

Submission on behalf of the Rifle Company Butterworth Veterans Group

Specifically with regard to the likelihood of casualties

This submission is intended to address the question posed by the Chair of the Tribunal on 23 November 2022 with regard to the likelihood of casualties. In a letter to the Rifle Company Butterworth Veterans Group (RCB VG), the following was stated:

“As foreshadowed in discussion at the hearing, the panel would appreciate receiving from you, by 31 January 2023, anything further that you wish to say in relation to the degree of likelihood of casualties arising from RCB service, and in particular copies of any contemporaneous evidence documenting the official rating of that likelihood.”

The following documents are not meant to be exhaustive, but they do represent a random sample of items from the RCB Review Group’s database of documents gathered from various sources over the past two decades.

Not a lot of analysis is offered as these documents are largely self-explanatory. The highlighted portions of text are salient. The remainder of the document has been excised for convenience, but the RCBRG database reference is added to assist in viewing the parent document.

Annex “A”

RCBRG Document 19681009 – **Operational Order 11_68 – Protection of Service Property – RAAF Base Butterworth and Associated Installations**

See p7 (highlighted) “... establishment of casualty clearing posts at these Zone Headquarters;”

“... establish a casualty clearing post ...”

“ ... ambulances on immediate standby ... ”

“ ... casualties ... ”

Annex “B”

Document 19700226 – **Directive to the OC RAAF Butterworth on command and control in Internal Security of Penang and Butterworth**

See p3 (highlighted)

“ In an extreme emergency, eg imminent danger to life, and only as a last resort, you are authorised to act without prior authority.”

Annex “C”

Document 19710311B – **Record of Conversation – DDMI**

See p5 (highlighted)

“The Threat to Butterworth

...

11. DDMI said that the threat to all RMAF Bases was now very seriously regarded; ... “

Annex "D"

Document 19710319 – **Malaysia (Int Briefs)**

See p1 (highlighted)

"... Malaysia's DDMI, who said that the threat to all RMAF bases was now very serious."

"3. He assessed Air Base Butterworth as being 'a probably target', "

Annex "E"

Document 19710415 – **JSD Report 11_1971 Guidelines for Defence of Shared Military Installations in Malaysia_Singapore**

See p2 (highlighted)

"7. Commanding Officers ... are responsible for the protection and security of their ... personnel ..."

See p3 (highlighted)

"9. The purpose ... is to secure ... personnel and their dependents, ... "

See p6 (highlighted)

"15 c. It is necessary to plan for the protection of British (ANZAC) personnel ..."

Annex "F"

Document 19710908 – **HQ RAAF BAB Operation Order 1_71 – Shared Defence of Air Base Butterworth less annexes**

See p2 (highlighted)

"... the RAAF ... are jointly responsible for the protection of all ... personnel ... "

"2. Mission. To protect ... personnel ..."

See p5 (highlighted)

" ... any incident involving the use of force or casualties ..."

"(4) Co-ordination – Medical Plan."

See p6 (highlighted)

"... with the consequent risk of being shot."

Annex "G"

Document 19710908B – **OPORDER No 1_71 All Annexes**

See p15 (highlighted)

"2. First-Aid Requirements. On declaration of Security Red No 4 RAAF Hospital will:

- a. Issue a first-aid kit to each defence headquarters; and
- b. Have a first-aid team on immediate call to move on GDOC direction by vehicle or helicopter."

See p19 (highlighted)

"(5) detail of any casualties ..."

See p54 (highlighted)

“b. Casualties.”

Annex “H”

Document 19750915 – **Brief for DCAS concerning Security of Butterworth Pt 1**

See p3 (highlighted)

“8. Likely Forms of Attack.”

See p4 (highlighted)

“d. direct and indirect attacks on personnel and their families ... using explosives or small arms; ...”

“A rocket attack was launched against Brigade Headquarters ... on 24th September ... either Butterworth or Alor Star will be the target for future attacks. Australian personnel are stationed at both locations.”

See p5 (highlighted)

“12. The first and obvious effects from rocket mortar and other forms of attack will be the ... death and injury to personnel including families ...”

See p7 (highlighted)

“... increased security within the base perimeter is no protection against rocket or mortar attacks ...”

“On-base ground defence arrangements are required to provide close defence of assets when attack is imminent and a specialist ground defence (or infantry) force capable of responding quickly to an attack, to relieve an over-run position and counter attack any groups which occupy positions on the base.”

See p9 (highlighted)

“As a general rule an infantry battalion can hold a defensive position having a front of 1000 metres in close country and 2000 metres in open country.”

Annex “I”

Document 19750915A – **Brief for DCAS concerning Security of Butterworth Pt 2**

See p13 (highlighted)

“27. The most important requirement is to ensure that the base has adequate emergency response arrangements to deal with casualties ...”

“29. Plans for the partial or complete evacuation of dependents; including their dispersal in Australia, should be reviewed.”

“The area involved would require several battalions secure in detail, but a deterrent presence [sic] conducting a reasonably aggressive patrol programme could be provided by two battalions.”

See p15 (highlighted)

“The OC stated that the effect of the orders appeared to be that the OC Butterworth ... could employ service personnel ... off-base when necessary ...”

See p16 (highlighted)

“... he contended that this included a right to operate off-base where necessary ...”

“In summary, the directives approves the OC to take action off-base in concert with Malaysian forces in accordance with local arrangements.”

Annex “J”

Document 19761105 – **The RAAF presence at Butterworth**

See para 37. (highlighted) “It is unlikely that Australian personnel and equipment would be a deliberate target. But any attack on RMAF aircraft at Butterworth, or terrorism in the Butterworth or Penang areas generally could endanger Australian personnel (including dependants)...”

See para 39. (highlighted) “... In any case the timely deployment of relevant Australian ground forces (at least a three Battalion Task Force would be required) to provide an assured defence for the RAAF deployments would directly and deeply involve Australian combat forces ...)”

See para 66. (highlighted) “... and to insulate it as far as possible from risk of physical attack.”

Annex “K”

Document 19780404 – **Directive by OC RAAF to OC Australian RCB**

This entire document is worthy of reading.

Annex “L”

Document 19781212A – **Annexes A to H in Unit Standing Orders ARC ABB Malaysia (incl ROE)**

See para 6b (highlighted)

“Weapons. ... one GPMG M60 ... “ No doubt to be used on fully automatic to “shoot to wound.”
Note. “SLP” should read “SLR”.

See para 6e (highlighted)

“The quantity of ammunition to be held in the QRF boxes is:

- (1) 420 x 7.62mm ball and 400 x 5.56mm ball
- (2) 800 x 7.62mm link (1 in 4 tr)
- (3) 50 x 9mm ball ...”

If the section were full-strength (i.e. 10 men), 7 men would carry SLRs, two would carry M16s and one would carry the GPMG M60. That provides for 60 rounds of SLR per rifleman, 200 rounds of M16 for the Section Commander and Forward Scout and 800 rounds of link belt for the M60. That is not counting 16 rounds of 9mm for each pistol on issue. That is more ammunition than soldiers carried on operations in Vietnam. With telephone and armscote duties, most sections would number less than 10 men, so the average load of ammunition per man would be greater than shown here. Why?

Annex “M”

Document 19790706 – **HQ FF Comd Staff Instr 2-79 General Instructions for the Aust Rifle Coy at Air Base Butterworth**

See para 3 (highlighted)

“ ... be available to assist in the protection of Australian personnel ... “

See para 7 (highlighted)

“ ... two medical orderlies;”

See para 22 (highlighted)

“Because of the possibility of chance encounters with wild animals or belligerents ... issue ... ball ammunition ...”

See para 59 (highlighted)

“The company is deemed to be on war service ... charge will be prefaced by the letters ‘WOWS’ (‘While on War Service’).”

See para 96b(6) (highlighted)

“(6) combat rations,”

See para 96e (highlighted)

“Weapons ... A normal allocation of company weapons including GPMG M60 is to be taken. An additional 16 SLRs are to be taken for the attached personnel.

(2) Weapon Reserve. The following weapons reserve has been established at Butterworth: ...

(c) Machine Gun General Purpose M60 4

f. Radios.

(1) The following radio sets are to be held by the Company at Butterworth: ...

(b) ANPRC 25/77 19”

Note: A rifle company carries 10 M60 machine guns. RCB was to take their own 10, plus there would be 4 spares in Butterworth. A rifle company carries one radio per platoon. With two in Company HQ, that would total 5. Why would they need 19?

See para 107 (highlighted)

“Combat Rations.

- a. An operational reserve of three days is to be held at Butterworth.” Note: this is separate to that required for field exercises (see para 107b).

See para 110 (highlighted)

“Local Labour

“110. RAAF. RAAF has accepted responsibility for the employment of local labour for gardening, grass cutting and the daily cleaning of toilets and ablutions. Requests for, or complaints about, this service should be lodged by telephone to the NCO I/C Base Services.

“111. Army. The cleaning of barracks and offices is a sub-unit responsibility. Civilian labour may be engaged for employment in the barracks, payment being made by the members in each block requiring the service, on a monthly basis. Such employees must be cleared for employment by RAAF security authorities.”

Note: It has been recorded elsewhere and proffered by Defence that service in Malaysia could not be warlike owing to the presence of “servants” but it is clear to see here that privately employed labour in Malaysia is no different than an ADF member paying a civilian to mow their lawns at home in Australia.

Annex “N”

Defence FOI 272_22_23 – Statement of Reasons

It appears from this document is relatively self-explanatory, however, the term used in the request was “expectation of casualties” (taken from the definition of warlike service) and not “likelihood of casualties” as was contained in the DHAAT letter following the hearing of 23 November 2022 (see quote above). If neither “expectation of casualties” nor “likelihood of casualties” is used by Defence to determine warlike service, it begs the question – is the likelihood or expectation of casualties really the critical missing element Defence makes it out to be or is it just a convenient red herring?

Summary

It is clear from the above that the subject of casualties – in the context of the defence of the Air Base at Butterworth was a regular topic for discussion and concern.

The OC RAAF Butterworth had the luxury of a fully functional hospital (4RAAF Hospital) to support the contingencies addressed in the documents. Medical kits were carried by all companies deployed and field dressings were carried by each soldier deployed. Additional medics were assigned to RCB from 1973 – 1989. If not for the treatment of anticipated/potential casualties, then what?

Distribution of first-aid kits and the like was a clear indication of the likelihood of casualties, as was the plans for their medical evacuation and regular practice of aeromedical drills using RAAF SAR rotary wing airframes at Air Base Butterworth. Even with a hospital in proximity, preparations were made for treating severe trauma on site to afford a better chance at survival of the casualty on arrival at the base hospital.

Conclusion

There is ample evidence of an expectation of casualties and the likelihood of casualties at RCB 1970 – 1989 from a variety of reliable sources over the course of the deployment.

For this – and other – reasons, if the critical element that needs to be satisfied is an expectation and/or likelihood of casualties, the service should be classified as warlike.

Annex "A"

itle	HQ Butterworth - Operational orders.
Contents range	1967 - 1973
Series number	A703
Control symbol	565/19/21
Access status	Open
Barcode	3077331

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Copy No. 110 of 125

Headquarters
RAAF Base Butterworth
C/- GPO Penang
MALAYSIA

HQ 12/49/ATR

9th October 1968

Dok
Operation Order 11/68

*Copy 109 sent
direct to Dorg.*

PROTECTION OF SERVICE PROPERTY -
RAAF BASE BUTTERWORTH AND ASSOCIATED INSTALLATIONS

- References:
- A. L7010 Malaya, Sheet No 28 Penang Island and Butterworth, Edition No 1 - SDFM; 1:63,360.
 - B. L905 Penang Island, Sheets Nos 1 and 2, Edition 5/DNMM, 8 in to 1 mile.
 - C. Joint Service Security Plan No 1/68.
 - D. Headquarters RAAF Butterworth Administrative Instruction No 2/67.
 - E. Headquarters RAAF Butterworth Administrative Instruction No 5/67.
 - F. Headquarters 17 Division/Malaya District Directive 20009 Ops dated 25th July 1968.

Task Organization

1. Situation.

- a. The Threat. Malaysia has in the past suffered from an organised Communist insurgency, from external threats accompanied by guerilla activity, and local disaffection and civil disturbance. Although each of these threats has been contained, the possibility of their recurrence cannot be ignored. A threat to Service installations could arise from:
 - (1) local disaffection and civil disturbance, probably without any substantial measure of centralised dissident control, and dependent on the local political situation;
 - (2) organized sabotage; or
 - (3) activity by insurgents.
- b. Delegations of Responsibility. Maintenance of law and order in West Malaysia is the responsibility of the Malaysian Federal Government, through its police forces, assisted as necessary by Malaysian Armed Forces. British and Australian Forces in Penang Island and Butterworth have a general responsibility for the safety and protection of their families and

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DATE 24 OCT 68

- (1) appoint a medical officer to co-ordinate all medical aspects of internal security planning and operations;
 - (2) on the declaration of Phase II, position medical equipment at A, B, C, D and G Zone Headquarters to facilitate the subsequent establishment of casualty clearing posts at these Zone Headquarters;
 - (3) on the declaration of Phases III and IV, establish a casualty clearing post staffed by one medical orderly or other trained personnel at A, B, C, D and G Zone Headquarters, and maintain ambulances on immediate standby as required by the Commanding Officer, Base Squadron;
 - (4) on the declaration of Phases III and IV, provide medical facilities at No 4 RAAF Hospital for personnel employed in Zones E and G; and
 - (5) during these phases, ensure that the officer appointed as co-ordinator is kept informed of the medical requirements of operations.
- f. Reports. Zone Commanders are to report to Base Ground Defence Headquarters as follows:
- (1) when forces have been deployed, verbal by radio or telephone;
 - (2) when a change in phase of readiness has been received and effected, verbal by radio or telephone;
 - (3) when an unusual incident occurs, verbal by radio or telephone;
 - (4) hourly, at times as directed by the Commanding Officer Base Squadron, as a routine communications check, verbal by radio and telephone;
 - (5) daily, by 0800 hours, a situation report to cover manning, casualties, summary of incidents, difficulties encountered in routine, weapons count, or otherwise as directed by the Commanding Officer, Base Squadron; and
 - (6) on reversion to Phase I, a consolidated report covering all aspects, including a chronological description, lessons learned, and recommendations for future operations.

FE 2004 Ops

27 FEB 1970

02400

HQ FARELF

DIRECTIVE TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING RAAF BASE BUTTERWORTH
ON COMMAND AND CONTROL IN INTERNAL SECURITY OF PENANG AND BUTTERWORTH

INTRODUCTION

1. This Directive will be effective from 1 March 1970, at which time the Directive issued by the General Officer Commanding 17 Division/Malaya District under 17 Div 20009 Ops dated 25 July 1968 will lapse.
2. The maintenance of law and order in West Malaysia is the responsibility of the Malaysian Government. Should law and order break down, British, Australian and New Zealand Forces in Penang Island and Butterworth are responsible for the safety and protection of Service property and dependants, and British, Australian and New Zealand based civilians employed by the Forces. In addition they may be made responsible for the protection of British, Australian and New Zealand civilians who are not connected with the Services.
3. With the agreement of the Air Commander, operational control of the Penang and Butterworth area for protective security purposes is vested in you. The Garrison Commander Penang is responsible, under you, for the coordination of all aspects of protective security on Penang Island.

RESPONSIBILITIES

Planning

4. You are to formulate plans and policy for the protection, in an Internal Security situation in Penang and the Butterworth area, of British, Australian, New Zealand and Gurkha Forces personnel and British, Australian and New Zealand based civilians employed by the Forces, their dependants, Service property, installations and equipment.
5. To fulfil this responsibility you are to form a Joint Committee composed as follows:

a. Chairman. Officer Commanding RAAF Base Butterworth.


/b.

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9. As a general rule plans prepared under paragraph 6 above can only be implemented after receipt of Ministerial approval. However, if time does not permit this, the Commander-in-Chief Far East, in consultation with the British, Australian and New Zealand High Commissioners in Kuala Lumpur, and in response to their request for military assistance, will authorise implementation direct to you. In an extreme emergency, eg imminent danger to life, and only as a last resort, you are authorised to act without such prior authority.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

10. With the agreement of the Air Commander, the chain of command for reporting Internal Security matters is to my headquarters, keeping HQ Malaya Area informed. In addition, both you and the Garrison Commander Penang are to keep your own Single Service Headquarters informed of the latest situation. If any Single Service dispute should arise it may be referred to Single Service Headquarters.



(P.M. HUNT)

Lieutenant General

Commander Far East Land Forces

26 February 1970

Distribution:Copy No

Officer Commanding RAAF Base Butterworth

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Annex "C"

Title	RAAF Butterworth - Ground defence plans.
Contents range	1969 - 1971
Series number	A703
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Access status	Open
Item ID	3076058

Record of Conversation with : LT. COL. AHMAD BIN HAJI ABD'L KADIR, ABS, PJK.
Deputy Director of Military Intelligence

On : Thursday, 11th March, 1971.

Officers Present : Group Captain J.C. Thorp, RAAF.
Lt. Col. R.J. Gardner, OBE, RAA.

General

1. Following the report of OT activity on the night 7/8 Mar 71 against the railway bridge over Sungai Jarak, we sought an appointment with the Directorate of Military Intelligence to discuss the border situation in general and the potential threat to Air Base Butterworth in particular.

2. The discussions with the Directorate of Military Intelligence were frank and fruitful; in the course of the conversation we traversed a number of subjects including :-

- a. the attack on the railway bridge,
- b. activities in Kelim district,
- c. the general situation on the Thai/Malaysian border,
- d. the general situation in East Malaysia,
- e. the threat to Butterworth.

Thai/Malaysian Border

3. Incident on night 7/8 Mar (See our 881 dated 9 Mar)

a. The DDMI told us that there was in fact little information additional to what had been published in the papers; a full and accurate account of the incident had been reported in the press.

b. He went on to say, however, that it appeared certain that the incident had been perpetrated by the MRLF and that it had not been connected with any activities by militant CTO known to be in Kelim district. The prime aim of the incident appeared not to be disruption of the main north-south railway as, among other reasons, only some 200 lb of explosives had been used and it had been used against the track itself rather than the bridge; the track had been repaired and traffic running freely within 48 hours of the incident. The incident had, however, been of some propaganda value to the CTO indicating to the local population their presence in the area and their ability, through their affiliated agencies, to strike against certain targets.

4. Kelim District (See our Periodic Report No. 50 dated 4 Feb, para 3 to JIO only)

a. The military assessment is that there are approximately 20 militant

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7. Over the last week there have been two successful operations in Sarawak :-

- a. On 5 Mar 6 militant SCO were captured in Sarikai district.
- b. 8 RMR on 8 Mar had launched an operation jointly with Police marine units and the RMI in an area west of the area of Operation Jala Raja; the operation has to date been particularly successful and so far 3 SCO have been killed, 6 militant SCO have been captured and some 26 suspect sympathisers have been arrested.

8. The operations appear to have been launched after close consultation and co-operation with the Police Special Branch; we had the impression that the security forces in East Malaysia have now adopted a more patient attitude in the prosecution of operations, and are not now prepared to allow the suspected presence of SCO in certain areas to force them into an immediate reaction but to wait until there is better intelligence of the SCO strength, location and task before committing their forces.

9. DDMI said that at present in Sarawak the areas of most importance in descending order of priority were Third Division, First Division, Second Division, with virtually no particular interest at present in the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, although this was not to say that these last divisions were not watched carefully.

The Threat to Butterworth

10. We asked the DDMI to brief us on the Malaysian military appreciation of the threat to the Air Base Butterworth, following the incident against the railway bridge and the sighting of, and activity by, the CTO and their supporters in the Kelia district.

11. DDMI said that the threat to all RAF Bases was now very seriously regarded; they were attractive targets and any success against them, apart from material damage caused, would be a good moral victory for the CTO; the military effect of such a successful operation would be to reduce the air support (particularly transport) essential to the Malaysian security forces.

12. He assessed Air Base Butterworth as "a probable target", basing his assessment upon the recent increase of enemy strength and activity in the area and the large number of supporters (some 27,000) assessed as being in the Perang/Province Wellesley area, some of whom could be included in the locally engaged labour on the base; the nation-wide activities on 25 Apr 70 he believed had been directed by a group in this area. The threat of mortar attack was assessed as so remote as to be negligible though it was appreciated this situation could change rapidly once the enemy were known to have these weapons.

13. On the weekend 13/14 Mar the DDMI and a team comprising an officer of the Operations Staff of the Army Staff Division, an officer of the Logistic Division, the Provost Marshal and a representative of 8th Brigade are visiting Butterworth with a view to assessing the situation in the area, the defence of the base and any consequential action which may be deemed necessary; HQ 8th Brigade has been given the task of preparing contingency plans for the defence of the base.

(ANZUK Eyes only)

DAFI Brief to CAS

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MALAYSIA

Terrorist Activity

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1. Small groups of Communist Terrorists are known to have existed for some time at Jalong, north of Ipoh, and at Kulim, east of Butterworth.

Another group of 20-30 terrorists is now established about midway between Jalong and Kulim. This group is spreading communist propaganda and recruiting sympathisers in two villages where rural Chinese from bandit areas were resettled during the 1958-60 emergency. The communists are apparently gaining active support in these villages. ~~Yet another group~~ of CTs numbering about 100 has appeared in the general area of Grik. It is assessed that there are 1200-1500 CTs in the areas shown in red on the viewgraph.

2. The Services Adviser Kuala Lumpur - Group Captain Thorpe - recently discussed the situation with the Malaysian D/DNI, who said that the threat to all RAAF bases was now very serious. They were attractive targets and any success against them would be a great morale victory for the CTs. The military effect of a successful operation would be to reduce the air support (particularly transport) essential to the operations of the Malaysian security forces.

3. He assessed Air Base Butterworth as being 'a probable target', basing his assessment upon the recent increase of enemy strength and activity in the area and the large number of supporters (some 27,000) assessed as being in the Penang/Province Wellesly area, some of whom could be included in the locally engaged labour on the base. The threat of a mortar attack was discussed but was assessed as so remote as to be negligible, although it was recognised that the situation could change rapidly should the CT acquire these weapons.

4. The D/DNI and other officers visited Butterworth recently to assess the situation in the area, the defence of the base and any consequent action which might be deemed necessary. Headquarters 6th Brigade has been given the task of preparing contingency plans for the defence of the base.

5. The report by Group Captain Thorpe has been passed to the OC RAAF Butterworth by the Australian High Commission at Kuala Lumpur and action

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Communist Terrorist Activity

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1. Our brief of last week on the CT situation in the Malaysia/Thailand border area showed the spread of CT activity and influence and assessed the strength of CTO in the area as being 1,200 to 1,500. We stated that the developments represented at least a germinal threat to the RAAF at Butterworth.

2. Since that brief we have received a report from the Services Adviser Kuala Lumpur - Group Captain Thorpe - regarding a meeting with the D/DMI at which the threat to Butterworth was considered. In the Services Adviser's words the D/DMI said that the threat to all RMAF bases was now very seriously regarded. They were attractive targets and any success against them, or from material damage caused, would be a good morale victory for the CTO. The military effect of such a successful operation would be to reduce the air support (particularly transport) essential to the operations of the Malaysian security forces.

3. He assessed Air Base Butterworth as being 'a probable target', basing his assessment upon the recent increase of enemy strength and activity in the area and the large number of supporters (some 27,000) assessed as being in the Penang/Province Wellesly area, some of whom could be included in the locally engaged labour on the base. The threat of a mortar attack was discussed but was assessed as so remote as to be negligible, although it was recognised that the situation could change rapidly should the CT acquire these weapons.

4. Last weekend the D/DMI and other officers visited Butterworth to assess the situation in the area, the defence of the base and any consequent action which might be deemed necessary. Headquarters 6th Brigade has been given the task of preparing contingency plans for the defence of the base.

5. The report by Group Captain Thorpe has been passed to the OC RAAF Butterworth by the Australian High Commission at Kuala Lumpur and action has been taken to ensure that he receives regular and prompt intelligence on the CT situation in his area from Headquarters 6th Malaysian Brigade.

6. The letter from the Australian High Commission Kuala Lumpur attaching the report by Group Captain Thorpe has been passed to DGPP.

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4. In an operational situation, if an Allied Ground Force Commander is appointed, he will assume responsibility for defence against the attacks referred to in paragraph 3.

5. In order to obtain the necessary assistance for the protection of any Service property, personnel, and dependants outside the perimeter of the ANZUK military establishment, the Commanding Officers of the establishments will be responsible for maintaining close liaison with:

- a. the ground forces responsible for the area ground defence; and
- b. local military, police, and civilian authorities.

6. ANZUK Forces can only be used outside the perimeter as provided in the Directive to the ANZUK Force Commander.

7. Commanding Officers of ANZUK Force establishments are responsible for the protection and security of their establishments and installations, equipment, and personnel within the perimeter boundary against:

- a. individuals or small parties and enemy regulars, partisans, guerillas or civil dissidents who have entered or who pose an immediate threat of entering the base, installation, or property;
- b. sabotage;
- c. pilfering;
- d. subversion; and
- e. espionage.

8. Plans produced to cover the contingencies in paragraphs 6 and 7 for the ground defence of ANZUK military installations are to be forwarded to ANZUK Chiefs of Staff Committee for information.

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GROUND DEFENCE OF SHARED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

The Purpose

9. The purpose of shared defence is to secure, by mutual co-operation the functions, facilities, equipment, personnel and their dependants, which are located within the perimeter of the installations shared by two or more national forces.

Command and Control

10. Unless otherwise stipulated in specific instances, national forces will remain under the command of their own national commanding officers. However, the control of forces responsible for the security of a shared installation or base must be vested in a single officer who will exercise this control through national commanding officers. This single officer will normally be the officer commanding the shared base or installation duly appointed as agreed between the member nations concerned.

11. When deciding which nation should exercise single operational control of ground defence/internal security measures of a shared installation or base, some or all of the following factors are relevant:

- a. the responsibility for operational function of the installation; for example, an operational airfield;
- b. the extent and nature of occupancy and/or use by national forces;
- c. the comparative strengths and content of national forces occupying or using the installation. This may apply particularly when an installation contains both combat and administrative or technical units;
- d. the need to guard any particularly sensitive equipment; and

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for the ground defence of a shared installation should be drafted by the senior British (or ANZAC) Commander in consultation with his local counterpart in that installation. The draft plans, which should conform to the factors outlined in paragraph 11 above should be cleared through single Service HQs, who would then forward them to the Defence Advisers of the High Commissioners concerned in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. When this action has been completed the JSSPC (Singapore) and HQ 17 Div/Malaya District as appropriate should be notified of the single Service intentions.

CONCLUSIONS

15. It is concluded that
 - a. Where installations are shared with local forces, joint planning for their security is required.
 - b. So long as the installation remains a British (ANZAC) responsibility, the defence Commander must remain British (ANZAC).
 - c. It is necessary to plan for the protection of British (ANZAC) personnel and facilities in an installation, within or in addition to the joint plan.
16. It is further concluded that
 - a. An approach to MOD is required so that the principles which preclude planning for an IS situation with a local government can be relaxed sufficiently to permit planning and liaison for measures essential to the security of the installation.

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SHARED DEFENCE OF
AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH



OPERATION ORDER NO. 1/71

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- (b) sabotage or malicious damage;
- (c) racial communal disturbances, and
- (d) industrial disputes.

b. Preservation of Law and Order.

- (1) The maintenance of law and order in Malaysia is the responsibility of the Malaysian Government, discharged through the Royal Malaysian Police aided if necessary by the Malaysian Armed Forces.
- (2) In a shared defence situation the RAAF and RMAF are jointly responsible for the protection of all operational assets, personnel and property within the perimeter of the air base.
- (3) Guidance on legal aspects affecting members required to act in a shared defence situation is given at Annex 'A'.

c. Delegation of Responsibility.

- (1) The Officer Commanding Air Base Butterworth has operational control of all forces within the perimeter of the air base and he is designated Ground Defence Commander.
- (2) The Officer Commanding Air Base Butterworth delegates to the Commanding Officer Base Squadron RAAF the operational command of all ANZUK forces within Air Base Butterworth assigned to him for ground defence purposes. The CO RMAF continues to exercise operational command of all Malaysian armed forces contained within the perimeter of Air Base Butterworth.
- (3) The Commanding Officer Base Squadron RAAF and Commanding Officer RMAF are designated Deputy Ground Defence Commanders and are to act in liaison to achieve the ground defence aims of the Officer Commanding Air Base Butterworth.

d. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Malaysian Armed Forces
- (2) Royal Malaysian Police Force

e. Reinforcements. Reinforcements may be available from the following sources:

- (1) Headquarters ANZUK
- (2) Departments of Defence and Air;
- (3) Friendly Forces.

2. Mission. To protect operational assets, property and personnel within the perimeter of Air Base Butterworth by joint arrangement and mutual support.

../3. Execution

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- (3) Photography. The Officer in Charge RAAF Photographic Section is to ensure that a photographer is available at all times from the declaration of Security Red, for employment as directed by the Duty Controller GDOC. The RAAF Photographic Officer is to ensure that from the declaration of Security Red an adequate and well documented photographic record of events is obtained, and that in particular any incident involving the use of force or casualties which may be the subject of subsequent inquiry is covered as far as is practicable. Photographic coverage of nefarious devices is to be given operational priority. Any conflicts in priorities will be resolved by Duty Controller GDOC.

- (4) Co-ordination - Medical Plan. Refer Appendix 4 to Annex 'B'.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Recall of Members.

- (1) Members of the RAAF will be recalled in accordance with the RAAF Recall Plan.
- (2) Members of the RAAF will be recalled in accordance with the RAAF Recall Plan.

b. Fire Services. Normal Base fire services are to continue to operate at all times. From declaration of Security Amber any request for fire fighting assistance off-base is to be referred to the Duty Controller GDOC.

c. Prisoners and Detainees. Persons apprehended are to be carefully guarded, disarmed, and thoroughly searched at once. They are to be brought to and held securely near the appropriate Defence Flight headquarters for handing over to the Malaysian Military Police custody. The Duty Officer at Defence Flight headquarters is first to notify the Duty SSP Controller and then the Duty Controller GDOC. OIC SSP Coy, DAPM and the RAAF Intelligence Officer are to interrogate any person apprehended. OIC SSP Coy is to arrange for the person to be handed over to the custody of the Malaysian Police and is to arrange for a statement concerning the circumstances of apprehension to be made to the Malaysian Police as required. The RAAF Photographic Officer is to arrange for such photographic records as may assist in any subsequent Malaysian Police action.

d. Dress. From the declaration of Security Amber all Service members are to wear uniform at all times, except when off duty within the confines of their own home or barracks.

e. Medical.

- (1) Arrangements will be influenced by the extent of curfews and restrictions which may be imposed.

../(2) CO No 4 RAAF

6.

- (2) CO No 4 RAAF Hospital will ensure that as far as practicable normal medical services are available. Refer Appendix 4 to Annex 'B'.
- f. POL. Refer Annex 'E'. Note fuel stocks to be at highest practicable level.
- g. Base Water Supply. Base water reserves for fire fighting are to be maintained at a high level. The RAAF Barracks Officer is to maintain a close check on storages and is to issue warnings to curtail water consumption (including the institution of water rationing) if this becomes necessary. If mains water supply is interrupted he is to maintain water supplies from the on-base well, in conjunction with the Area Manager, CDW, instituting at once such measures as are necessary for water rationing. CO 4 RAAF Hospital is responsible for checking the purity of water supplies and for issuing any necessary guidance to the Duty Controller GDOC. If water supply fails in any area for an extended period, the RAAF Barracks Officer in conjunction with the Area Manager, CDW, is to arrange for earth closets or pan closets to be provided as necessary, and the RAAF Motor Transport Officer is to arrange essential water supplies by tanker.
- h. Curfew Passes.
- (1) Service members in uniform do not require curfew passes. However, during curfews, especially by night, identification from a distance is difficult. In a severe internal security situation, great care must be taken to avoid being mistaken for a curfew breaker with the consequent risk of being shot.
- (2) Service vehicles are exempt from curfew regulations. However, all drivers are to comply with the road signs and/or directives issued by the Security Forces.
- i. Arms and Ammunition. Instructions relating to the issue, safeguarding and accounting of arms and ammunition are set out at Annex 'C'.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Locations.

- (1) GDOC. Building No 56 Room 7.
- (2) Defence Flight Headquarters. Locations are contained in Annex 'C'.

- b. Daily Briefing. From the declaration of Security Amber briefings will be given daily at 1100 hours by the Duty Controller, at the GDOC, to Defence Flight Commanders, Mobile Reserve Commanders APM, OIC SSP, OC Admin Wing RMAF or Deputy, officers in charge of any re-inforcements, commanding officers at their own discretion and other officer appointments at the discretion of the Deputy Ground Defence Commanders.

.../c. Code Name.

Annex "G"

ANNEX A TO AIR BASE
DEFINITION OF ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 100 SEPTEMBER 1971

LEGAL ASPECTS OF A HOSTAGE SITUATION SITUATION IN THE DEFENSE OF AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

1. General. The use of force in the defense of Air Base Butterworth is governed by Malaysian Law. The following instructions give the circumstances under which the Malaysian Law allows personnel (both Malaysian and Australian) to protect the Base, themselves, their property and dependants.

2. Legal Powers of Service Personnel.

a. The legal powers of personnel at Butterworth are set out in the following legislation:

- (1) The Penal Code of the Federated Malay States;
- (2) The Criminal Procedure Code of the Federated Malay States;
- (3) The Protected Areas and Protected Places Ordinance of 1955 (this applies only to that part of the Base east of the main road).

b. These powers are set out in detail in the paragraphs which follow.

Legal Powers of Defence Available at All Times.

1. Arrest. Any person who, without lawful authority, enters the Base or who is found on the Base and who is suspected of being a member of a subversive organisation or of being a member of a criminal organisation or of being a member of a terrorist organisation or of being a member of a group of persons who are engaged in a criminal or subversive or terrorist activity, may be arrested by any person who is authorised to do so.

2. Defence of the Base.

- (1) Every person has a right to defend his person or property or the Base or any other person against any offence or against the Base.
- (2) This right may be exercised only when there is a reasonable apprehension of danger to the Base and when the use of force is necessary.
- (3) In the exercise of this right any force which may be used may be such as is necessary to prevent the offence or to prevent the danger or to prevent the loss of property or to prevent the loss of the Base.
- (4) In the following instances only the right of self-defence, or the right of defence of the Base, or the right of defence of any other person, may be exercised:

- a. If there is an assault causing reasonable apprehension of death.

b. If there is a threat of death.

DATE: 10/10/77
TIME: 10:00 AM
FILE: 100-441100-1000
DATED: 10/10/77

1. CO No 4 RAAF Hospital will implement a satisfactory medical plan within the restrictions imposed by cholera etc. He will.

- a. prepare in advance a broad medical plan to meet shared defense situations;
- b. keep the Ground Force Commander, Navy Ground Defense Commander informed of any aspects of his long range planning which require co-ordination with other activities listed in this order;
- c. if considered justified, issue a medical order to those units; and
- d. on submission of Security Index appoint an officer responsible for close liaison with the Duty Controller MDC. This officer will co-ordinate:
 - (1) the activation or modification of a medical plan which meets the current situation in force and is not restricted within the present MDC plan and
 - (2) the way to the liaison necessary in implementation of this medical plan to provision of assets, transport for medical personnel and equipment, etc.

- b. when an unusual incident occurs;
- c. when a change in the state of alert has been effected; and
- d. Reports of Opening Fire. All instances where firearms have been used are to be reported to Duty Controller (DOW) at once. The detail required is:

- (1) unit or units concerned
- (2) location of incident by reference to the grid shown on the map or appendix or otherwise as necessary;
- (3) brief description of incident to include surrounding circumstances and persons involved;
- (4) number of rounds fired; and
- (5) amount of any casualties or damage, both military and civilian.

The Duty Controller (DOW) is to report the incident by priority message if life and limb are endangered as directed by the ground command.

Appendix 1. Reinforcement

1. Vital Points

1.1. Vital Points

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APPENDIX 18 TO
ANNEX C TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH OP ORDER NO 1/71
DATED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1971

(SPECIMEN SITREP)

(Issuing Headquarters)

(Date/Time Group)GH

Situation Report No

Situation as at 0730 hours on

1. Situation.

a. Manning.

..... Officers, SNCOs Cpls, LACs.

b. Casualties.

..... Officers, SNCOs Cpls, LACs.

c. Vehicle State.

Total strength

Number serviceable

Number unserviceable

d. Radio State.

Total number

Number serviceable

Number unserviceable

e. Battery State. (AN-PRC 25)

Number held serviceable

Number required

f. Ammunition State.

Authorized stock held? YES/NO

Resupply required rounds 7.62 mm,

..... rounds 9 mm.

g. Incidents.

Number of incidents which occurred during period
of this report (If this is first
SITREP stipulate period of report.)

.../Brief

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564/8/28

Subject BRIEF FOR DCAS CONCERNING SECURITY OF BUTTERWORTH

~~DCAS~~

FIRST DRAFT ONLY

- References:
- A. FAS SIP D58/4/1 of 29th May 1975
 - B. MPO Minute 312/1975 of 3rd June 1975
 - C. MPO Minute 574/1975 of 21 August 1975
 - D. DEFAIR 564/8/28 of 18th September 1975

1. Following a series of rocket attacks in Malaysia against Minden Barracks Penang and RMAF Kuala Lumpur, FAS SIP proposed to DJS at Reference A that 'Defence Central take a lively interest in the security of (RAAF) aircraft and arrangements'. In summary, FAS SIP recommended that:

" recent developments and incidents, must significantly reduce confidence in the security of aircraft, especially against rocket attack from outside the base. We need authoritative advice on the situation and prospects so that policy consideration may be fully informed."

2. At Reference B and C DJS supported the proposal to review the threat to the security of Butterworth and the arrangements for the protection of aircraft. Subsequently, a draft revised assesment of the threat to Butterworth was prepared by JIO and circulated for comment. Both DAFI and SRGD expressed concern

/ regarding

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- b. communal disturbances including inter-racial disputes for any number of reasons.
- c. sabotage or malicious damage by indigenous dissident groups or individuals.

A detailed description of the CPM and CTO activities, capabilities, policies and intentions and an outline of situations in which the base may be attacked, possible forms of attack and a review of operations by Malaysian Security Forces is at Reference D. The primary threat to Butterworth is considered to be from:

- a. the 8th Assault Group of 63 CTs based in the Kulim and Baling districts East of Butterworth; and
- b. a small extremist urban group in the Penang area.

8. Likely Forms of Attack. In summary, the possible forms of CTO attack on Butterworth are:

- a. an open conventional attack by day or night by a large group of CTs using small arms and explosives and possibly supported by rocket and mortar fire;
- b. a covert penetration by night by small groups of terrorists with the object of attacking vital points and aircraft using explosives;
- c. sabotage using delayed action explosives, booby traps and similar devices by subversive groups, locally employed civilians and contract personnel on the base;

/d. direct and

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- d. direct and indirect attacks on personnel and their families in public areas or quarters using explosives or small arms; and
- e. attacks by fire using mortars, rockets or other indirect fire weapons from the surrounding padi-field, village (Kampong) areas.

9. Current Assessment. Intelligence information received in late September 1975 reports that the CTO has given instructions to its underground organization in Peninsular Malaysia to carry out rocket attacks against air bases, especially during the months of September and October. The CTO appear to have a fairly reliable supply of 3.5 inch rockets; the weapon was first manufactured at the end of World War II and the rockets may originate from caches built up during the First Emergency or from sources in southern Thailand. Although the attacks to date have caused little damage, the CT's are probably pleased with the relatively wide publicity they have received in the press. There are only four major air bases in Peninsular Malaysia: Muautan, Sempany (Kuala Lumpur), Butterworth and Alor Star. Muautan is relatively isolated from CTO groups and the principal threat, therefore, exists against the remaining three bases.

A rocket attack was launched against a Brigade Headquarters at Sungai Pattani on 24th September and it is quite possible that either Butterworth or Alor Star will be the target for future attacks. Australian personnel are stationed at both locations.

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10. The major difficulty from a Defence viewpoint is that the CT's are able to decide the timing, nature and frequency of attacks virtually unhindered and with little fear of retaliation. Conversely they can effectively disrupt base operations by 'leaking' false intelligence regarding their intentions to either create alarm resulting in the setting up of tighter security which can then be reconnoitred and probed to determine its weakness, or which from sheer inactivity on the part of the CT's will be repealed within a short period. In any case, the advantage remains with the CT.

EFFECT OF ATTACKS ON RAAF BUTTERWORTHGeneral

11. Attacks on the Butterworth base would be launched for political/psychological aims to attain publicity and sympathy, not for the military purposes of capturing ground or materiel. Accordingly, these attacks should they develop, are expected to be irregular or perhaps non-recurring. The CTO is not yet considered to be in a position to conduct sustained military, sabotage or rocket attacks on any one target. This factor renders more difficult, the task of establishing and maintaining a satisfactory defence and security system. In any case, any arrangements introduced could only serve to reduce the freedom of action of the CTO and could not obviate the risk of attack.

Personnel and Materiel

12. The first and obvious effects from rocket mortar and other forms of attack will be the damage to aircraft, equipment and facilities, and the death and injury to personnel including

/ families

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families and LECs. Damage to aircraft and facilities will provide substantial political/psychological propaganda to the CTO. The personnel effects will be:

- a. Political within Australia. Agitation for the withdrawal of RAAF units from Butterworth; or at least dependant families could be expected. Such a 'withdrawal' would be politically advantageous to the CTs and potentially damaging to Australia's prestige in SEA.
- b. Morale in Butterworth. Immediately following the first attack on Butterworth an unestimated number of families could be expected to demand repatriation to Australia. Whilst not in effect a withdrawal, some planning for this contingency should be undertaken.
- c. Likely Effect on LECs. Immediately following the first attack, LECs could be expected to absent themselves from work for several days, possibly resulting in a requirement to replace the civil labour from Australia.

13. An increase in the level of defence preparedness including signs of defensive works against rocket attacks, could produce the effects at 11b and c. above even before an attack develops. It may be necessary to consider the personnel implications of requests for early repatriation to Australia and the replacement of civil labour. Additionally, it may be necessary to determine the extent of information which should be released to dependants when protective works are undertaken.

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14. In the hopefully longer term, it will be necessary to consider restricting Butterworth to an unaccompanied tour. However, at this time, the implementation of this proposal is considered premature.

CURRENT GROUND DEFENCE AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTSGeneral

15. In April 1975, following rocket attacks on Kuala Lumpur and Minden Barracks Penang, CAS briefed the Minister that security precautions on the base had been tightened. However, increased security within the base perimeter is no protection against rocket or mortar attacks and permits only response to rather than prevents sabotage group attacks initiated beyond the perimeter. Accordingly, improved ground defence and security arrangements are required.

16. Ground defence and security of assets are achieved by a combination of military and police action:

- a. On-base to scrutinise LECs, contractors and others as potential saboteurs through routine police security and entry control procedures, security patrols of assets and intelligence. On-base ground defence arrangements are required to provide close defence of assets when attack is imminent and a specialist ground defence (or infantry) force capable of responding quickly to an attack, to relieve an over-run position and counter attack

/ any groups

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any groups which occupy positions on the base.

- b. Off-base, by routine screening of the population, road blocks, vehicle checks and community inspections by police field force (PFF). Direct Military action involves the patrolling of areas around the base to deny the CT freedom of action, detect signs of CT activity, locate and destroy CT saboteur, mortar and rocket teams.

Passive defence arrangements to mitigate the effects of mortar, rocket and sabotage attacks are also required.

Area Security

17. The security of Provinces Wellesby, Penang, Kedah and Perlis is the responsibility of 6 Malaysian Infantry Brigade (MIB). The Brigade HQ is at Sungei Patani and units are established at Penang, Sungei Patani and Alor Star, but the Brigade is continuously committed to anti-terrorist operations within its area of responsibility. No security posts are permanently manned in the area immediately surrounding Butterworth and there are no artillery units in the area. There is no known Security Forces contingency plan for the reinforcement of Butterworth, but 6 MIB troops may be deployed to the area on the request of OC RAAF Air Base Butterworth. However, the effectiveness of the Brigade response would depend upon the availability of troops who are usually involved elsewhere in operations, and the response depends upon the priority afforded by the Brigade Commander to Butterworth as a defensive task. 6 MIB's security responsibility extends over an area approximately 80 miles square

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with battalions committed to border and inland areas remote from Butterworth. In the face of these commitments and as Air Forces personnel are required to contribute towards their own defence, the diversion of 6MIB units to the Butterworth area on a continuing basis cannot be assured.

18. 81 and 82mm mortars are crew served weapons which are accurate and effective area weapons against area targets at maximum ranges of 4700 metres. An efficient crew can launch 8-10 bombs before the first impact. These mortars were used by NVA/VC forces in Vietnam against attractive targets such as parked aircraft and support facilities. 3.5 inch rockets are equally effective area weapons over shorter ranges of metres.

19. The problem posed to forces defending military installations from enemy mortar or rocket attacks relates directly to the case with which these weapons of significant destructive power and accuracy can be covertly brought to the target area and fired. As a general rule an infantry battalion can hold a defensive position having a front of 1000 metres in close country and 2000 metres in open country. It is possible to man widely separated defensive positions from which to mount an aggressive patrol programme. In this case one battalion would be adequate by day, but infiltration between positions by night would be relatively easy. In a case, one battalion could not maintain an aggressive patrol programme for more than one to two weeks.

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sector of the perimeter and provided both on-base and off-base quick reaction force. In separate incidents, ADC patrols ambushed a VC mortar team setting up a mortar site and as a quick reaction force conducted a sweep of an area off-base, captured a VC sapper member of a sabotage team.

Base Security and Defence

23. OC RMAF is responsible for the security of the base and has a Malaysian Military Policy (Special Security Police) Company for this purpose, but no military defence personnel. OC RAAF is responsible for point defence of RAAF assets, aircraft and personnel using RAAF Police, Security Guards and dogs. The ARA Company provides an on-base quick reaction force to supplement these arrangements. Static defences comprise a single two metre perimeter fence with barbed wire overhand and lighting of most vital points (VPs). In the past, attention has been drawn to the serious weaknesses in the defences, including the ineffective performance of the SSP, the possible absence of the ARA part of the company on exercises, deficiencies in the static defences and the parking of aircraft in a straight line without the protection of revetments. Cases of ^{theft} ~~shaft~~ have shown that unauthorised persons have been able to gain access to areas within the base including Vital Points. In a deteriorating situation, the reinforcement of the base with specialist ground defence personnel may be necessary.

Passive Defence

24. The threat of mortars and rockets presents a problem of providing adequate passive defence arrangements to prevent / or mitigate

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27. The most important requirement is to ensure that the base has adequate emergency response arrangements to deal with casualties and to recover from the effects of an attack.

Families Protection

28. Families protection arrangements are adequate, but may need to be reconsidered if attacks by CT occur.

29. Plans for the partial or complete evacuation of dependants; including their dispersal in Australia, should be reviewed.

Summary of Defence Arrangements

30. The defence and security of the base involves:
- a. On-base police security functions and a capacity to react quickly to and counter attacks by small groups of armed CTs. Close defence of facilities and assets is provided by unit personnel and the ARA company fulfills the military Quick Reaction Force role. On-base security arrangements are satisfactory.
 - b. Off-base Police field force and Army activity to deny the CTO access to the base, to mortar and rocket firing positions and positions from which to launch assaults. The area involved would require several battalions secure in detail, but a deterrent presence conducting a reasonably aggressive patrol programme could be provided by two battalions. 6MIB units are responsible / for an

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32. In his submission OC Butterworth pointed out the:
- a. under the Protected Areas and Protected Places Ordinance, considerable powers to defend personnel, property and materiel were conferred on visiting forces
 - b. quite extensive powers have been granted to the Commonwealth Services in Malaysia under the (Malaysian) Internal Security Act of 1960. Chapter 1, Part 11 of the Act covers "special provisions relating to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to proclaim any area as a "security area" if he believes that public security in that area is disturbed or threatened. In other sections, provision exists for 'danger areas' to be declared within 'security areas' and for Security Forces to including members of visiting forces to take specified actions within those areas. The OC stated that the effect of the orders appeared to be that the OC Butterworth (in 1969 - a RAAF OC) could employ service personnel (including the use of arms) off-base when necessary in a declared danger area. These orders apply to family protection and protection of RAAF assets.
 - c. the directive to OC Butterworth precluded the use of Australian personnel in aid to a civil power, but as the CAS directive authorised his participation in defence schemes no safeguard personnel

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and their dependants and protect equipment and property, he contended that this included a right to operate off-base where necessary except to provide 'aid to the civil power'.

33. The Butterworth submission is in folio 2, DGPP's brief to CAS and folio 9 and the CAS directive at folio 11. A revised directive has been prepared, but not yet issued. In summary, the directives approves the OC to take action off-base in concert with Malaysian forces in accordance with local arrangements. Although the OC RMAF Butterworth is now responsible for the security of the base and OC Butterworth for point defence, there appears to be no reason to expect that the OC RAAF has a diminished right or responsibility to act to protect his personnel and assets in concert with Malaysian forces.

34. Reinforcement. Whilst every effort should be made to influence the Malaysian Government and Ministry of Defence to provide adequate and effective security of the area close to Butterworth, it should be recognized that the number of Army personnel that could be provided will almost certainly be less than is required. Therefore, the RAAF should continue to co-operate with Malaysian forces to contribute toward the shared and on-base and off-base defence of our assets.

35. Currently, the ARA Company is prevented from off-base operations, presumably in case their activities are mis-interpreted as internal security operations. The defence of assets in the / immediate

THE RAAF PRESENCE AT BUTTERWORTH

Annex "J"

Introduction

In the 1971 Five Power communique Ministers of the five governments declared that they "would continue to co-operate, in accordance with their respective policies, in the field of defence(and) in relation to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, that in the event of an armed attack externally organised and supported or the threat of such an attack against Malaysia or Singapore, their governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such attack or threat."

2. Noting the requirements to review the future of the Mirage deployment again with the Malaysians before the end of 1976 the Defence Committee has drawn attention to the desirability of reviewing both the Australian obligation under the Five Power communique and the question of whether the RAAF deployment in Malaysia should be continued, modified or terminated.⁽¹⁾ The present paper addresses these matters, with particular regard to the RAAF deployment.

3. At present the deployment involves two fighter squadrons (totalling 38 Mirages), five Dakota transports, two Iroquois helicopters and 1358 RAAF personnel. Of these a detachment of six Mirages is located in Singapore (see para 31 below). An infantry company of 135 on rotation from Australia is also stationed at Butterworth. One thousand three hundred and thirty-four locally engaged civilians are employed there.⁽²⁾

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(1) Australian Strategic Analysis & Defence Policy Objectives 1976 (ASADPO), Paragraph 179.

(2) Figures of personnel at Butterworth as at 1 October 1976.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

36. The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) has attacked Security Force installations in the past and may conduct further attacks against military installations. Butterworth is the closest major air base to established terrorist localities and could be such a target particularly as the Malaysian air force already uses it for counter-terrorist operations. This would probably - but not necessarily - be associated with a significant escalation of CPM activity. Such escalation is presently assessed as unlikely, but a terrorist attack occurring without warning is not to be excluded and the risk continues as time extends. An attack on the base would probably be of short duration, using indirect fire from light mortars or small rockets.

37. It is unlikely that Australian personnel and equipment would be a deliberate target. But any attack on RMAF aircraft at Butterworth, or terrorism in the Butterworth or Penang areas generally could endanger Australian personnel (including dependants) or equipment. Action has recently been taken at a cost of \$0.501m to construct revetments to give some protection to the Australian aircraft at Butterworth against attack. The need for improved security on and off the base has also been kept under close review and action taken appropriate to the assessed situation.

38. In the event of attacks on Butterworth occurring or being manifestly threatened, responsive deployments by Malaysian Armed Forces which have the responsibility for the security of Butterworth and its adjacent area would be heavily influenced by essentially operational considerations extending well beyond the security of Butterworth alone. The Malaysians would not necessarily seek for their fighter deployments in Butterworth the same level of security that would be sought by the Australian Government in respect of RAAF personnel and

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equipment. This would give rise to concern in Australia and possibly public pressure.

39. As indicated in paragraph 22 above, it is unlikely that the Malaysian Government would accept the deployment of Australian ground forces in such a situation. In any case the timely deployment of relevant Australian ground forces (at least a three Battalion Task Force would be required) to provide an assured defence for the RAAF deployments would directly and deeply involve Australian combat forces in an internal security situation in mainland South East Asia - with unpredictable consequences. Moreover such a deployment would be beyond the present and planned capabilities of the Defence Force.

40. The RAAF deployment at Butterworth has so far been substantially free from political challenge either in Malaysia or Australia. But should there be an attack on the Base, or should the security situation deteriorate, such political challenge could well be stimulated.

41. We could thus have a situation in which the RAAF presence could be exposed both to direct threat and to political challenge.

42. To withdraw at that stage would be humiliating to Australia and the Australian Defence Force. It would cast doubt on the credibility of Australian defence assurances and would undermine international confidence in Malaysia's ability to handle its own security problems. Unless significant national purposes are being served by our remaining, the prudent course would be to withdraw and thus eliminate risk of involvement in an exposed military position.

will need to decide, taking into account the Malaysian Government's wishes, on the extent to which funds should be devoted to re-furbishing facilities at Butterworth for use by the Malaysian air force after the RAAF withdrawal. The following indicates expenditure that it is estimated would be involved if the RAAF remained at Butterworth until 1979:

- to be before 1979?*
is on 1979
replacement equipment
- a. Essential early replacements which will result in immediate improvement in the RAAF's operational capability and/or air safety potential; \$3.72m
 - b. Replacements which will reduce the maintenance load on the RAAF and contribute significantly to an improved operational capability and/or air safety potential; \$2.5m
 - c. Replacements suggested by RAAF for handing over to the RMAF. \$1.35m

65. Should the RAAF deployment be extended beyond 1979, additional expenditure estimated at \$2.2m could be incurred to meet the RAAF's own needs.

CONCLUSIONS

66. The considerations set out above suggest that the Mirage deployment at Butterworth is now approaching the end of its mission; and that it could, if continued, increasingly become a military liability in an exposed position. The diminished strategic and political purpose which it serves and the limited but important strategic and security risks inherent in its continuance indicate a need for action to reduce its sensitivity to local challenge and to insulate it

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as far as possible from risk of physical attack. These considerations point to withdrawal of the operational deployment as soon as practicable, and to restriction of the scope of Australia's defence activities in Malaysia and Singapore. Re-orientation of these activities into an essentially technical supportive (as distinct from operational) role appears to be called for.

67. Though the need for an early decision and for negotiations opening the way to withdrawal has been identified, no consideration dictates that that withdrawal should be precipitate. Several factors argue powerfully for avoidance of any public appearance of urgency. There is some scope for flexibility in timing. Strategic and political considerations favour a phased withdrawal to allow time for local physical and political re-adjustment. *right physical atmosphere to be created*

68. No insuperable difficulty ^{to overcome} would attend withdrawal ^{redeployment} of one flying squadron and maintenance personnel commencing in January 1978. *provided*

69. The remaining flying squadron and the balance of the maintenance squadron could be redeployed in Australia in January 1979 with some penalties in terms of cost, operational efficiency and inconvenience to personnel.

70. To the extent that the second phase of withdrawal (para 62 above) were delayed towards July 1980, short term cost penalties, inconvenience and inefficiencies would be reduced to a minimum.

71. The costs of providing permanent working and living accommodation and base facilities in Australia are of the order of \$30-50m, depending primarily on location. If the locations chosen for Mirage squadrons are identical with those selected for the future TFF, only some \$1m of these costs will be directly attributable to Mirage relocation.

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Copy No 3 of 6

THIS FORM
49
DATE
BY

DIRECTIVE

BY

Annex "K"

THE OFFICER COMMANDING RAAF BUTTERWORTH

TO

OFFICER COMMANDING

AUSTRALIAN RIFLE COMPANY BUTTERWORTH

Reference: A. Headquarters Field Force Command 722/K11/11
dated 6 March 1978

Introduction

1. This Directive details the operational command to be exercised by Officer Commanding RAAF, Butterworth and is to be read in conjunction with Reference A.

Command

2. You are under my operational command in all matters concerning security duties for the protection of Australian assets, property and personnel at Air Base Butterworth.

Tasks

3. Your company is to be capable of conducting the following tasks in relation to security duties at Air Base Butterworth and training in these tasks is to be completed to my satisfaction before the company participates in other exercises:

- a. cordon and search;
- b. internal base patrolling;
- c. protection of RAAF Service Police/SSP at established road blocks;
- d. protection of Key Points;
- e. crowd dispersal;
- f. providing a quick reaction force (QRF) of section strength (on immediate standby on a 24 hour a day basis);

/g. providing

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- g. providing a reserve force to be activated on deployment of the QRF;
 - h. operating mobile tactical lights on likely penetration points;
 - i. manning of listening posts and standing patrols by night, including the use of image intensifiers; and
 - j. operating Tobias Intruder Detection equipment.
4. The agreed Joint Plan for the shared defence at Air Base Butterworth is to be used as a basis for the operation of your Company on security duties, but is not to be so binding as to hinder the efficiency and flexibility of your Company for a specific security situation.


Limitations

5. Your area of operation for the protection of Australian assets, property and personnel is confined to those areas within Air Base Butterworth and its associated off-base RAAF-controlled installations. Your Company is only to deploy operationally outside such areas on my personal order or that of my Deputy Ground Defence Commander, RAAF.
6. Your Company is not to enter non-Australian occupied buildings on security duties.

Engagement by Fire

7. Engagement by fire and the Rules of Engagement are to be strictly in accordance with Annex A to this Directive.

4 April 1978


(J.A. JACOBS)
Air Commodore
Officer Commanding

Annex: A. Engagement by Fire

Distribution:

OC Australian Rifle Company, Butterworth
65 Ground Liaison Section
- CO Base Squadron RAAF Butterworth
Senior Ground Defence Officer
File: HQBUT 3/5/AIR ()
BQBUT 15/11/AIR PT1

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ANNEX A TO
HQBT 3/5/AIR (12)
DATED 4 APRIL 1978

ENGAGEMENT BY FIRE

General

1. All troops are to be made aware, through briefing and discussions, of the difficulties of and necessity for, identifying friend from foe. Most Malaysians who have access to the Air Base, seldom carry identity cards and probably have only a vague awareness of authorized and unauthorized areas.
2. It is imperative that all ranks know and understand the rules of engagement and methods of ensuring own troops safety.
3. The most important implication of engagement by fire is 'IF IN DOUBT DO NOT SHOOT'.

Rules of Engagement

4. Application. The Rules are to be applied within the Air Base regardless of curfew, periods of increased security, air defence exercises and time of day or night. All ranks operating within the Air Base are to be aware of friendly national organizations which operate within the Air Base. (A list of all units operating on the base is attached as Appendix 1.)
5. Orders for Opening Fire. You may open fire at a person or persons only in the following circumstances:
 - a. If you are ordered to guard any building, vehicle, aircraft, tent being used as a dwelling or as a place of storage, or you are ordered to guard the occupants of, or any property contained in such building, vehicle, aircraft or tent, you may open fire at any person who is in the act of destroying or damaging by fire or explosives the building, vehicle, aircraft or tent, or the property contained therein PROVIDED THAT THERE IS NO OTHER MEANS OF PREVENTING THE PERSON FROM CARRYING OUT THE ACT OF DESTRUCTION OR DAMAGE.
 - b. If you or any other person is illegally attacked in such a way as to give you reason to fear that death or grave bodily injury will result, you may open fire on the person carrying out the attack PROVIDED THAT THERE IS NO OTHER MEANS OF PREVENTING THE PERSON FROM CARRYING OUT THE ATTACK.
6. Before opening fire you are to warn the person whom you intend to shoot of your intention to open fire unless he ceases his illegal act. You should use the challenge 'HALT OR I FIRE - PERHENTI ATAU SAYA TEMPAK' repeated three times.
7. At all times, before opening fire you must remember:
 - a. If in doubt do not shoot.

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ANNEX A (CONT)

-2-

- b. You must not fire unless this is the least force necessary to enable you to carry out the orders you have been given.
 - c. Shoot to wound and not to kill.
 - d. Use the minimum number of rounds necessary.
 - e. Your right to shoot ceases as soon as the necessity for protection has passed, ie, if your first round wounds the person so that he can no longer continue the act which caused you to open fire, you are not to shoot him again.
8. You are to take careful note of the fact that your right to shoot ceases at the Air Base boundary fence. You are not to shoot at a person on the other side of the fence.

Sentries on Protected Places

9. If you are posted as sentry on a Protected Place, the provisions of paragraph 3 apply. However, if any person enters the Protected Place and whilst within the boundaries of the Protected Place fails to halt when challenged with the words 'HALT OR I FIRE - BERHENTI ATAU SAYA TENBAK' repeated three times you may fire at him provided you are unable to stop him or to arrest him by any other means.
10. Similarly, should a person whom you have arrested within a Protected Place attempt to escape, you may shoot them subject to:
- a. your having challenged them correctly in accordance with the procedure given in paragraph 5; or
 - b. there being no other means of affecting their rearrest.
11. You are to take careful note of the fact that your right to shoot ceases if the person you challenge leaves the Protected Place, whether escaping from arrest or not. You must not shoot at such a person or any other at any time when they are outside the boundaries of the Protected Place, except within the provision of paragraphs 5 - 7.

Appendix: 1. List of Units Operating within the Air Base Butterworth

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX A TO
ICMART 3/5/11R ()
DATED 4 APRIL 1978

FRIENDLY NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
WHICH OPERATE WITHIN THE AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

1. The following Units/National Organizations operate within the Air Base:

a. RMAF

- (1) Headquarters RMAF Butterworth;
- (2) No 3 Squadron RMAF;
- (3) No 12 Squadron RMAF;
- (4) No 26 Company, Special Security Police, Malaysian Military Police, and
- (5) No 1 Air Defence Centre RMAF.

2. Details of dress, duties and weapons carried by RMAF units are:

a. Headquarters RMAF Butterworth

- (1) Dress - flying suit or camouflage greens.
- (2) Duties - fixed picquet defence.
- (3) Weapons - SLR 7.62mm or AR M16.

b. No 3 and No 12 Squadrons RMAF

- (1) Dress - flying suit (orange or green), camouflage greens.
- (2) Duties - operational pilots/crews of F5E NURI and Alouette aircraft, or fixed picquet defence.

c. No 26 Company, SSP, NMP

- (1) Dress - polyester greens with cap or camouflage greens.
- (2) Duties - Control of entry, fixed picquet defence and external perimeter patrols as required (foot and/or vehicle).
- (3) Weapons - SLR 7.62, AR M16, Sterling SMG, Pistol 9mm. (Note other automatic rifles similar to the AR M16 may be carried when ordered.)

d. No 1 Air Defence Centre RMAF

- (1) Dress - camouflage greens.

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(2) Duties - fixed picquet defence and internal patrols within IIDS complex.

(3) Weapons - SLR 7.62, Pistol 9mm.

3. Details of dress, duties and weapons carried by Malaysian National Organizations are:

a. Headquarters 6MIB (Army Units)

(1) Dress - camouflage greens.

(2) Duties - external perimeter patrols limited air defence role (40mm Bofors).

(3) Weapons - AR M16, Pistol 9mm.

b. Headquarters 6MIB (Police Field Force Battalion)

(1) Dress - polyester or jungle greens.

(2) Duties - external perimeter patrols.

(3) Weapons - AR M16, Pistol 9mm, SLR 7.62.

c. Royal Malaysian Police Force

(1) Dress - Khaki or blue uniforms.

(2) Duties - control of entry or road block duties.

(3) Weapons - Pistol .38, Sterling SMG, shot guns.

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ANNEX A TO
AS RIFLE COY
UNIT STANDING ORDERS
DATED 17 DEC 78.

ORDERS - DUTY OFFICER

1. The company Duty Officer is to be rostered from all senior NCO and above, excluding the OC and Education Officer. Duty Officers are to be rostered in Routine Orders Part 1. Duties are not to be changed without prior approval of the OC.
2. The company Duty Officer is to be briefed by the OC, or in his absence, the 2IC at 1600 hrs daily. Weekend company Duty Officers will be briefed at 1600 hrs on Friday.
3. The Duty Officer's tour of duty is to be:
 - a. Working Days. From 1600 hrs on the day of mounting until 0800 hrs the following day, except that he is to inspect the midday meal.
 - b. Weekends and Stand-down Days. For 24 hrs commencing at 0800 hrs.
4. Dress - Polyesters with cap/slouch hat and Sam Browne/Black Belt and red sash as appropriate. A cane is to be carried.
5. The Duty Officer is the Coy Comd's direct representative.
6. On mounting duty the Duty Officer is to:
 - a. draw from the 2IC or receive from the previous Duty Officer the following:
 - (1) Duty Officer's Log Book,
 - (2) Duty Officer's Signal Register,
 - (3) Company Standing Orders,
 - (4) Plan of Air Base Butterworth with KP shown,
 - (5) List of KP, and
 - (6) Key to the Duplicate Key Cabinet.
 - b. report to OC or 2IC at 1600 hrs for briefing
 - c. ensure that the Q&F Commander understands his duties and responsibilities.
 - d. ensure that the Duty Driver fully understands his duties

/e. ensure

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6. Weapons. The section weapons are to be as follows:
- a. three pistols,
 - b. one GPMG M60, and
 - c. remainder SLP and M16.
7. Security Picquet. See Annex A
8. Radio/Telephone Picquet. Duties as detailed in Appendix 1.
9. Drills.
- a. Turnout. Designed to practise the QRF in turnout at maximum speed. The turnout ends when the duty vehicle containing the section reaches the halt sign at the perimeter of the company lines.
 - b. Deployment to a KP. Designed to familiarise the QRF with location of KP and the best route to them. The SP Guard Room will order the QRF to proceed to a particular KP where the Duty Officer will meet them. This turnout is to be done with full regard to speed limits, road safety and personal safety. On arrival the QRF will adopt a tactical disposition around the KP which will be inspected by the QRF Comd.
10. Weapons and Ammunition.
- a. Weapons will be drawn from the armoury before mounting. Immediately after mounting they will be placed in the QRF Room, where the QRF Comd becomes responsible for their security.
 - b. Loaded magazines and link ammunition are to be issued by the QRF Comd at 1630 hrs on weekdays and 0800 hrs on weekends and public holidays, when the QRF assumes duty in the QRF Room.
 - c. During period of daily training within Air Base Butterworth the QRF is to be equipped and available for reaction. If training outside the coy area, the QRF is to move in the QRF vehicle with a radio, and with the QRF ammunition secured in the ammunition boxes in the truck. During training periods no live QRF ammunition is to be carried on the men. If reacted the QRF weapons are to be cleared and the members subsequently issued with the QRF ammunition before deployment to the KP.

/ d. The state

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d. The state of weapon readiness for the QRF are contained in Appendix 2. Rules of Engagement are in Appendix 3.

e. The quantity of ammunition to be held in the QRF boxes is:

(1) 420 x 7.62 mm ball and 400 x 5.56mm ball;

(2) 800 x 7.62 mm link (1 in 4 tr);

(3) 50 x 9 mm ball; and

(6) 6 flares.

11. Alcohol. Personnel of the QRF section are not permitted to consume alcohol during their tour of duty, nor for six hours before mounting duty.

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HQ FF Comd File

722/K11/17

Volume 11

Annex "M"

FIELD FORCE COMMAND

STAFF INSTRUCTION NO 2/79

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUSTRALIAN RIFLE COMPANY

AT AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

AMENDMENTS

Amendment No

Date Entered

Signature

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AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Telephone: 310455

INDIAL: 3393569

In Reply Please Quote:

722-K11-17

HEADQUARTERS FIELD FORCE COMMAND
Victoria Barracks
PADDINGTON NSW 2021

6 Jul 79

See Distribution List

HEADQUARTERS FIELD FORCE COMMAND STAFF INSTRUCTION NO 2/79
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUSTRALIAN RIFLE
COMPANY AT AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

- References:
- A. Directive by GOC FF Comd to OC Australian Rifle Coy Butterworth dated 6 Mar 78
 - B. Directive by OC RAAF Butterworth to Australian Rifle Coy Comd Butterworth

INTRODUCTION

General

1. Air Base Butterworth is a Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) base situated on the Malaysian mainland, six miles north east of Penang Island. Security of the base is a Malaysian responsibility.
2. In accordance with the terms of the Five Power Defence Arrangements entered into by the Australian and Malaysian Governments, an Australian Army rifle company is deployed on a 3 monthly rotational basis from Australia to Air Base Butterworth to provide an opportunity for training and to develop further co-operation between the Malaysian Armed Forces and the Australian Defence Force. The rotational plan accords with Australian national policy of deploying troops overseas for training exercises.
3. The rifle company will undertake normal training including exercises with Malaysian Armed Forces when arranged and, if necessary, be available to assist in the protection of Australian personnel, assets and property at Air Base Butterworth as directed by the Officer Commanding RAAF Butterworth.
4. This instruction is in three parts:
 - a. Part 1 - Operational Aspects;
 - b. Part 2 - Personnel Aspects; and
 - c. Part 3 - Logistic Aspects

/ Part 1

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PART 1 - OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

Tasks

5. The tasks of the company are:
- to train in accordance with instructions issued by the commanding officer of the parent battalion;
 - to be prepared to train, in conjunction with the Malaysian Armed Forces, on combined exercises; and
 - to undertake security duties as directed by OC RAAF Butterworth.
6. An outline of the security duties required to be performed is contained in Reference B which has been distributed to Task Force headquarters level. File 12

Manning

7. The strength of the company is to be 132 personnel. It is to be based on Establishment 4001-XX-2, and include the following personnel:
- two medical orderlies; + (RAAF Camp Hospital)
 - one storeman familiar with ammunition handling, storage and accounting procedures, (See also para 92);
 - one fitter armament;
 - six drivers, including at least one NCO, with B5 endorsed Army driving licences;
 - one physical training instructor;
 - three RAE tradesmen, including at least one carpenter; and
 - two military policemen, RACMP, including one qualified as an investigator.

Consideration should be given to including a postal NCO and an additional clerk.

8. Additional specialists, such as an FO or Education Offr may be included at the discretion of HQ 1 Div if desired, however the number of additional specialists is to be kept to a minimum, and the total of 132 all ranks is not to be exceeded.

9. In addition to the drivers included above, at least one soldier in each rifle and support section is to hold a current Army driving licence.

10. Regimental details of RACMP personnel are to be advised to 65 GL Sect as early as practicable, prior to deployment, for rostering purposes.

/ Replacement Policy

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- b. Security Training. Wherever possible, training for security duties should be carried out before departure. Suggested objectives, syllabi and training programme are at Annex B.

20. In Malaysia. While at Butterworth, the company is to carry out training in the following categories:

- a. continuation of the parent battalion training programme. As availability of training areas cannot be guaranteed well in advance, it is recommended that training programmes be produced in a series of weekly packets, which can be readily adapted to fit changed range availability dates;
- b. local security training as may be required by OC RAAF Butterworth;
- c. platoon training at Malaysian Army Combat Training Centre (known as PULADA) under arrangements made by the Australian Defence Adviser, Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur; and
- d. combined training with the Malaysian Armed Forces as arranged by the Australian Defence Adviser.

21. Training Areas and Combined Training. The OC RAAF Butterworth will liaise with the Australian Defence Adviser on matters relating to training areas and to combined training exercises with the Malaysian Armed Forces. Any training areas used by the company are to be well clear of areas in which counter insurgency operations are being carried out or where there is insurgent activity. Training areas which are presently available are listed in Annex C.

22. Carriage of Ball Ammunition on Field Training Exercises. Because of the possibility of chance encounters with wild animals or belligerents, a company commander may wish to issue a limited amount of ball ammunition to provide a degree of safety during field training activities for which blank ammunition is also to be issued. Carriage of ball ammunition for this purpose is authorised, subject to prior approval of OC RAAF Butterworth and the conditions listed at Annex D. Requests for approval for the carriage of ball ammunition are to specify the area of the proposed activity and the number of rounds to be carried by each nominated member.

23. RAAF Air Support.

- a. Rotary Wing. The RAAF operate two UH1 at Butterworth for SAR duties. One of these acft is required to be on SAR standby at all times during flying operations. Subject to both UH1 being serviceable, one may be made available for company training for up to twenty hours per tour. The company is to bid for these aircraft through 65 GL Section.
- b. Fixed Wing. Subject to availability, RAAF C47 (Dakota) or C130 are used to move the main body of each exercise group between Butterworth, Pulau Langkawi and PULADA. The company is to bid for these aircraft through 65 GL Section.

/ 24. Training Films.

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PART 2 - PERSONNEL ASPECTS

Eligibility

42. Each member selected for duty with the company is to have reached 18 years of age prior to departure for Malaysia and is to have sufficient residual service in his unit to complete the tour of duty plus an additional two months on RTA. All troops are to be DP1 at time of deployment.

43. HQ 1 Div is to ensure that only members of good character and performance are chosen for this activity. Soldiers with a poor record of conduct, or existing or potential compassionate problems are to be excluded from the contingent.

Passports

44. Each member is to be issued with a passport prior to embarkation. Officers are to be issued official (green) passports, and other ranks ordinary (blue) passports.

Medical and Dental

45. General. 4 RAAF Hospital Butterworth provides full medical and emergency dental support for the company.

46. Pre-deployment. Units are to ensure that each member selected for duty with the company undergoes a priority dental examination in accordance with MPA Vol 3 Chap 36 para 3605, and is classified PES(FE) prior to deployment.

47. Documentation.

- a. Personal Medical Documents and Dental Records.
Med 4s, Med 5s and F Dent 1 are to be lodged with the hospital on arrival at Butterworth.
- b. International Certificate of Vaccination (ICV).
Before departure ICVs are to be checked and updated for the period of the tour. Members are to be in possession of ICV on emplanement.

48. Malaria Prophylaxis. Maloprim is to be used as the malaria prophylactic drug by all members of the company group. One tablet to be taken on the same day of each week, and a roll book is to be kept and checked. All members of the company group are to complete a malaria eradication course on return to Australia.

Drug Abuse

49. The abuse of drugs in South East Asia, including Malaysia, is wide spread. Drugs of abuse are readily available, and by Australian standards, inexpensive to obtain. There should be no doubt in the minds of all company members that the possession, use or trafficking in illicit drugs is illegal in both Malaysian and Australian civil and military law. Malaysian civil authorities will make no exceptions for Australian servicemen involved in drug offences.

50. A program of education on the dangers of drug abuse is to be included in pre embarkation training for each company (including attached personnel) proceeding to Butterworth. The assistance of local Military Police should be sought in the preparation of this program. OC 65 GL Sect is to arrange for the briefing of the company on local drug problems as soon as possible after their arrival at Butterworth.

/ 51. In dealing

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- b. DFR 5, 6 and 7 provide for Officers, Warrant Officer and Non Commissioned Officers of one Service to have power over members of another Service for all command and discipline purposes except punishment while outside the territorial limits of Australia.

59. Disciplinary Code. The company is deemed to be on war service pursuant to Defence Act 54 and is subject to the Army Act under Defence Act 55. If it is necessary to charge a member of the Australian Army outside the territorial limits of the Commonwealth, such charge will be preferred under the relevant section of the Army Act (Part VI ALM Vol 1) and such charge will be prefaced by the letters "WOWS" ("While on War Service").

60. Powers of Punishment.

- a. Company Commander. The company commander is a detachment commander and therefore has the powers of a commanding officer under AMR 238 (4).
- b. Superior Authority. The GOC FF Comd is the superior authority for the company.

61. Courts Martial. The superior authority as detailed in paragraph 60 b remains responsible for Courts Martial.

62. Detention. Sentences of up to 28 days detention are to be served at the RAAF detention facility at Butterworth, unless return to Australia is desirable. Sentences in excess of 28 days are to be served at 1 MCE.

63. Legal Services. The RAAF Legal Officer is available to advise members of the company on legal matters. He has the right of entry into Malaysian Lower Court hearings to act as Counsel.

Finance

64. Pay Variation Advices (PVAs). Prior to the company's departure from Australia, the parent unit is to forward to the Controller of Army Pay (CAP) a Change of Pay Station or Pay Point proforma (WF 289) for each member showing the paypoint as "99". These forms are to be forwarded under cover of a memo advising the company's Butterworth postal address to enable the dispatch of PVAs to Butterworth. On departure from Butterworth for RTA, the company is to submit to CAP, Form WF 289 for each member, changing the paypoint to that of the member's parent unit, quoting the unit EDP number.

65. Allowances.

- a. Outfit Allowance. (Manual of Overseas Allowances, Chapter 3)

- (1) Providing members have not been paid the basic element of outfit allowance in the preceding two years they are entitled to receive \$A120 with 50% vouchering required.
- (2) Army Office is the approving authority for the payment of outfit allowance. Nominal rolls of company members are to be forwarded to reach Army Office one month prior to the company's departure, with an information copy to HQ FF Comd.

/ b. Short Term

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96. Equipment and Stores

- a. General. A complete set of company stores, less personal weapons and items on personal (AAB 83) issue is maintained at Butterworth. These company stores comprise a company's entitlement of stores and equipment based on the Equipment Table for an Infantry Battalion, supplemented by essential block scale items and a scaling needed for the company to train and carry out its role. The complete set of company stores is to be handed over to each relieving company. Personal weapons and associated Complete Equipment Schedule items are to remain on temporary issue to individuals (AAF F12) and be transported to Butterworth in bulk or by the member. For movement to and from Butterworth and within Malaysia, personal weapons are to be carried in "Bags, cloth, rifle".
- b. Scaling. The following levels of stores and supplies are to be maintained at Butterworth by the Company to cover a 3 month tour:
 - (1) an estimated scaling of spare parts to maintain:
 - (a) company radio sets; and
 - (b) company weapons.
 - (2) Army stationery requirements;
 - (3) a 10% maintenance scaling of clothing and personal equipment;
 - (4) a small pool of company stores estimated as stock required to replace stores rendered unserviceable;
 - (5) a supply of commonly used expendable/consumable stores/supplies; and
 - (6) **combat rations**, hexamine tablets and cookers.
- c. Maintenance of Stores Pool. Stores are to be demanded periodically, to replace items written off, so that unit holdings are sufficient to maintain the company and to hand over a complete set of stores and equipment to the relieving unit.
- d. Clothing.
 - (1) Block Scales 3002/20 and 3004/10 apply.
 - (2) The issue of the following items of clothing is authorized under Block Scale 3002/20:
 - (a) Shorts, men's polyester blend, Khaki, pr 1.
 - (b) Stockings, men's wool and nylon, stretch knit, khaki. pr 2.
 - (c) Puttees, khaki, short pr 1.

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- (3) The issue of two sets of shorts, drill green S62 is authorized under Block Scale 3004/05.

e. Weapons.

- (1) Type. A normal allocation of company weapons including GPMG M-60 is to be taken. An additional 16 SLRs are to be taken for the attached personnel.
- (2) Weapon Reserve. The following weapons reserve has been established at Butterworth:
- | | | |
|-----|----------------------------------|---|
| (a) | Rifle 7.62 mm L1A1 | 5 |
| (b) | Rifle 5.56 mm M16A1 | 3 |
| (c) | Machine Gun General Purpose M-60 | 4 |

f. Radios.

- (1) The following radio sets are to be held by the Company at Butterworth:
- | | | |
|-----|-------------|----|
| (a) | PRC F1 | 3 |
| (b) | ANPRC 25/77 | 19 |
- (2) Batteries are to be demanded by submission of a demand on HQ 2 Sup Gp. Demands are to be in accordance with previously submitted forecasts (2 MD RO 274/78 refers).

- g. Sleeping Equipment. Lightweight sleeping equipment (Block Scale 3004/10) is to be issued to individuals on AAB 83 and written off unit charge before movement from Australia.

- h. There are sufficient of the following items held at Butterworth for issue to each company member if required:

- (1) trunks cabin metal;
- (2) helmets steel; and
- (3) tools entrenching.

RAAF Logistic Responsibilities

97. General. RAAF Butterworth has accepted the following administrative responsibilities:

- a. provision of offices, accommodation, stores, quarters and messes for all ranks;
- b. maintenance of buildings occupied by the company;

/ c. maintenance of

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102. Accounting for Accommodation Stores. Accommodation stores are to be issued from RAAF Barracks Store to the company commander in bulk, on an inventory "Articles in Use - Distribution Sheets" (AIU EA23 ABOE2/4). The company is to issue barrack stores to individuals and furniture and equipment to each office, etc, on individual inventories (EA23 Inventory Distribution Sheet ABOE2/4).

103. Expense Stores.

- a. Expendable Stores. A three month scaling of expendable stores not provided by the RAAF is to be held by the company. The scale is to be as complete as possible at the time of hand-over. Any stores required by relieving units, in addition to the scale, are to be taken with the unit from Australia.
- b. RAAF Expense Stores (Class C Stores). These are non-accountable items, eg - light bulbs, detergents, etc used in accommodation maintenance. They are to be demanded on RAAF Counter Slip (EA 47) from the Main Central Store.

104. Demands for Other Types of RAAF Stores. All RAAF Stores transactions are subject to automatic data processing. The requisitioning unit's preparation of forms is reduced to the minimum. All essential details contained in "The reportable area of the form" are to be entered by RAAF personnel (in consultation with the RQMS) to ensure that correct RAAF part numbers and nomenclatures are used.

RAAF Stationery

105. The necessary RAAF forms are available from Forward Supply Equipment Store, Butterworth.

Messing

106. Cooks. The company is to detach cooks for employment under the direction of the Base Catering Officer.

107. Combat Rations.

- a. An operational reserve of three days is to be held at Butterworth. This reserve is to be turned over monthly.
- b. A stock of rations for field exercises is held at Butterworth. Company Commanders are to advise the RQMS during their reconnaissance of their forecast requirements for exercises.
- c. Replenishment is to be by signal demand on 231 Sup Coy.

108. Meal Passes. Personnel will be issued individual meal passes on marching in and must have them available for inspection when attending meal parades. The purpose is to support checks that living out personnel are conforming to RAAF meal purchase rules. Passes must be surrendered following the last meal on the Base.

/ Transport

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

-22-

Transport

109. a. Allocation. The following RAAF Transport is allotted for the company's use:
- (1) Trucks, cargo, 3-ton, 4 x 4 - 6 (of which only 4 or 5 are normally available due to the RAAF maintenance programme)
 - (2) Trucks, utility, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton - 2
- b. Driving Licences. Army driving licences are to be endorsed by the RAAF Transport Officer before drivers operate RAAF Transport. (See paragraph 15).
- c. Management and Maintenance. RAAF transport is to be controlled and operated in accordance with BSSOs and AAP 876.
- d. Local Running - Messes. The Messes are located at a considerable distance from the company lines. The company is authorised to coordinate and use service transport to convey personnel to each meal and return on a one trip basis.
- e. Vehicle Accidents. RAAF SP are to be called to all accidents where service vehicles are involved and the RAAF Transport Section duty controller notified as soon as possible. The SP should also be summoned to all accidents in which servicemen are involved. This is to be effected in co-operation with the civil police.

Local Labour

110. RAAF. RAAF has accepted responsibility for the employment of local labour for gardening, grass cutting and the daily cleaning of toilets and ablutions. Requests for, or complaints about, this service should be lodged by telephone to the NCO I/C Base Services.

111. Army. The cleaning of barracks and offices is a sub-unit responsibility. Civilian labour may be engaged for employment in the barracks, payment being made by the members in each block requiring the service, on a monthly basis. Such employees must be cleared for employment by RAAF security authorities.

RAEME Equipment Repair

112. Weapons. Replacement action is to be taken on weapons which are beyond the capacity of the company fitter armament to repair.

113. Radios. RAAF technicians will undertake limited minor repair of radios. This may be arranged through the Senior Radio Officer.

Trunk Calls

114. Names of members eligible to make trunk calls, together with their signatures, are to be lodged with the Senior Radio Officer. This should be limited to the company commander and second in command.

Armoury and Weapon Security

115. All weapons are to be stored in the company armoury within company lines when not required for training. All accountable weapon spare parts are also to be stored in the armoury.

/ 116. Weapons security

RESTRICTED



DEFENCE FOI 272/22/23 STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

1. I refer to the application by Raymond Fulcher (the applicant) under the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (FOI Act) for access to:

The current policy, doctrine, guidelines or directive on how the expectation of casualties is determined for a warlike nature of service determination prior to deployment of ADF personnel overseas.

The recommendations for warlike service classification for the following operations:

- (1) DAMASK VI
- (2) NORTHERN WATCH
- (3) CATALYST
- (4) RIVERBANK
- (5) PALADIN
- (6) SLIPPER

Timeframe: 1 January 1992 to 28 November 2022

FOI decision maker

2. I am the authorised officer pursuant to section 23 of the FOI Act to make a decision on this FOI request.

Documents identified

3. I identified **no documents as matching the description of the request.**

Decision

4. I have decided to refuse this request under section 24A [requests may be refused if documents cannot be found, do not exist or have not been received] of the FOI Act.

Material taken into account

5. In making my decision, I had regard to:
- a. the terms of the request;
 - b. the content of the identified documents in issue;
 - c. relevant provisions in the FOI Act;
 - d. the Guidelines published by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner under section 93A of the FOI Act (the Guidelines); and
 - e. advice from subject matter experts in the Vice Chief of the Defence Force Executive and Joint Operations Command.

Reasons for decision

6. Section 24A(1) of the FOI Act states:

(1) An agency or Minister may refuse a request for access to a document if:

(a) all reasonable steps have been taken to find the document; and

(b) the agency or Minister is satisfied that the document:

(i) is in the agency's or Minister's possession but cannot be found; or

(ii) *does not exist.*

7. To ensure that "all reasonable steps" have been taken in relation to this request, officers within the Vice Chief of the Defence Force Executive and Joint Operations Command conducted searches for documents on "the current policy, doctrine, guidelines or directives on how the expectation of casualties is determined for a warlike nature of service determination" within Defence's official record keeping systems, common information access points and by consulting with relevant stakeholders. No documents were found.

8. I am satisfied that "all reasonable steps" have been taken to locate the documents sought by the applicant. I am satisfied that the documents cannot be found or do not exist, and refuse access under section 24A(1) of the FOI Act.

Further Information

9. The nature of service classifications for the operations are publicly available at the following websites:

- *Veterans' Entitlements (Non-warlike Service) Determination 2019* - [Veterans' Entitlements \(Non-warlike Service\) Determination 2019 \(legislation.gov.au\)](#);
- *Veterans' Entitlements (Warlike Service) Determination 2019* - [Veterans' Entitlements \(Warlike Service\) Determination 2019 \(legislation.gov.au\)](#).

Kathryn Burke
A/g Director
Freedom of Information
Associate Secretary Group