon is a Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) base in South Eastern Thailand. In 1962, as part of Australia's SEATO commitment, RAAF No. 79 Squadron comprising eight Sabre jets, together with associated support staff, was posted to the base. The purpose of the posting was to provide support for Thailand against a possible communist invasion from Laos. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) for No. 79 Squadron allowed the use of force against aircraft attacking Thailand with weapons without warning. The Squadron's area of activity was limited to the Thai borders.

5. By 1965 it was apparent that the threat to Thailand had passed and it was proposed by the RAAF that the Squadron return to Australia. However, by this time the United States Air Force (USAF) 8th Tactical Fighter Wing had commenced to use Ubon, initially in support of Thailand but later as a base for air attacks on North Vietnam. Following high-level negotiations it was agreed that No. 79 Squadron would remain at Ubon with a view to providing a bilateral joint US/Asian military presence to confront the spread of communism in South East Asia.

6. An integrated air defence system for Thailand was developed involving the USAF, the RTAF and the RAAF with fighter planes on air defence alert. This system was part of the USAF's Mainland South East Asia Air Defence Network which was in turn part of the Pacific Air Defence Network operated by US Pacific Command.

7. From March 1965, the USAF increased its bombing of North Vietnamese targets under Operation ROLLING THUNDER. Ubon was one of the bases used for this operation. As a result it was perceived that Ubon had become a significant target for retaliatory raids.

8. On 25 June 1965, with the consent of the Australian Government, No. 79 Squadron commenced the highest sustainable armed air defence alert of Alert State Five. This alert level applied daily from dawn to dusk seven days per week. It meant that two of the Squadron's eight Sabres were continuously fully armed and made ready for takeoff on five minutes notice. New ROE permitted use of force against aircraft attacking forces in Thailand and before the attackers used their weapons. However, the restriction on flying only within Thailand airspace was maintained.

9. At about the same time a flight of Airfield Defence Guards (ADG) was sent to Ubon to protect the base from ground attacks. These guards patrolled the base on 24 hours seven days per week basis. They also undertook patrols outside the base perimeter which US forces were not permitted to do.

10. High-level government discussions occurred from time to time on the broadening of No. 79 Squadron's activities but these were not proceeded with, largely because of the perceived sensitivities of the Thai and Malaysian Governments to be seen to support the USAF's involvement in the Vietnam War and as such activities were outside the SEATO treaty obligations. No action was taken by the USAF to protect Ubon with aircraft while No. 79 Squadron was at the base. Rather the base was used as the take-off point for Phantom fighter bomber aircraft on 24 hours seven days per week basis.

11. No. 79 Squadron withdrew from Ubon on 26 July 1968. Before doing so, a request was made to Commander 7th Air Force for approval to release the Squadron from its alert status. This was duly given.

Award sought

12. The RAAF personnel who served at Ubon from 25 June 1965 till 26 July 1968 have been awarded the Australian Active Service Medal (AASM) 1945-75 with Clasp 'THAILAND'. They are also seeking the award of a campaign medal. The award sought is either the Vietnam Medal (VM) or the Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal (VLSM). The personnel do not qualify for either of these medals under the present rules.

13. The claims for medallic recognition have been considered on a number of occasions. The two most recent of these are the *Report by the Independent Review Panel on Vietnam Campaign Recognition for RAAF Service at Ubon, Thailand 25 June 1965 to 31 August 1968, 2004*, (Riding Report) and the *Review of service recognition for RAAF Ubon (1965-68), 2008*, (Abigail Report).

14. The Riding Report recommended that the VM be awarded to the personnel who served at Ubon during the period referred to. This recommendation was not accepted by the government. The Abigail Report recommended that no action be taken to offer further recognition, including by way of the VLSM, for service of RAAF personnel stationed at Ubon. The government accepted this recommendation.

15. It was primarily because of the conflicting outcomes of these reports that the matter was referred to the Tribunal. In the Tribunal's view the conflict between the reports turns on the difference in result flowing from a close adherence to the formal legal status of No. 79 Squadron at Ubon, which was the approach taken by the Abigail Panel, and endeavouring to go behind that formal status to ask the question what was the task in fact

undertaken by No. 79 Squadron while based at Ubon - the approach taken by the Riding Panel.

16. The Tribunal received extensive evidence relating to the activities undertaken by No. 79 Squadron while at Ubon. There is no doubt in the Tribunal's view that the conditions of service there were warlike – as has been recognised by the Government by awarding the persons serving there the AASM 1945-75 with Clasp 'THAILAND' and granting eligibility for repatriation benefits. The only war that was producing these warlike conditions was that against North Vietnam.

17. The question therefore is whether, after 45 years, it is now possible to confront the reality of No. 79 Squadron's involvement in the Vietnam War. In the Tribunal's view it is time for it to be recognised that the squadron was making a significant contribution to the air campaign directed against North Vietnam. It provided the protection of an important base on behalf of the USAF. This is how the US viewed what the squadron was doing and the Tribunal considers that it is the correct view of the squadron's actions.

18. The VLSM was struck to recognise service personnel who had given essential and direct logistic support to Australian forces in Vietnam. The Tribunal considers that service at Ubon from July 1965 equates with the type of service for which the VLSM has been awarded. The USAF air war directed against North Vietnam was an integral part of the conflict in which Australian forces were engaged. There is no doubt in the Tribunal's view that the Australian personnel at Ubon performed an essential support role for the USAF. As recognised by the government, they were engaged in warlike activities and that war was the Vietnam War.

19. The Tribunal concludes that service at Ubon from 25 June 1965 to 31 August 1968 should be recognised with the award of the VLSM. The Tribunal does not consider that there will be any flow on effect for other service if such an award is made.

RECOMMENDATIONS

20. The Tribunal makes the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1: RAAF personnel who served at Ubon air base in Thailand from 25 June 1965 until 31 August 1968 be awarded the Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal.

Recommendation 2: The Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal Regulations be amended to give effect to this recommendation.

REPORT OF THE TRIBUNAL

Conduct of the Inquiry

1. The Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) is established under the *Defence Act 1903*. Its functions are set out in s 110UA of the Act. The Minister may direct the Tribunal to hold an inquiry into a specified matter concerning honours or awards and the Tribunal must hold an inquiry and report, with recommendations, to the Minister.

2. On 16 July 2010, the then Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Support, the Hon Dr Mike Kelly AM MP, directed the Tribunal to inquire into and report on unresolved recognition issues for Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel who served at Ubon (Thailand) between 1965 and 1968. A full copy of the Terms of Reference (TOR) is at the commencement of this report.

3. The inquiry was undertaken by the following members of the Tribunal:

Professor Dennis Pearce, AO (Chair)
Air Commodore Mark Lax, OAM, CSM (Retd)
Mr Kevin Woods, CSC, OAM

Steps taken in the inquiry

4. The inquiry commenced on 16 July 2010, with advertisements being placed in the major newspapers nationally giving notice of the inquiry and calling for submissions by 30 August 2010.

5. On 30 July 2010, the Tribunal wrote to key government organisations, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Department of Defence (Defence), advising them of the inquiry and inviting them to make submissions. The Tribunal also wrote to interested organisations and individuals who had previously made representations to the Minister.

6. The Tribunal received 24 written submissions from individuals and interested organisations. Attached at Appendix 1 is a list of the organisations and individuals who made written submissions.

7. The Tribunal conducted hearings in Canberra on 6, 8 and 21 October 2010 to hear evidence from various individuals, interested organisations and from Defence. A total of 10 persons made oral submissions to the Tribunal. Appendix 2 provides details of the Tribunal hearings and the persons who appeared at those hearings.

8. The Tribunal also considered additional supporting material including archival and departmental records and eye witness reports. The material is listed at Appendix 3.

Summary of RAAF service at Ubon

9. Ubon is a Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) base in South Eastern Thailand. In 1962, as part of Australia's SEATO¹ commitment, RAAF No. 79 Squadron comprising eight Sabre jets, together with associated support staff, was posted to the base. The purpose of the posting was to provide support for Thailand against a possible communist invasion from Laos. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) for No. 79 Squadron allowed the use of force against aircraft attacking Thailand with weapons without warning. The squadron's area of activity was limited to the Thai borders.

10. By 1965 it was apparent that the threat to Thailand had passed and it was proposed by the RAAF that the Squadron return to Australia. However, by this time the United States Air Force (USAF) 8th Tactical Fighter Wing had commenced to use Ubon, initially in support of Thailand but later as a base for air attacks on North Vietnam. Following high-level negotiations it was agreed that No. 79 Squadron would remain at Ubon with a view to its providing a bilateral joint US/Asian military presence to confront the spread of communism in South East Asia.

11. An integrated air defence system for Thailand was developed involving the USAF, the RTAF and the RAAF with fighter planes on air defence alert. This system was part of the USAF's Mainland South East Asia Air Defence Network which was in turn part of the Pacific Air Defence Network operated by US Pacific Command.

12. From March 1965, the USAF increased its bombing of North Vietnamese targets under Operation ROLLING THUNDER. Ubon was one of the bases used for this operation. As a result it was perceived that Ubon had become a significant target for retaliatory raids.

13. On 25 June 1965, with the consent of the Australian Government, No. 79 Squadron commenced the highest sustainable armed air defence alert of Alert State Five. This alert level applied daily from dawn to dusk seven days per week. It meant that two of the Squadron's eight Sabres were continuously fully armed and made ready for takeoff on five minutes notice. New ROE permitted use of force against aircraft attacking forces in Thailand and before the attackers used their weapons. However, the restriction on flying only within Thailand airspace was maintained.

14. At about the same time a flight of Airfield Defence Guards (ADG) was sent to Ubon to protect the base from ground attacks. These guards patrolled the base on a 24 hours seven days per week basis. They also undertook patrols outside the base perimeter which US forces were not permitted to do.

15. High-level government discussions occurred from time to time on the broadening of No. 79 Squadron's activities but these were not proceeded with, largely because of the perceived sensitivities of the Thai and Malaysian Governments to be seen to support the USAF's involvement in the Vietnam War and as such activities were outside the SEATO treaty obligations.

¹ SEATO was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, a multi-national collective defence arrangement established between 1954 and 1977. Member states included Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, France, (East) Pakistan, The Philippines, ROC (Taiwan), USA and the UK. Notably, Singapore and Malaysia were not members.

16. No action was taken by the USAF to protect Ubon with aircraft while No. 79 Squadron was at the base. Rather the base was used as the take-off point for Phantom fighter bomber aircraft on a 24 hours seven days per week basis. Planes took off in groups of four every 15 minutes throughout daylight hours and in groups of two at that interval during the night.

17. No. 79 Squadron withdrew from Ubon on 26 July 1968. Before doing so, a request was made to Commander 7th Air Force for approval to release the Squadron from its alert status. This was duly given.

18. A fuller account of this history is included in an extract from the *Report by the Independent Review Panel on Vietnam Campaign Recognition for RAAF Service at Ubon, Thailand 25 June 1965 to 31 August 1968, 2004*, (Riding Report) set out in summary form at Appendix 4.²

Award sought

19. The RAAF personnel who served at Ubon from 25 June 1965 till 26 July 1968 have been awarded the Australian Active Service Medal (AASM) 1945-75 with Clasp 'THAILAND'. They are also seeking the award of a campaign medal. The award sought is either the Vietnam Medal (VM) or the Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal (VLSM).

20. The VM may be awarded to Australian Defence Force personnel who rendered service in operations in Vietnam. The service that qualifies for an award is:

- Service of 28 days continuous or aggregated in ships or craft employed in operations on inland waters or off the coast of Vietnam;
- Service of one day or more on the posted strength of a unit or formation on land in Vietnam;
- One operational sortie over Vietnam or Vietnamese waters by aircrew on the posted strength of a unit allocated for direct support of operations in Vietnam.

21. The VLSM may be awarded for service of one day or more in the area of operations of Vietnam during the period 29 May 1964 to 27 January 1973:

- As a member of the crew of a ship or aircraft operating in support of the Australian Armed Forces;
- While attached to a unit or organisation operating in support of the Australian Armed Forces;
- While attached to, or serving with, a unit of the Australian Armed Forces or allied forces as an observer.

² Readers should also consult the two official histories: Chris Coulthard-Clark, *The RAAF in Vietnam: Australian Air Involvement in the Vietnam War 1962-1975*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1995, pp 10-16; and Alan Stephens, *Going Solo: The Royal Australian Air Force, 1946-1971*, AGPS, Canberra, 1995, chapter 14 (pp 272-281).

The area of operations of Vietnam is defined as the area of land and waters forming part of the territory of Vietnam; the waters off the coast of Vietnam; and the airspace above those areas.

22. It is accepted that service in Ubon does not fall within the qualifications for the award of either of these medals as presently stated.

Previous consideration of claims

23. Claims for recognition for service in Ubon have been considered on a number of occasions as set out in Appendix 5. The following is an outline of those reviews and their outcomes.

24. The *Committee of Inquiry into Defence and Defence-Related Awards*, 1994, (CIDA) recommended the award of the Australian Service Medal (ASM) 1945-75 with Clasp 'UBON' for all who served at the Ubon airbase for a period of 30 days or more. This recommendation was accepted by the government, although the clasp was amended to 'THAILAND'.

25. The *Review of Service Entitlement Anomalies in Respect of South-East Asian Service 1955-75*, 2000, (Mohr Review) considered that service at Ubon between 25 June 1965 and 31 August 1968 was properly to be regarded as 'warlike'. It accordingly recommended that medallic awards and eligibility for repatriation benefits should recognise this. These recommendations were based largely on the change in the ROE applicable to No. 79 Squadron by the removal of the requirement that engagement only be permitted against aircraft 'attacking with weapons'. The recommendations were accepted by the government which resulted in the upgrade of the ASM, awarded following the CIDA Report, to an AASM 1945-75 with Clasp 'THAILAND' for service during the period specified.

26. The *Report of the Review of Veterans' Entitlements*, 2003, (Clarke Review) recommended against extending eligibility for repatriation benefits to persons who served at Ubon in the period prior to 25 June 1965. Such service could not be classified as 'warlike'.

27. The *Report by the Independent Review Panel on Vietnam Campaign Recognition for RAAF Service at Ubon, Thailand 25 June 1965 to 31 August 1968*, 2004, (Riding Report) recommended that the VM be awarded to the personnel who served at Ubon during the period referred to. This recommendation was not accepted by the government.

28. The Ministerial direction to the Panel required it to consider 'whether additional information presented by the RAAF Ubon Recognition Group provided sufficient evidence for amending the regulations governing the award of the VLSM to cover Ubon service during the period 25 June 1965 to 31 August 1968'.³ The Panel recommended that the VM be awarded. This was technically outside its Ministerial direction which had directed it to the VLSM only. This was alluded to in the Minister's statement rejecting the Panel's recommendation.

³ AIRMSHL Riding advised the Tribunal that he was not given formal TORs, but merely a letter from the Minister to undertake the review.

29. The *Review of service recognition for RAAF Ubon (1965-68)*, 2008, (Abigail Report) recommended that no action be taken to offer further recognition, including by way of the VLSM, for service of RAAF personnel stationed at Ubon. The government accepted this recommendation.

30. The Abigail Panel's TOR required it to 'consider the merits of the claim for further service medal recognition by way of the Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal. The panel will examine the documentary evidence available and consider the nature and context of service at RAAF Ubon to arrive at a fair and sustainable outcome'. In accordance with its Terms of Reference, the panel did not call for submissions. However, it took evidence from representatives of the RAAF Ubon Recognition Group (RURG) after complaint was raised about its methodology. It did not call on other witnesses.

31. It was primarily because of the conflicting outcomes of the last two reports that the matter was referred to the Tribunal.

32. In the Tribunal's view the conflict between the reports turns on the difference in result flowing from a close adherence to the formal legal status of No. 79 Squadron at Ubon, which was the approach taken by the Abigail Panel, and endeavouring to go behind that formal status to ask the question what was the task in fact undertaken by No. 79 Squadron while based at Ubon - the approach taken by the Riding Panel.

Representations to the Tribunal

33. The RURG was set up in 1990 to press for recognition of service at Ubon. The founder of RURG, Mr Mal Barnes, and its Executive Officer, Mr Richard Stone, appeared at a hearing of the Tribunal. Mr Barnes had served at Ubon in 1966 as a Leading Aircraftsman. Mr Stone had been there in 1968 as an Administrative Officer. Both men had given evidence to both the Riding and the Abigail reviews.

34. Evidence was given to the Tribunal also by:

Air Vice-Marshal Roxley McLennan AO, (Retd) National President,
Royal Australian Air Force Association
Air Vice-Marshal Peter Scully, AO (Retd)
Wing Commander Peter Larard (Retd)
Group Captain John Jacobsen (Retd)

With the exception of Air Vice-Marshal McLennan, each of these witnesses had served as a Sabre pilot at Ubon during the relevant period (1965-68), and each had also been the Detachment Commander. All of them had appeared before the Riding Committee but none had given evidence to the Abigail Panel.

35. At the invitation of the Tribunal, Wing Commander Glen Hombsch (Retd), the Flight Commander of the Ubon ADG in 1967-68, gave evidence to the Tribunal relating to the role of the Defence Guards at the base.

37. Air Marshal Douglas Riding appeared before the Tribunal at the Tribunal's invitation. Air Marshal Riding had served as a pilot at Ubon and was the chair of the Riding Review.

38. Major General Peter Abigail was invited by the Tribunal to appear before it but declined, indicating that he did not wish to add anything to his report.

39. The Department of Defence, represented by Mr Pat Clarke and Mr Brett Mitchell, appeared before the Tribunal. The Defence Department maintains that the recommendation of 'no action be taken to offer further recognition including by way of VLSM, for service of RAAF personnel stationed at Ubon' in the Abigail Report was correct.

40. Twenty-four written submissions were received and taken into account by the Tribunal. All submissions except that from Defence supported recognition for those who served in Ubon by the award of either the VM or the VLSM.

Analysis of evidence

41. A consistent picture was presented by all witnesses. Ubon was a major base for US aircraft from the early 1960s. Initially it was used as part of the US's SEATO commitments. However, from 1965 the base was used by the USAF only for the air war against North Vietnam. It was not used for the defence of Thailand except by a squadron of RTAF piston driven planes (No. 22 Squadron, RTAF) which engaged in local area patrol duties. The USAF activities were devoted to the Vietnam War, not to the defence of Thailand which was no longer considered to be under threat of attack from any quarter.

42. The Mohr Review's description of the position is instructive. It said:

The US stance in Thailand changed from being concerned, primarily, with that country's air defence to one of using Thailand as a base for the USAF's increased aerial commitment to the military effort in the Vietnam conflict. As a consequence, the threat of retaliation from either China or North Vietnam against bases in Thailand from which USAF aircraft operated grew markedly. There was an increased threat posed to airfields in Thailand by direct aerial attacks, attacks on the USAF aircraft returning to Thailand and from ground attacks on airfields by communist insurgents. As Ubon was one of the most important USAF bases for its air operations in the Vietnam conflict, the threat to that airfield grew to quite a high level.

The Australian Defence Committee in 1965 reviewed the implications for Australia of the USAF build up of forces at Ubon. Notwithstanding the increased threat to Ubon, the Committee felt that,

... while the operations by RAAF aircraft in the air defence role will be confined to the boundaries of Thailand, the fact that RAAF aircraft are being employed in the defence of an air base from which offensive operations are being mounted against North Vietnam could be considered by North Vietnam and Communist China as being similar to participation in the actual offensive operation.

Nevertheless, the Defence Committee considered:

... the probability of enemy air attacks [on Thailand] would be slight.

Despite this assessment, the RAAF's commitment to the air defence of Thailand was elevated to meet the increased threat posed by the USAF's escalating efforts in the Vietnam conflict. A critical conference was held on 12 June 1965 between Commander Second Air Division USAF and the Officer Commanding RAAF Ubon. At the conference it was proposed that the RAAF undertake the air defence alert tasks with its aircraft at 'Alert State Five', from dawn to dusk seven days a week.

'Alert State Five' required that two fully armed aircraft be held on an operational readiness platform, preflighted, with pilots in close presence, ready and able to become airborne within five minutes to engage an intruding aircraft with a view to its destruction. This was the highest 'alert state' that could be achieved. 'Alert State Two', which required pilots to be seated in their aircraft, was impossible because of extreme heat experienced in that climate, and the next alert state, which called for a 'Combat Air Patrol' to be mounted with two aircraft airborne at all times, was beyond the Squadron's capability.⁴

43. The RAAF Sabres were operated under specific ROE as specified in SEATO Plans 4 and 6, with the intention to preserve the integrity of Thailand's airspace. According to the RAAF Official Historian:

Pilots were given three conditions under which 'the use of force' against hostile aircraft was permissible: self defence; in the air defence of Thailand when instructed by the Air Board; and if requested by the Thai authorities in the event of an attack without prior warning and prior reference to the Board was not practicable.⁵

On 25 June 1965, the RAAF detachment officially became part of the Thai Integrated Air Defence System controlled out of the Headquarters in Bangkok. The ROE changed to allow the Sabre aircraft to be placed on five-minute alert. The order to 'scramble' the Sabres would come from the Thai Air Defence Commander and not the Australian Air Officer Commanding.

44. Upon the arrival of the USAF in April 1965, Australian, US and Thai forces regarded the base as an integrated entity. Australian forces personnel shared guard duties with the other forces. RAAF fire fighters participated in fire and rescue of US aircraft crash incidents, airfield accidents and ground fires. RAAF refuellers were also used to refuel US aircraft. There was a continuing exchange of information between the parties. Most significantly, the USAF did not allocate resources to the defence of the base. As noted previously, RAAF Sabres provided the air cover for the base and RAAF ADGs provided the ground cover by protecting the base perimeter and surrounding terrain.

45. The evidence to the Tribunal indicated that the perceived threat to the base was real. The author of the official history, the RAAF in Vietnam, noted that: 'The RAAF

⁴ Review of Service Entitlement Anomalies in Respect of South-East Asian Service 1955-75 (The Mohr Review), Chapter 6, pp 6-3 and 6-4. Italics in original. The official histories both agree with this position. Coulthard-Clark, p 89-90 and Stephens, p 277-78.

⁵ Stephens, p 276.

personnel so deployed there [to Ubon] had not the slightest doubt they were at war'.⁶ The Sabres of No. 79 Squadron were scrambled from time to time to meet an apparent threat from incoming aircraft. Orders to scramble came from the USAF. No engagement ever occurred but there were instances of suspected enemy aircraft turning away, presumably when the presence of the Sabres became known. While the Alert State Five applied only during daylight hours, there were occasions when the pilots were placed on standby at night.

46. The pilots' living quarters were alongside a very large fuel supply depot and adjacent to the runway from which the USAF Phantoms took off day and night. Sleep was problematic even when not on alert. Such a location meant the quarters were a target for enemy mortar attacks, another factor that highlighted the belief that the Australians were in a war-zone.

47. The ADGs conducted airfield defence duties 24 hours a day, seven days a week⁷. They conducted armed patrols outside the base perimeter at night as well as during the day. They occasionally conducted vehicle patrols outside of the base perimeter for up to distances of 20 kilometres. Patrols outside of the base perimeter were always accompanied by a Thai police officer.

48. All witnesses described the atmosphere on the base as 'tense'. They were always apprehensive of an attack. This was particularly because the USAF aircraft were not protected with revetments but were simply lined up on the airfield. There were usually around 70 aircraft at the base. They would have provided an opportune target for any enemy force. Witnesses who saw service in both Vietnam and at Ubon were unable to distinguish the sense of danger between the two areas of service. Indeed the guard work at Ubon was regarded by those who served in both theatres as more exacting than that in some areas of Vietnam.

49. The evidence all points to the purpose of the Australian engagement at Ubon in practice having changed in 1965 from providing assistance in the defence of Thailand under SEATO arrangements to providing support for the USAF air war against North Vietnam. This support was limited to the protection of the Ubon base and the USAF planes located there. Nonetheless, this was recognised by the US authorities as providing an essential element of their air operations under Operation ROLLING THUNDER. It was put to the Tribunal by one witness that the first step in any air power deployment is to secure the base from which operations are conducted. This step was taken for the USAF by the RAAF.⁸

The formal position

50. No evidence has been found stating that No. 79 Squadron was based in Ubon as part of Australia's commitment to the Vietnam War. This was sufficient to persuade the Abigail Panel that no further award should be conferred for service with No. 79 Squadron. That Panel said:

⁶ Coulthard-Clark, p 11.

⁷ It was suggested by Defence that Ubon did not operate on weekends. This is not correct. The base may have been closed then but the air operations and the guard duties continued throughout the weekend.

⁸ Wing Commander Larard (Retd), interview, 6 October 2010.

Throughout the entire period of deployment of RAAF Ubon, from 1962 to 1968, the purpose of the commitment remained to contribute to the air defence of Thailand and the forces were limited to operations within Thai territory. The commitment and limitations preceded the commencement of the USAF air campaign against North Vietnam in 1965, and subsequently ran in parallel with that campaign.

...

However, this type of co-operation [with the USAF at Ubon] and the provision of air defence within Thailand does not lead to a conclusion that RAAF Ubon was participating in the Vietnam War. It was not the primary purpose of the commitment. RAAF Ubon was never so assigned and the unambiguous policy intent of the Australian Government at the time is compelling in this regard.

51. If the matter is to be determined having regard only to the position stated formally by the Australian Government at the time, the Tribunal would agree with the Abigail Panel's conclusion. However, it was put to the Tribunal that the matter should be determined by looking at the factual circumstances that existed in their totality and not just as appears on official documents.

The case for recognition

52. The Tribunal has seen ample indication in the mass of documents relating to No. 79 Squadron's assignment to Ubon that indicates that there was sensitivity in Thailand and Malaysia about the role of the Squadron. The Vietnam War was a point of considerable contention among South-East Asian countries and there was a strong desire by some of them to avoid any appearance of commitment to either side in the conflict. References are common to Thai concerns about the role of Ubon as a support base for the USAF air war over Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The Australian documentation reflects these concerns.

53. There can be no doubt that the Australian Government did not wish it to appear publicly that No. 79 Squadron was engaged in the Vietnam War. Whether one can, or should, take the next step of saying that the Squadron was not engaged in that War seems to the Tribunal to be less certain. The documentation reveals a continuing dialogue between Australian and US Government representatives about the involvement of Australian forces in the War. The Ubon operation featured regularly in these discussions. The documentation is directed almost exclusively to the Vietnam War. The protection of Thailand rates barely a mention.

54. On the ground, the Australian involvement in the management of the airfield and the activities based on it was almost exclusively with the USAF. The RTAF was seen as a fringe player.

55. It is apparent that the Australian Government did not wish to expand the role of the Squadron beyond the Thai border. However, this seems to have been driven more by Thai sensitivities referred to above than any decision that it should represent the extent of the Australian involvement. There are suggestions, supported by the Defence Committee, for an expanded role but these were rejected expressly on political grounds. It might be noted that, at the same time as the government was specifying the limits to No. 79 Squadron's involvement, it was agreeing to an expansion of the Army and Naval

commitment to the War, and considering the deployment of a squadron of RAAF Canberra Bombers.

56. It is accepted that, from mid-1965, there was no external threat to Thailand except such as might flow from the fact of air bases in Thailand being used to attack North Vietnam. The only 'enemy' was North Vietnam and its allies. The primary task of the Squadron was to defend the Ubon air base.

57. The position seems to the Tribunal to be that the formal position was that No. 79 Squadron was at Ubon to protect Thailand from external aggression. From mid-1965, the practical reason for being there was to assist the USAF in its air war against North Vietnam. This is recognised by the Abigail Report which stated:

... the Panel concludes that the activities of RAAF Ubon did provide de facto support within Thailand to the USAF air campaign in Vietnam ... The Panel believes it reasonable to conclude that this outcome was both understood and accepted by the Australian government at the time.

58. However, as indicated above, the Abigail Panel considered that this did not warrant a finding of participation in the Vietnam War.

59. The Tribunal agrees with the Abigail Report's factual conclusions both on the formal basis on which No. 79 Squadron was present at Ubon and on the activities that were conducted by the Squadron at Ubon. The question that it must address is whether those conclusions lead to the rejection of a claim for recognition as they did for the Abigail Panel or whether it is appropriate to look behind that formal position to reach a conclusion on whether the Squadron's actions at Ubon (together with base support personnel) warrant recognition with a campaign medal.

Identification of 'the war'

60. The Tribunal considers that it is relevant to take into account the finding of the Mohr Review that determined that service at Ubon was 'warlike'. This conclusion was based on the following finding:

'Alert State Five' was not peacetime or garrison duty, nor was it a training exercise. 'Alert State Five' required that two fully armed aircraft be at the end of the runway with pilots in close presence, ready and able to be airborne within five minutes to engage an intruding aircraft with a view to its destruction, subject to identification or lack of it. The danger of casualties was clearly forecast.

The question then remains as to whether or not this was 'warlike' or 'non-warlike'. Did the squadron face an objective danger? Did they 'incur' danger? Even though no danger eventuated in the sense that there were no actual combat engagements, they were armed for combat and had been told by those who knew more of the situation that danger did exist and they must hold themselves in readiness to meet it, not at some indeterminable time in the future, but at five minutes notice.

In regard to base security this fell into two distinct areas. First, there was security within the base itself. The Review heard from a number of those who have been at Ubon. It is clear from what was said that within the base itself the RAAF contingent had prepared defensive protection and arms had been issued for use if needs be. Second, the ADGs patrolled both day and night outside the perimeter of the base and in so doing saw evidence of terrorist activity. So far as it is known they were never engaged in an exchange of fire, but the danger of terrorist activity in the general area was known and precautions taken. These patrols were armed and authorised to fire if the situation called for fire.

The Rules of Engagement for the RAAF contingent from 1965 onwards signified that contact with hostile forces of an enemy should be expected and that these hostile forces were to be engaged in armed combat with the aim of destroying them. In these circumstances there was an expectation of casualties.

Conclusion

It is my opinion that, in the final analysis, the period of service at Ubon in the period 1965-1968 was warlike in nature. Their service, most certainly comparable with many other groups of the three services in other similar limited conflicts, should properly be rewarded with the appropriate repatriation and medal entitlements.

61. The Government accepted the Report's recommendation by its approval of the award of the AASM 1945-75 with Clasp 'THAILAND' to those serving at Ubon.

62. It is difficult to see what the operation was that could be classified as warlike other than the war against North Vietnam or its allies.⁹ There was no circumstance post-July 1965 involving Thailand that could be described as warlike – except the threat of attack from North Vietnam. This threat arose from the air campaign being undertaken by the USAF as part of the Vietnam War.

63. Whatever might have been said in the formal decisions relating to the retention of No. 79 Squadron in Ubon, it is clear that the real purpose of its posting was to assist the USAF air campaign against North Vietnam. There was no other reason for the Squadron to be there. Thailand was not under independent threat. The proposal was that the Squadron be returned to Australia when the threat to Thailand came to an end in 1965. It was in response to US requests that the Squadron was left at Ubon.

Conclusion on eligibility for award

64. It seems to the Tribunal to be splitting hairs to say that No. 79 Squadron was retained at Ubon for the defence of Thailand and not as part of the Vietnam War effort when it is recognised that it was the use of Thai bases in support of that War that was providing the threat to Thailand.

65. The extent to which Australian decision-making was tailored to the political sensitivities of the time is demonstrated by the evidence to the Tribunal of the subterfuges

⁹ The Tribunal noted that the Australian War Memorial Roll of Honour recognises the two members of the RAAF detachment who died during the Ubon detachment, 1965-1968.

practised to replace aircraft stationed at Ubon with new aircraft based at RAAF Base Butterworth in Malaysia when routine maintenance was required. Two Sabres would be flown in from Butterworth as escort for transport aircraft and swapped at the base for the Sabres that were to be serviced. This, it was said, avoided the Malaysian Government being made aware of the regular use that was being made of the Sabres at Ubon. Whether this deceived the Malaysians may be doubted, but it met the political niceties that were regarded as a necessity.

66. The question therefore is whether, after 45 years, it is now possible to confront the reality of No. 79 Squadron's involvement in the Vietnam War. In the Tribunal's view it is time for it to be recognised that the Squadron was making a significant contribution to the air campaign directed against North Vietnam. It provided the protection of an important base on behalf of the USAF. This is how the US viewed what the Squadron was doing and the Tribunal considers that it is the correct view of the Squadron's actions.

Recognition flowing from this conclusion

67. The Tribunal's TOR requires it to make findings and recommendations as to the eligibility of ADF members who served at Ubon between 25 June 1965 and 31 August 1968 'for the VLSM or the granting of any other form of recognition for their service'.

68. Some witnesses before the Tribunal urged the recommendation of the VM. They said that No. 79 Squadron and the ADG members were as much engaged in the Vietnam War as those in the geographical area of Vietnam. They were 'at the sharp end' of the conflict. It was said that the making of awards by reference to geographical areas based on a ground war failed to have proper regard to the practicalities of air war. Operations involving aircraft are often not confined to the boundaries of a war's area of operation (AO). It is not sufficient to recognise air support only in terms of flights over the designated AO. Significant contributions are made and danger encountered outside the AO which should be recognised by the campaign medal appropriate to service in the AO.

69. It was this line of approach that had resulted in the Riding Report recommending the award of the VM. The Tribunal has sympathy for this approach and it should be taken into account when determining eligibility in relation to future conflicts. However, the Government has rejected the award of the VM to the Ubon personnel and the Tribunal is not persuaded that there is such a clear case for its award as to warrant a fresh recommendation.

70. The Tribunal considers that the position in regard to the VLSM is different. This medal was struck to recognise service personnel who had given essential and direct logistic support to Australian forces in Vietnam. As noted previously, the VLSM is awarded to persons who served in the Vietnam AO as a member of the crew of a ship or aircraft operating in support of the Australian Armed Forces or while attached to a unit or organisation operating in support of the Australian Armed Forces. Service does not have to be on the Vietnam land area but includes service up to 185 km off the coast. This picked up the service of those who served on the HMAS SYDNEY. Service on RAAF Hercules transport aircraft also qualified for the medal.

71. The Tribunal considers that service at Ubon from July 1965 equates with the type of service for which the VLISM has been awarded. The USAF air war directed against North Vietnam was an integral part of the conflict in which Australian forces were engaged. There is no doubt in the Tribunal's view that the Australian personnel at Ubon performed an essential support role for the USAF. As recognised by the government, they were engaged in warlike activities and that war was the Vietnam War. The Tribunal concluded that service at Ubon from 25 June 1965 to 31 August 1968 should be recognised with the award of the VLISM.

72. The Tribunal was not pressed to recommend any other form of recognition for service at Ubon and it makes no such recommendation.

Possible flow on from award of VLISM

73. The Tribunal directed its attention to other service that might claim to be in a position equivalent to that of service personnel at Ubon. No other personnel of whom the Tribunal is aware served under like conditions to those at Ubon. Accordingly, the Tribunal does not consider that there is likely to be any legitimate claims for further recognition.

74. The Tribunal's recommendation is based on the immediate support provided by Ubon personnel to the USAF at the Ubon base, the level of preparedness that this support demanded and the nature of the threat to the base. These conditions were not replicated, for example, at RAAF Base Butterworth. Nor did they apply to RAAF personnel involved in the observation of the combat flying of USAF F-111s under Operation COMBAT LANCER at RTAF Base Takhli. These personnel are mentioned in the Mohr Review. However, they were not involved in direct logistical support of the kind provided at Ubon, nor were they under the same level of threat.

75. For the same reason that the Mohr Review did not find that service at Ubon prior to 25 June 1965 should be regarded as 'warlike', the Tribunal finds that such service does not qualify for the award of the VLISM.

RECOMMENDATIONS

76. The Tribunal makes the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1: RAAF personnel who served at Ubon air base in Thailand from 25 June 1965 until 31 August 1968 be awarded the Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal.

Recommendation 2: The Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal Regulations be amended to give effect to this recommendation.

Appendix 1 – Submissions

The Tribunal received submissions from the following people and organisations:

Donald Godfrey Battams
Allen Burns
Squadron Leader Trevor Butler (Retd)
Vittorio Carbone
Terry Deery
Department of Defence
Warren E Dickson
Mike Fogarty
Claude Halsey
Group Captain John Jacobsen (Retd)
John Jeffreys
Cecil John Edmund Levien BEM
Peter Edward Lewis
Henry Michael Loeckenhoff
Robert Manning
Michael Morrissey
Maxwell James Pahl
Denys Potts
Royal Australian Air Force Association
RAAF Ubon Branch SA Division
RAAF Ubon Reunion Recognition Group
Joseph Douglas Richards
Sydney Ryan
Arthur Skimin

Appendix 2 – Tribunal Hearings

15 September 2010

Chair: Professor Dennis Pearce, AO

Members: Air Commodore Mark Lax, OAM, CSM (Retd) and Mr Kevin Woods, CSC, OAM

06 October 2010

Chair: Professor Dennis Pearce, AO

Members: Air Commodore Mark Lax, OAM, CSM (Retd) and Mr Kevin Woods, CSC, OAM

Witnesses:

Air Vice-Marshal Roxley McLennan, AO (Retd), National President RAAF Association

Air Vice-Marshal Peter Scully, AO (Retd) (via Teleconference)

Wing Commander Peter Larard (Retd) (via Teleconference)

08 October 2010

Chair: Professor Dennis Pearce, AO

Members: Air Commodore Mark Lax, OAM, CSM (Retd) and Mr Kevin Woods, CSC, OAM

Witnesses:

Group Captain John Jacobsen (Retd) (via Teleconference)

Pat Clark and Brett Mitchell, Department of Defence

Mal Barnes and Richard Stone, RAAF Ubon Recognition Group

Air Marshal Douglas Riding, AO, DFC (Retd)

21 October 2010

Chair: Professor Dennis Pearce, AO

Members: Air Commodore Mark Lax, OAM, CSM (Retd) and Mr Kevin Woods, CSC, OAM

Witness:

Wing Commander Glen Hombsch (Retd) (via Teleconference)

Appendix 3 – Additional Material Examined by the Tribunal

Archival Records

National Archives of Australia

Series A1209

1961/600 SEATO Plan 5 (Defence Committee)
1962/122 SEATO MPO Plan 7

Published sources

Chris Coulthard-Clark, *The RAAF in Vietnam: Australian Air Involvement in the Vietnam War 1962-1975*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1995

Alan Stephens, *Going Solo: The Royal Australian Air Force, 1946-1971*, AGPS, Canberra, 1995

Other sources

The previous official reports concerning Ubon service are listed and summarised at Appendices 4 and 5

Appendix 4 – Summary of RAAF Involvement at Ubon¹⁰

The RAAF Contingent was sent to Thailand in June 1962 under the aegis of SEATO Plan 5, a plan to counter communist insurgency in Laos.

The Contingent consisted of the Command Element, No. 79 Squadron and Base Squadron Ubon.

The original role of No. 79 Squadron was air defence of Thailand and Base Squadron Ubon's role was to support the squadron and provide airfield support services to SEATO air forces using the airfield.

Operational air defence command and control was coordinated through COMUSMACTHAI.

The ROE allowed the use of force against aircraft attacking Thai territory with weapons without warning.

In early 1963 the Laotian crisis passed and the Australian Government considered withdrawing the RAAF Contingent, following withdrawal of UK and NZ air forces and US ground forces deployed under Plan 5.

But it decided to leave the Contingent in place to provide a bilateral joint US/AS military presence to confront the spread of communism in South East Asia.

In response to a perceived air threat from North Vietnam in August 1964, the USAF and RTAF developed an integrated air defence system for Thailand with fighters on air defence alert and new ROE. The RAAF was invited to join.

This new Thai air defence system was part of the USAF Mainland South East Asia Air Defence Network which was in turn part of the Pacific Air Defence Network.

The RAAF/USAF and RTAF agreed new RAAF Roles, Tasks and ROE, significantly broadening the original, to mount an air defence alert and allow use of force against aircraft attacking forces in Thailand, and before the attackers used their weapons.

The context of this new air defence tasking had its genesis in December 1964 when the US signalled its intention to mount an air campaign against North Vietnam and the Communist supply routes through Laos.

In response to a request to assess what additional assistance Australia might provide to South Vietnam, one of the additional forms of assistance in the air campaign suggested by the Department of Defence was the employment of No. 79 Squadron at Ubon in the air defence role at a high state of alert. This was supported by the Department of External

¹⁰ *Report by the Independent Review Panel on Vietnam Campaign Recognition for RAAF Service at Ubon, Thailand 25 June 1965 to 31 August 1968, 2004, pp 17-19.*

Affairs who also suggested that perimeter defence forces at Ubon would be desirable, given the likelihood of an enemy retaliation to the air campaign.

US Operation ROLLING THUNDER commenced on 2 March 1965 with attacks against North Vietnam and Laos with reprisal raids for specific VC activity and on interdiction targets in the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply routes.

As a result, the perceived enemy threat against allied bases in Thailand increased, with air and ground attacks possible.

The likelihood of air attack was considered slight but would be catastrophic if carried out. Allied air defence forces were maintained at the highest sustainable level of air defence alert.

On 25 June 1965, No. 79 Squadron commenced the highest sustainable armed air defence alert of Alert State Five daily from dawn to dusk with the new ROE in effect.

The ground threat from insurgents was considered more likely, and the RAAF sent a flight of Airfield Defence Guards to protect the RAAF Contingent at Ubon. On 26 July 1965 President Johnson requested additional Australian forces for the war.

Expanding the role of No. 79 Squadron was considered but not taken up primarily because of Department of External Affairs' concern about deniability. In this context, the RAAF Sabres were a unique type of aircraft in the air campaign, and as they could only have come from Ubon in Thailand, this would have created political difficulties at the time for the Thai Government. As a consequence No. 79 Squadron's support for the air campaign remained in the air defence role.

In mid 1966 the US established a more comprehensive air defence plan (OPLAN 427-66) for Mainland South East Asia because of concern about the continuing vulnerability of vital equipment and bases in Thailand and South Vietnam to enemy air attack.

The Minister for Defence approved No. 79 Squadron's participation in this plan.

No. 79 Squadron was listed under 'Augmentation Forces' in OPLAN 427-66.

Overall air defence operations were conducted through a single control agency.

PACAF publications were the standard source of reference for all operations.

The Mainland SEA air defence region operated on a 24 hour basis.

No. 79 Squadron operations were subject to RAAF ROE including geographic constraint.

Alert states by all air defence forces were determined and ordered by the Commander 7th Air Force in Saigon and the host country air force.

No. 79 Squadron operated under this plan until its withdrawal on 26 July 1968.

To give effect to the withdrawal, which was necessary because of the Mirage III re-equipment program, Department of Air requested Commander 7th AF Commander's approval to release of No. 79 Squadron from its alert status.

7th AF approved release with effect 0001hrs local, 26 July 1968.

Appendix 5 – Summary of Previous Ubon Reviews

RAAF service at Ubon between 1965 and 1968 has been the subject of five previous reviews. This Appendix summarises the findings, recommendations and Government decision for each case.

TABLE 1 - SUMMARY OF REVIEWS

Review	Date Complete	Recommendation	Outcome
CIDA	1994	Service be recognised by ASM 45-75 with Clasp 'UBON'	ASM 1945-75 with Clasp 'THAILAND'
Defence/DVA Review	1997	Service be classed as 'Operational'	Service classed as 'Operational'
Mohr	2000	Service be classed as 'Warlike' ASM 1945-75 upgraded to AASM 1945-75	Service classed as 'Warlike' AASM 1945-75 with Clasp 'THAILAND'
Riding	2004	Service be recognised with the Vietnam Medal	No change
Abigail	2008	No further recommendation	No change

The Committee of Inquiry into Defence and Defence-Related Awards (CIDA)

Intent: A comprehensive two-stage public inquiry into the Australian system of honours and awards.¹¹

Dates of Review: May 1993 – March 1994.

Findings/Recommendations:¹²

The Committee recommended 'that service of Australian personnel at Royal Thai Airforce (*sic*) base at Ubon be recognised through the Australian Service Medal 1945-75 with Clasp 'UBON'. The relevant qualifying period should be 30 days.

The Committee recommended that members of 2 Field Troop Royal Australian Engineers and other Australian personnel who participated in Operation Crown and served in Ban Kok Talat between January 1964 and May 1966 should also be awarded the Australian Service Medal 1945-75 with Clasp 'UBON', with the relevant qualifying period of 30 days.

Outcome/Government Decision: ASM 1945-75 with Clasp 'THAILAND'

¹¹ Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Defence and Defence-Related Awards, March 1994 (hereafter called CIDA), p i.

¹² CIDA pp vi, 45-46

1997 Defence/DVA Report on Service Entitlement Anomalies Review (The Defence/DVA Review)

Intent: A joint-interdepartmental review to consider four specific periods of service by members of the ADF where it is claimed anomalies in regard to eligibility for repatriation benefit exists. One of the four periods of service examined was the RAAF contingent at Ubon in Thailand, 31 May 1962 to 31 August 1968.¹³

Dates: 1997

Findings/Recommendations:

It recommended that members serving at Ubon in Thailand from 31 May 1962 to 31 August 1968 be accorded operational service under the provisions of the *Veterans' Entitlement Act 1986*.¹⁴

Outcome/Government Decision: Upgrade of service from non-operational to operational.

Review of Service Entitlement Anomalies in Respect of South-East Asian Service 1955-75 (The Mohr Review)

Intent: A review of possible anomalies in service entitlements affecting those members of the Australian Defence Force who served in South-East Asia during the period 1955-75.¹⁵

Dates of Review: April 1999 – February 2000

Findings/Recommendation:

The Committee recommended that 'RAAF service at Ubon in the period 25 June 1965 until the Squadron was withdrawn on 31 August 1968 be classified as 'warlike' operational service and that personnel be eligible for the appropriate repatriation and medal entitlements'.¹⁶

Outcome/Government Decision: Upgrade of ASM 1945-75 with Clasp 'THAILAND' to AASM 1945-75 with Clasp 'THAILAND'.

Independent Review Panel on Vietnam Campaign Recognition for RAAF Service at Ubon, Thailand, 25 June 1965 to 31 August 1968 (The Riding Review)

Intent: To establish whether the additional information presented by the RAAF Ubon Recognition Group provided sufficient evidence for amending the regulations governing

¹³ 1997 Defence/DVA Report on Service Entitlement Anomalies Review (hereafter called the Defence/DVA Review), pp 9-13.

¹⁴ Defence/DVA Review, p 13.

¹⁵ Review of Service Entitlement Anomalies in Respect of South-East Asian Service 1955-75, February 2000 (hereafter called the Mohr Review), p v.

¹⁶ Mohr Review, pp xvi, 73.

the award of the VLISM to cover Ubon service during the period 25 June 1965 to 31 August 1968.¹⁷

Dates: June 2004 – July 2004.

Findings/Recommendations:

Inter alia, that ‘service by the RAAF Contingent at Ubon between 25 June 1965 and 31 August 1968 does not satisfy the purpose of the Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal, but does completely satisfy the purpose of the Vietnam Medal as declared by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II in the Royal Warrant’.

The Review recommended to the Minister that ‘the Vietnam Medal be awarded to personnel who served on the posted strength of the RAAF Contingent at Ubon, No. 79 Squadron and Base Squadron Ubon between 25 June 1965 and 31 August 1968, and that a mechanism be found to amend the explanatory conditions of the Vietnam Medal’.¹⁸

Outcome/Government Decision: Recommendation not accepted as outside the TORs.

Review of Service Recognition for RAAF Ubon (1965-68) (The Abigail Review)

Intent: An independent panel to review the treatment of award recommendations stemming from the Battle of Lon Tan, and service medal recognition for service with RAAF Ubon.¹⁹

Dates of Review: October 2007 – March 2008

Findings/Recommendation:

The Panel recommended that ‘no further action be taken to offer recognition, including by way of the Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal, for the service of RAAF personnel stationed at Royal Thai Air Force Base Ubon between 25 June 1965 and 31 August 1968’.²⁰

Outcome/Government Decision: Government accepted the review findings.

¹⁷ Report to the Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence by the Independent Review Panel on Vietnam Campaign Recognition for RAAF Service at Ubon, Thailand, 25 June 1965 to 31 August 1968 (hereafter called the Riding Review), p 2.

¹⁸ The Riding Review, pp 35-36

¹⁹ Review of service recognition for RAAF Ubon (1965-68) (hereafter called the Abigail Review), p v.

²⁰ The Abigail Review, pp vii, 15.

APPROVED BY AIR BASE
ENTERTAINMENT OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 21 FEBRUARY 1971

LEGAL ASPECTS OF A THREATENED DEFENSE
SITUATION IN THE DEFENSE OF
AIR BASE ENTERTAINMENT

1. General. The use of force in the defense of Air Base Entertainment is governed by Malaysian Law. The following instructions give the circumstances under which the Malaysian Law allows personnel (both Malaysian and Australian) to protect the base, themselves, their property and dependants.

2. Legal Powers of Service Personnel.

a. The legal powers of personnel at Butterworth are set out in the following legislation:

- (1) The Penal Code of the Federated Malay States.
- (2) The Criminal Procedure Code of the Federated Malay States.
- (3) The Protected Areas and Protected Places Ordinance of 1955 (This applies only to that part of the base east of the main road).

b. These powers are set out in detail in the Foreword and follow.

Legal Powers of Defense Available At All Times.
Persons within the base, whether or not they are in the service of the base, are entitled to the protection of the law and the defense of their property and persons. It is in each case subject to the restrictions contained in the law.

Principle of the Law.

- (1) Every person has a right to defend his own body or the body of any other person against any offence involving the use of force.
- (2) This right may be exercised only when there is a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body and the use of force is necessary to prevent the apprehension from passing.
- (3) In the exercise of this right any harm other than death may be caused to the assailant, provided that no more harm than is necessary is inflicted for the purpose of defense.
- (4) In the following instances only, the right may, however, extend to causing of death to the assailant:
 - (a) If there is an assault causing reasonable apprehension of death.
 - (b) Where the defender

Where the defender in the case of such an assault is so situated that he cannot effectively exercise the right of private defence without the risk of harm to an innocent person, the right extends to the running of that risk.

- (b) If there is an assault causing reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt.
- (c) If there is an assault with intent to abduct, kidnap or wrongfully confine or to commit rape or an unnatural sexual offence.

b. Defence of Property.

- (1) Every person has a right to defend the property, movable or immovable, of himself or any other person against any act or attempted act of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.
- (2) This right may be exercised only when there is reasonable apprehension of danger to property and ceases as soon as assistance is obtained from the public authorities or property is recovered or the offender has retreated with the property.
- (3) In the exercise of this right any harm other than death may be caused to the assailant, provided that no more harm than is necessary is inflicted for the purpose of defence.
- (4) In the following instances only, the right may extend to the causing of death to the assailant:
 - (a) Robbery - is theft or extortion in the process of which death, hurt or wrongful restraint is caused or attempted.
 - (b) House-breaking by night.
 - (c) Mischief by fire - or arson - committed on any building used as a human dwelling or as a place for the custody of property.
 - (d) Theft, mischief or house-trespass - but only where there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt will result if the right of private defence is not exercised.

.../Note: (1) 'Mischief'

3.

ANNEX A

- Note: (i) 'Mischief' means destroying or injuring property with the intent to cause or with knowledge that it is likely to cause wrongful loss or damage to property.
- (ii) 'House-trespass' means entering into or remaining in any place used as a dwelling or any building used as a place of worship or for the custody of property with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property.

c. Restrictions. The right of private defence does not apply:

- (1) Against an act committed or attempted by or at the direction of a public servant acting as such in good faith - unless there is reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt.
- (2) Where there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities
- (3) Where more harm is inflicted than is necessary for the purpose of defence.

4. Legal Powers of Arrest Available At All Times. Powers of arrest are contained in sections 11 and 27 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Under these powers:

- a. Every person is bound to assist a Magistrate, Justice of the Peace or Police Officer reasonably demanding his aid in arresting or preventing the escape of any other person whom the Magistrate, Justice of the Peace or Police Officer is authorised to arrest.
- b. Any person may arrest any other person who, in his view, commits a non-bailable and seizureable offence (for example, theft, rape, kidnapping or murder) and shall hand him over to the nearest police officer or police station as soon as possible.

5. Legal Powers of Arrest and Search on Base East of the Main Road. In a protected place designated as such (as the Base East of the main road is) any member of the Forces performing the duties of a guard or sentry or any commissioned officer may search any person in or seeking to enter that place and may detain any such person for the purpose of such search. Any person refusing to submit to such a search may be arrested. Any person who attempts to enter or who is in a protected place and fails to stop after being challenged three times so to do, may be arrested by force which may extend to the voluntary causing of death.

Note: The power to arrest, other than the power to arrest after the challenge is repeated three times, arises from section 3 of the Federation Protected Areas and Protected Places Ordinance

.../which makes every

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APPENDIX A

which makes every offence against the provisions of the Ordinance a seizable and non-bailable offence for the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Code.

6. Summary. Under the local laws regarding Criminal Trespass and Internal Security all ranks have certain rights. These rights are as follows:

- a. We can defend ourselves, our families and friends against any form of violence but in doing so we are not permitted to use more than necessary force. None of us can use firearms unless it is the only way of saving our own life or lives of others or of preventing serious injury to ourselves or them.
- b. We can all of us defend our own and Service property but again we must not use more than necessary force. We can only use firearms to prevent persons actually breaking into dwelling houses at night or to prevent the attempted destruction of dwelling houses or Service stores or property.
- c. If you are acting as a guard or sentry in the Protected Place area of the Base you will receive orders regarding extra powers you have. The most important of these extra powers is that anyone who attempts to enter or who is in a Protected Place, and who fails to stop after being challenged three times by you can be arrested by force and if necessary, you can use firearms to effect his arrest.

7. Under the local Criminal Procedure Code we are all bound as individuals to go to the assistance of any police officer who is having difficulty in arresting a wrong-doer and who asks for our assistance.

ANNEX B TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
GROUND DEFENCE OPERATIONS CENTRE

1. The Ground Defence Operations Centre at Butterworth (GDOC) is established in room 7, building 56 and has four main tasks as follows:

- a. to provide a staff and communications system through which the Officer Commanding Air Base Butterworth (Ground Defence Commander) can exercise his function of operational control of the Air Base Butterworth area for shared defence purposes;
- b. to provide a staff and communications system through which the Deputy Ground Defence Commanders can direct operations to safeguard Service property at Air Base Butterworth and its associated installations on the mainland;
- c. to maintain contact with and relay orders or information to or from various higher authorities as well as subordinate Units/Sections that may be involved in a shared defence situation affecting Air Base Butterworth;
- d. to maintain a record of all information, messages and action relating to shared defence operations.

2. The GDOC will be skeleton manned on the declaration of Security Green, and will maintain a watch on events. On the declaration of Security Amber it will be fully manned and will assume control of all mainland shared defence operations.

3. During working hours the Senior Ground Defence Officer is responsible to initiate manning of the GDOC in accordance with the appropriate Security state. During stand-down hours the Duty Staff Officer has this responsibility. He is to assume the functions of Senior Ground Defence Officer during Security Green, and the Duty Controller from Security Amber until relieved. In non-working hours, information leading to the declaration of a security state would normally be expected to be made available to either Assistant Provost Marshal, Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal (DAPM) or Duty Staff Officer RAAF, the OIC SSP and the Orderly Officer RAAF. The Duty Staff Officer should evaluate information, and if necessary:

a. inform:

- (1) Commanding Officer Base Squadron;
- (2) Commanding Officer RMAF;
- (3) Assistant Provost Marshal;
- (4) Senior Ground Defence Officer;
- (5) Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal;
- (6) Officer in Charge

ANNEX D

- (6) Officer in Charge Special Security Police
- (7) Administrative Staff Officer RAAF;
- (8) CC Admin Wing RAAF; and
- (9) RAAF Radio Officer

- b. collect the keys to GDOC from the Duty Operations Officer and open up the GDOC (building 56 room 7);
- c. recall to the GDOC a skeleton staff (see paragraph 4) from the manning list held on the Duty Controller's desk;

(NOTE: If the Senior Ground Defence Officer has been contacted, he will assume duty as Ground Defence Adviser.)

- d. take any message coming into the GDOC and make a record in the log book (but extension 555 is to remain switched through to the Guard Room)
- e. maintain close liaison with RAAF Police Section and OIC SSP to see if there has been any change in the situation, checking at least hourly
- f. continue to man the GDOC until relieved by a Ground Defence Adviser;
- g. if notified of the declaration of Security Amber or if in his opinion the situation warrants such action, he is to:

- (1) inform those listed at sub-paragraph a. of the change of state;
- (2) if he has not already done so, collect the keys to the GDOC from the Duty Operations Officer and open up the GDOC (building 56 room 7);
- (3) recall for duty in the GDOC a full staff (see paragraph 5) from the manning list held on the Duty Controller's desk;

(NOTE: If the Administrative Staff Officer has been contacted he will assume the duty as Duty Controller.)

- (4) record all his action in the GDOC log book
- (5) cancel the switching of the GDOC switchboard to the Guard room;
- (6) take all calls coming into the GDOC and record all messages; and
- (7) continue to man the GDOC until relieved by a Duty Controller.

If the Duty Staff Officer needs assistance to man the GDOC before being relieved by the GDOC duty staff, he is to call on the Orderly Officer RAAF/RMAT and the Orderly Sergeant RAAF/RMAT.

4. GDOC skeleton

1.

ANNEX B

4. USMC skeleton Manning comprised:
 - a. ground defense adviser;
 - b. recorder/plottor/telephone orderly, RAAR/RAAF;
 - c. radio operator/switchboard operator, RAAR/RAAF; and
 - d. driver/messenger, RAAR/RAAF.

5. Full Manning consists of:
 - a. duty controller, RAAR;
 - b. assistant controller, RAAR;
 - c. ground defense adviser;
 - d. recorder/telephone orderly (2), RAAR/RAAF;
 - e. plottor (2), RAAR/RAAF;
 - f. radio operator/switchboard operator (2), RAAR/RAAF; and
 - g. driver/messenger, RAAR/RAAF (2).

6. The Deputy Ground Defense Commander, of the Duty Controller, may order a limited degree of Manning. The number, if the situation so requires.

7. The staff officer responsible for the control of the Deputy Ground Defense Commander is to be known as the Duty Controller. The following RAAR/RAAF will be required as staff controllers to provide support (as required):

- a. Administrative Staff Officer (Personnel Administration);
- b. Senior Assistant Officer (Base Squadron);
- c. Air Transport Administration;
- d. Senior Assistant Officer (Base Squadron); and
- e. Senior Assistant Officer (Base Squadron).

Administrative Staff Officer is to be the senior controller and is responsible for the following duties:

8. The staff officer responsible for the control of the Duty Controller is to be known as the Duty Controller. The following RAAR/RAAF will be required as staff controllers to provide support (as required):

9. The staff officer responsible for the control of the Duty Controller is to be known as the Duty Controller. The following RAAR/RAAF will be required as staff controllers to provide support (as required):

10. The staff officer responsible for the control of the Duty Controller is to be known as the Duty Controller. The following RAAR/RAAF will be required as staff controllers to provide support (as required):

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APPENDIX 1

The Senior Ground Defence Officer is to be the Senior Ground Defence Adviser and is to prepare the Duty roster.

10. The following details are set out in Appendixes:

- a. Organisation Chart - Appendix 1; and
- b. Duty Rostering GDC staff - Appendix 2.

11. The Senior Ground Defence Officer is responsible for the state of readiness of the GDC including provision of furniture, wall displays, stationery and documentation and preparation of all rosters for running the GDC.

12. Arms. Staff of the GDC will not normally be armed. Personal Arms, if issued on the orders of the Deputy Ground Defence Commander or Duty Controller, are to be retained by the person to whom they are issued at all times.

13. Guarding. The GDC is a Vital Point (VP) within the 400M Security Defence Flight Area. The officer in charge of that defence flight is to provide guards for the GDC from the declaration of Security Red.

14. Emergency Lighting. The Senior Ground Defence Officer is to hold all pressure lamps in the Ground Defence Section to provide emergency lighting for the GDC. On the declaration of Security Red he is to arrange for them to be held in the GDC.

15. Accommodation. Until such time as suitable accommodation is provided by a permanent installation, the 400M Security Defence Flight is to provide and install a veritable shelter from the declaration of Security Red.

General

- a. All GDC activities must be co-ordinated with the overall GDC plan. Either directly or indirectly GDC staff will be involved in every phase of command and control during the shared defence situation.

Relationships with other unitsRelationship with the 400M Security Defence FlightRelationship with the 400M Security Defence FlightAppendix 1 - Organisation Charta. Senior Ground Defence Officer - GDC Staffb. Relationship with Royal Malaysian Policec. Relationship with the 400M Security Defence Flight

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ORDER OF THE AIR BASE
DEFENSE FORCE ORDER NO. 1/71
DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1971

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES -
AIR STAFF

1. Deputy Ground Defense Commanders. The Deputy Ground Defense Commanders are responsible to the Officer Commanding for the security of Service installations and property at Air Base Butterworth and associated military installations. Their duties include:

- a. command and control of their respective national forces allocated to shared defense at Air Base Butterworth unless special exception is made;
- b. preparation and up-dating of shared defense plans and orders; and
- c. ensuring that the GDF and ground defense units can be activated at short notice at any time and can perform their allotted tasks, including the conduct of exercises for the purpose as necessary.

2. RAF Duty Controller. The RAF Duty Controller is responsible to the Deputy Ground Defense Commander for the day-to-day functioning of the RAF and the routine operations of RAF forces deployed for shared defense purposes. The RAF Duty Controller is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the RAF and the routine operations of RAF forces deployed for shared defense purposes. He is to be familiar with all shared defense plans and instructions held in the GDF. He is to:

- a. obtain all messages as quickly as possible and ensure that information is passed to units for action or information where applicable, including changes in security status;
- b. inform the Deputy Ground Defense Commander immediately of all critical developments which should be brought to the attention of the Officer Commanding or if there is a situation of total emergency;
- c. allocate specific tasks to the Royal Air Force or to specific units;
- d. allocate specific tasks to the RAF Police or to specific units, as appropriate;
- e. ensure that he fully understands the situation before taking any action which may affect the RAF;
- f. ensure that the RAF is operationally alert at all times;
- g. ensure that the RAF is brought up to date on the day-to-day basis;
- h. ensure that the RAF is fully aware of the situation and of the instructions which may affect the RAF.

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3.

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX B

h. carry out any other instructions of the Duty Controller and

1. ensure that they understand any outstanding action before taking over duties and brief their reliefs before going off duty.

g. Duty Plotter. The duty plotter is responsible to the Duty Controller for maintaining a visual record, on maps and air photographs held in the HOC and Deputy Ground Defence Commander's office, of shared defence incidents which affect the safety of persons protected by this Order, and the security of Service property. He is to:

- a. plot all incidents as directed by the Duty Controller on the main displays
- b. bring the information on the Commander's displays up to date every hour on the hour
- c. be familiar with the symbols used for plotting, and the details of incidents which need to be recorded
- d. understand the information already recorded before assuming duty and brief his reliefs and

h. carry out any other instructions from the Duty Controller.

f. Duty Alarm Operator. The duty alarm operator is responsible to the Duty Controller for maintaining the alarm system, including the alarm control panel, the alarm receiver, and the alarm indicator, and for ensuring that the alarm system is in a state of readiness for use at all times.

g. Duty Alarm Operator. The duty alarm operator is responsible to the Duty Controller for ensuring that the alarm system is in a state of readiness for use at all times.

h. Duty Alarm Operator. The duty alarm operator is responsible to the Duty Controller for ensuring that the alarm system is in a state of readiness for use at all times.

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s. Duty Alarm Operator. The duty alarm operator is responsible to the Duty Controller for ensuring that the alarm system is in a state of readiness for use at all times.

APPENDIX B TO
PART I

- d. take incoming messages to a duty recorder on receipt;
 - e. check communications every two hours on the odd hour if traffic is light, or when ordered to do so by the Duty Controller; and
 - f. understand the state of communications before taking over duty, and brief the following operators before going off duty.
5. Driver/Passenger. The driver/passenger is responsible to drive and maintain the TMS vehicle, and to deliver messages as required by the Duty Controller. He is to collect the vehicle from PT Section on the opening of the TMS.
6. Ground Liaison Officer. It is a normal responsibility of the Ground Liaison Section at Air Base Butterworth to collect, exchange and disseminate intelligence information affecting the national security situation within Malaysia. This responsibility remains with the Section in a shared defense emergency.
7. RAF Intelligence Officer. The RAF Intelligence Officer is to work closely with the Ground Liaison Officer for the overall intelligence function and he may also be required to attend the 'Joint Ground Defence Command' daily briefing at the TMS.
8. The Ground Liaison Section. This section is responsible for all TMS in the TMS, and is responsible for the proper use of systems, intelligence gathering, intelligence dissemination through the Ground Liaison Section and the TMS. The use of personnel will depend on the circumstances, but at least daily is required for a continuous operation.

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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX E TO AIR BASE
SUPERVISORY BY ORDER NO. 101
DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1971

MISSION TYPE: CIVIL MALAYSIAN BORDER

1. On declaration of Security Amber, the SO MIAF is to maintain a liaison officer in the headquarters of the OCEP Butterworth.

2. Duties of Liaison Officer.

- a. To keep Duty Controller EMO advised of the situation in the Butterworth Police District and
- b. To report all other information of an internal security value as may be relayed to him.

3. The Liaison Officer will make his reports directly to the SOCE.

4. Equipment List.

a. Annex E to MIAF is responsible to provide the Liaison Officer with a vehicle and an alternative radio link to the SAMPSON Security Controller.

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APPROVED FOR
ISSUE BY THE NAME
HULL OF THE ARMY NO. 101
DATED 1011 SEPTEMBER 1971

CO-ORDINATION - MEDICAL PLAN

1. CO No 4 HAF Hospital will implement a satisfactory medical plan within the restrictions imposed by chiefs etc. He will:

- a. prepare in advance a broad medical plan to meet shared defense situations
- b. keep the Ground Defense Commander/Deputy Ground Defense Commanders informed of any aspects of his long range planning which requires co-ordination with other activities listed in this order;
- c. if considered justified, issue a medical alert to these leaders; and
- d. on declaration of Security Alert appoint an officer responsible for close liaison with the Duty Controller HHC. This officer will co-ordinate:
 - (1) the execution of modification of a medical plan which meets the current restrictions in force and is in compliance within the overall HAF plan;
 - (2) the duty of the liaison personnel in implementation of this medical plan in relation to security, transport for medical officers or Commanders units.

2. CO-ORDINATION - Declaration of Security and

- a. issue a formal alert to units in accordance with the plan;
- b. have a formal alert to units in accordance with the plan in the direction of the units of the plan.

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ATTACH C TO AIR BASE
DEFENSE PLAN
DATED 27th SEPTEMBER 1971

PROTECTION OF SERVICE PROPERTY -
AIR BASE HUNTERWORTH

1. In the event of any deterioration in the local situation HDBO will notify Ground Defence Flights and units of increasing tension of readiness by declaring Security Brown, to be followed as tension increases by status Amber and Red.

- a. Action to be taken on declaration of Security Green. The GDBO is to be alerted by the Senior Ground Defence Officer or Duty Staff Officer. The GDBO is to be alerted immediately and is to maintain a watch on events as directed by the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.
- b. Action to be taken on declaration of Security Amber. The GDBO is to be alerted and instructed by the Deputy Ground Defence Commander. The Ground Defence Officers AMB/HR are to activate their mobile resources. The Ground Defence Officers are to begin collection of information for the Duty Controller GDBO.
- c. Action to be taken on declaration of Security Red. The GDBO is to be alerted immediately. Ground Defence Officers are to activate their mobile resources and begin their duties. The AMB/HR are to activate their mobile resources and begin their duties. The GDBO is to begin collection of information for the Duty Controller GDBO.

This plan is to be reviewed annually or if a change in the local situation is deemed necessary. The plan is to be reviewed by the Senior Ground Defence Officer or the Deputy Ground Defence Commander. The plan is to be reviewed by the Senior Ground Defence Officer or the Deputy Ground Defence Commander. The plan is to be reviewed by the Senior Ground Defence Officer or the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.

PROTECTION OF SERVICE PROPERTY -

- a. The responsibility for the protection of service property is the responsibility of the Senior Ground Defence Officer or the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.
- b. The responsibility for the protection of service property is the responsibility of the Senior Ground Defence Officer or the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.
- c. The responsibility for the protection of service property is the responsibility of the Senior Ground Defence Officer or the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.
- d. The responsibility for the protection of service property is the responsibility of the Senior Ground Defence Officer or the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.
- e. The responsibility for the protection of service property is the responsibility of the Senior Ground Defence Officer or the Deputy Ground Defence Commander.

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- b. establishment of a Ground Defense Flight Headquarters or a Mobile Reserve Force - quarters as appropriate to include secure storage of weapons and equipment;
- c. facilities for ground defense and equipment;
- d. a daily routine plan for guards, sentries and patrols to include the requirements for their security plans:

- (1) During normal working hours
- (2) During non-working daylight hours 1500 - 1800 and 0500 - 0800
- (3) During night hours 1900 - 0500

e. a plan of complete entry (whether verbal or written) to all buildings and grounds to which they are permitted.

f. arrangements for control of entry, including control of goods and services to and from the camp.

g. plans for control of entry to the camp.

h. arrangements for control of entry to the camp and for control of entry to the camp.

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- b. From the declaration of Security Amber this control is to be exercised through the GDOC.
- c. Detailed arrangements for the operational deployment of the company are contained at Appendix 6.

7. Organization and Responsibilities. The organization and responsibilities of ground defence elements are set out as follows:

- a. RAAF Mobile Reserve Flight - Appendix 7
- b. No 3 Squadron RAAF Defence Flight - Appendix 8
- c. No 75 Squadron RAAF " " - Appendix 9
- d. No 473(M) Squadron RAAF " " - Appendix 10
- e. RAAF Mobile Reserve Flight - Appendix 11
- f. No 3 Squadron RAAF Defence Flight - Appendix 12
- g. No 11 Squadron RAAF " " - Appendix 13
- h. No 1 Air Defence Centre RAAF Defence Flight - Appendix 14
- i. Increment to RAAF Service Police - Appendix 15

The area of responsibility of each element is defined in the Appendices 2, 3 and 4.

8. Weapons and Ammunition. The RAAF Armament Officer is responsible for the issue of weapons and ammunition to the Mobile Reserves at the declaration of Security Amber and to ground defence flights and the Base Police Section supplement at the declaration of Security Red. Commanders of defence flights are to establish sub-armouries and weapons and ammunition are to be stored in sub-armouries at all times except when issued to members on duty. The scale of issue and orders for accounting for issues are set out at Appendix 16.

9. Equipment. The Ground Defence Officer RAAF and the Q3 Supply RAAF are to hold stocks of equipment as shown in Appendix 17. They are to hold these stores in such a way that they can readily be issued to the mobile reserves on the declaration of Security Amber and to unit defence flights on the declaration of Security Red. They are to ensure that the items are kept in serviceable conditions.

10. Communications. The primary means of communication is line (telephone) except for the Mobile Reserve Flights, SSP and RAAF Police Sections which will have radio communications. For communications diagram, including call signs, see Annex 7.

11. Reports. Defence flights, Mobile Reserve Flights, RAAF Police and SSP are to report to the GDOC as follows:

- a. by 0630 hours daily or earlier if possible - a situation report (SITREP) giving the situation as at 0730 hours - a proforma is at Appendix 18.

.../b... when an unusual

ANNEX C

- b. when an unusual incident occurs;
- c. when a change in the state of alert has been effected; and
- d. Reports of Opening Fire. All instances where firearms have been used are to be reported to Duty Controller SHM at once. The detail required is:

- (1) Unit or units concerned
- (2) Location of incident, by reference to the grid shown on the map at Appendix A or otherwise, as necessary;
- (3) Brief description of incident to include surrounding circumstances; persons involved;
- (4) Number of persons injured;
- (5) Details of casualties and injuries sustained.

The Duty Controller SHM is to report the incident to the appropriate authority as soon as possible and to the appropriate authority as directed by the appropriate authority.

Appendix 1. List of Incidents

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7. Transport. Requests made by the reinforcements for transport are to be channelled through the HQ Duty Controller who is to co-ordinate the request through the appropriate transport officer, HMF or HMF.

8. Briefing. The Ground Liaison Officer is to brief the commander of the reinforcements. This briefing is to include:

- a. the current situation;
- b. location of relevant features (such as VPs, other airfield installations, boundaries of protected area, off-base installations and quarters);
- c. geography of the Southwest area;
- d. disposition of other ground defence forces;
- e. probable hazards, including, if applicable, status of readiness;
- f. transport and communication facilities; and
- g. administrative matters relating to ground defence/defence for area and equipment (such as orders for reported availability of ground).

9. Planning. The Ground Liaison Commander is to allocate roles to reinforcements. The Deputy Ground Defence Commander are to allocate tasks. In allocating roles and tasks the principles set out in paragraph 3, Annex A must be observed.

10. Reinforcement Readiness. Because of specific requirements which will be designated, it will not necessarily be possible to undertake pre-planned reconnaissance and surveillance. However, it is possible that, except in the event of immediate reinforcement, reinforcement will not be available in advance party. The Senior Ground Liaison Officer is to ensure that the officer in charge of the reinforcements receives a detailed briefing.

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APPENDIX 2 TO

ANNEX C TO AFD DISE

BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71

DATED 3TH SEPTEMBER 1971

VITAL POINTS

VP NO	DESCRIPTION	BLDG NO	GRID REF	RESPONSIBILITY FROM SECURITY RED
1	Missile Preparation Bay		6J	38QN RAAF
2	Fuel Installation	47	8J	38QN RAAF
3	38QN Maintenance Hangar	49	9H, J	38QN RAAF
4	Fuel Installation	47A	11J	75SQN RAAF
5A	38QN Aircraft		9J	38QN RAAF
5B	75SQN Aircraft		11J	75SQN RAAF
6	Motor Transport Compound	45, 45A	11, 12C, H	75SQN RAAF
7	Plinth K		3K	SSP & RAAF Police Increment
8	Explosives Store	92	8J	38QN RAAF
9	Operations Building	54	14, 15J	118QN RAAF
10	Plinth N	56D	14J	118QN RAAF
11	Fuel Installation	77	15G	118QN RAAF
12	478SQN Aircraft		12, 13J	478(M)SQN
13	478SQN Maintenance Hangar	51	13J	478(M)SQN
14A	Visiting and RAAF Aircraft		16H, G	118QN RAAF
14B	Helicopters		17C, H, J	38QN RAAF
14C	Helicopters	111A, B	20K	38QN RAAF
15	Telephone Switchboard	58B	12, 13F	478(M)SQN
16	Emergency Power Supply	74	15F	478(M)SQN
17	Power Supply	20	13E	SSP
18	Armoury	65	14F	478(M)SQN
19	Plinth G	78L	20F	SSP & RAAF Police Increment
20	Water Tower	69	14F	478(M)SQN
21	Explosives Area		9, 10, 11, 12M, N	SSP
22	PAR	123E	11M	SSP)
23	Plinth P		12M	SSP) & RAAF
24	CADF Installation	76A	19L	SSP) Police
24A	Surveillance Radar	123D	7N	SSP) Incre-
24B	SSB Receivers	123C	6F	SSP) ment
25	75SQN Maintenance Hangar	50	12J	75SQN RAAF
26	Transmitter Station	89, 89A	8C	SSP
27A	4RAAF Hospital		10D	RAAF Police Sect
27B	Auxiliary Power Station		10D	RAAF Police Sect

/2B Air Defence Centre

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ANNEX C

VF NO	DESCRIPTION	BLDG NO	GRID REF	RESPONSIBILITY FROM SECURITY RED
28	Air Defence Centre HOLLANDS / ADC, AND THE Defence Centre	147/148	17, 18, O, - P, Q	No. 1 ADC/ RMAP
29	Pumping Station, Reservoir and Wells		19D	RAAF Police Sect
30	Ground Defence Operations Centre	56	14H	478(M)SQM
31	MARILGE BEACH AND EMERGENCY POWER	100B/106C	off Base North of runway	SSP
32	TACAN	106E	" " " "	SSP

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APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORDERS FOR SENTRIES AND PATROLS - GENERAL

1. Sentries guarding VIPs and other Service property may be static or mobile (patrols). In areas where there are other members working, static sentries may be mounted singly by day. In all other circumstances they are to be mounted in pairs; mobile sentries may exceed this number if necessary.
2. When sentries are mounted in pairs one is to be nominated as the sentry for the point to be guarded, the other is to be nominated as the tactical sentry. The duty of the tactical sentry is to cover the sentry and he is to be concealed.
3. Sentries will normally be armed with a rifle or SMG. Tactical sentries are to be armed with a rifle or SMG. The rifle is the best weapon for a sentry. However, where there is a possibility of self-inflicted damage to our installations, eg around aircraft, the SMG is useful.
4. Sentries are to be fully briefed on each occasion that they are mounted, using the specimen orders which follow as a guide. Briefing may be verbal or verbal and written.
5. The tour of duty of a sentry should not exceed two hours. The relief of a sentry and his tactical sentry should be staggered, eg the sentry is posted and relieved on the even hour, his tactical sentry on the odd hour.

SPECIMEN ORDERS FOR SENTRIES OR PATROLS
MOUNTED IN A PROTECTED PLACE

Responsibility

6. If you do not understand any part of these orders you are to tell the Guard/Patrol Commander at once.
7. You are Sentry/Patrol Number _____.
8. You are to guard (or patrol) _____ which is part of a Protected Place.
9. Your area of responsibility is the area enclosed within the security fence, but you have a special responsibility for _____ which is an installation vital to the operational effectiveness of the Base.
10. Your period of duty is from _____ hours to _____ hours and you are not to leave your post (or area) until duly relieved.
11. You are to be thoroughly alert at all times.

Arming.

12. You have had _____ rounds of ammunition issued to you.
13. If you are armed with:

.. /a. Rifle.

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APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX C

- a. Rifle. The bayonet is to be fixed and the magazine charged with 20 rounds. No round may be fed into the breech until you are preparing to fire. Your safety catch is to be applied.
- b. Sub-machine Gun. The recoiling parts are to be forward and no round is to be fed into the chamber until you are preparing to fire. The safety device is to be applied.
- c. Pistol. The pistol is to be fully loaded, (no round in the breech in an automatic pistol), the safety catch applied (if fitted), and the pistol is to remain in the holster until you are preparing to fire.

Challenging and Use of Force

14. If any person either enters the wire surrounding the Protected Place or is seen by you to be attempting to make his way through, over or under the wire or is in an area in which you suspect his presence to be unauthorised or is acting in a manner to arouse suspicion of unauthorised presence, you are to act as follows:

- a. Adopt the "on guard" position and challenge in a loud clear voice: "HALT WHO GOES THERE?" and "BERHENTI SIAPA ITU?"
- b. If the person fails to halt or to stop his efforts to enter the Protected Place, challenge again in a loud clear voice: "HALT OR I FIRE!" and "BERHENTI ATAU SAYA TEMBAK".
- c. If the person fails to halt or stop his efforts to enter the Protected Place adopt instant position, challenge again: "STAND FAST! I AM READY TO FIRE" and "BERDIRI TEGAK! SAYA SEDIA MENEMBAK".
- d. If the person still fails to halt, or stop his efforts to enter the Protected Place you will, using as little force as necessary, but including firing as a last resort, force him to halt and hold him covered with your weapon until help arrives.
- e. If a suspect person/s or intruder/s or would-be intruder/s halts on any of your challenges say in a loud clear voice:
 - (1) "ADVANCE AND BE RECOGNIZED" and "MARA UNTOK DI-KENALI" or
 - (2) "ADVANCE ONE AND BE RECOGNIZED" and "MARA SA-ORANG UNTOK DI-KENALI".
 - (3) "HALT!" "BERHENTI!"
 - (4) "PASS FRIEND" "BOLEH LALU, SAUDARA" or hold him covered with your weapon until help arrives.

..f. If a would-be

3.

APPENDIX 5 TO
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- f. If a would-be intruder does not persist in trying to enter and runs away on being challenged, let him go and report the occurrence as soon as possible, but without leaving your post unguarded to do so.
15. Any person you arrest within the Protected Place is to be warned that if he attempts to escape he may be shot but before shooting you must remember:
- a. Only as little force as may be necessary to effect his re-arrest may be used.
 - b. If it is necessary to fire, you must, before firing, carry out the procedure of para 14b. and c. above.
 - c. Once a person escaping arrest gets outside the Protected Place you must not fire to prevent his escape and you are not to pursue him beyond the perimeter fence.

When You May Fire

16. You are permitted to fire only in the following cases:
- a. If the person fails to halt or stop his efforts to enter the Protected Place and there is no other effective way of stopping him.
 - b. If any person you have arrested escapes and, provided he is not outside the boundaries of the Protected Place, provided that there is no other way of re-arresting him and if it is necessary to fire you must, before firing, carry out the procedures of para 14 b. and c. above.
 - c. If a person is in the act of destroying or damaging by fire, explosives or other violent means the Protected Place or any part of it or any property in it that you are guarding, or is in the act of removing any property that you are ordered to guard, you may fire only if there are no other means available to prevent such destruction, damage or removal. Before firing you must first shout "STAND FAST I AM READY TO FIRE" and "BERDIRI TEGAK SAYA SEDIA MANEMBAK", and allow the person a reasonable time to halt before firing.
 - d. If you yourself, or any other person authorised to be in the Protected Place are being attacked from inside or outside the Protected Place in such a way as to give you no time to challenge, and you have reason to fear that death or grave bodily injury will result, you may fire without challenging.

.../17. Before firing

APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX C

17. Before firing at all remember:
- a. You must not fire, unless firing is the least force necessary.
 - b. Shoot to wound and not to kill.

SPECIMEN ORDERS FOR TACTICAL SENTRIESNotes

- a. Armed sentries are normally to operate in pairs, although this may be waived during daylight hours. The second sentry is referred to as the Tactical Sentry.
- b. Orders for the Tactical Sentry follow those for the other (No 1) sentry or Patrol except that the Tactical Sentry will normally adopt a tactical position as described in the subsequent paragraphs.

Responsibility

18. You are responsible for safeguarding the sentry you is given. You are also jointly responsible for the protection of your post and for the safety and security of the equipment and property which you have been ordered to guard.

Arming

19. If you are armed with:
- a. Rifle. The bayonet is to be fixed and the magazine charged with 20 rounds. No round may be fed into the breech until you are preparing to fire. Your safety catch is to be applied.
 - b. Sub-machine Gun. The recoiling parts are to be forward and no round is to be fed into the chamber until you are preparing to fire. The safety device is to be applied.

Challenging and Use of Force

20. Throughout your tour of duty you are to be in a tactical firing position. You are to watch all persons approaching your post (or area) and the other sentry's post and are to be ready to protect the sentry you are covering if it should be necessary. The other sentry is responsible for challenging. You are not responsible for challenging, but you are to warn the other sentry if you see any person approaching the post whose manner you suspect and whom you consider the other sentry may not have seen.

21. If the other sentry challenges a person and that person does not halt after the second challenge, you are to call for assistance (or give any other appropriate warning) and adopt

.../the on guard position.

5.

APPENDIX 5 TO
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the on guard position. If, after the third challenge the person still does not halt but is not attacking you or the other sentry or destroying property you are to assist the other sentry to stop and detain him, remembering that you must use only as little force as is necessary, and that you may fire only as a last resort.

22. If a person runs away you are not to open fire. You or the other sentry are to report the incident at once to your flight headquarters, but without leaving your post unguarded to do so.

When You May Fire

23. You may open fire at a person or persons in the following circumstances and then only if you have no other means of stopping him or them:

- a. if they are in the act of forcibly destroying or damaging or removing property which you or the other sentry are ordered to guard; or
- b. if you yourself or the other sentry or any other person authorised to be in the area you are ordered to guard are being attacked in such a way as to give you reason to fear that death or grave bodily injury will result.

24. Remember that at all times in carrying out your duty and should you or the other sentry be attacked, you must only use such force as is reasonably necessary, and if in doubt you must summon assistance.

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APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ANZUK INFANTRY COMPANY

1. This Appendix details the actions to be taken by the ANZUK Company, when deployed to Air Base Butterworth, during a shared defence emergency.

2. Security Green. On the declaration of Security Green the company comes under the operational control of the Ground Defence Commander. The company commander is to:

- a. return the company to Butterworth, if away;
- b. check all stores and procedures;
- c. refresh all loaders down to section commander in their probable tasks, and the geography of the area including the location of VPs; and
- d. bring one platoon to two hours readiness, including drawing RAAF-supplied extra radios and vehicles for this platoon.

3. Security Amber. On the declaration of Security Amber the GDOC is activated and operational control of the Company will be exercised through this Centre. The company commander is to:

- a. bring his platoon at two hours notice up to immediate readiness and place it under the command of the Ground Defence Commander or his Deputy;
- b. as soon as possible bring his remaining platoons to full readiness, including the drawing of RAAF-supplied extra radios and vehicles if necessary;
- c. establish liaison in GDOC for duties as Ground Defence Adviser and Company Liaison Officer;
- d. maintain communications between company HQ and GDOC; and
- e. cancel all leave.

4. Security Red. As for Security Amber.

5. Tasks. The company will be employed as far as possible on tasks commensurate with their training and specialist skills. Dependant on the situation, tasks could include:

- a. deployment of platoons, if considered appropriate for the task at the discretion of the Ground Defence Commander

.../b. a quick reaction

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APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX C

- b. a quick reaction force capable of responding to any incident as required; deployment may be effected by vehicle, foot or helicopter;
 - c. patrols for the prevention of illegal entry, or the apprehension of persons who have entered;
 - d. cordon an area for a search
 - e. the provision of a road block;
 - f. crowd control and dispersal
 - g. establish additional protection of VPs as required; and
 - h. provide additional protection as required to secure points of entry to the Base and/or VPs.
6. Transport. The RAAF Motor Transport Officer will provide additional vehicles for the use of infantry company during an emergency if necessary. The company commander may arrange collection from the RAAF MT Section as follows:
- a. on the declaration of Security Green
Two x 3 Ton Vehicles; And
 - b. on the declaration of Security Amber, four x 3-ton vehicles.
7. Communications. The RAAF Ground Defence Officer will make available radio equipment as follows:
- a. at all times a suitable set to act as a company rear link to Air Base Butterworth.
 - b. on the declaration of Security Green, four AN PRG25 sets to provide a platoon net, and
 - c. on the declaration of Security Amber, four AN PRG sets to provide another platoon net.
- The company commander is to arrange the drawing of these radios at the appropriate times from the RAAF Ground Defence Section.
8. Arms and Ammunition. Only personal weapons will be used during shared defence operations. Soldiers armed with the L1A1 SLR, and F1 SMG, or the AR15 are to carry twenty rounds of ammunition, ten in each of two magazines. Every round of ammunition issued must be accounted for. The company second in command is to report as soon as possible to the Duty Controller any rounds fired or missing.
9. General Compliance with this Order. Orders for guards sentries and orders for opening fire as detailed in Appendix 5 to Annex C, forming part of this Operation Order apply equally to Army members. The company commander is to comply generally with all directions and instructions in this Order; if there is any conflict with Army operating or administrative procedures he should ensure that full detail is made known to the Duty Controller GDOC as soon as possible, but in the meantime endeavour to comply in the best way possible.

APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

MOBILE RESERVE FLIGHT - RAAF

1. Command. The RAAF Ground Defence Officer is appointed to command the Mobile Reserve Flight. He is responsible to the Commanding Officer Base Squadron for the organization, manning, training and equipment of the flight, and is to ensure that the flight is capable of carrying out its allotted tasks at all times. He is to prepare a detailed plan for the discharge of responsibilities under this Annex, and is to submit it for approval of the Commanding Officer Base Squadron RAAF.
2. Location. Mobile Reserve Headquarters is located at the RAAF Ground Defence Training Section.
3. Manning. The Mobile Reserve is manned by members of Base Squadron RAAF.
4. Organization. Flight organization is as follows:

MOBILE RESERVE FLIGHT

FLIGHT HQ

Flt Cdr	: Gr Def O	
2 I/C	: F Sgt ADG	1 x $\frac{1}{2}$ ton or $\frac{2}{3}$ ton 4 x 4 6 x AN FRC25 Sets 9 x F1 SMG
Controller	: Sgt ADG	
Drivers	: 3 LAC/AC's	
Radio Ops	: 3 LAC/AC's	

Sect Comd: 1 Sgt	As for 1 Sec	As for 1
2 I/C : 1 Cpl		& 2 Sec
Riflemen : 8 LAC/AC's		

Vehicles

2 x $\frac{1}{2}$ ton or $\frac{2}{3}$ 4x4 2 x F1 SMG 8 x L1A1 SLR		
--	--	--

5. Tasks. The Mobile Reserve is to provide:
 - a. a quick reaction capability to respond to any incident within the perimeter of the Air Base as directed by the Duty Controller GDOC;
 - b. patrols within the perimeter of the Air Base as directed by the Duty Controller GDOC;
 - c. assistance to ground defence flights as directed by the Duty Controller GDOC; and
 - d. assistance

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ANNEX C

d. assistance to the SSP as directed by the Duty Controller GDOC.

6. Equipment. The RAAF Ground Defence Section will hold equipment for all RAAF ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The RAAF Ground Defence Officer is to draw the equipment for the mobile reserve on the declaration of Security Amber. The equipment is specified at Appendix 17.

7. Scales of Issue of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Ground Defence Officer is to draw arms and ammunition on the declaration of Security Amber. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.

8. Transport. On the declaration of Security Amber the RAAF Motor Transport Officer is to withdraw seven $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{3}{4}$ ton 4 x 4 vehicles from other users and carry out a full A service. He is to inform the RAAF Ground Defence Officer when this is complete, and RAAF Ground Defence Officer is to arrange the collection of the vehicles from the Motor Transport Section.

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
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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

NO 3 SQUADRON RAAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

1. Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron RAAF is to provide a defence flight for the close protection of squadron operational assets, and other service property in the same locality in accordance with the information contained in this Annex. The Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron RAAF is to appoint an officer to command the Defence Flight No 3 Squadron. This officer is to be responsible to the Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron for the organization, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located at Hangar 49, Room 13 unless otherwise directed by the Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron. If a change of location is ordered, Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron is to ensure that Commanding Officer Base Squadron is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of No 3 Squadron Defence Flight is the protection of VPs 1, 2, 3, 5A and 8. Insofar as is compatible with this primary commitment the flight is to protect all Service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. The Commanding Officer No 3 Squadron is to organize No 3 Squadron Defence Flight as he sees fit. The following is a suitable outline organization:

Flight Commander (Flt Lt/Flg Off)



(Note: This organization is based on the allocation of responsibilities as follows:

- a. 1 Section. VP 1.
- b. 2 Section. VPs 2 and 8.
- c. 3 Section. VPs 3 and 5A.)

.../5. Equipment.

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5. Equipment. The Ground Defence Section will hold equipment for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The flight commander, No 3 Squadron Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red. The equipment is specified at Appendix 17.

6. Issue of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The flight commander No 3 Squadron Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.


7. Transport. On the declaration of Security Red the RAAP Motor Transport Officer is to withdraw and A-service the vehicles for this flight. He is to inform the flight commander when this is complete, and the flight commander is to arrange the collection of vehicles from the Motor Transport Section.

APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OP ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 31 SEPTEMBER 1971

NO 75 SQUADRON RAAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

1. The Commanding Officer No 75 Squadron RAAF is to provide a defence flight for the close protection of squadron operational assets, and other Service property in the same locality in accordance with the information contained in this Annex. The Commanding Officer No 75 Squadron is to appoint an officer to command No 75 Squadron Defence Flight. This officer is responsible for the organization, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located at Room 27, Building 55, No 75 Squadron Headquarters unless otherwise directed by Commanding Officer No 75 Squadron. If a change is ordered Commanding Officer No 75 Squadron is to ensure that Commanding Officer Base Squadron is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of the No 75 Squadron Defence Flight is the protection of VPs 4, 5B, 6 and 25. Insofar as is compatible with the primary commitment the flight is also to protect all Service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. The Commanding Officer No 75 Squadron is to organize No 75 Squadron Defence Flight as he sees fit. The following is a suitable outline organization:

Flight Commander (Plt Lt/Plg Off)



(Note: This organization is based on the allocation of responsibilities as follows:

- a. 1 Section. VPs 4, 5B and 25.
- b. 2 Section. VP 6.)

.../5. Equipment.

APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX C

5. Equipment. The Ground Defence Section will hold equipment for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flight Commander No 75 Squadron Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red. The equipment is specified at Appendix 17.

6. Issue of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flight Commander No 75 Squadron Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.

7. Transport. On the declaration of Security Red the RAAT Motor Transport Officer is to withdraw and A-service the vehicles for this flight. He is to inform the Flight Commander when this is complete, and the flight commander is to arrange the collection of vehicles from the Motor Transport Section.

APPENDIX 10 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

NO 478(M) SQUADRON RAAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

1. The Commanding Officer No 478(M) Squadron RAAF is to provide a defence flight for the close protection of certain operational installations and other Service property in the vicinity of those installations. The area where No 478(M) Squadron is required to provide protection is as far as possible the area where the unit normally works, but it includes other locations. The Commanding Officer No 478(M) Squadron is to appoint an officer to command the No 478(M) Squadron Defence Flight. This officer is responsible for the organization, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located at Room 2, Building No 55B, No 478(M) Squadron Headquarters unless otherwise ordered by Commanding Officer No 478(M) Squadron. If a change is ordered, Commanding Officer No 478(M) Squadron is to ensure that Commanding Officer Base Squadron is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of No 478(M) Squadron Defence Flight is the protection of VPs 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20 and 30. Subject to this over-riding commitment, the flight is to protect all Service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. The Commanding Officer No 478(M) Squadron is to organize No 478(M) Squadron Defence Flight as he sees fit. A suitable outline organization for the purpose is shown at Attachment 1.
5. Equipment. The Ground Defence Section will hold equipment for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flight Commander No 478(M) Squadron Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red. The equipment is specified at Appendix 17.
6. Issues of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flight Commander No 478(M) Squadron Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.
7. Transport. On the declaration of Security Red the RAAF Motor Transport Officer is to withdraw and A-service the vehicles for this flight. He is to inform the flight commander when this is complete, and the flight commander is to arrange the collection of vehicles from the Motor Transport Section.

Attachment: 1. Organization of No 478(M) Squadron Defence Flight

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ATTACHMENT 1 TO
APPENDIX 10 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORGANIZATION OF NO 476(M) SQUADRON RAIF DEFENCE FLIGHT

Flight Commander (Flt Lt)

Flt HQ

2 IC (7 Off)
Radio Operator (2AC)
Runner/Clerk (4AC)
2 x light vehicles
1 x truck cargo 3 ton
1 x ANPRC 25 radio set
2 x Fl SMG
6 x LL41 SIR

No 1 Section	No 2 Section	No 3 Section	No 4 Section
Sect Comd (Sgt)	Sect Comd (F Sgt)	Sect Comd (Sgt)	Sect Comd (F Sgt)
2 IC (Cpl)	2 IC (Sgt)	2 IC (Cpl)	2 IC (Sgt)
Riflemen (12AC)	Riflemen (12AC)	Riflemen (SAC)	Riflemen (16AC)
1 x Fl SMG	5 x Fl SMG	1 x Fl SMG	1 x Fl SMG
13 x LL41 SIR	9 x LL41 SIR	9 x LL41 SIR	17 x LL41 SIR

(Note: This organization is based on the assumption that the responsibility for the protection of VPs will be allocated by the Flight Commander as follows:

- 1 Section. VPs 15 and 12.
- 2 Section. VPs 30 and 13.
- 3 Section. VPs 18.
- 4 Section. VPs 20 and 16.

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APPENDIX 11 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

MOBILE RESERVE FLIGHT - RMAF

1. Command. The Officer Commanding Supply Squadron RMAF is to form up a Mobile Reserve Flight RMAF whose tasks are outlined in para 5 below. He is to appoint an officer to command the Mobile Reserve Flight RMAF. This officer is responsible for the organization, administration, manning, training and equipment of the flight, and is to ensure that the flight is capable of carrying out its allotted tasks at all times. The Officer Commanding Supply Squadron RMAF is to prepare a detailed plan for the discharge of responsibilities under this Annex.
2. Location. Mobile Reserve Flight Headquarters is to be located at Supply Squadron Building 63.
3. Manning. The Mobile Reserve Flight is to be manned by members of Supply Squadron and Admin Wing as detailed by OC Supply.
4. Organization. Flight organization is as follows:

FLIGHT HQ

Flt Cdr : Junior Officer
2 IC : SNCO
Runner/Clerk : LAC
1 x Land Rover/Mini Coach
1 x Pistol Browning 9 mm
3 x L2A3 SMC

Sect Comd : Sgt
2 IC : Cpl
Riflemen : 12AC
14 x L2A3 SMC

5. Tasks. The Mobile Reserve is to provide:
 - a. a quick reaction capability to respond to any incident within the perimeter of the Air Base as directed by the Assistant Controller GDOC.
 - b. patrols within the perimeter of the Air Base as directed by the Assistant Controller GDOC.
 - c. assistance to ground defence flights as directed by the Assistant Controller, GDOC; and
 - d. assistance to the SSP as directed by the Assistant Controller GDOC.
6. Equipment. Supply Squadron RMAF is to hold appropriate equipment and accommodation stores for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flight Commander is to draw the equipment for the mobile reserve on the declaration of Security Amber.

11/7. Issue of Arms,

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ANNEX C

7. Issue of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flight Commander is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Amber. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.

8. Transport. On the declaration of Security Amber, the RMAF Motor Transport Officer is to provide the flight with 1 x land rover/mini coach and driver.

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APPENDIX 12 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

NO 3 SQUADRON RMAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

1. The Officer Commanding No 3 Squadron RMAF is to form up a defence flight for the close protection of certain operational installations and other service property in the vicinity of those installations in accordance with the information contained in this Annex. OC 3 Squadron is to appoint an officer to command the No 3 Squadron Defence Flight. This officer is responsible for the organization, administration, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located in Building 140, No 3 Squadron Headquarters, unless otherwise ordered by OC 3 Squadron. If a change is ordered, OC 3 Squadron is to ensure that OC Admin is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of No 3 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is the protection of VPs 14B and 14C. Subject to this over-riding commitment, the flight is to protect all service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. OC 3 Squadron is to organize No 3 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight as he sees fit. A suitable outline organization for the purpose is shown at Attachment 1.
5. Manning. OC Tech is to provide all the airmen required for the Defence Flight.
6. Equipment. Supply Squadron RMAF is to hold appropriate equipment and accommodation stores for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flt Cdr No 3 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red.
7. Issues of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flt Cdr No 3 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.
8. Transport. On the declaration of Security Amber the RMAF Motor Transport Officer is to provide the flight with 1 x land rover/mini coach and driver.

Attachment: 1. Organization of No 3 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight

ATTACHMENT 1 TO
APPENDIX 12 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORGANIZATION OF NO 3 SQUADRON RMAF
DEFENCE FLIGHT

Flight Commander (Junior Officer)

Flt HQ

2 IC (SMCO)
Runner/Clerk (1AC)
1 x Land Rover/Mini Coach
1 x Pistol Browning 9 mm
3 x L2A3 SMG

Sect Comd (Sgt)
2 IC (Cpl)
Riflemen (18AC)
2 x L2A3 SMG
18 x M1A1 SLR

(Note: This organization is based on the assumption that the following tasks can be accomplished:

- a. Protection of VPs 14B and 14C.
- b. foot patrols of Grid Ref J18 and 19
Appendix 4, to Annex C.

APPENDIX 13 TO
ANNEX C TO AIN BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

NO 11 SQUADRON RMAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

1. The Officer Commanding No 11 Squadron RMAF is to form up a defence flight for the close protection of certain operational installations and other service property in the vicinity of these installations in accordance with the information contained in this Annex. OC 11 Squadron is to appoint an officer to command the No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight. This officer is responsible for the organization, administration, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located in Building 60A, No 11 Squadron Headquarters, unless otherwise ordered by OC 11 Squadron. If a change is ordered, OC 11 Squadron is to ensure that OC Admin is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is the protection of VPs 9, 10, 11 and 14A. Subject to this over-riding commitment, the flight is to protect all service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. OC No 11 Squadron is to organize No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight as he sees fit. A suitable outline organization for the purpose is shown at Attachment 1.
5. Manning. OC Tech is to provide all the airmen required for the Defence Flight.
6. Equipment. Supply Squadron RMAF is to hold appropriate equipment and accommodation stores for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flight Commander No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red.
7. Issues of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flight Commander No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armory on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.
8. Transport. On the declaration of Security Amber the RMAF Motor Transport Officer is to provide the flight with 1. land rover/mini coach and driver.

Attachment: 1. Organization of No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight

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ATTACHMENT 1 TO
APPENDIX 13 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORGANIZATION OF NO 11 SQUADRON RIAF
DEFENCE FLIGHT

Flight Commander (Junior Officer)

Flt HQ

2 IC (SMCO)
Runner/Clerk (LAC)
1 x land rover/mini coach
1 x Pistol Browning 9 mm
3 x L2A3 SMG

Sect Comd (Sgt)
2 IC (Cpl)
Riflemen (24 AC)
2 x L2A3 SMG
24 x L1A1 SIR

(Note: This organization is based on the assumption that
VPs 9, 10, 11 and 14A can be adequately protected.

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APPENDIX 14 HQ
ATTACH 1 TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

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NO 1 AIR DEFENCE CENTRE RMAF DEFENCE FLIGHT

1. The Officer Commanding No 1 Air Defence Centre is to provide a defence flight for the close protection of No 1 ADC operational assets and other service property in the same locality in accordance with the information contained in this Annex. OC 1 ADC is to appoint an officer to command this flight, and he is responsible for the organization, administration, manning, equipment and operations of his flight.
2. Location. Flight Headquarters is to be located in Building 143, No 1 ADC Headquarters, unless otherwise ordered by OC 1 ADC. If a change is ordered, OC 1 ADC is to ensure that OC Admin is promptly informed.
3. Tasks. The primary responsibility of No 1 ADC RMAF Defence Flight is the protection of its operational installations *and its assets*. Subject to this ever-riding commitment the flight is to protect *also* all service property within its area of responsibility.
4. Organization. OC 1 ADC is to organize No 1 ADC RMAF Defence Flight as he sees fit. A suitable outline organization for the purpose is shown at Attachment 1.
5. Manning. OC 1 ADC is to provide all the personnel required for the Defence Flight.
6. Equipment. Supply Squadron RMAF is to hold appropriate equipment and accommodation stores for all ground defence elements, except weapons and ammunition. The Flight Commander No 1 ADC RMAF Defence Flight is to draw this equipment on the declaration of Security Red.
7. Issues of Arms, Storage and Accounting. The Flight Commander No 1 ADC RMAF Defence Flight is to draw arms and ammunition from the Base Armoury on the declaration of Security Red. The scale of issue and instructions for storage and accounting are contained at Appendix 16.
8. Transport. On the declaration of Security *imber* the RMAF Motor Transport Officer is to provide the flight with 1 x land rover/mini coach and driver.

Attachment: 1. Organization of No 1 Air Defence Centre
RMAF Defence Flight

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
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ATTACHMENT 1 TO
APPENDIX 14 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

ORGANIZATION OF NO 1 AIR DEFENCE CENTRE RMAT
DEFENCE FLIGHT

Flight Commander (Junior Officer)



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APPENDIX 15 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

INCREMENT TO RAAF SERVICE POLICE

1. In addition to unit defence flights and the mobile reserve, the Commanding Officers of No 3 Squadron, No 75 Squadron, No 478(M) Squadron and Base Squadron RAAF are to provide an increment to the RAAF Police Section. This increment is to be used by the RAAF DAPM to assist the SSP in the guarding of VPs or other installations outside the areas of responsibility of defence flights.
2. This force is to comprise one SNCO, provided by Base Squadron, and 24 junior airmen, six from each of the nominated units. The DAPM is to keep an up-to-date nominal roll of members, in conjunction with Senior Ground Defence Officer. He is to administer the increment, although he may delegate routine tasks to the SNCO who is supplied for this purpose. The Senior Ground Defence Officer and the DAPM are jointly responsible for the training of members allocated to the increment to the RAAF Police Section.
3. The members will be armed with LL41 SLR and will carry two magazines. The initial ammunition scale is 1,000 rounds of 7.62 mm ball. The DAPM is to arrange the drawing of weapons and ammunition from the RAAF Armoury on the declaration of Security Red, and he is to arrange storage facilities in the RAAF Police Sub-armoury. The issues and return of arms and ammunition from the sub-armoury is to follow normal procedure.
4. The DAPM is to arrange the drawing of 27 kits, combat, from the RAAF Ground Defence Section on the declaration of Security Red. He is to hold adequate number of the standard grid map of the Base, at all times.

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APPENDIX 16 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

SCALES OF ISSUE OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND PYROTECHNICS,
AND ORDERS FOR STORAGE AND ACCOUNTING

1. Scale of Issue of Arms and Ammunition.

a. Mobile Reserve Flight - RAAF

1 1/2 inch Signal Pistol	1
F1 SMG	16
F1 Magazines	32 (2 per F1)
LLA1 SLR	32
SLR Magazines	96 (3 per LLA1)
9 mm ball	1,088 rounds
9 mm ball - reserve	2,520 rounds (1 'H60' Box)
7.62 mm ball	1,920 rounds
7.62 mm ball - reserve	1,800 rounds (2 'H60' Boxes)

b. No 3 Squadron RAAF Defence Flight

F1 SMG	10
F1 Magazines	20 (2 per F1)
LLA1 SLR	26
SLR Magazines	52 (2 per LLA1)
9 mm ball	680 rounds
7.62 mm ball	1,040 rounds

c. No 75 Squadron RAAF Defence Flight

F1 SMG	10
F1 Magazines	20 (2 per F1)
LLA1 SLR	24
SLR Magazines	48 (2 per LLA1)
9 mm ball	680 rounds
7.62 mm ball	960 rounds

d. No 478(M) Squadron RAAF Defence Flight

F1 SMG	10
F1 Magazines	20 (2 per F1)
LLA1 SLR	54
SLR Magazines	108 (2 per LLA1)
9 mm ball	680 rounds
7.62 mm ball	2,160 rounds

e. Increment to RAAF Police Section

LLA1 SLR	25
SLR Magazines	50 (2 per LLA1)
7.62 mm ball	1000 rounds

f. No 3 Squadron RAAF Defence Flight

Pistol Browning 9 mm	1 (2 magazines)
L2A3 SMG	5
L2A3 Magazines	10
LLA1 SLR	18
SLR Magazines	36
9 mm ball	450 rounds
7.62 mm ball	1000 rounds

.../g. No 11 Squadron RAAF

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APPENDIX 16 TO
ANNEX Cg. No 11 Squadron RMAF Defence Flight

Pistol Browning 9 mm	1 (2 magazines)
L2A3 SMG	5
L2A3 Magazines	10
L1A1 SLR	24
SLR Magazines	48
9 mm ball	450 rounds
7.62 mm ball	1300 rounds

h. No 1 Air Defence Centre RMAF Defence Flight

Pistol Browning 9 mm	1 (2 magazines)
L2A3 SMG	5
L2A3 Magazines	10
L1A1 SLR	12
SLR Magazines	24
9 mm ball	450 rounds
7.62 mm ball	650 rounds

i. Mobile Reserve Flight - RMAF

1 $\frac{1}{2}$ Signal Pistol	1
Pistol Browning 9 mm	1
Pistol Browning 9 mm Magazine	2
L2A3 SMG	17
SMG Magazines	34
9 mm ball	1300 rounds

2. The RMAF Base Armoury will issue the appropriate arms, ammunition and magazines in accordance with the instructions contained in this Order.

3. Storage and Accounting. Arms are to be stored in sub-armouries when not in use. Ammunition is to be stored in lockable ready-use lockers. Arms are to be signed out and in, in an arms register (exercise book) each time a weapon leaves or returns to a sub-armoury; serial numbers are to be recorded for each outward movement, and checked for each inward movement. Similarly, ammunition is to be accounted for by signing out and in, a particular number of rounds in an ammunition register (exercise book) each time ammunition is drawn or returned. Any deficiencies in ammunition are to be explained in the register, and reported to GDOC in the next SITREP.

4. Scale of Issue Pyrotechnics.a. Mobile Reserve Flights

Flares Tripwire Mk 2 - as required

(Note: To be issued only on instructions from the Duty Controller GDOC.)

Cartridges signal 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ in red	16
Cartridges signal 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ in yellow	16
Cartridges signal 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ in green	16
Cartridges smoke puff white	16

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APPENDIX 17 TO
ANNEX 8 TO AIF BASE
TUTTERFORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

EQUIPMENT FOR GROUND DEFENCE FLIGHTS

Ident No.	Item	Mobile Reserve RAAF	3SQN Def Flt RAAF	75SQN Def Flt RAAF	478(M) SQN Def Flt RAAF	Mobile Reserve RAAF	3SQN Def Flt RAAF	113QN Def Flt RAAF	LADO
5620-857-0759	ANPRC 25 Radio	9	5 *	4 *	6 *				
6135-858-5712	Batteries Dry	12	8 *	6 *	10 *				
6650-019-9546	Binoculars Prismatic	7	2	2	4				
6230-014-5733	Flashlight	14	7	7	14				
6230-014-5207	Flashlight, pencil type	6	3	3	4				
Q12/2624	Lamp, pressure **	4	2	2	2				
Q12/3199	Clock, 8 day	1	-	-	-				
7105-018-2673	Cot Folding	25	24	23	44				
Q14/57	Sheet	39	36	34	64				
Q14/21	Pillowslip	39	36	34	64				
8415-RAF-220 1396	Cape, monsoon	39	14	14	30				
7210-010-1897	Pillow	25	24	23	44				
7105-024-5361	Table, folding	3	1	1	1				
Q12/3346	Chair, tubular, folding	12	12	12	20				
Q12/318	Urn, electric (2 gallon)	1	1	1	1				
	Teapot	1	1	1	1				
	Cups	30	35	34	64				
	Teaspoon	30	30	30	30				

As required by RAAF

.../DLA/20418

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APPENDIX 17 TO
ANNEX C

Ident No.	Item	Mobile Reserve RAAF	3SQN Def Flt RAAF	75SQN Def Flt RAAF	478(M) SQN Def Flt RAAF	Mobile Reserve RAAF	3SQN Def Flt RAAF	11SQN Def Flt RAAF	LADO
DIA/20418	Cutters Wire	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8415-023-8802	Gloves, leather	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8465-000-0035	Kit Combat ***	39	36	34	64	-	-	-	-
	Message pads Form A224	4	2	2	2	-	-	-	-
	Clip Boards	6	6	6	10	-	-	-	-
	Ruled foolscap (in pads)	10	4	4	4	-	-	-	-
	Plain foolscap (reams)	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	-
	Large exercise book	4	4	4	4	-	-	-	-
	Pen, ball-point, blue	6	4	4	4	-	-	-	-
	Pen, ball-point, red	6	4	4	4	-	-	-	-
	Pencil, black, lead	6	4	4	4	-	-	-	-
	Pencil, chinagraph, assorted	6	4	4	4	-	-	-	-
	Ruler 15"	6	6	6	6	-	-	-	-
	Envelopes - large (pkts)	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	-
	Envelopes - foolscap (pkts)	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	-
	Envelopes - small (pkts)	3	2	2	2	-	-	-	-
	Standard grid maps of Butterworth	3	2	2	2	-	-	-	-
	Weapon cleaning material	10	6	6	6	-	-	-	-
		as required	as required	as required	as required	As required by RMAF	As required by RMAF	As required by RMAF	As required by RMAF

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..5340-014-7365

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APPENDIX 17 TO
ANNEX C

3.

Ident No.	Item	Mobile Reserve RAAF	3SQN Def Flt RAAF	75SQN Def Flt RAAF	478(M) SQN Def Flt RAAF	Mobile Reserve RMAF	3SQN Def Flt RMAF	11SQN Def Flt RMAF	LADO
5340-014-7365	Padlock, large	2	2	2	2				
7125-014-0905	Cabinet, storage 18 1/2" x 42" x 36"	1	1	1	1				
	Whistle	8	7	6	13				
5330-016-8701	Megaphone Hailer	2	-	-	-				
1095-RAF-7B982	Pistol Signal No 4 Mk 1	1	-	-	-				
132E/409	1 Star	100 yds	-	-	-				
5660-022-0471	Cotton tape plain 2 ins	12	-	-	-				
	Barbed wire steel								
	dannert (coils)								
J120/152	Plares tripwire Mk 2		See Appendix 16						
	Danner IS	1	-	-	-				
6135-014-3454	Battery Dry 1.5V (for flashlight)	42	21	21	42				
6135-120-1030	Battery Dry 1.5V (for pencil flashlight)	18	9	9	12				
6240-155-8675	Globe, bayonet type (for flashlight)	14	7	7	14				
6240-995-1156	Globe, screw type (for pencil flashlight)	6	3	3	4				
	Acetate Sheet (for map Overlays)	-----	As required	-----	-----				

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.../* To be drawn

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4.

APPENDIX 17 TO
ANNEX C

- * To be drawn from Ground Defence Section on declaration of Security Amber.
- ** An additional 6 lamps, pressure, are to held for the GDOC.
- *** An additional 27 kits, combat are to be held for the RAAF Police Section Increment.
- Ø RAAF Police Section to hold a quantity of these maps at all times.

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APPENDIX 13 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

(SPECIMEN SITREP)

.....
(Issuing Headquarters)

.....CH
(Date/Time Group)

Situation Report No

Situation as at 0730 hours on

1. Situation.

a. Manning.

..... Officers, SMCs Cpls, LACs.

b. Casualties.

..... Officers, SMCs Cpls, LACs.

c. Vehicle State.

Total strength

Number serviceable

Number unserviceable

d. Radio State.

Total number

Number serviceable

Number unserviceable

e. Battery State. (AN-PRC 25)

Number held serviceable

Number required

f. Ammunition State.

Authorized stock held? YES/NO

Resupply required rounds 7.62 mm.

..... rounds 9 mm.

g. Incidents.

Number of incidents which occurred during period
of this report (If this is first
SITREP stipulate period of report.)

.../Brief

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2.

APPENDIX 13 TO
ANNEX C

9

Brief summary of incidents
.....
.....
.....
.....

h. Reports of Enemy Sightings or Enemy Movement.

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

i. Administration. Administrative and other factors
affecting operations (eg messing, accommodation
welfare, etc)

.....
.....
.....

(NB: This SITREP is prepared for ease of transmission by
radio or telephone.)

.....
Officer in Charge

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ANNEX D TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OP ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

NEFARIOUS DEVICES

1. Dissident elements may use "home-made" explosive or acid devices. Such devices can be initiated by:
 - a. burning fuse;
 - b. electric fuse operated remotely
 - c. delay mechanism including watch mechanism;
 - d. sensitive contacts (possibly light actuated) in an electrical mechanism;
 - e. acid delay; and
 - f. mechanical means, including percussion and trip mechanisms.
2. To deal with such devices a Bomb Disposal Team is formed under the control of the RAAF Armament Officer. The RAAF Armament Officer is responsible for ensuring that the team is qualified for the duty, for initiating action on equipment scaling, and holding at readiness appropriate equipment for the team's use. External assistance may be sought from HQ 28th Commonwealth Brigade, the Malaysian Police through OCPD Butterworth, or 6th Malaysian Infantry Brigade, Sungai Petani.
3. On declaration of Security Amber the RAAF Armament Officer is to report to the Duty Controller GDOC on the readiness state of the Bomb Disposal Team. The Bomb Disposal Team will be activated under the control of the Duty Controller GDOC from the declaration of Security Red and is to be on immediate standby as far as practicable. At any time when immediate standby cannot be achieved, the RAAF Armament Officer is to ensure that the Duty Controller GDOC is informed of the circumstances and arrangements for calling out the team.
4. Malaysian authorities are responsible for the disposal of all devices found outside Service property except that devices in or near hirings or close enough to Service property to have operational effect, will be actioned as appropriate to the circumstances.
5. The disposal of any nefarious device found on or below the high water mark is the responsibility of Malaysian Naval authorities, but if devices are found on the beachfront adjacent to Air Base Butterworth the member finding is responsible to report immediately to GDOC or RAAF/SSR Security Controller and is to take action as in paragraph 7.
6. Immediate Reporting. All reports of nefarious devices on Air Base Butterworth are to be made to GDOC or the Guard Room (extension 444) by the fastest available means. If a report is made to the Guard Room, the Security Controller is to notify Duty Controller GDOC or Duty Staff Officer if the GDOC is not manned and OIC SSR at once. Duty Controller GDOC or the Duty Staff Officer as appropriate, is to notify the RAAF Armament Officer at the earliest opportunity, giving the fullest available description of the device.

7. Safety Precautions

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7. Safety Precautions. The senior member present when knowledge of or suspicion of the presence of a nefarious device arises is responsible to:

- a. notify GDOC (extension 555) or Security Controller RAAP/SSP (extension 444) by the fastest available means
- b. seek local assistance to clear all persons from the immediate area and cordon it off as far as practicable
- c. minimize danger to material surroundings as far as practicable and take prudent action to limit the device's effect
- d. retire to a safe distance (normally at least 100 yards);
- e. await qualified assistance
- f. prevent any attempt to move the device and
- g. remain in charge of the situation until he hands over his responsibilities to another member or until the arrival of the Bomb Disposal Team when he is to hand over his responsibilities to the team leader.

8. Disposal. Unless the device can be positively identified and can be disposed of by an approved method it will normally be exploded in-situ after taking suitable precautions for the safety of property.

9. Follow-up Reports. The Duty Controller GDOC is to report all incidents of nefarious devices to the respective RAAP/RMAF Headquarters, describing:

- a. exact location where found
- b. details of mechanism if known
- c. type of device, including a general description
- d. details of disposal action and
- e. approximate nett explosive content (NEC) or other dangerous feature.

If possible the device is to be photographed by the photographer on call. Photographs are to be delivered to the RAAP Armament Officer who is responsible to ensure their appropriate distribution.

10. Search for Nefarious Devices. All defence element and unit commanders are to ensure that their deployed forces are constantly alert for the possible presence of nefarious devices and are to initiate routine search checks in their area of responsibility at regular intervals. Unit commanders are, from

.../declaration of

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3.

ANNEX D

declaration of Security Red, to arrange for the routine pre-flight checks of aircraft to include special precautions against the possibility of nefarious devices. RMAF Movement Control Officer and Commanding Officer RMAF are to ensure that the opportunity for locally employed civilians being in the vicinity of or having access to visiting aircraft is minimized and strictly controlled from the declaration of Security Red, and that careful search for nefarious devices is made before departure. The OIC SSP is, on instructions from Asst Controller GDOC, to initiate search of locally employed civilians and other non-Service persons entering the Protected Place. He is to ensure that he has a capacity to cordon off and exercise control of entry to any area in which the presence of a nefarious device is known or suspected.

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ANNEX E TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH CY ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

POL

1. On the first declaration of a security state, officers responsible for maintaining fuel supplies at the Air Base are to raise and maintain POL stocks to the highest practicable level. Particular responsibilities in relation to security states are as follows:

a. Security Green.

- (1) Air Base Fuels Officer is to raise holdings of AVGAS, AVTUR and aircraft and MT oils and lubricants to maximum levels.
- (2) Transport Officers are to raise MT and diesel fuels to maximum holding levels.

b. Security Amber.

- (1) Fuels Officers are to provide GDOC with a daily status of all fuel stocks on the Air Base and operational reserve at contractors' premises.
- (2) Fuels Officers are to notify GDOC of any requirements for armed escort of bridging tankers.
- (3) RAAT Fuels Officer is to obtain the keys to the AVGAS installation and provide members to operate this installation if necessary.
- (4) RAAT Fuels Officer is to fill with AVTUR 100 drums for emergency deployment of helicopters.

2. Fuel Installations - Vital Points. Each of the bulk fuel installations on the Air Base is a vital point and is to be afforded protection in accordance with Annex 'C'.

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ANNEX F TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Officers delegated the responsibility for the communications of their respective national forces are to ensure that these facilities are in working order at all times and are to carry out communication checks at least once every calendar month.

Radio Communications

2. General. Communications between GDOC and Defence Flights will be effected by means of land line and radio transceivers.

3. Circuits/Nets. Radio circuits/nets are shown diagrammatically at Appendix 1.

4. Radio Frequencies. Radio frequencies and frequency designators are shown at Appendix 1. These frequencies are not to be disclosed over any communication channel. If it is necessary to refer to radio frequencies the relevant designators must be used.

5. Call Signs. Station call signs are listed at Appendix 1. Stations are to be referred to by their call sign and not by name.

6. Telephone facilities. Important telephone numbers are listed at Appendix 2.

Appendices: 1. Radio communications diagram
2. Important telephone numbers


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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX F TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH CP ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 3TH SEPTEMBER 1971

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS



Net Identification - Mat Digger
Net Call Sign - Dingo

Serial No.	Frequency	Callsign	Frequency Designator
1	73.25	Hawk	01
2	To be provided by RMAF		
3	73.25	Eagle	01
4	73.25	Magpie	01
5	73.25	Swan	01
6	To be provided by RMAF		
7	To be provided by RMAF		
8	To be provided by RMAF		
9	40.80	Rover	02
10	To be provided by RMAF		
11	49.10	Wombat	03

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX F TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 9TH SEPTEMBER 1971

IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS

<u>Air Base</u>	<u>Penang 32101</u>	<u>Office</u> <u>Ext</u>	<u>Home</u> <u>Ext</u>
<u>RAAF</u>			
Officer Commanding		200	651
Deputy Ground Defence Commander/ CO Base Squadron		220	667
Assistant Provost Marshal		212	Pg 34373
Deputy Asst Provost Marshal		272	
Senior Ground Defence Officer		239	655
Ground Defence Officer/ OIC Mobile Reserve		240	380
Barracks Officer		340	
Armament Officer		626	Pg 32320
Radio Officer		340	Pg 61458
CDW Area Manager		450	Pg 61084
Ground Defence Operations Centre		555	
3SQN Defence Flight		614	
75SQN Defence Flight		602	
473(M)SQN Defence Flight		620	
Mobile Reserve Flight		240	
ANZUK Support Company		784/786	
Fire Section		235/319	
No 4 RAAF Hospital		737/739	
Guardroom		444	
Operations Room (Air)		207	
CDW Chief Engineer		453	406

/RMAF

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX F

RAAF Penang 32231 For internal calls dial 213/214 and ask the operator for the extension.

	<u>Office</u> <u>Ext</u>	<u>Home</u> <u>Ext</u>
Commanding Officer	110	120
Deputy Ground Defence Commander	110	120
OC Administrative Wing	113	Pg 62604
3SQN Defence Flight	127	
11SQN Defence Flight	136	
1ADC Defence Flight	772(RAAF Exchange)	
Mobile Reserve Flight	163	
OIC Special Security Police	183	
Guardroom	213	

CIVIL POLICE

Contingent Police HQ	Pg 64444
Duty Officer Police HQ Penang	Pg 64444 Ext 123
CCPD Police District Butterworth	Pg 31222

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