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30 November, 2022

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## Submission to Inquiry - Mr Stanley Hannaford

### Part 1 – Name of Inquiry

**Name of Inquiry \***

Medallic Recognition For Service with Rifle Company Butterworth

### Part 2 – About the Submitter

**Title or Rank \***

Mr

**Given Names \***

Stanley

**Surname \***

Hannaford

**Post-nominals (if applicable)**

**Street Number and Name \***

[Redacted]

**Suburb \***

[Redacted]

**Postcode \***

[Redacted]

**State \***

[Redacted]

**Email Address: \***

[Redacted]

**Primary Contact Number \***

[Redacted]

**Secondary Contact Number**

**Is the Submission on behalf of an organisation? If yes, please provide details:**

Rifle Company Butterworth Veterans Group

### Part 3 – Desired outcome

**Provide a summary of your submission:**

War Like Service with full entitlements under the Veterans Entitlements Act, Australian Active Service Medal 1945/75 ( AASM ) for service pre 14 Feb 1975 and AASM 75 for service post 14 Feb 1975. General Service Medal 1962 ( GSM ) for service pre 14 Feb 1975, under the Imperial Awards System. The Malaysian Government is requested to extend the qualifying period for the Pinjat Jasa Malaysia Medal ( PJM ) to cover the RCB service 1970-1989.

## Part 4 - Your submission and Supporting Documentation

File Attached: Supplementary-Submission-on-behalf-of-the-Rifle-Company-Butterworth-Veterans-Group.docx  
live-Taylor-RCB.docx  
Expectation-of-Casualites-RCB-1969-1989.jpg  
Les-Morgan.docx  
Comparison-of-Operational-Service-Entitlements-and-Awards-RCB-Version-18.doc

## Part 5 – Consent and declaration

✓ I consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal making my submission publicly available.

✓ I also consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal:

- using information contained in my submission to conduct research;
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation considered by the Tribunal to be appropriate; and
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation the subject of adverse comment in the submission;
- using content in my submission in its report to Government.

**The Tribunal will decide which person or organisation is appropriate, and this may include:**

1. persons or organisations required to assist with the inquiry; and
2. persons or organisations with an interest in the inquiry.

✓ I declare that the information I have provided is correct.

**Name**

Stan Hannaford

**Date**

30/11/2022


*Mr Stanley  
Hannaford*


Signed by Mr Stanley Hannaford

Signed on: 30 November, 2022

# Signature Certificate

Document name: Submission to Inquiry - Mr Stanley Hannaford







Supplementary Submission on behalf of the Rifle Company Butterworth Veterans Group ( RCBVG ) Submitted by Stan Hannaford.

Attached are statements from three RCB veterans supplementary to our previous submission.

The RCBVG also request that the Tribunal look at the following medallic recognition for RCB service.

1. General Service Medal 1962-. For RCB service pre 14 Feb 1975 as this was the only campaign medal available at the time under the Imperial Awards System.
2. Pinjat Jasa Malaysia Medal (PJM) This medal has been awarded by the Malaysian Government to ADF personnel who served in Malaysia during both the Malaysian Emergency and the Borneo Confrontation.
3. A Malaysian Government statement confirming that the RCB was in fact assisting the Malay Armed Forces at Butterworth Air Base by carrying out such vital defence warlike duties, should encourage the Australian Government to request the Malaysian Government to extend the qualifying period for eligibility for the PJM to cover the period 1970 – 1989.
4. I was advised personally by the Malaysian Defence Advisor to apply for the PJM for my service in Malaysia with the RCB, this application was submitted through the Malaysian Defence system. The verbal response to my application was, the Australian Government would need to request the Malaysian Government to extend the qualifying period to take in the RCB service 1970—1989 and it would be looked upon favourably.

Stan Hannaford.

For the RCBVG

30 Nov 2022

### Expectation of Casualties RCB 1969 -1989

The generally accepted definition of *Expectation* "a strong belief that something will happen or be the case". An ex Secret draft brief from 1975 states clearly, "the most important requirement is that the base has adequate emergency response arrangements to deal with casualties and to recover from the effects of an attack".<sup>1</sup> 'Expectation' presumes that the term is applied prospectively. I seriously doubt whether any government would tell the voting public that they were sending troops into harm's way and that they expect casualties as this would be pure speculation and politically disastrous. Conversely, it would be counterintuitive to apply it in retrospect as it refers to the future, not the past.

An infantry soldier is trained to close with and kill the enemy, expectation of casualties is implicit and accepted as an occupational hazard. It follows that if deployed into a known warlike theater where casualties are occurring on both sides then there would be an expectation of casualties.

The soldiers on QRF who assaulted the VPs in the dark with sweat in their eyes in the dark of night fully battle ready with live front line ammunition certainly expected casualties should they encounter armed CTs.

The Malaysian soldiers or police who were fighting the CTs in the jungles and on the streets of their own country were taking casualties.<sup>2</sup>

The Staff officers who wrote the briefs and threat studies with battle statistics certainly knew that there was an expectation of casualties.

The Govt officials who generated the distortion and deceit at the outset of RCB had every reason to conceal the fact that they knew the state of the country and that there was an expectation of casualties.

Current Government officials who are relying solely on inept, inaccurate and incorrect past decisions on RCB and have little or no historical knowledge of the facts cannot be relied upon for comment.

Many documents in the RCBRG database show clearly that there were battles being fought between the Malaysians and CTs including air strikes from the airbase.<sup>3 4</sup> Military operations against the CT (including the local formation 6MIB, in whose area of operations the air base was situated), are likewise well documented as are casualty statistics from both sides. Not only did they expect casualties, they took casualties.

Expectation of casualties is implied by the fact that Australian personnel were in harm's way simply by being deployed to a country fighting a counter revolutionary war and being inside the area of operations of a Malaysian Infantry Brigade. The only barrier between Australian personnel and the local CTs was a wire fence and a Malaysian military formation that could not guarantee its presence due to its commitment to local operations against the CTs.<sup>5</sup>

Clearly the RCB deployments up until the surrender of the CPM in 1989 were warlike despite any distortion surrounding the term 'expectation of casualties'.

LF Solomon

<sup>1</sup> 19750915 and 19750915A Brief for DCAS concerning security at Butterworth Brief (stored in two parts) Ex-SECRET Not identified Dept of Air 564/8/28 undated, and marked "First Draft only" Summarises threat levels to ABB in late 1975. Threat is now less from an external enemy, but now the result of "... a resurgence of militant overt and covert activity by the CPM and its military arm the CTO." And others. Lists likely enemy and detail of threat. Para 16 addresses the need for an infantry combat force " ... capable of responding quickly to an attack, to relieve an over-run position and counter attack any groups which occupy positions on the base."

<sup>2</sup> 19750430 Security Situation - Air Base Butterworth - Report No 32 Minute Ex-SECRET GPCAPT R S Royston, DAFI INT 8/10/3 dated 30 Apr 75 More evidence of CT attacks, with details of units attacked and when, with casualties.

<sup>3</sup> 19770520 Sitrep for Butterworth and Northern Peninsula Malaysia (Farley) Cablegram Ex-SECRET (FARLEY) Dept of Foreign Affairs Canberra A101/AIR3 dated 200805Z May 77 Int proof for FGA sorties by RMAF against the CTs out of ABB, and enemy activity Kulim area.

<sup>4</sup> 19770715 Sitrep for Butterworth and Northern Peninsula Malaysia Cablegram to Mt Parkinson, Sir Arthur Tange, AM Rowland (CAS) and LTGEN MacDonald (CGS) Ex-SECRET FARLEY HQ Butterworth DCR 027/15 dated 150200Z Jul 77 Reports the local situation including movement of CT 8th Assault Unit east of Kulim, and RMAF fighter ground attack missions from ABB against the CTs

<sup>5</sup> 19750918A Malaysia - The threat to Air Base Butterworth Description of the Base DRAFT document Ex-SECRET Unknown Not referenced The attachment re-draft of the JIO report to more accurately demonstrate the threat to ABB. Cover, a separate document, is 19750918.

I acknowledge the Chair's concern regarding causalities, and the premise of "likelihood of causalities" against "expectation of causalities" in deciding the awarding of the AASM and classification of War Like Service.

However, is the issue of causalities consistent with other operations where AASM and War Like Service been granted. I would submit they are not, and the following table (compiled by Lt Col R Linwood ASM (Retd ) is evidence that compares several operations covering periods from 1965 to the present. In a number of these deployments, it can be seen that the "expectation of causalities " is similar to or less than that which was expected by RCB. Notably, Deigo Garcis, Namibia Engineers, and Ubon RAAF, to name 3. The table also compares among other categories, Intelligence Threat Assessment, Causalities of Allies and Enemies, weapons issued to Australian forces and Enemy weapons.

Les Morgan RCB Veteran.

## COMPARISON OF OPERATIONAL SERVICE ENTITLEMENTS AND MEDALLIC AWARDS – RCB (18)

(AS AT 6 MAR 22)

Criteria	Australian Rifle Company Butterworth (1)	Diego Garcia RAAF ground personnel (9)	Ubon RAAF Airfield Defence Guard (2)	Namibia Engineer UN deployment	Somalia HMAS Tobruk and Jervis Bay	Middle East - (incl Iraq) Operations OKRA, HIGHROAD, MANITOU, ACCORDION (4)	Cambodia UN deployment	Rwanda UN deployment (8)
<b>Operational deployment period</b>	2 Nov 1970 – 2 Dec 89	2001 - 2002	1965 - 1968	18 Feb 89 to 10 Apr 90	1992-3	1 Jul 14 ongoing	20 Oct 91-7 Oct 93	Aug 94 to Aug 95
<b>Current award</b>	ASM 45-75 or ASM	AASM	AASM 45-75	AASM and UNTAG medal	AASM	AOSM (5)	AASM and UNAMIC/UNT AC medal	AASM and UNAMIR medal
<b>Initial award</b>	ASM 45-75 or ASM	ASM	ASM 45-75	ASM and UNTAG medal	ASM	AOSM	ASM and UNAMIC/UNT AC medal	ASM and UNAMIR medal
<b>Intelligence Threat Assessment</b>	Yes	Remote possibility from a ground perspective	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Closest distance from known enemy</b>	Outside perimeter. No attack	1680 km, across an ocean. No attack	No enemy attacked while AS Air Defence Guards (ADG) were there (2)	Outside perimeter	At sea, docked at Mogadishu on occasions (2). No attack	Outside base perimeter. No attack yet. Many personnel are nowhere near an enemy, being based in allied countries	Mixed with potential hostiles	Outside perimeter, very close at Kibehu, taunting the AS soldiers to open fire
<b>Rules of Engagement</b>	Self-defence, shoot to wound if possible, per ROE	None known for small arms. Very low level enemy air or naval threat	Aircraft provide use of force against aircraft attacking base (7)	UN had no ROE so AS troops used ROE/OFOF for self-defence	Self defence, shoot to kill if necessary	OPSEC, but HAS to be at least self-defence, being an operational deployment	Self-defence, shoot to wound if possible, per ROE	Self defence – no shooting engagements unless on order
<b>Patrol area</b>	RCB patrolled inside	No patrols known	ADGs could patrol outside perimeter	Only check points, assembly	Large ocean area plus	Only inside training area,	Check points, assembly areas	Convoy and VP protection. Carried



	perimeter, in conjunction with RAAF Police Dog Teams; permission could be given by RAAF Base Commander to patrol outside		(7)	areas and protection of work locations	alongside at Mogadishu	not outside allied security perimeter	and protection of work locations	40mm illum, F89 light machine guns and pers wns
<b>RAAF and RAN Aircraft</b>	Fighters were the prime IADS asset; tasked to stay out of Thai airspace unless cleared. Maintained flight in Singapore. Acft conducted patrols over Indian Ocean.	Provide air defence of Diego Garcia base and transiting through it	Limited to Thai airspace providing air defense for the USAF attack aircraft and bombers (7)	No. One RAAF officer on ground duties.	N/A. Ships self-protect and achieve mutual protection with other warships	RAAF acft conducting strike missions, EW, refueling and logistic support	6 Army helos in support (armed?) Helos had an armed protection/QRF platoon in base loc	No combat acft. Med pers only
<b>Expectation of casualties</b>	Possible, and planned for. Combat medics in RCB, with backup from RAAF & local hospitals. 3 Fatal NBCAS.	No. Base medical facilities available. Nil fatal	Possible. Base USAF and Thai medical facilities available. Nil fatal	Possible, including mines. Nil fatal	Possible. HMAS Tobruk had an embarked medical team with surgical capability. Nil fatal	Possible, and planned for. Entire deployable fd hosp is deployed in loc with strategic medevac as for MEAO. Nil fatal	Possible. Prime role was to prov comms spt for UN troops. Nil fatal	Possible. Prime role was to prov med spt for UN troops. Nil fatal
<b>Weapons issued</b>	Full complement of rifle company weapons	Normal small arms for air crew	Small arms (rifle and pistols)	Personal small arms only – pistol, SLR and 7.62mm Bren LMG	Pistols, shotguns, rifles and 50cal machine guns	Multiple by both AS and Iraqi Army (Brigade level weapons), including anti-armour	Pers wpns. Inf coy carried rfl and F89 light machine guns.	Pers wpns. Inf coy carried rfl and F89 light machine guns. Thee M113A1s.

<b>Ammunition</b>	Live ammunition all weapons (1)	Gnd staff believed to be unarmed (TBC).	Live (small arms only)	Live (small arms only)	Live per above	Live per above	Live per above	Live. Nil explosive
<b>Within range of enemy weapons</b>	Yes – mortars, small arms & explosives	No	No evidence of any attacks involving Australians (7)	South African Defence Force (who were not “enemy”, intimidated AS troops by firing near them, holing vehicles deliberately at least once	Possibly. Pirates carried RPGs, small arms and up to 12.7 mm DshK	Yes – mortars, small arms, MG up to 12.7 mm DshK & explosives	Yes – mortars, mines, small arms & explosives	Yes – mortars, small arms, RPG/SPG 9, MGs to 12.7mm DshK and machetes
<b>Reinforcements considered</b>	Yes, to battalion strength (6)	No	No (Ubon had Thai and USAF defences incl MG bunkers)	No. Part of a UN force that included civilians	Yes	Yes. Operation OCRA is a substantial deployment	Yes. Part of a larger UN force.	Other UN elements
<b>Combat engagements</b>	Yes, by Malaysian army and police. Some green on blue	No	No evidence of any involving RAAF (7)	No. “Not a shot fired”.	No	Not yet	None known	Kibehu came close. AS fired no shots and were not fired upon (no AS troops hit)
<b>Casualties known after deployment</b>	Nil from enemy, but at three Fatal NBCAS and many injured NBCAS	Nil	No evidence of any. NVA sappers attacked in 1970 after AS left	None	Nil	None yet	Some NBCAs. Nil killed.	Nil Battle Cas
<b>Allied casualties within 50 kilometers</b>	Yes (3)	Nil	No evidence of any	Possibly other UN troops	No	Yes – Iraqi Army fighting ISIL	Probable, UN casualties, if any, not known	Large numbers of neutrals murdered
<b>Allied casualties within 100 kilometers</b>	Yes (3)	Nil	No evidence of any	Possibly other UN troops	No	Yes – Iraqi Army fighting ISIL	Probable, UN casualties if any, not known	Large numbers of neutrals murdered
<b>Enemy casualties within 50 kilometers</b>	Yes (3)	Nil	No evidence of any	Not yet identified	No	Yes	Probable, depending on definition of “enemy”	Probably, but not caused by AS troops
<b>Enemy</b>	Yes (3)	Nil	No evidence of any	Not yet	No	Yes	Probable,	Probably, but not

<b>casualties within 100 kilometers</b>				identified			depending on definition of "enemy"	caused by AS troops
<b>WILL completed before deployment</b>	Yes	Has to be – they were deployed on overseas service	Has to be – they were deployed on overseas service	Standard UN deployment procedure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Primary task</b>	Protect RAAF aircraft, other assets and personnel inside the perimeter, and apply service protected evacuations from Penang.	Protect RAAF aircraft, other assets and personnel inside the perimeter.	Protect RAAF aircraft, other assets and personnel inside the perimeter.	Supervise the return of refugees, holding of a general election, withdrawal of South African forces and Namibia's transition to independence	Provide logistic (incl healthcare) support to Coalition forces. Nil refugees treated.	Train Iraqi 206 Corps; self-protect	Provide comms spt to UNAMIC/UNT AC	Med elm to provide med spt to UN force. Rifle company with sect of APCs to protect the med force
<b>Allied support</b>	RAAF Police Dog Teams inside the wire, RMAF (Handau) on the perimeter, external defence provided by 6 RMAF brigade (army)	TBA; probably USAF	Substantial Thai and USAF forces	Part of a UN force incl police and civilians	Coalition naval forces; coalition ground forces when alongside	Coalition forces	Rest of UNAMIC/UNT AC (22,000 troops in all)	UNAMIR I and II.
<b>Basis for upgrade of award</b>	See Note 10	See Note 11	See Note 12	See Note 13	See Note 14	See Note 15	See Note 16	See Note 17

**NOTES:**

1. For RCB, pistols, rifles, automatic rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, 40mm grenade launchers, 66mm Light anti-tank weapons, 84mm medium anti-tank guns, all with at least a First Line of live ammunition. Hand grenades and Claymore mines included in ammunition stocks stored inside the base. All available at short notice from on-base ammo storage. QRF carried pistols, rifles, automatic rifles and machine guns, ammunition for which was in the QRF area under guard, and frequently carried on both drill and actual callouts inside the base, and carried on order outside the base on some exercises. MGs were also pintle-mounted on RAAF trucks which had spotlight each for many rotations. Dates are the official Communist Insurgency/Second Malaysian Emergency dates listed by the Malaysian Government.

2. In Ubon, the enemy was in another country – Vietnam, a long way away; the Ubon airbase was surrounded by friendly/neutral Thais. There were no identified local enemy and there is no evidence of any ground contacts while RAAF were there. At the **same time** Ubon was garrisoned with ADG, so too was Butterworth, also a support base for Vietnam). In Somalia, RAN operations ranged from being tied up alongside Mogadishu providing logistic/medical support, to patrolling at sea out to 1000+ km off-shore. There was no enemy navy or air threat. Pirates were a low possibility, being the equivalent to land-based criminals that Army was tasked to defend themselves and the Somali population against. Navy had no contacts. Army had only a few contacts, with nil friendly battle casualties.
3. An array of researched Malaysian publications list MAF casualties. See Document Database.
4. Operation OKRA also features a security force based on a rifle company with virtually identical tasks as those carried out by RCB at Butterworth. A similar protective force, called Force Protection Element, is doing the same in Afghanistan at Kabul. Two **other** separate groups are also in the Middle East – including the Air Task Group supporting the RAAF airstrikes and refueling operations based in UAE/Dubai/Qatar, and the second is the SOTG also conducting “training” in unspecified locations. Such service and others in Operation ACCORDION (some support personnel in the Middle East are not even armed) in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan attracted/campaign medals without ever stepping foot in hostile areas or facing any threat different from that by the RCB 1970-89. For example see <https://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/OpAccordion/> where the duties of some of these groups is essentially the same as RCB, and <https://defence.gov.au/Medals/Australian/Since-1975/AOSM-Greater-Middle-East-Operation.asp> . These award decisions are examples of the *Statement of Principles No 3: To maintain the inherent fairness and integrity of the Australian system of honours and awards care must be taken that, in recognising service by some, the comparable service of others is not overlooked or degraded.*”
5. The Australian Operational Service Medal (OSM) replaced the AASM. The award criteria for the OSM is at: <http://www.defence.gov.au/Medals/Master/docs/Australian/Since-75/AOSM-GMEO-Instrument-2015.pdf> and advised at DEFGRAM 188/2015.
6. RCB Research database Document 19751007 paras 5-6 gives evidence.
7. INQUIRY INTO UNRESOLVED RECOGNITION ISSUES FOR ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WHO SERVED AT UBON BETWEEN 1965 AND 1968. 18<sup>th</sup> February 2011. Item 60. The question then remains as to whether or not this was ‘warlike’ or ‘non-warlike’. Did the squadron face an objective danger? Did they ‘incur’ danger? Even though no danger eventuated in the sense that there were no actual combat engagements, they were armed for combat and had been told by those who knew more of the situation that danger did exist and they must hold themselves in readiness to meet it, not at some indeterminable time in the future, but at five minutes notice. North Vietnamese sappers attacked after RAAF had left.
8. Medical force protected by 2 and then 2/4 RAR with F88 rifles and F89 LMGs, a section of armoured personnel carriers (armament included 30/50 cal MG combination). Two man crew also had personal wpns.
9. Deployment on 9 Nov 01 of four F18s and air and ground crew from 77 Sqn. Replaced in Feb 02 by same assets from 3 Sqn who RTA Australia 21 May 02. Several scrambles of planes occurred; all false alarms (no enemy). Nil ground threats. “No threat ever materialized” (Defence web site).
10. **RCB**. Still denied recognition of service as ‘warlike’, despite all of these comparative upgrades/awards. RCB troops served approx. one month for 1 Nov 70-30 Aug 73, then for three months thereafter.
11. **Deigo Garcia**. Recognised as Warlike Service per 20011207 - *Determination of Warlike Service - VEA 86 - OP SLIPPER* (signed by Danna Vale Minister for DVA for and on behalf of the Minister for Defence on 7 Dec 01). See also <http://www.defence.gov.au/Medals/Master/docs/Australian/Since-75/Australian-Active-Service-Medal-ICAT-Instrument-2015.pdf>

12. **Ubon. 2000 Review of Service Entitlement Anomalies in Respect of SE Asian Service 1955-75**, under chap 6. See <http://www.defence.gov.au/Medals/Master/docs/Reviews-Reports/Review-Service-Anomalies-South-East-Asian.pdf>, p73: **Conclusion** ... the period of service at Ubon in the period 1965-1968 was warlike in nature. Their service, most certainly comparable with many other groups of all three services in other similar limited conflicts, should properly be rewarded with the appropriate repatriation and medal entitlements. **Recommendations** It is recommended that RAAF service at Ubon: ... b. in the period 25 Jun 65 until the Squadron was withdrawn on 31 Aug 68 be classified as 'warlike' operational service and that personnel be eligible for the appropriate repatriation and medal entitlements.
13. **Namibia.** 30 days of service with UNTAG from 18 Feb 89 to 10 Apr 1990. See <http://www.defence.gov.au/Medals/Master/docs/Tables/AASM/S303-01-AASM-NAMIBIA.pdf>
14. **RAN ships off Somalia. Inquiry Into Recognition of Australian Defence Force Service in Somalia Between 1992 and 1995**, chaired by Prof Dennis Pearce AO (p7-8): Tribunal found that in the case of both of the RAN Units, their ROE were used to determine the level of their award. In this case, the Ships' ROE were restricted to self defence only (although lethal force was permitted in some circumstances). The Tribunal further found that the use of ROE as the sole criteria for determining the level and classification of honours and awards was flawed. Furthermore, that with the exception of Somalia, medallic recognition principles which began with the lead up to the First Gulf War (1990/91), were based on all assigned ASF units within the AO being treated equally as a part of the ADF Joint Force. The Tribunal found that the recognition for HMA Ships Tobruk and Jervis Bay was inadequate, and recommended upgrade to AASM. Defence opposed this position. See <https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Somalia-Report-Public-Release.pdf> for full report. One day of service for Naval Component for **Operation Solace** from 10 Jan 93 to 21 May 93.
15. **Operation OKRA/HIGHROAD.** Not upgraded; participants have been awarded AOSM from the outset.
16. **Cambodia.** 1 day of service (or 1 sortie) with the UNTAC from 20 Oct 91 to 7 Oct 93. See <http://www.defence.gov.au/Medals/Master/docs/Tables/AASM/S102-01-AASM-CAMBODIA.pdf>
17. **Rwanda.** 1 day of service with UNAMIR - Operation Tamar from 25 Jul 94 to 8 Mar 96. Recognised as Warlike Service per *official Media Release by Minister for Veterans' Affairs The Hon Bruce Billson on 13 Feb 06*. 20060213. See also <http://www.defence.gov.au/medals/Master/docs/Tables/AASM/S79-06-AASM-RWANDA.pdf>
18. **Submarine Special Operations.** CLASSIFIED Special Submarine Operations service from 1 January 1993 to 12 May 1997 (dates TBC) was upgraded in 2019 to operational and qualifying service under the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (VEA), also earning upgrade to the AASM from the ASM (Special Ops).
19. <https://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/OpAccordion/>
20. The AASM was also awarded for the following UN activity with respect to Vietnam 1975:  
RAAF activities with TSF Butterworth to UNICEF 29 Mar - 28 Apr 75  
RAAF activities with HQEISDET S to UNICEF 29 Mar 0 28 Apr 75
- First RAAF mission was 2 April. RAAF acft/personnel relocated to Bangkok on 17 April and last Australian military personnel (RAAF) were evacuated from Saigon on 25 Apr 75.
21. Spare.

**Update 18**

**Research Contact:**

LTCOL Russell Linwood, ASM (Retd)



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