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28 January, 2023

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Submission to Inquiry - Mr Stanley Hannaford

Part 1 – Name of Inquiry

Name of Inquiry *

Inquiry into medallic recognition for service with Rifle Company Butterworth

Part 2 – About the Submitter

Title or Rank *

Mr

Given Names *

Stanley

Surname *

Hannaford

Post-nominals (if applicable)

Street Number and Name *

[Redacted]

Suburb *

[Redacted]

Postcode *

[Redacted]

State *

[Redacted]

Address: *

[Redacted]

Primary Contact Number *

[Redacted]

Secondary Contact Number

Is the Submission on behalf of an organisation? If yes, please provide details:

Rifle Company Butterworth Veterans Group

Part 3 – Desired outcome

Provide a summary of your submission:

As previously mentioned The RCBVG also request that the Tribunal looks at the following medallic recognition for RCB service. 1. General Service Medal 1962-. For RCB service pre-14 Feb 1975 as this was the only campaign medal available at the time under the Imperial Awards System. 2. Pinjat Jasa Malaysia Medal (PJM). This medal has been awarded by the Malaysian Government to ADF personnel who served in Malaysia during both the Malaysian Emergency and the Borneo Confrontation and Malaysian Forces for war service during the

Communist Insurgency 1968-1989. 3. A Malaysian Government statement confirming that the RCB was in fact assisting the Malay Armed Forces at Butterworth Air Base by carrying out such vital defence warlike duties, should encourage the Australian Government to request the Malaysian Government to extend the qualifying period for eligibility for the PJM to cover the period 1970 – 1989. 4. I was advised personally by the Malaysian Defence Advisor to apply for the PJM for my service in Malaysia with the RCB, this application was submitted through the Malaysian Defence system. The verbal response to my application was, the Australian Government would need to request the Malaysian Government to extend the qualifying period to take in the RCB service 1970—1989 and it would be looked upon favourably.

Part 4 - Your submission and Supporting Documentation

File Attached: 3.-NAA-File-A13883.pdf

1.-RCBVG-Sup-Sub-26-Jan-2023.docx

2.-Supplementary-Submission-RCBVG-Group-1.pdf

Part 5 – Consent and declaration

✓ I consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal making my submission publicly available.

✓ I also consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal:

- using information contained in my submission to conduct research;
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation considered by the Tribunal to be appropriate; and
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation the subject of adverse comment in the submission;
- using content in my submission in its report to Government.

The Tribunal will decide which person or organisation is appropriate, and this may include:

1. persons or organisations required to assist with the inquiry; and
2. persons or organisations with an interest in the inquiry.

✓ I declare that the information I have provided is correct.

Name

Stan Hannaford


Date

28/01/2023



Signed by Mr Stanley Hannaford

Signed on: 28 January, 2023





Dear Jay/Tammy,

Please find attached a further supplementary submission to the DHAA Tribunal on behalf of the Rifle Company Butterworth Veterans Group (RCBVG)
Submitted by Stan Hannaford and George Lovette

As previously mentioned The RCBVG also request that the Tribunal look at the following medallic recognition for RCB service.

1. General Service Medal 1962-. For RCB service pre 14 Feb 1975 as this was the only campaign medal available at the time under the Imperial Awards System.
2. Pinjat Jasa Malaysia Medal (PJM) This medal has been awarded by the Malaysian Government to ADF personnel who served in Malaysia during both the Malaysian Emergency and the Borneo Confrontation.
3. A Malaysian Government statement confirming that the RCB was in fact assisting the Malay Armed Forces at Butterworth Air Base by carrying out such vital defence warlike duties, should encourage the Australian Government to request the Malaysian Government to extend the qualifying period for eligibility for the PJM to cover the period 1970 – 1989.
4. I was advised personally by the Malaysian Defence Advisor to apply for the PJM for my service in Malaysia with the RCB, this application was submitted through the Malaysian Defence system. The verbal response to my application was, the Australian Government would need to request the Malaysian Government to extend the qualifying period to take in the RCB service 1970—1989 and it would be looked upon favourably.

Stan Hannaford.

For the RCBVG

27 Jan 2023



Typical Infantry Rifle Company - Delta Company 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment – 28 ANZUK Brigade 1971 – 1973 Singapore - Deployed on its second rotation direct from Singapore to Butterworth Air Base January 1973 with a composition of Regular Army and National Servicemen. Other 6RAR Rifle Company's deployed throughout 1971- 1972-1973 .

On behalf of the Rifle Company Butterworth Veterans Group ,I would like to add the following supplementary information to our initial submission in support of the recognition for service with Rifle Company Butterworth as warlike service.

De facto

In [jurisprudence](#), *de facto* mainly means "practiced, but not necessarily defined by law" or "practiced or is valid, but not officially established".

1. Whilst it is recognised by the various Australian Governments over the years that Rifle Company Butterworth (RCB) rotations provided protective security to Australian RAAF assets and personnel during its deployments to Butterworth Air Base from November 1970 through to December 1989, there is a formal position taken to either not fully understand the role or down play the role carried out by RCB on the basis that the role was not formally established with warlike conditions in mind.
2. Unlike other warlike deployments where planning and risk analysis is undertaken by a government **prior** to deploying its troops, RCB was different with ad hoc type defensive arrangements which were developed in situ and in correlation with increased intelligence against a background of a growing insurgency situation.
3. The RCB rotations from November 1970 through to June 1973 were carried out by troops assigned to the ANZUK Brigade which were sourced in country rather than being sent direct from Australia which may have some bearing upon the lack of Government input at the early stages.
4. From the outset in late 1970 it is clear that the Australian Government knew of the escalating threat although did not consider it serious enough at the initial phase to warrant classification as warlike service and as a result kept adjusting the role of RCB in the defence of RAAF assets which later developed into a holistic role in the total internal defence of the Air Base.

5. Warlike conditions prevailed by way of a Threat to the Air Base promulgated through intelligence assessments of possible attacks by Communist Terrorists and or subversive elements which required RCB to operate under specific Rules of Engagement **not only in a defensive manner but also in an offensive manner if required.**
6. Initially and central to airbase security was the need to provide protection from external overt attack to the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) which had been installed at Butterworth during 1970 – 1971. Initially this role fell under the auspice of the ANZUK / FPDA yet there was an overlapping of the air base defences which resulted in RCB also providing protective security against attack by an internally inspired Communist Insurgency. In other words RCB was tasked with two military objectives.
7. The timeline of events suggests a correlation between the very first RCB rotation in November 1970, the growing insurgency problem and the establishment of the IADS at Butterworth.
8. The aim of the Communist Terrorists was for the establishment of a Communist State in both Malaya by armed struggle. (Refer to Paragraph 18 Of this submission)
9. The involvement of RCB at Butterworth is recognised with the award of the Australian Service Medal (ASM) yet it's tasks in carrying out Orders under Operational Orders 1/70 , 1/71 & 1/72 , Unit Standing Orders is best described as a de facto warlike arrangement which was critical in order to protect Australian assets and personnel against a background of **hostile intent** from communist terrorists and or subversive elements.
10. The primary role of RCB was to Protect and Defend Australian Assets and Personnel at Butterworth Air Base on a continual basis by providing an armed capability through a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) capable of responding in a holistic way to breaches of security and if necessary, responding to an attack against the air base by the CTs or subversive elements operating under Rules Of Engagement which allowed for the use of lethal force. The Protective Security role was carried out under specific Orders.
11. The **Protective and Defensive** nature of tasks required of RCB troops was for them **to be capable of War fighting** at BAB and be capable of extracting and evacuating Australian Assets personnel and Australian Nationals when called upon to do so.
12. Typically, this involved -
 - Cordon and Search
 - Internal Base Patrolling
 - Protection of RAAF Service assets and personnel
 - Perimeter Patrols nightly commencing at 1600 hours and concluding at 0630 hours the following morning.
 - Protection of Vital Points including those used by the Malaysian Air Force (MAF) both external and internal to the Air base.
 - Provision of a Quick Reaction Force of section strength on 24hr stand by in a state of readiness.

- Provision of a reserve force activated on 30 minutes notice to assist the QRF if required.
- Manning of listening posts and standing patrols by night.

13. In May 1971 a briefing was held at Air Base Butterworth to discuss details on the security and defence of the Air base and to advise on specialist aspects of base security. The basis of the briefing centred around an earlier Threat Assessment prepared by the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO)

14. A recommendation flowing from the meeting was for the implementation of two distinct defensive arrangements to cater for minor threats and to cater for a continuing threat from dissident individuals.

THE THREAT

9. The 1971 JIO assessment of the threat to Air Base Butterworth may be briefly summarised as follows:

- It is unlikely that any armed action by formed bodies of troops from the JIO or Malaysian Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF) will be mounted against the base within the next twelve months unless a favourable situation resulted from the diversion of the base security forces and local forces to quell civil disturbance.
- There is a continuing threat from unco-ordinated action by dissident individuals which could result in loss or damage to the assets of the base.
- There is no evidence to indicate that potential enemies have any indirect-fire weapon capability such as mortars.

10. The acceptance of this threat assessment leads to a requirement for two phases of defensive arrangements, apart from the arrangements necessary to protect members, dependants and nominated personnel in the event of civil disturbance. These are:

- day to day security measures to protect the base against the minor threat stated at paragraph 9.b. consisting of routine guarding measures; and, Protective Security role. ROE applied
- the capability to adopt an expanded security posture to counter the unlikely, but nevertheless possible, threat summarised at paragraph 9.a. Rcb troops were kept at the threshold in the event of this occurrence. ROE applied.


Defensive Phase 1

Defensive Phase 2

The requirement to adopt two phases of defensive arrangements goes to the core of this issue of recognition with an emphasis on the capability to adopt an expanded security posture. Infantry personnel are trained in this capability.

15.¹ November 1971 Anzuk Intelligence Unit - Threat Assessment.


Following on from the earlier JIO threat assessment, the ANZUK Brigade Intelligence Unit carried out a separate threat assessment dated November 1971.



16. ² In response to the 1971 Anzuk Intelligence Unit Threat assessment Note 1-71 The Commander Anzuk Force sent a Communique to Defence Canberra noting his concerns regarding the security of Anzuk Installations and Airplanes.


Commander Anzuk Force (Rear Admiral Wells) raised the bar by requesting **Anzuk Forces take immediate steps to protect** the installations and equipment.– (Anzuk Forces included 6RAR ,RAAF, 1RNZIR, 1RHF,) He requested that a Committee be formed to investigate for the **capacity of Butterworth to meet the Threat. An emphasis was placed on the need to Protect Anzuk Installations.**

*“My main concern is that Anzuk Forces take immediate steps to protect Anzuk Installations & equipment at Butterworth.” Committee to investigate for the capacity of Butterworth to meet the Threat and report to Commander AnzukAir for action needed to protect Anzuk Installations and Aircraft as **highest priority.**”*



² NAA – A138883 - Page 119 Communique CmdAnzuk Force to Defence Canberra

17. ³ In Confidential Memorandum Ref 149 dated 21st January 1972 the Australian High Commissioner for Malaysia J.R.Rowland wrote to the Secretary Department of Foreign Affairs – Canberra advising on a presentation by Commander Anzuk Force to six High Commissioners on a report that had been prepared by an urgently formed Committee into the deficiencies in the present security arrangements and that subsequent improvements had been considered including extra patrolling.



High Commissioner Rowland expressed his appreciation that a report had been prepared by the Committee and furthermore acknowledged the threat assessment.

18. Tangible evidence from the very top of the diplomatic chain which clearly demonstrates concerns regarding the threat situation and the capacity of Butterworth Air base to meet that threat. The Status of Forces Agreement entered into by Malaysia and Australia allowed for the Australian Forces to take whatever steps necessary to defend its own assets which included a provision for the carriage of arms.


³ NAA – A138883 Pages 65 & 66 - Memorandum from High Commissioner to Dept of Foreign Affairs.

3. I remarked that since much of what might be done to strengthen the present arrangements would probably require Malaysian agreement, we would need to carry the Malaysians with us; we would also need direction from Canberra. In particular, any suggestion of withdrawing the Mirages (which Admiral Wells had mentioned as one possible argument for use with the Malaysians to get them to do more) would require such direction, since the presence of the Mirages was of course one of the mainstays of the whole Five Power structure.

4. I said that we would be glad to see the paper prepared for COMANZUKFOR and its practical recommendations; Admiral Wells said that he intended to pass it to High Commissions.

The High commissioner remarked that any agreements to improve the present arrangements would require Australia to carry the Malaysians with them and would also require direction from Canberra noting the importance of maintaining the Mirage jets at Butterworth as the mainstay of the Five Power Structure.

19. 4 In response to the Memorandum from the High Commissioner, the Department of Foreign Affairs acknowledged they had taken up the issue with both the Departments of Defence and Air to ensure that the problem is kept prominently in mind by the Service Authorities.

 **CONFIDENTIAL** 82
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 213/1/9/5/1
CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2600
File No. 696/6/4/5/6 8th February, 1972
Memo. No. 207
The Australian High Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR
Butterworth Security
Thank you for your memorandum 149 of
21st February on your file 207/2/3/5.
2. We are glad that momentum is being maintained to make necessary improvements to the security arrangements at Butterworth. We are ourselves in touch with the Departments of Defence and Air to ensure that the problem is kept prominently in mind by the Services authorities.
3. We have not yet seen the paper prepared for COMANZUKFOR but are checking with Defence. We shall try to hurry along their reaction to any recommendations made.
4. In the meantime we fully agree that, if not already operating, steps to introduce checks with Special Branch on locally-engaged civilian employees are an obvious and necessary precaution. We should be glad if, following your enquiries, you could let us have details of existing practice, and your views on any possible improvements which the Malaysians might be prepared to join in making workable.
(F.J.Blakeney)
First Assistant Secretary
Defence Division
Copied to Singapore

The Commander Anzuk Force Rear Admiral Wells was confronted with the realities of the threat situation and possible attack against Anzuk Force installations and assets as detailed in the Anzuk Threat Assessment .

The Mirage Jets formed the cornerstone of the Five power Defence Arrangement along with the Integrated Air Defence System. The RAAF formed the Air component of Anzuk Force.

20. ⁵ The intentions of the Communist Terrorists was to establish a communist state of Malaya through armed struggle which included a campaign of widespread terrorism, sabotage, guerilla action, and attacks on military and para military forces and government property. The policy and intentions of the CTO as stipulated in the threat assessment was validated with the capture of documents which set out the policy of the CTO. (Para 41)

CPM/CTO Policy and Intentions

39. The basic aim of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and its associated organisations is the establishment of a communist state of "Malaya" embracing West Malaysia and Singapore. The CPM currently states that this will be accomplished ultimately by engaging in "armed struggle" (referred to in western military writing as Phase II of communist strategy) i.e. that phase of the insurgent campaign involving widespread terrorism, sabotage, guerilla action and attacks on military and para-military forces and government property.

40. This policy involves the development of an extensive underground infrastructure, accompanied by the systematic build-up of an armed capability. A captured document states CPM tasks as "to carry on strengthening the forces, to consolidate and expand the guerilla bases, to expand the operational areas of the vast area of the northern tip (i.e. the north of West Malaysia), to resume the masses' work in rural areas, to build underground bulwarks, to forge ahead with the masses' movement and to expand the guerilla war."

Paragraph 39 makes it very clear the aim of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and its associated organisations is for the

" establishment of a communist state of Malaya" – by engaging in armed struggle involving widespread terrorism, sabotage, guerrilla action and attacks on military and para military forces and government property."

41. That this document is a reliable indicator of CTO intentions is confirmed by other captured documents containing directions to the 8th and 12th CTO Regiments; by the pattern of CTO activity since mid-1968 - small scale isolated incidents near the Thai border with limited objectives such as "blooding" newly trained groups, capturing arms and celebrating a particular anniversary in the CTO calendar; and by

.../13

Paragraph 41 validates the findings of paragraph 39 with the statement -

" That this document is a reliable indicator of CTO intentions is confirmed by other captured documents containing directions to the 8th and 12th CTO Regiments."

21. ⁶ The above assessment conflicts with the view taken by Defence with evidence given by Colonel Thompson, who at the time was Acting Director General Military Strategic Commitments VCDF Group – Department of Defence. At the October 29 – 2014 Standing Committee on Petitions which met to discuss the re classification of Rifle Company Butterworth service from Peacetime service to warlike service Col Thompson advised the Committee of the insurgency however characterised the insurgency as banditry with very limited attacks on any Malaysian constabulary due to it being a Police action stating that the Military were not deployed against them – only very occasionally and furthermore stated

“ I can tell you first hand that the every day expectation , especially of families was one of an idyllic and peaceful life style rather than any threat ever. “

Colonel Thompson acknowledged at the hearing that he had spent three years at Butterworth as a RAAF brat.

Wednesday, 29 October 2014

House of Representatives

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COOPER, Ms Jacqueline, Director Nature of Service Branch, Department of Defence

ROBERT, The Hon. Stuart, Assistant Minister for Defence, Commonwealth Parliament

THOMPSON, Colonel Murray, Acting Director General Military Strategic Commitments, VCDF Group, Department of Defence

Committee met at 10:43

Today we will be hearing from representatives from the Department of Defence to discuss a petition which calls for the reclassification of the military service of Rifle Company Butterworth between 1970 and 1989. I now invite representatives from the Department of Defence to discuss the petition. I remind witnesses that, although the committee does not require you to give evidence under oath, this hearing is a legal proceeding of parliament and therefore has the same standing as proceedings of the chambers themselves. The evidence given today will be recorded by Hansard and will attract parliamentary privilege. If you would like to make a brief opening statement, we can then go straight to questions.

Mr Robert: Thanks Chair, and thank you for the opportunity to come along as the responsible minister and to bring Colonel Thompson, Director General of Military Strategic Commitments, and Ms Cooper. It was interesting speaking to Colonel Thompson before; he actually spent three years of his life—I think you said as a 'RAAF brat', Colonel—

Col. Thompson: I did.

⁶ House of Representatives Standing Committee on Petitions – October 29 - 2014 Reclassification of service by Rifle Company Butterworth .

Col. Thompson: There was a communist insurgency, but it was extremely low level. It was actually along the border areas of what is now Thailand, and certainly by the mid-seventies it would be characterised as banditry more than a comprehensive insurgency. There were very limited attacks on any Malaysian constabulary, because it was a police action. The military were not deployed against them—only very occasionally. By 1989 it had ended. The communist terrorist Chin Peng, who had been living the jungle, was an old man and he finally came out and effectively ended the communist insurgency.

CHAIR: Former RCB personnel have stated that they and their families expected that combat would occur and that casualties would be sustained and have argued that it is not relevant whether actual combat occurred if there was an expectation that combat would occur. Is that consistent with the practice during the period 1970 to 1989?

Col. Thompson: It is all a matter of perspective. There were certainly no orders given and, although certain orders to Rifle Company Butterworth may well have heightened the risk in their order of training and raising people's awareness, I can tell you firsthand that the everyday expectation, especially of families, was one of an

PETITIONS COMMITTEE

Wednesday, 29 October 2014

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idyllic and peaceful lifestyle rather than any threat ever. I will pass to Ms Cooper, who can categorise some of those.

Ms Cooper: The point the claimants are making is the concept of perception of harm, which was discussed by Justice Moore when he did his review. It has also been tested in the courts. Many people have claimed they have warlike service, because they perceived danger and they all felt danger, however, the conclusion from the courts was that there had to be a real and objective danger, not just a perception of danger.

Mr Robert: Chair, if you look through the commanders' diaries and look to the evidence of government and military at the time, there was never an expectation of casualties occurring. If I look at my time as a military officer in 1998 in Bougainville during the crisis there, we were unarmed—the first unarmed mission. It was seen as a peace-making operation and while there was an Australian Service Medal issued, not an Active Service Medal—no-one was claiming it was war-like, but it was quite common for us to be confronted by weapons and knives and weapons in faces, there were confronting issues in reconciliation and disarming rebels, but no-one was claiming that Bougainville should be increased to war-like service.

22. 7 Proximity of Terrorist Units and activity to Butterworth Air Base.

7.

18. The Joint Intelligence Organisation (Australia) estimated in October, 1971, that the CTO has about 1,800 to 2,000 armed terrorists, organised into three regiments - the 8th in the Sadao area of Thailand adjoining Perlis and Kedah States, the 12th in the Betong Salient adjoining Perak State and the 10th in the Weng District opposite Kelantan State - with up to 300 CTs operating in West Malaysia.

19. There is also a reserve and operational support organisation, the Malayan Communist Youth League (MCYL), estimated to number between 3,000 and 6,000, based mainly in Southern Thailand, but with small cells in West Malaysia. Since November, 1969, the CTO, which has always had propaganda support from Radio Peking, has also had similar support from a radio station, Voice of the Malayan Revolution, located in southern China.

20. The Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF), which first came to notice in April, 1970, is the largest and best-organised communist subversive organisation in West Malaysia. The MNLF has cells in most States. Direct links exist between the Perak and Kedah MNLF committees, and each of these also has direct links with the 12th CTO Regiment. The MNLF has already demonstrated a capability for co-ordinated subversive and minor terrorist activities in both West Malaysia and Singapore. There are also a number of other minor subversive groups, some of whom are in touch with the CPM or the MNLF, including the Malayan Patriotic Front (MPF) and the Malayan People's Liberation Front (MPLF). The organisations mentioned operate in the Penang/Butterworth area.

23. ⁸ The Joint Intelligence Organisation JIO Study No 14/74 identified incident locations near Butterworth Air Base involving communist terrorists . Kulim located approximately 20km to the east of the air base stands out as a Ct hot spot.

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Annex A
to JIO Study No. 14/74

CPM/CTO Activity in Kedah State and Province Wellesley near
Air Base Butterworth

1. Brief details of activity between May 1973 and June 1974 are as follows:

Date	Location	Details
25th May 1973	11 kilometres north-east of Mahang	Security Force patrol triggered off a terrorist booby-trap; two Security Force personnel wounded.
? May 1973	32 kilometres east of Kulim	Abandoned terrorist camp capable of housing 50 to 60 personnel found.
5th June 1973	Mahang area, Kulim district	Security Forces contacted a lone terrorist, who escaped.
7th June 1973	13 kilometres north-east of Mahang	Camp for 30 to 40 terrorists found.
7th June 1973	Mahang area	Two Security Force personnel wounded by terrorist booby-trap.
17th to 23rd June 1973	Kulim district	Three terrorists sighted.
20th June 1973	Kulim district	Six terrorists sighted.
24th to 30th June 1973	Sungai Bakap, Province Wellesley	Three sightings of terrorists — reportedly same group.
28th June 1973	6 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Security Forces recovered seven terrorist leaflets.
30th June 1973	Kulim district	Three armed terrorists sighted.

⁸ NAA – A138883 Pages 26 to 30 - Annex A to JIO study 14/74 - The Threat to Air Base Butterworth up to end of 1975

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Annex A (contd)

Date	Location	Details
Early July 1973	5 kilometres north-east of Serdang	Terrorist group of unknown strength sighted.
12th July 1973	18 kilometres SSE of Kulim-Serdang	Chief Inspector of Police shot dead at his home by suspected terrorists.
19th July 1973	Serdang	Two shots fired in direction of police station; no casualties.
22nd July 1973	4 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Three armed terrorists sighted.
26th July 1973	Karangan area, Kulim district	Two suspected terrorists in civilian clothes sighted.
1st August 1973	5 kilometres north-west of Serdang	Four armed terrorists sighted.
Early August 1973	11 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
2nd September 1973	16 kilometres south-west of Baling	Three armed terrorists sighted.
8th or 9th September 1973	Baling and Kulim subdistricts	One Security Force member and one terrorist killed when Security Force patrol clashed with 20 terrorists, one Security Force member slightly wounded.
9th to 15th? September 1973	21 kilometres south-west of Baling	Terrorist resting-place for five to eight people found.
4th October 1973	8 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
10th October 1973	5 kilometres south-east of Tawar	Three armed terrorists sighted.

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Annex A (contd)

Date	Location	Details
24th October 1973	6 kilometres south-east of Malau	Fourteen terrorists sighted.
7th December 1973	11 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Nine armed terrorists sighted.
8th December 1973	5 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Three armed terrorists sighted.
16th December 1973	11 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Four terrorists sighted.
6th January 1974	Serdang/Mahang Road, three kilometres from Kulim	Volley of shots fired at police road-block, wounding one Security Force member. No reported terrorists casualties.
6th January 1974	8 kilometres south-east of Kulim	About 15 armed terrorists sighted.
18th January 1974	3 kilometres north-east of Kulim	Five terrorists sighted.
21st January 1974	4 kilometres north-east of Kampong Terap-Kulim	Six armed terrorists sighted.
6th February 1974	Tawar area	One armed terrorist seen.
8th February 1974	Karangan area, Kulim district	11 terrorists sighted.
14th February 1974	Kampong Wang Pinang/Sungai Ular/Anak Kulim Estate general area, Kulim district	Six terrorists sighted.
17th February 1974	14 kilometres east of Karangan-Kulim	A lone terrorist sighted.

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Annex A (contd)

Date	Location	Details
About 20th February 1974	8 kilometres east of Kulim	One Security Force member wounded by booby-trap.
25th February 1974	5 kilometres south-east of Terap-Kulim district	Three armed terrorists sighted.
28th February 1974	10 kilometres north-east of Serdang	Three terrorists sighted.
1st March 1974	22 kilometres east of Kulim	Three terrorists sighted.
1st March 1974	13 kilometres east of Kulim	Three terrorists sighted.
3rd March 1974	22 kilometres east of Kulim	Four terrorists sighted.
3rd March 1974	13 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
4th March 1974	8 kilometres east of Kulim	Contact with three terrorists; no casualties.
5th March 1974	8 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Terrorist camp found.
11th March 1974	Kampong Dusun, 2 kilometres north-east of Kulim town	Two terrorists sighted.
13th March 1974	22 kilometres south of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
17th March 1974	22 kilometres south of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
3rd April 1974	3 kilometres south-west of Kampong Terap, near Malau	Two armed terrorists sighted.

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
Annex A (contd)

Date	Location	Details
27th April 1974	14 kilometres south-west of Kulim	Unknown number of terrorists sighted.
4th May 1974	27 kilometres north-east of Kulim	10 armed terrorists sighted.
15th May 1974	6 kilometres east of Kulim	3 terrorists sighted.
26th May 1974	Kampong Wang Pinang, Kulim area	Contact with unknown number of terrorists.
19th May to 1st June 1974	Kulim area	3 terrorist groups, 6 to 15 strong, sighted.
19th May to 1st June 1974	Bukit Mertajam, Province Wellesley	One small group of terrorists sighted.
26th May to 1st June 1974	Bukit Mertajam area, Province Wellesley	Unknown number of terrorists sighted.
4th June 1974	7 kilometres ESE of Butterworth, Province Wellesley	3 suspected terrorists arrested; small cache found.
9th to 15th June 1974	Valdor village area, Province Wellesley	1 terrorist sighted.

24. ⁹ A locality map indicates the CTO was operating close to Butterworth Air Base during its build up phase. Butterworth was used as a Forward Operational base by the Malaysian forces in their counter offensive operations.

Rifle Company Butterworth / QRF acted as a second line of defence and although not directly involved with the Malaysian forces external to the air base had a holistic role in defending the air base internally, an air base relied upon by the Malaysians in their counter offensive operations against the terrorists.

⁹ NAA – A138883 Page 31 - The Threat to Air Base Butterworth up to end of 1975




25. ¹⁰ In a Memorandum dated 12 May 1972, the Australian High Commissioner in Malaysia through its Secretary notified the Department of Foreign Affairs, Australian High Commissioner – Singapore, Commander Anzuk Force and the Officer Commanding Air Base Butterworth of a radio broadcast made by the Communist Terrorists from Southern Yunan (China) which detailed sensitive information regarding the Australian military presence at Butterworth including that of 6RAR with 120 men guarding the Air Base.

Concerns were held that although the radio broadcast was not a call to arms to attack the Air Base it was thought possible it may incite action from Ct activists and supporters—

¹⁰ NAA – A138883 Page 55 ----Correspondence Australian High Commission – Kuala Lumpur 12 May 1972 in response to Radio Broadcast by Cts.

“ while the broadcast is not a call to attack the air base, it must be considered possible it could have some inciting effect on CT activists and supporters. It is the first direct reference to Air Base Butterworth we have received.”

The radio transcript reveals the Cts were operating within 15 miles of Butterworth Air Base with an expansion of their guerrilla areas.



9

RADIO SUARA REVOLUSI BROADCAST IN MALAY TO SINGAPORE
AND MALAYSIA 1030 GMT 1 APRIL 1972

"The Australian Defense Minister is Plotting in our Country"

(Text) Australian Defense Minister David Fairbairn has been wandering around Malaya and other countries in Southeast Asia in mid-March. Since the establishment of the Five-Power Defense Pact by British imperialism, the senior officials of the Australian Reactionary Government and its military leaders made frequent visits to Malaya for secret talks with the Razak and Lee Kuan Yew cliques.

During David Fairbairn's visit, an Australian Military Survey Mission was already active in Kuala Lumpur. Meanwhile, an Australian fleet under the command of a Rear Admiral arrived in Singapore territorial waters for a one 1-week naval exercise beginning nineteen 19 March. The exercise was participated in by the Air Forces and Navies of Britain, New Zealand and both puppet cliques. That was the biggest fleet dispatched by Australia to Singapore in recent years.

Besides being an accomplice of U.S. imperialism in the Indochina war of aggression, the Australian Reactionary Government is also an accomplice of British imperialism to suppress our country's people struggle for independence. In coordination with British imperialists' strategic arrangement in the Far East, the Australian Reactionary Government has been actively providing military assistance and training to both puppet regimes in recent years.

It is also responsible for managing the British imperialists' military bases in our country and plays an important role in the Five-Power Defense Pact.

On fifteen 15 March, Fairbairn shouted blatantly opposing China and defending crimes committed by the Australian Reactionary Government as an accomplice of U.S. and British imperialists to enslave the people of Southeast Asia and Malaya. As such, his ugly colonialist features were barely exposed. He said: "The liberation war backed by China will continue in several areas and the necessity of the Five-Power Defense Pact is necessary."

- 2 -

In Singapore, he reiterated that Australia has a great strategic interest in seeing the freedom of the Southeast Asian region guaranteed. The Australian Defense Policy is formulated in a manner which enables it to protect its interest by stationing Australian forces in this region and by participating in various defense pacts with allied and friendly countries.

Fairbairn was satisfied with his talks with Razak and Goh Keng Swee and assured them of the continued presence of Australian troops in Malaya. He also announced Australia's military assistance to the Lee Kuan Yew clique amounting to four 4 million dollars and fifty million 50,000,000 dollars to the Razak clique within a period of three 3 years. This assistance includes military facilities and the training military personnel of both puppet cliques.

According to Fairbairn, the Australian Government has trained 15,000 fifteen thousand Malaysian military personnel.

During his sojourn in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, Fairbairn visited the Butterworth and Singapore Airbases and met with British, Australian and New Zealand military leaders.

Before departing from Singapore, he disclosed that the Air Forces of the Five-Power Pact will carry out an exercise in Malaya this month.

Fairbairn is plotting in our country at a time when the Malayan National Liberation Army is advancing successfully. The Butterworth Airbase which is managed by the Royal Australian Air Force is only fifteen 15 miles from our Army's Operation Area. It is reported that forty 40 out of the one hundred and ten 110 Mirage jet fighters of the Royal Australian Air Force are stationed in our country and out of the 40 forty supersonic jet fighters, thirty two 32 are stationed at Butterworth Airbase and eight at the Tengah Airbase in Singapore. In addition, there are also a number of other types of Royal Australian Air Force aircraft including sixteen 16 Sabre jets which are Australian gifts to the Razak clique and also a number of puppet helicopters. The Australian reactionaries and the Razak clique are frightened over the rapid expansion of our Army guerrilla areas.

/3...

- 3 -

90

The Australian reactionaries have been worried lately over Butterworth Airbase being the principle target of continued Communist attacks.

Under the pressure of the Australian reactionaries, the Razak clique has reinforced its defenses at Butterworth Airbase recently. At this stage, an Infantry Company of about one hundred and twenty 120 men from the Sixth 6th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment is stationed there to help guard base along with the Royal Australian Air Force dogs.

The puppet clique soldiers are responsible for guarding the barbed-wire fences of the base and the surrounding area. Nevertheless, the Australian reactionaries are still not happy with the security measures.

Ah Australian reactionary newspaper criticized Fairbairn's recent visit to Kuala Lumpur. Fairbairn's visit to the Butterworth Airbase is aimed at resuscitating members of the Australian Air Force. But this cannot cover up the uneasiness of the Australian ruling clique.

26. The Communist Terrorists were aware of the presence of the 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR) and its role in protecting the air base. Referred to as puppet clique Soldiers responsible for guarding the barbed wire fences of the base and surrounding areas. It was felt that the broadcast may attract subversive elements into acts of sabotage.

“At this stage , an Infantry Company of about one hundred and twenty 120 men, from the 6th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment is stationed there to help guard base along with Royal Austrlian Air Force dogs.”


27. Expectation of Casualties

¹¹ Rifle Company Unit Standing Orders – QRF Commander Orders

In order for RCB to execute and achieve its protective security role and tasks the RCB procedure was for its Rifle Platoons to rotate continually every three days on a 24/7 roster.

One standby platoon providing:

The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of section strength (10 men) based in the Guard room in a state of readiness and on immediate call on a 24hour a day basis with weapons and ammunition ready for deployment as required by the OC – QRF .



28. The Commander of the QRF was required to arrange for the QRF to carry out a patrol of the perimeter fence every day at first light which included a foot patrol along the golf course fence and when not carrying out a foot patrol by mounting an open sided QRF truck in which a section group of 10 would mount. The QRF truck had a large spot light mounted above the drivers cabin. At other times perimeter patrols were carried out on foot without the use of a QRF truck and at random hours throughout the night or early morning prior to sunrise.

The area surrounding the air base along the eastern boundary had kampong villages abutting the perimeter. The air base was lit up against the darkness and as a result QRF patrols stood out against the air base background.

Its not unreasonable to foresee a situation where the Cts or subversive elements establish an ambush at some point around the perimeter of the Air Base in wait for a QRF/RCB response. The QRF/RCB troops were faced with this unknown and in the mind of the soldier tasked with QRF or RCB duties, there was an expectation of casualties.

¹¹ Annex B To Rifle Company Unit Standing Orders – Duties QRF Commander RCBGRP Master File Ref # 19781212A



- P 1 -
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Annex F
to JIO Study
No. 13/75

Vertical Air Photograph of Air Base Butterworth showing Possible CTO Approaches.

29. ¹² The following testimony is reflective of a typical QRF perimeter patrol and gives an insight into concerns the QRF Commander held for QRF / RCB engaged in patrolling the air base perimeter.

Mr Stone: My service started in 1974 at Butterworth. As I said, I would like to offer some relativity to you. I notice that in your meetings with the representative from Defence you asked a question about comparison between Butterworth and Timor. I also served in Timor. In fact, I have been 29 times to Timor; I have served there operationally nine times. Definitely, the service that I had in Butterworth in 1974-75 was absolutely comparable to the service of the Air Force defence guards at Comoro Airport throughout that period. Throughout my infantry service, I went on to be a lieutenant colonel. I had eight years at lieutenant colonel. I commanded a peacekeeping force in the Iran-Iraq war. I commanded the Army response to the Fiji coup in 1987 and, since becoming a chaplain, I have served again back in Timor numerous times, the Solomons nine times, and Bougainville as a peacekeeping operation, as well as several humanitarian sets of operations. Specifically too, also as a lieutenant colonel, when I came back from the Iran-Iraq war, I was asked to be the Army lieutenant colonel in the ADF command centre, so I was responsible for deploying the contingents that we sent to Cambodia, to Operation Desert Storm and to the western Sahara. Prior to that, as a lieutenant colonel, I had been in charge of infantry operations in Army headquarters, so I have an understanding of what happens at Defence. I understand how people write briefs. Junior officers write briefs to ministers who see them very quickly and pass them on and trust that they have received the information in good faith. Certainly, as I have read so many of the documents about Butterworth, I am astounded that the information that has been provided has been lacking in fact—some of it because, as our evidence will demonstrate, the evidence was top secret and classified at the time.

The bottom line for me is that in 1974-75 in Butterworth, every night, we deployed armed patrols—with weapons and with rules of engagement—who would have taken offensive action and killed people without any further orders every night of our operation. It was a warlike operation. I, as a platoon commander, felt grave responsibility that our soldiers were doing that every night. We knew from intelligence briefings we got weekly that there were communist terrorists throughout the area, within kilometres of the Butterworth Air Base. It was a warlike operation.


30. **In the event of attack by the Cts or subversive elements during these patrols there is clearly an expectation of casualties with QRF troops either being killed or wounded.**

The position taken by Defence implies that the QRF were not tasked with defending the air base but were there to merely provide a presence. The Rules of engagement were two pronged which allowed for a soft response by giving three verbal warning prior to using lethal force or in the event of an outright attack and fearing for their life the QRF could respond with lethal force without warning.

¹² House of Representatives – Standing Committee on Petitions Hansard Wednesday 19 November 2014 – Evidence by Mr Gary Stone RCB Veteran

31.¹³ The 1971 Threat Assessment concluded as a likely method of attack the use of

*“iv Sabotage by the **planting of explosive devices or booby traps**, designed to damage vital points **and injure personnel** by one or more Cts , members of subversive groups , or sympathetic or suborned LEC/ contractor personnel.”*



The ANZUK threat assessment concluded that a likely method of attack could be with the use of mines / booby traps which supports the view the Australian Government at the time had not properly carried out a risk analysis in terms of casualties for RCB.

QRF/RCB troops were faced with this type of unknown each time they carried out patrols of the Air Base. In the eyes of the soldier the threat element was always present with an expectation of casualties . An expectation of casualties must be measured against the threat environment and Operational Orders which required RCB to respond with lethal force.

It was a de facto arrangement which placed RCB troops in harms way.

32. Training - Counter Insurgency



Arm patch Anzuk Infantry Brigade

During its time with 28ANZUK Brigade, 6RAR along with 1RNZIR and 1RHF trained extensively in counter insurgency in the south of Malaysia including training at the Jungle Warfare Centre known at the time as Kota Tinggi . At the time the majority of 6RAR senior NCO and Officers were Vietnam Veterans, some also having combat experience in Borneo . 6RAR having returned to Australia in June 1970 after its second tour of Vietnam deployed to Singapore one year later in July 1971 replacing 1RAR. At the time 6RAR was a highly experienced Infantry combat unit.

Individual Training

Training was conducted at Individual level consisting of but not limited to -

- Unarmed combat training
- Physical fitness endurance training
- Small arms training
- General parade drills
- Lectures – Mines / Booby Traps etc

Sub Unit Training

Malaysia was a very harsh environment to operate in with high humidity, constant tropical downpours and lightning strikes being common. Soldiers were constantly wet with the humidity or rain.

Platoon or Company Level training was normally conducted at the Jungle Warfare training Centre at Kotta Tinggi (Now called Pulada) . It was not uncommon to also train external to Pulada in primary and secondary jungle environments and at times in plantation environments such as rubber or date palm plantations.

- Ambushing including night ambushing
- Attack and withdrawal
- Counter attack
- Night navigation in a secondary jungle setting
- General navigation in a jungle setting
- Search and destroy
- Patrolling

Unit and Brigade Training.

Brigade military exercises involving the three Infantry Battalions and supporting elements were carried out in the south of Malaysia. A typical exercise was aptly named Exercise SECRET in which 6RAR carried out a blocking and counter penetration role against an enemy Ct unit. The Malaysian Infantry unit 7MIB acted as enemy for the purposes of the military exercise.

The training was realistic and reflective of counter insurgency training in a South East Asian Country that was at War internally. There were several other Military exercises carried out over the period July 1971 to July 1973.

JUNE 1973.

RESTRICTED
EXERCISE SECRET

Copy No 21 of copies 22
6 RAR
ANZUK FPO 5

10 Jun 73

OPS 01

OP ORD 01

References: A. Map Malaysia Keluang Sheet 124 Scale 1:63,360.
B. 6 RAR R841-1-70 dated 29 May 73.

1. Situation.


a. En Forces.

- (1) 102 Army is continuing its adv north towards Keluang. 1/57 Div has been reported concentrating in the area of Rengan. From Int reports it appears this Div has been given the task of by passing Keluang via area B and establishing a block on the MSR between Keluang and Jemiluang.
- (2) Morale is exceptionally high. 1/57 Div led the successful breakthrough at Kulai in the early stages of the offensive.
- (3) It is anticipated that fwd elements of 1/57 Div could be on the southern edge of area B by last light 14 Jun 73.
- (4) The most likely direction of attack will be from the south east and south west to seize the high ground astride the main vehicle track in area B.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) The Commonwealth Div (-) is deployed in area of Keluang. 28 ANZUK Bde (+) has been given the task of preventing major en movement through the western edge of area B.
- (2) 28 ANZUK Bde is deployed as shown in annex A.

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX A OF
6 RAR OP ORD 01
DATED 10 JUNE 73





Australian Government



NATIONAL
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OF AUSTRALIA

Your story, our history

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NAA: A13883, 213/1/9/5/1 PART 2

Series number: A13883

Control symbol: 213/1/9/5/1 PART 2

Barcode: 8267619

Number of pages: 137

Singapore ANZUK (Australia New Zealand United Kingdom) intelligence group Singapore - threat to
Butterworth air base

CAVEAT MATTER ENCLOSED

CAVEAT MATTER ENCLOSED



NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA

STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DECISION UNDER SECTION 40(5)
OF THE ARCHIVES ACT 1983

Series	A13883
Control Symbol	213/1/9/5/1 PART 2
Barcode	8267619
Title	Singapore ANZUK (Australia New Zealand United Kingdom) Intelligence Group Singapore - Threat to Butterworth Air Base
Decision Maker	J. Bleeze
Designation	APS 5 Access Examiner
Date	10 November 2020

In accordance with requirements of subsection 8(1) of the *Archives Act 1983* (Cth) (Archives Act), I am a person authorised by the Director-General, pursuant to an Instrument of Delegation, to make a decision in relation to access to the requested item.

Basis for decision

In making my decision, I considered:

- the content of the item requested
- the relevant provisions of the Archives Act 1983
- policy and guidelines of National Archives of Australia that relate to the access examination of Commonwealth records
- information provided by Commonwealth agencies which I have relied upon in formulating my decision

Decision

After examining this item I have decided that this item is open with exception under 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act for the reasons set out below.

Five folios (22, 24 and 87-89) have been wholly exempt from public access.

The findings of facts

Section 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act provides that:

a record is exempt from public access if it contains information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth.

This item contains:

- Details which if disclosed could affect the Commonwealth's relations with the current government of a foreign country.
- Information that relates to co-operation between an Australian intelligence agency and counterpart agency of allied governments. Such co-operation is based on a common commitment to protect sensitive capabilities from disclosure.
- Information relevant to the capability, sources, objectives, methods, areas of interest or operations of an Australian intelligence agency. The information is still regarded as sensitive.

Reasons for decision

International relations are dependent upon the adequate flow of information between one country and another. If sensitive information was disclosed, it could lessen the confidence of a foreign government in the Australian Government and thus damage international relations.

The public disclosure of this information could compromise the future activities of Australian intelligence agencies and impair their ability to carry out their statutory functions. It would therefore reasonably be expected to cause damage to the defence and security of the Commonwealth.

Review of decision

The National Archives of Australia (the Archives) carefully examines items before deciding to exempt any part of them. As part of that process we may consult with other agencies which have expertise on specific national and international matters.

If you do not agree with the decision, you can formally appeal within 28 days of receiving a decision:

1. by first applying to the Archives for an internal reconsideration of my decision; and
2. if you still do not agree with the decision, you can apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for a review.

For more information please read the **National Archives Fact Sheet 12** *What to do if we refuse you access* (www.naa.gov.au/about-us/publications/fact-sheets/fs12.aspx).

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213/1/9/8
-> 213/1/9/5/1

J10328

2 October 1974

The Director,
Joint Intelligence Organisation,
CANBERRA

JIO Study No 14/74 "Malaysia - the Threat to
Air Base Butterworth to the end of 1975"

I have seen copy No 25 of the above named JIO Study which was sent to the Defence Adviser at this High Commission. If agreed to by ANZUK JIC, the contents might be appropriately passed to the Commander of the ANZUK Force by ANZUKIG(S), in accordance with the ANZUKIG(S) function of making major assessments available to Force Commander, upon direction from ANZUK JIC.

(F.W. Truelove)
Chairman
ANZUKIG(S)

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25

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245. 28/10

HAB 210

F.L.C

JIO STUDY
No. 14/74
Issued Sep. 1974

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JIO AUSTRALIA

MALAYSIA
THE THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
TO THE END OF 1975

BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED UP TO 30TH JUNE 1974

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, CANBERRA, A.C.T.

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PROTECTIVE SECURITY HANDBOOK
FOR THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT
AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

NOTE

This document is the property of the Australian Government and is to be handled as provided for in the "Protective Security Handbook" authorized by the Prime Minister's Department.

SECRET

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MALAYSIATHE THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
TO THE END OF 1975DESCRIPTION OF THE BASEGeneral

1. Air Base Butterworth is a Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) base that is jointly used by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). It occupies an area of about 4530 hectares in the Province of Wellesley on the north-west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, eight kilometres north of Butterworth town (on both sides of the main north-south road) and about 65 kilometres from the Betong Salient section of the Thai/Malaysian border. The Base has a major all-weather airfield capable of supporting sustained bomber and fighter operations. The runway is 2440 metres by 46 metres and has asphalt overruns of 137 metres on the northern end and 158 metres on the southern end.

2. A wide range of installations, including an air-defence centre, radar and navigational aids, fuel and ammunition storage, and a Matra missile preparation bay are on or near the Base. Functional elements on the Base include:

- (a) Headquarters RAAF Butterworth.
- (b) Headquarters RMAF Butterworth.
- (c) Base Squadron RAAF Butterworth.
- (d) Technical Wing RMAF Butterworth.
- (e) No. 478 (Maintenance) Squadron RAAF.
- (f) No. 3 Squadron RAAF.
- (g) No. 75 Squadron RAAF.
- (h) No. 11 Squadron RMAF.
- (i) No. 3 Squadron RMAF.
- (j) Transport Support Flight RAAF.
- (k) No. 4 RAAF Hospital.
- (l) Special Security Police (SSP) of 26 Company Malaysian Military Police.

(m) No. 1 Air Defence Centre RMAF.

(n) Headquarters Integrated Air Defence System (Five-Power Defence Arrangements).

No. 65 Ground Liaison Section Australian Regular Army (ARA) and an ARA Infantry Company are attached to the Base.

3. Aircraft based at Butterworth include:

(a)	<u>RAAF</u>	<u>Aircraft Type</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Total</u>
	No. 3 Squadron	Mirage III	All-weather Fighter	18	
	No. 75 Squadron	Mirage III	Fighter	<u>18</u>	36
	Transport Support Flight	Dakota C-47	Transport	6	6
		Iroquois UH-1B	SAR	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
					Total <u>44</u>

(b)	<u>RMAF</u>	<u>Aircraft Type</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Total</u>
	No. 11 Squadron	Sabre F-86	Fighter	<u>16</u>	16
		Tebuan CL-41	Fighter/ Ground-attack	<u>3</u>	3
	No. 3 Squadron	Alouette 111	Helicopter	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>
					Total <u>29</u>

Personnel

4. 1380 RAAF personnel are employed at the Base. Of these, 900 live in Pinang, with their families, 250 live on the Base with their families, and the remaining 230 live in. Total dependants are 2837, of whom 2237 live in Pinang and 600 live on the Base. The ARA Company attached to the Base comprises 123 personnel.

5. The RAAF also employs about 1400 locally employed civilians (LEC).

6. The Malaysian service-personnel strength living on the Base is 886, comprising 610 RMAF, 126 SSP, and 150 Royal Malaysian Navy personnel who are employed at the Butterworth dockyard.

Security Measures to Protect Base

7. To support the operational function of Air Base Butterworth in addition to aircraft and personnel there are considerable installations and equipment located in areas that have been designated Vital Points (VP) for defence in an ANZUK/Malaysia Shared Defence Plan for the protection of the Base in an emergency. Broadly speaking the Officer Commanding RMAF has overall responsibility for the protection of the Base throughout each 24-hour period, and the Officer Commanding RAAF is responsible for the point defence of RAAF aircraft and operational facilities and the protection of RAAF families.

8. To assist the OC RAAF an ARA Infantry Company is permanently available at Butterworth as a quick-reaction force. The Company is usually rotated by airlift, at three-monthly intervals, direct from Australia. It is available as a quick-reaction force, but it may be engaged in local training from time to time. Other support is provided by RAAF defence flights made up of RAAF non-specialist ground-defence personnel. Static defences comprise a single two-metre perimeter fence with barbed-wire overhang, and lighting of most Vital Points.

Present Base Security Arrangements

9. The Royal Malaysian Military Police, 26 Company, Special Security Police (SSP), is responsible for the security of the Base, including control of entry, the vetting of locally employed civilians, the guarding on a 24-hour basis of eight Vital Points, and the patrolling of the others at irregular intervals throughout the period. It maintains a quick-reaction force of section strength (about 10 men).

10. The RAAF Mirage flight lines are not guarded during working hours, when they are under normal surveillance by RAAF personnel; outside these hours they are floodlit and guarded by pairs of armed RAAF Security Guards with two dogs. RAAF Service Police carry out patrols in radio-equipped vehicles at irregular intervals every night, and during the patrols they check the security of Vital Points. They make reports to the Duty Security Controller located in the RAAF guardroom.

11. The ARA Company assists with the protection of RAAF personnel, property, and shared facilities within the Base. It provides a section (normally 10 men) as a quick-reaction force from 1800 to 0600 hours daily.

Families Protection Plan

12. Under customary international law the Malaysian Government has a duty to protect all persons in Malaysia; however, under the provisions of the Australian/Malaysian Defence Accord, Commonwealth forces have the right to take additional measures for the protection of dependants of Service members and families of employees of Australian Government Departments attached to the RAAF, including visitors resident with those families.

13. There is always a risk of racial communal disturbances that could affect families resident in Base married quarters, housing estates, and hirings in Butterworth and Pinang. Because of this a Families Protection Plan has been instituted to ensure the protection of service personnel and dependants, including visitors of dependants resident with families, in the Butterworth/Pinang area.

14. The OC RAAF Butterworth has delegated to the CO Base Squadron the responsibility of the Families Protection Plan. The Assistant Provost Marshal (APM) has been delegated the responsibility for implementing the operational aspects of the Plan. To facilitate the functioning of the Plan the APM maintains two control centres that direct a network of wardens within zoned areas of Butterworth and Pinang. All zones and the control centres maintain continuous radio contact. In an emergency families would be directed to guarded safe areas.

THE EXTERNAL THREAT TO MALAYSIA

15. We believe that it is unlikely that any external overt military threat against Malaysia will arise before the end of 1975.

THE THREAT FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA

Capability

16. There is a potential threat to the Butterworth Base from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and its military arm, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), which is generally referred to as the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO). The CTO controls areas along the Thai-Malaysian border and has been developing a widespread infrastructure throughout Peninsular Malaysia. Most members of the CPM are Chinese, but there are Thai Muslim and Malay members concentrated in

the border area of the east coast. In May 1974 official figures of the Thai-Malaysian Border Committee indicated that there were between 1500 and 2000 armed communist terrorists in southern Thailand and Peninsular Malaysia. The calculation of more exact figures is made difficult by the lack of knowledge of numbers recruited by the terrorists. There are four regiments in the CTO:

- (a) 5th Regiment, in central Perak State;
- (b) 8th Regiment, in the Sadao area of Thailand;
- (c) 10th Regiment, in the Weng area of Thailand, opposite Kelantan; and
- (d) 12th Regiment, in the Betong Salient (where the Central Committee of the CPM is also).

A CTO attempt to re-establish the 6th Regiment in Pahang State during January 1974 was frustrated by the Security Forces.

17. The armed terrorists are supported by several front organizations in southern Thailand and Peninsular Malaysia. The Malayan Communist Youth League (MCYL) is based mainly in southern Thailand and has between 3000 and 6000 members. It is particularly active in the Betong Salient, where members supply the communist terrorists with food and act as their agents among the local population. The Malaysian authorities consider the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF) to be the best organized and most effective of the communist front organizations operating in support of the CTO throughout Peninsular Malaysia (including Singapore). The MNLF has a strength of about 900 and has demonstrated a capability for coordinated acts of minor sabotage and terrorism on the anniversaries of events important to the CTO. Other communist organizations are the Malayan Patriotic Front (MPF), the All-Pinang Revolutionary Youth League, the Selangor National Liberation League, the National Liberation League, the Kelantan Communist League, and the National Communist League; they have a role similar to that of the MNLF.

18. Since November 1969 the CTO has been supported by a radio station, Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VMR), which is in southern China and broadcasts four times a day in Mandarin, Malay and Tamil. The broadcasts mainly contain criticism of the policies of the Malaysian Government and encouraging accounts of encounters between the terrorists and Security Forces. The currency of many of the news items indicates some form of rapid communication between the CTO and the station in China.

19. In May 1973 two captured communist terrorists claimed that a split had occurred between the 8th Regiment and the Central Committee, that the Regiment had formed a separate organization, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), and that elements of the 12th Regiment had joined the new organization. No firm evidence of the existence of any separate organization has, however, been noted.

CPM Policies and Intentions

20. The basic aim of the CPM, and of its associated organizations, is the establishment of a communist State of "Malaya". ("Malaya" in CPM usage includes Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore.) The 1972 constitution of the CPM states, inter alia, "The 40 years of practice of revolution by the Communist Party of China, particularly the experience of the two armed struggles, has proved that the road of using the countryside to evade the cities and capture political power by force of arms is the only correct road".

21. The CTO has well-established armed units in the Thai border region and in central Perak State, but would probably want to have armed units operating effectively throughout the length of Peninsular Malaysia and to firmly establish its infrastructure (for example, the MNLF) before proceeding to the second phase of insurgency (openly contesting control of the rural areas with the Government). Nevertheless, the CTO has sufficient numbers to greatly increase armed activity in some areas of northern Malaysia if it chooses to do so. Such increased conflict would, however, be likely to be localized; it would not result in a country-wide emergency, paralyzing the Security Forces, or in the creation of conditions immediately favourable to a revolutionary victory, unless it were coupled with other factors such as widespread public disorder. It has been reported that, in December 1973 and January 1974, a group of 58 terrorists from the 6th Assault Unit moved to Pahang from the Thai border area in an attempt to re-establish the nucleus of the 6th Regiment in the base area the Regiment used during the First Emergency. It seems, however, that the terrorists were frustrated by Security Forces' operations and were forced to retreat north. Nevertheless, the CTO can be expected to renew its efforts to redeploy armed units to areas of former influence throughout Peninsular Malaysia.

22. A secondary factor influencing the conduct of the CTO campaign is the desire to maintain a presence in the public eye in order to prevent the Government from claiming that it has the situation completely under control. Accordingly, any successful government operation is usually followed by a CTO reprisal. Since April 1973 there have been five definite

assassinations of Chinese Special Branch officers by terrorists following a successful government operation in the area. In addition, the Inspector-General of Police, Tan Sri Abdul Rahman Hashim, was assassinated in the street at Kuala Lumpur on 7th June 1974. The destruction of road plant near Gerik (described later in this para.) occurred within a month of the conclusion of the successful Operation Gonzales farther south in Perak State. Success for the Government, as for the CTO, depends on public support and confidence. The CTO cannot afford to allow the Malaysian Government to be seen to be gaining complete control of the situation and so to win the confidence of the people. The legitimacy of the present federal government is the principal target of the CTO propaganda, and an unquestioned ability by the Government to ensure the security of society would definitely contribute to that legitimacy. The terrorists have shown that they will attack government outposts and individual officials in retaliation for reverses suffered as the result of government operations, and will attempt to maintain the impression that their influence is steadily expanding and is working towards the overthrow of the Government. In May 1974 more than 100 terrorists from the 12th Regiment destroyed road plant used on the construction of the East-West Highway near Gerik. This was the largest and possibly the most successful operation conducted by the CTO since the end of the First Emergency in 1960, and it demonstrated a formidable capability to conduct large-scale sabotage operations — a factor that is very relevant to the point of this report. The CTO has demonstrated a willingness to clash with Security Forces who penetrate its base areas, but not to the point of protracted defence of those areas.

Wd ?
CTO

23. The CTO could easily adopt tactics used by other terrorist organizations, notably those in South America, of murdering or kidnapping important foreign residents in order to publicly embarrass the Government and to obtain concessions such as the release of political prisoners. There has so far been no evidence that the CPM has any intention of using these tactics. The CTO is mainly concerned with controlling the rural areas in line with the orthodox Maoist theory of revolutionary warfare, and it is unlikely that the MNLF would be capable of conducting a widespread terror campaign against foreign interests in urban areas. If the CTO did adopt these tactics, however, Australian personnel and their dependants stationed at Butterworth could be threatened; it is impossible to say whether they would be primary targets in preference to other foreigners in Malaysia, such as members of diplomatic missions.

24. Finally, the CTO's policy will be influenced by the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China. China has probably privately assured the CTO that she will continue to offer moral support (the maintenance of the VMR radio station); but China's public recognition

of the Malaysian Government, and therefore her tacit acceptance of its legitimacy, considerably weakens the position of the CTO as the revolutionary alternative government. This may result in a weakening of the Chinese population's support for the terrorists and in demoralization of the terrorists themselves. On the other hand, the destruction of the road plant and the assassination of the Inspector-General of Police coincided with Tun Razak's visit to China, and the CTO may stage further similar incidents to encourage its members to continue the armed struggle.

25. We assess that the CTO's present intentions are to consolidate and extend its present position in Peninsular Malaysia by recruiting and building up mass support among the Chinese peasants, especially in areas where there were large numbers of terrorists during the First Emergency; to enlist support among the Malay peasants; to develop lines of communication and establish camps and base areas; to consolidate supply links between armed units and the infrastructure; and to progressively extend CTO influence and presence, especially that of armed groups, while avoiding major contacts with the Security Forces. The CTO appears to be sensitive to adverse publicity, however, and can be expected to conduct retaliations for any government successes. We also consider that the CTO judges that an attempt to move into the second phase of widespread confrontation would at present be premature and possibly counter-productive, and that such an attempt is unlikely within the period under review.

Arms and Equipment

26. Until 1969 arms used by the CTO were mainly of British origin, having been obtained during World War II or captured during the First Emergency. They include British .303 rifles (short magazine Lee Enfield); .303 Bren light-machine-guns; .45 US Thompson sub-machine-guns; 9-mm Sten guns; .38 Smith and Wesson pistols; 9-mm Browning pistols; and shot-guns of various kinds. Other weapons have since been captured from the Security Forces of both Malaysia and Thailand or purchased in southern Thailand; they include US carbines, 7.62 SLR (self-loading rifles), 9-mm sub-machine guns, and shot-guns.

27. There have been reports of terrorists armed with AK-47 rifles in southern Thailand, but there is no firm evidence of the CTO's possessing Chinese, Soviet or other communist weapons, and there is no evidence that the CTO has mortars or other support weapons. However, we accept that these weapons could probably be acquired at short notice, or may even be held by the CTO; given the circumstances, CTO use of such weapons could occur without warning.

28. The CTO has shown a capability to manufacture and use both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosive devices. Although these are home-made, they are technically effective and have inflicted severe damage on soft-skinned vehicles such as Landrovers and 3-ton trucks. Electrical detonation is frequently used, and delayed-timing devices were reported to have been used in the attack near Gerik. The MNLF and other subversive organizations have used electrically-detonated gelignite charges in booby-traps. The CTO probably obtains explosives and detonation equipment from supporters working in the mines in northern Perak and the Thai border area.

CTO Activities in Butterworth Area

29. The nearest major CTO unit to Butterworth is the 8th Assault Unit in the Kulim area, about 25 kilometres east. This was declared a "black area" (an area of strong terrorist activity) during the First Emergency, and the return of an armed unit logically follows the CTO pattern for expanding its influence throughout Peninsular Malaysia. The unit has been involved in contacts with Security Forces in the area since January 1971, but all have been within Kedah State. (A list of recent sightings and contacts is at Annex A.) Captured documents indicate, however, that the unit intended to establish contact with supporters in villages inside Province Wellesley. There have been reports of sightings of armed terrorists within the Province, but we do not know the extent of their support among the peasants in the area. The appearance of booby-trapped red flags in Pinang and Butterworth on several occasions since 1970 indicates the presence of elements of the MNLF or other subversive organizations. In November 1971 the Malaysian Special Branch reported that the MCYL also intended to establish groups in Selama and the town of Butterworth.

Known Incidents on the Base

30. In June 1971 about 12 metres of copper-core cable was stolen from the Mirage engine run-up bay near the Matra site, and a locked building was forcibly entered at the same time. This area is within 15 metres of an SSP guard position. Between 6th and 10th August 1971 copper earth strips were stolen from the roof of a building in the bomb dump. A week later eight one-metre lightning arrestors and some fire-extinguisher caps were stolen from the bomb dump. A search failed to reveal the method of entry to the dump. The building from which the metal strips were removed is in full view of the SSP guard-room at the gate to the dump. There have been other thefts from inside the base area, some outside working-hours. In mid-September 1971 two Malays were seen on a platform in a tree outside, but close to, the eastern perimeter fence near the bomb dump. They were

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apprehended and handed to the SSP and then to the Malaysian Police. Special Branch in Pinang has informed RAAF Butterworth that it believes that those apprehended were engaged in surveillance of the Base.

31. These incidents are not necessarily attributable to the communist terrorists or their supporters; the thefts were probably carried out by locals, perhaps locally employed civilians or contractor personnel, or even members of the SSP. The incidents do, however, reveal that unauthorized personnel have on several occasions been able to gain access to areas within the Base including Vital Points.

Operations by Security Forces

32. There are several reasons for believing that the Malaysian Security Forces will intensify their operations against the terrorists and will apply considerably more pressure. The success of Operation Sri Aman in Sarawak from October 1973 to March 1974 appears to have considerably reduced the threat from armed insurgents and the consequent need to maintain a large number of operational units in Sarawak. It seems that the Government is not prepared to make any major reductions in force levels until rehabilitation of the surrendered terrorists is completed and the Government can be reasonably sure that there will not be a mass return to armed insurgency. If the situation in Sarawak continues to improve this will enable the Government to concentrate its forces against the CTO in Peninsular Malaysia. Malaysian security operations in Sarawak have generally been more successful than those in Peninsular Malaysia, largely because of the policy of using units raised within Sarawak. Several units have, however, displayed a high level of competence in the techniques of anti-terrorist operations in deep jungle, and their expertise may be valuable against the CTO. An indication of a new approach to the problem of the CTO was the conduct of the first division-sized operation, Operation Gonzales, by the Malaysian Army near Ipoh in April 1974. The operation involved 10 infantry battalions and supporting units in a coordinated sweep through a suspected CTO base area. Its results (11 terrorists killed and the discovery of a large training camp) have increased the morale of the Security Forces, and it is very likely that more similar operations will be conducted.

Summary of CTO Capability

33. The CTO has a total strength of between 1500 and 2000 armed terrorists based in the Thai border area and within Peninsular Malaysia. The terrorists have expanded their influence considerably since 1968 and have successfully established armed units and base areas within Malaysia

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as far south as the Cameron Highlands. Their recent attempt to expand their presence into Pahang State appears, however, to have been frustrated by successful countermeasures by the Security Forces. The MNLF and other subversive organizations have throughout Peninsular Malaysia cells that are capable of conducting minor acts of sabotage and terrorism. The terrorists have demonstrated their ability to carry out assassinations of selected police officers. They have a variety of small-arms; there is no evidence that they have any heavy support weapons, such as mortars, but we accept that these could be acquired at short notice and probably without the Government's receiving any advanced warning. The terrorists also use anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosive devices. They displayed a significant capability in conducting large-scale sabotage operations in their attack near Gerik.

34. The Kulim area appears to be a centre for CTO movement between the Betong Salient and villages east and south-east of Kulim in Kedah and Perak States. We assess that there are between 100 and 150 armed terrorists of the 8th Assault Unit based in the Kulim-Baling area, supported by cells of various subversive organizations in Province Wellesley and the adjacent areas of Kedah State.

35. No armed terrorists are known to be on Pinang Island, but there are branches of the MPF and the MCYL there. They have planted red flags in various places on significant CTO anniversaries, and they could pose a threat to RAAF families if the CPM initiated a terror-campaign against foreign residents.

SITUATIONS IN WHICH AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH MIGHT BE ATTACKED

36. If the CTO succeeded in substantially expanding its infrastructure and area of influence in Peninsular Malaysia to the point at which a widespread campaign of attacks on prominent installations was launched as an introduction to the second phase of revolutionary warfare, Air Base Butterworth might be included as one of the targets; we consider, however, that CTO development to this stage is unlikely in the period under review.

37. The CTO might see advantage in mounting an attack on the Base in the event of large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest, perhaps involving the diversion of Security Forces. We do not, however, consider such developments likely during the period under review.

38. The CTO might decide to attack the Base if it believed it would gain a significant psychological or propaganda result. This might occur as retaliation for a major success against the terrorists by the

Security Forces, especially as a result of an operation in the Butterworth area. The Base contains a concentration of relatively lightly-guarded, very expensive equipment, the destruction of which would impose no direct inconvenience or hardship on the local population. A successful attack on an RMAF installation would gain a great deal of publicity for the CTO and would considerably weaken Government claims that it is winning the campaign against the terrorists. We do not believe that the presence of Australian aircraft or the Five-Power Defence Arrangements are issues of major importance to the CTO, which is therefore unlikely to attack the Base solely, or mainly, because of the Australian presence. In the advent of an attack, however, it is unlikely that the terrorists would try to discriminate between RAAF and RMAF targets; both Australian personnel and equipment would obviously be endangered. The large-scale destruction of RMAF aircraft and equipment would be attractive propaganda, and this possibility must be considered.

39. Although we assume that Australian aircraft will not be deployed from Butterworth in an anti-terrorist role, the use of the Base as an airfield from which RMAF anti-terrorist air operations were being flown might prompt CTO reaction. For example, the RMAF has one squadron of Sabre Fighters and a detachment of four Alouette helicopters stationed at Butterworth, and if these aircraft were used extensively in operations against the terrorists, especially against the 8th Assault Unit near Kulim, there might be a reaction attack to destroy the aircraft and to achieve a propaganda victory.

40. The MNLF or one of the other smaller subversive groups might make some limited sabotage and booby-trap attempt against the Base as part of a nationwide, or more restricted, campaign.

41. The form of an attack by the CTO on Air Base Butterworth ranges through a number of possibilities:

- (a) An open conventional assault on the Base, by day or night, by a large group of communist terrorists using small-arms and explosives. This would directly confront the superior fire-power of Base defence personnel and would probably result in heavy casualties for the terrorists.
- (b) Covert penetration at night by separate groups of terrorists with the object of attacking Vital Points and aircraft, using explosives. The CTO demonstrated its capability to carry out such operations in its attack near Gerik, and such a plan offers the prospect of destroying a large amount of expensive equipment with a relatively low risk of casualties among the terrorists.

- (c) An attack by fire using mortars or other indirect weapons from the surrounding paddy-field/kampong areas, especially those to the east. This method would be likely if the CTO acquired a mortar/rocket capability.
- (d) Sabotage by the planting of delayed-action explosives, booby-traps, and other similar devices designed to damage equipment and injure personnel, by members of subversive groups or sympathetic locally employed civilians or contractor personnel. In this case targets outside the Base perimeter may be chosen, as there would not be as much danger of detection by security patrols. Minor acts of sabotage committed within the Base by such personnel would result in their detection and a tightening of security measures with no significant gains for the CTO cause. Nevertheless, the use of booby-traps and minor acts of sabotage by subversive groups are relatively common throughout Peninsular Malaysia and pose a distinct threat both to the Base and Australian personnel and their dependants.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Base and the Target

42. Air Base Butterworth, an RMAF base jointly used by the RAAF, on the north-west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, 65 kilometres from the Betong Salient section of the Thai border, supports operations by RAAF Mirages (36), RMAF Sabres, and other aircraft. Of 1380 RAAF personnel who work at the Base, 480 live on it, as do nearly 900 Malaysian servicemen and 600 RAAF dependants and police. An ARA Company of 123 personnel is also stationed on the Base. Some 1400 locally employed civilians and contractor personnel are employed at the Base. A wide range of installations, including an air-defence centre, radar and navigational aids, fuel and ammunition storage, and a missile (Matra) preparation bay, are on or near the Base.

Present Security Arrangements

43. The Malaysian Special Security Police is responsible for the security of the Base, including control of entry, guarding/patrolling of Vital Points (38 of which are designated in an ANZUK/Malaysia Shared Defence Plan for the protection of the Base in an emergency), and the maintenance of a 10-man quick-reaction force. At night, pairs of RAAF Security Guards, each with a dog, guard the Mirage flight lines, which are floodlit, and RAAF Service Police carry out mobile patrols of Vital Points

at irregular intervals. An ARA Infantry Company is available at Butterworth as a quick-reaction force, but it may be engaged in local training from time to time. This company is usually rotated by airlift direct from Australia every three months. It has a section of about 10 men on stand-by from 1800 to 0600 hours daily. Static defences comprise a single two-metre perimeter fence with barbed-wire overhang, and lighting of most Vital Points.

44. In the past attention has been drawn to serious weaknesses in the defences, including the ineffective performance and inexperience of the SSP, the possible absence of the ARA company, deficiencies in the static defences, and the parking of Mirages in a straight line without the protection of revetments. Cases of theft have shown that unauthorized persons have been able to gain access to areas within the base, including Vital Points.

Capability of Communist Organizations

45. In the absence of an overt external threat to Malaysia, which we assess to be unlikely during the period under review, the potential threat to the Base is from the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) and related subversive organizations.

46. The CTO has an estimated strength of 1500 to 2000 armed terrorists in the Thai border area and the northern states of Peninsular Malaysia. We believe that, of these, about 150 are members of the 8th Assault Unit and are in the Baling and Kulim subdistricts, east of the base. They are armed with small-arms and are capable of effectively using anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosive devices. There is no evidence that they have mortars or other heavy weapons, but we accept that they could probably acquire these at short notice and use them without our receiving any prior warning. The 12th CTO Regiment has proved that the CTO is capable of conducting successful large-scale sabotage raids against targets supposedly protected by Security Force patrols.

CTO Policies and Intentions

47. We believe that the CTO's intentions are to consolidate its present position in Peninsular Malaysia by recruiting among both Chinese and Malays, by developing base areas and extending the presence of armed units, by establishing communications with its underground supporters among the population, and by maintaining its image as a serious, active threat to an illegitimate government. It is difficult to predict when the CTO will feel confident enough to initiate the second phase of revolutionary warfare (open attacks on government installations and active contests with the

Security Forces for control of the countryside), but we doubt that this phase will be initiated in the period under review. We assess, however, that the CTO presence within Peninsular Malaysia is likely to increase during the period, and that there will be more frequent clashes with Security Forces as the scale of government operations against the terrorists increases.

The Threat Assessment

48. Likelihood of Attack. We assess that, during the period under review:

- (a) It is unlikely that any threat to Air Base Butterworth will arise from an external overt military attack on Malaysia.
- (b) There is a potential threat to the Base from the CPM, the CTO, and related communist subversive organizations. The CPM/CTO have an estimated 150 terrorists armed with rifles, machine-guns and explosives in the Kulim and nearby forest areas about 40 kilometres from the Base.
- (c) CPM/CTO policy will be directed towards the consolidation of its infrastructure within Peninsular Malaysia, and this will not be advanced to the point at which a decision will be taken to launch armed struggle. It is therefore unlikely that the CPM/CTO will, as a deliberate act of policy, attempt an attack on Air Base Butterworth.
- (d) It is possible, but still unlikely, that the CPM/CTO could decide to attack the Base if there were large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest.
- (e) There is a danger that the CTO may decide to attack the Base in order to achieve a psychological and propaganda victory over the Government in retaliation for a major success by the Security Forces. Such an attack may also be encouraged by any use of the Base by RMAF strike aircraft against the communist terrorists.
- (f) There is some risk that members of subversive groups could, regardless of CPM/CTO policy, or acting on their own initiative, attempt an isolated attack on or within the Base at any time.

Annex A
to JIO Study No. 14/74

CPM/CTO Activity in Kedah State and Province Wellesley near
Air Base Butterworth

1. Brief details of activity between May 1973 and June 1974 are as follows:

Date	Location	Details
25th May 1973	11 kilometres north-east of Mahang	Security Force patrol triggered off a terrorist booby-trap; two Security Force personnel wounded.
? May 1973	32 kilometres east of Kulim	Abandoned terrorist camp capable of housing 50 to 60 personnel found.
5th June 1973	Mahang area, Kulim district	Security Forces contacted a lone terrorist, who escaped.
7th June 1973	13 kilometres north-east of Mahang	Camp for 30 to 40 terrorists found.
7th June 1973	Mahang area	Two Security Force personnel wounded by terrorist booby-trap.
17th to 23rd June 1973	Kulim district	Three terrorists sighted.
20th June 1973	Kulim district	Six terrorists sighted.
24th to 30th June 1973	Sungai Bakap, Province Wellesley	Three sightings of terrorists — reportedly same group.
28th June 1973	6 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Security Forces recovered seven terrorist leaflets.
30th June 1973	Kulim district	Three armed terrorists sighted.

Date	Location	Details
Early July 1973	5 kilometres north-east of Serdang	Terrorist group of unknown strength sighted.
12th July 1973	18 kilometres SSE of Kulim-Serdang	Chief Inspector of Police shot dead at his home by suspected terrorists.
19th July 1973	Serdang	Two shots fired in direction of police station; no casualties.
22nd July 1973	4 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Three armed terrorists sighted.
26th July 1973	Karangan area, Kulim district	Two suspected terrorists in civilian clothes sighted.
1st August 1973	5 kilometres north-west of Serdang	Four armed terrorists sighted.
Early August 1973	11 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
2nd September 1973	16 kilometres south-west of Baling	Three armed terrorists sighted.
8th or 9th September 1973	Baling and Kulim subdistricts	One Security Force member and one terrorist killed when Security Force patrol clashed with 20 terrorists, one Security Force member slightly wounded.
9th to 15th? September 1973	21 kilometres south-west of Baling	Terrorist resting-place for five to eight people found.
4th October 1973	8 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
10th October 1973	5 kilometres south-east of Tawar	Three armed terrorists sighted.

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Annex A (contd)


Date	Location	Details
24th October 1973	6 kilometres south-east of Malau	Fourteen terrorists sighted.
7th December 1973	11 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Nine armed terrorists sighted.
8th December 1973	5 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Three armed terrorists sighted.
16th December 1973	11 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Four terrorists sighted.
6th January 1974	Serdang/Mahang Road, three kilometres from Kulim	Volley of shots fired at police road-block, wounding one Security Force member. No reported terrorists casualties.
6th January 1974	8 kilometres south-east of Kulim	About 15 armed terrorists sighted.
18th January 1974	3 kilometres north-east of Kulim	Five terrorists sighted.
21st January 1974	4 kilometres north-east of Kampong Terap-Kulim	Six armed terrorists sighted.
6th February 1974	Tawar area	One armed terrorist seen.
8th February 1974	Karangan area, Kulim district	11 terrorists sighted.
14th February 1974	Kampong Wang Pinang/Sungai Ular/Anak Kulim Estate general area, Kulim district	Six terrorists sighted.
17th February 1974	14 kilometres east of Karangan-Kulim	A lone terrorist sighted.

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
Date	Location	Details
About 20th February 1974	8 kilometres east of Kulim	One Security Force member wounded by booby-trap.
25th February 1974	5 kilometres south-east of Terap-Kulim district	Three armed terrorists sighted.
28th February 1974	10 kilometres north-east of Serdang	Three terrorists sighted.
1st March 1974	22 kilometres east of Kulim	Three terrorists sighted.
1st March 1974	13 kilometres east of Kulim	Three terrorists sighted.
3rd March 1974	22 kilometres east of Kulim	Four terrorists sighted.
3rd March 1974	13 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
4th March 1974	8 kilometres east of Kulim	Contact with three terrorists; no casualties.
5th March 1974	8 kilometres south-east of Kulim	Terrorist camp found.
11th March 1974	Kampong Dusun, 2 kilometres north-east of Kulim town	Two terrorists sighted.
13th March 1974	22 kilometres south of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
17th March 1974	22 kilometres south of Kulim	Two terrorists sighted.
3rd April 1974	3 kilometres south-west of Kampong Terap, near Malau	Two armed terrorists sighted.

Date	Location	Details
27th April 1974	14 kilometres south-west of Kulim	Unknown number of terrorists sighted.
4th May 1974	27 kilometres north-east of Kulim	10 armed terrorists sighted.
15th May 1974	6 kilometres east of Kulim	3 terrorists sighted.
26th May 1974	Kampong Wang Pinang, Kulim area	Contact with unknown number of terrorists.
19th May to 1st June 1974	Kulim area	3 terrorist groups, 6 to 15 strong, sighted.
19th May to 1st June 1974	Bukit Mertajam, Province Wellesley	One small group of terrorists sighted.
26th May to 1st June 1974	Bukit Mertajam area, Province Wellesley	Unknown number of terrorists sighted.
4th June 1974	7 kilometres ESE of Butterworth, Province Wellesley	3 suspected terrorists arrested; small cache found.
9th to 15th June 1974	Valdor village area, Province Wellesley	1 terrorist sighted.

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CPM/CTO AREA OF ACTIVITY IN RELATION TO BUTTERWORTH



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BUTTERWORTH - SECURITY.
PERSONAL FOR BRADY FROM LYON.
YOUR 548 AND TELECON BRADY/LYON.

2. I BELIEVE THAT IF ANZUKIG(S) WERE TO BE REQUIRED TO UPDATE THE THREAT TO AIRBASE BUTTERWORTH PAPER WHICH IT PREPARED ABOUT THIS TIME LAST YEAR IT WOULD NEED TO HAVE SUGGESTION TO THAT EFFECT FROM THE FORCE COMMANDER AND THEN A DIRECTIVE TO CARRY OUT THE UPDATE FROM THE CHAIRMAN ANZUK JIC (I.E. CHAIRMAN NIC - JOCKEL).

3. LATTER DIRECTIVE I WOULD BELIEVE TO BE NECESSARY IN VIEW OF SPECIAL NATURE OF THE THREAT PAPER, FACT THAT IT WAS COMMISSIONED LAST YEAR BY CHAIRMAN NIC AND MORE PARTICULARLY BECAUSE, AS WITH LAST YEAR'S PAPER, JIC WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIVE SECTIONS, PARTICULARLY ON CTO INTENTIONS AND POLICY. I FRANKLY DOUBT WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PREPARE AN UPDATE BEFORE 27TH NOVEMBER - 2ND DECEMBER.

4. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH MY PERSONAL OFF-THE-CUFF REACTIONS TO THE POSSIBILITY MENTIONED IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 1 ARE:

(A) THE TREND OF OBSERVABLE CT ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS SUGGESTS THAT THEY ARE FOLLOWING, PERHAPS EVEN MORE RIGOROUSLY THAN IN EARLIER MONTHS, A POLICY OF AVOIDING CONTACTS WITH SECURITY FORCES IN WEST MALAYSIA. THERE HAVE BEEN NO RECENT AMBUSHES OF SECURITY FORCES AND CERTAINLY NO ATTACKS, OR INTELLIGENCE SUGGESTING THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTACKS, ON MALYSIAN GOVERNMENT INSTALLATIONS, MILITARY OR OTHERWISE.

(B) SIMILARLY, WE HAVE NO RECENT EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD LEAD US TO VARY THE ASSESSMENT MADE LAST YEAR THAT THE CTS WOULD NOT FOR VARIOUS REASONS SET OUT IN THE THREAT PAPER THINK IT PROFITABLE AS A MATTER OF POLICY TO ATTACK AUSTRALIAN (OR OTHER EXTERNAL FORCES OR INSTALLATIONS) IN WEST MALAYSIA IN ORDER TO GAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL OR PROGRANDA ADVANTAGE.

(C) THERE WAS ONE REPORT OF A SIGHTING OF CTS IN AN AREA NEW TO CT ACTIVITY SOUTH OF BUTTERWORTH IN JULY (RCI 16/72) BUT THIS WAS ABOUT 20 MILES SOUTH AND THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT THE SIGHTING SHOULD BE RELATED TO ANY THREAT TO BUTTERWORTH. THERE HAS BEEN NO OTHER INTELLIGENCE - SIGHTINGS OF OTHERWISE - TO MY KNOWLEDGE SUGGESTING THE POSSIBILITY OF CT ACTION AGAINST AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH.

(D) AS TO WEAPONS, IT HAS, I THINK, FOR SOME TIME BEEN THE AGREED ASSESSMENT THAT THE CTO DOES HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACQUIRING IN SOUTHERN THAILAND EX-AMERICAN SMALL ARMS AND MORTARS. BUT, WHILE WE LAST YEAR ASSESSED THAT CTS IN KULIM AREA HAD SMALL ARMS, INCLUDING PROBABLY EX-AMERICAN SMALL ARMS, THERE IS STILL NO EVIDENCE OF ANY MORTARS HAVING BEEN INTRODUCED INTO WEST MALAYSIA.

5. ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGING COMMENTS, MY PERSONAL GUESS WOULD BE THAT, EVEN IF WE WENT THROUGH THE UNDOUBTEDLY TIME-CONSUMING EXERCISE OF AN ANZUKIG(S) UPDATE OF THE THREAT PAPER, IT WOULD BE LIKELY TO COME OUT WITH AN ASSESSMENT ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THAT OF LAST YEAR.

6. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE FOREGOING (ENTIRELY INFORMALLY) WITH THE ANZUKIG(S) CO-ORDINATOR (SANKEY) WHO IS PERHAPS CLOSER TO THE DETAIL OF INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO THE GROUP THAN I AM, AND HE FULLY AGREES WITH MY COMMENTS.

CFM: 415 548 27TH 2ND 16/72 20
ENDS 181547LT
RTH

SECRET

113
AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

File _____
IN *KL*

Reg. No. _____

IMMEDIATE

H.C.	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec (Con)
D.H.C.	1st Sec (Inf)	Attache (S & A)
S.A.	A.S. A.	Attache
Trade	2nd Sec (Con)	Records Clerk
1st Sec (1)	2nd Sec (Adm)	Registrar
1st Sec (2)	3rd Sec	S. T. O.

KLS598
IKZXE OTUAP

SECRET

I M M E D I A T E

SECRET

72 10 18 | 13 14

ACTION COPY

548

BUTTERWORTH - SECURITY.

FOR LYON.

ON 27

WITH ANNIVERSARY OF KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION ON NEUTRALISATION NOVEMBER AND AUSTRALIAN ELECTIONS ON 2 DECEMBER, IT OCCURS TO US THAT THERE COULD POSSIBLY BE GREATER STIMULUS TO CTS TO TAKE SOME ACTION AGAINST BUTTERWORTH.

ACTION IN RESPECT OF ANNIVERSARY COULD BE DESIGNED TO PORTRAY THE MALAYSIAN INITIATIVE ON NEUTRALISATION AS A SMOKE SCREEN.

ACTION BEFORE OR AFTER AUSTRALIAN ELECTIONS COULD BE TO INFLICT SOME SORT OF DAMAGE THAT MIGHT PERSUADE AN INCOMING AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TO PULL OUT OF BUTTERWORTH.

2. WE DO NOT KNOW CT CAPABILITY TO GET AT BUTTERWORTH - BUT WE HAVE NOTED THAT GENERAL OTHMAN IS QUOTED IN THIS MORNING'S PRESS AS STATING THAT CTS HAVE AMERICAN WEAPONS.

3. OUR UNDERSTANDING FROM SPECIAL BRANCH HAS BEEN THAT THE CTS HAVE ACCESS TO EX-AMERICAN WEAPONS, INCLUDING MORTARS, AND THAT IT HAS BEEN ASSUMED THAT THE CTS HAVE AT LEAST EX-AMERICAN SMALL ARMS IN THEIR POSSESSION IN SOUTHERN THAILAND, THOUGH THERE HAD BEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT THE WEAPONS WERE BEING USED WITHIN MALAYSIA.

WE ALSO RECOLLECT THAT THAI GUERILLAS INFLICTED SOME DAMAGE ON US AIR BASES AT UBON ON 1 OCTOBER AND UDORN ON 3-4 OCTOBER.

4. AS YOU KNOW, COMANZUKFOR WILL BE MEETING HIGH COMMISSIONERS HERE TOMORROW.

WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF WE COULD HAVE BEFORE THEN YOUR COMMENTS ON HOW POSSIBILITY OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE MIGHT BEST BE HANDLED - IN PARTICULAR, ON THE SUGGESTION THAT ANZUKIG MIGHT RE-EXAMINE SECURITY SITUATION AT BUTTERWORTH, XXWITH A VIEW TO MAKIN RECOMMENDATIONS TO COMANZUKFOR.

CFM 548 27 2 1 3-4
ENDS 181245LT
VBR

SECRET

Replied 18/10
2
7

112
AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

File

Reg. No.

IN

KK

K.A.

1st Sec (C & A)

3rd Sec (Con)

D.H.C.

1st Sec (Inf)

Attache (S & A)

S.A.

A.S.A.

Attache

Trade

2nd Sec (Con)

Records Clerk

1st Sec (1)

2nd Sec (Adm)

Registrar

1st Sec (2)

S. T. O.

KLC 3275
KLS 531
MBA 810
IKZXE COUNW
IKZXE OTUAP
IKZXE BWRTH ANZUK

RESTRICTED

ADDRESSSED CANBERRA 2757, REPEATED SINGAPORE 479, COMANZUKFOR 117
HQ BUT 193.

FOR DEFENCE AND DEPAIR (AIR STAFF).

FROM SERVICES ADVISER.

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY - CONFERENCE WITH MINDEF REPS 23 AUG.
OUR 2523 26 AUG REFERS. REFERENCE

~~LEL LEPDMRENCE~~ OUR PARA DELTA.
EXCLUDING THE MIRAGE SECURITY FENCE, REQUEST YOU ADVISE
WHETHER OR NOT YOU WOULD AGREE TO COST SHARING THE REMAINDER
OF THE PROPOSALS ON 50/50 BASIS, IF MALAYSIANS IN FACT TABLE
THIS PROPOSITION.

CFM: 2757
ENDS 201110LT
CD

479 117 193 23 2524 26 50/50

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

'72 9 20 12 03

ACTION COPY

213/19/5/1 119
Butterworth

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**AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE**

Reg. No.

File

IN K.L

H.C.	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec (Con)
D.H.C.	1st Sec (Inf)	Attache (S & A)
S.A.	A.S.A.	Attache
Trade	2nd Sec (Con)	Records Clerk
1st Sec (1)	2nd Sec (Adm)	Registrar
1st Sec (2)	3rd Sec	S. T. O.

KLC 2982
KLS 474
MBA 725
IKZXE COUMW
IKZXE OTUAP
IKZXE BWRTH ANZUK

RESTRICTED

'72 8 28 9 43

ACTION COPY

RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 2524, REPEATED SINGAPORE 423, COMANZUKFOR 105, BUTTERWORTH 175.

FOR DEFENCE AND DEPAIR (ARSTAFF) FROM SERVICES ADVISER.

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY - CONFERENCE WITH MINDEF REPS 23 AUG.
OUR 463 YOUR 3071 22 AUG REFERS.

- (A) NO STARTLING DEVELOPMENTS
- (B) MINDEF HAS COMPLETED SECURITY SURVEY.
WILL ENDEAVOUR OBTAIN COPY.
- (C) RMAF BUTTERWORTH HAS WORKS PROJECT WITH CDW FOR COSTING.
BEFORE SUBMISSION TO MINDEF PROPOSAL COMPRISES ADDITIONAL
THREE STATIC POSTS, TWO OBSERVATION TOWERS, LIGHTING IN
SELECTED AREAS.
EXPECT ESTIMATE IN ONE WEEK.
RMAF ANXIOUS TO KEEP COSTS BELOW DOLLARS MALAY FIFTY THOUSAND
TO AVOID MAJOR NEW WORKS CLASSIFICATION.
- (D) MINDEF LOGISTICS STAFF LIKELY TO RECOMMEND TO MINDEF THAT
PROJECT BE COST-SHARED ON FIFTY-FIFTY BASIS.
- (E) RMAF ESTAB BID ALREADY SUBMITTED FOR ADDITIONAL
SEVENTY-FIVE MEN TO MAN NEW POSTS AND SUPPLEMENT EXISTING
GUARDS.
RENEWED EFFORTS LAUNCHED TO OBTAIN TWENTY FIVE
PORTABLE COMM SETS.
- (F) WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS ASAP.

CFM: 2524 423 105 175 23 2463 3071 22
ENDS 261110LT
CD

RESTRICTED

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
31 JUL 1972
SINGAPORE.

110

CONFIDENTIAL

203/1/9/5/1

Date: 28 July, 1972.

FROM: Australian High Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR.

TO: Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. Savingram No. 52

REPEATED:
Australian High Commission,
SINGAPORE. Savingram No. 49

Air Base,
BUTTERWORTH. Savingram No. Misc. 17

CONFIDENTIAL

BUTTERWORTH : VISIT OF SOVIET
MILITARY ATTACHE

Your telegram 2539 (Singapore 2573).

Services Adviser has spoken with Samad Noor who says no approach has been made to Malaysians by Russians for visit to Butterworth.

2. Samad took readily to the points in your 2359 and saw the "party of service attaches" as the most practical way of handling the situation if a formal approach were to be made. He said Belousov would not be given clearance to visit only RMAF units. Belousov would be told he could go to Butterworth if MINDEF should arrange an escorted tour of Services Attache Corps.

3. Samad believed that in view of foregoing the question of adverse press did not arise.

Handwritten notes:
l/w
Mr Bentley
Capt [unclear]
Lt Col [unclear]
Mr Armstrong

CONFIDENTIAL

108
213/19/5/1
AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

File

IN

Reg. No.

H.C.

D.H.C.

S.A.

Trade

1st Sec (1)

1st Sec (2)

1st Sec (C & A)

1st Sec (Inf)

A.S.A.

2nd Sec (Con)

2nd Sec (Adm)

3rd Sec

3rd Sec (Con)

Attache (S & A)

Attache

Records Clerk

Registrar

S. T. O.

CSQ3639 071039

O. 59794

COUMW IKZXE OTUAP ANSUK

SECRET

SECRET

72 7 7 8 23

ADDRESSED KUALA LUMPUR 2524, REPEATED SINGAPORE 2558,
REPEATED COMANZUK (FOR INFORMATION).

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY.

FROM DEFENCE.

YOUR 1887.

VARIOUS MESSAGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH INTERVENED BETWEEN
OUR 2132 AND YOUR 1887 SUGGEST WE SHOULD CLARIFY PRESENT POSITION
AND OUR REQUIREMENTS.

2. WE SHOULD LIKE YOU -

(A) TO PLACE EMPHASIS ON OBTAINING CLEARANCE (AS DISTINCT FROM
AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE) FOR ERECTION OF SECURITY FENCE AT MIRAGE
TARMAC/HANGAR AREA:

(B) TO INFORM MALAYSIA WE SHALL BE PROVIDING THREE SECURITY GUARDS
WITH DOGS (PARA 4 OF YOUR 1753 REFERS):

(C) ON ASSUMPTION THAT MALAYSIANS THEMSELVES BELIEVE TOWERS TO
BE INTERPRETED THIS WAY - TO OBTAIN CLEARANCE FOR ERECTION OF ALL
THREE TOWERS. OUR POSITION ON COST-SHARING REMAINS AS IN OUR 2132.

3. QUESTION OF WARNING DEVICES (PARA 2 OF OUR 2132) IS STILL BEING
CONSIDERED.

CFM : 2524 2558 1887 2132 1887 4 1753 2132 2 2132
ENDS 06/2021 AEST
LEC

SECRET

See CM 7/7
file

ACTION COPY

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

107

File

OUT ANZUK

H.C. <u>10</u>	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec (Con)
<u>D.H.C.</u>	1st Sec (Inf)	Attache (S & A)
S. A.	A.S.A.	Attache
Trade	2nd Sec (Con)	Records Clerk
1st Sec (1)	2nd Sec (Adm)	Registrar
1st Sec (2)	3rd Sec	S. T. O.

AHC-001/07
RR RBMWC
DE RBMWAH
R 070045Z JULY 72
FM AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION SINGAPORE
TO COMANZUKFOR
ZEM
S E C R E T

SECRET

ACTION COPY

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM FOREIGN CANBERRA.

ADDRESSED KUALA LUMPUR 2524, REPEATED SINGAPORE 2558,
REPEATED COMANZUK (FOR INFORMATION).

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY.

FROM DEFENCE.

YOUR 1887.

VARIOUS MESSAGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH INTERVENED BETWEEN
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TARMAC/HANGAR AREA:

(B) TO INFORM MALAYSIA WE SHALL BE PROVIDING THREE SECURITY GUARDS
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THREE TOWERS. OUR POSITION ON COST-SHARING REMAINS AS IN OUR 2132.

3. QUESTION OF WARNING DEVICES (PARA 2 OF OUR 2132) IS STILL BEING
CONSIDERED.

BT

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

106

File 213/1/95/1
IN *Ch...*

Reg. No.

CONFIDENTIAL

H.C. <i>2</i>	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec (Con)
D.H.C.	1st Sec (Inf)	Attache (S & A)
S.A.	A.S.A.	Attache
Trade	2nd Sec (Con)	Records Clerk
1st Sec (1)	2nd Sec (Adm)	Registrar
1st Sec (2)	3rd Sec	S. T. O.

ACTION COPY

CSQ3652 071936

0.60236
COUMW IKZXE (PRIORITY)
COUMW OTUAP

'72 7 7 17 16

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED KUALA LUMPUR (PRIORITY) 2539, REPEATED SINGAPORE 2573.

BUTTERWORTH (UNDERLINED)

WHILE RAAF ADVISE THAT SUITABLE VISIT COULD BE ARRANGED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RAAF SECURITY, THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS LEADING US TO BE RESERVED ABOUT PROPOSED VISIT.

FOR INSTANCE THERE IS NO MILITARY ATTACHE IN SOVIET EMBASSY HERE AND NO PRECEDENT FOR SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHES (OR, AS FAR AS WE KNOW, SOVIET MILITARY OFFICERS) CALLING ON AUSTRALIAN COMMANDERS: AND WE WOULD PREFER THAT SUCH PRECEDENTS NOT BE ESTABLISHED BY VIRTUE OF CALLS MADE ON AUSTRALIAN FORCES STATIONED IN OTHER (UNDERLINE ONE) COUNTRIES.

WE ARE UNCERTAIN, FURTHERMORE, WHAT THE PRESS AND PUBLIC REACTION THERE AND HERE WOULD BE TO THE VISIT IF IT TOOK PLACE.

OUR FORCES ARE IN MALAYSIA IN SUPPORT OF FIVE POWER ARRANGEMENTS, OUR PART IN WHICH OFFICIAL SOVIET PRESS HAS PUBLICLY ABUSED.

2. YOU MIGHT PUT IT TO MALAYSIANS WHETHER BELOUSOV COULD VISIT BUTTERWORTH AS MEMBER OF PARTY OF SERVICE ATTACHES?

THIS IS THE PREFERRED METHOD IN MANY COUNTRIES FOR DEALING WITH SUCH REQUESTS.

SUGGEST YOU ALSO TEST SAMAD ON PROPOSITION THAT EVEN SHOULD MALAYSIANS AGREE TO BELOUSOV'S VISITING THE BASE, THAT WOULD NOT COMMIT AUSTRALIAN OFFICERS TO RECEIVE HIM OTHER THAN SOCIALLY IN COMPANY WITH MALAYSIAN OFFICERS IN THE COMBINED OFFICER'S MESS.

WE DO NOT (UNDERLINE ONE) WISH THEM TO DO SO.

3. YOU MIGHT ALSO ASK SAMAD FOR HIS VIEWS, ASSUMING MATTER CAME TO NOTICE OF PRESS, ABOUT THE PUBLIC APPEARANCE OF AN OFFICIAL SOVIET VISIT?

BUTTERWORTH AFTER ALL IS THE RMAF BASE FROM WHICH MISSIONS ARE FLOWN AGAINST COMMUNIST TERRORISTS.

IF DISTINCTION WERE MADE BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND CHINESE COMMUNISTS, IS IT CONCEIVABLE THAT VISIT BY RUSSIANS WOULD PROVIDE AMMUNITION TO, E.G. SUARA REVOLUSI ABOUT COLLUSION BETWEEN MALAYSIANS, AUSTRALIANS, AND THE REVISIONISTS. AND MIGHT THIS NOT CAUSE FRESH CONCERN FOR BUTTERWORTH SECURITY LIKE THAT CREATED BY LAST SUARA REVOLUSI OUTBURST?

CFM 2539 2573 2. BELOUSOV 3.
ENDS 071915AEST
LH

CONFIDENTIAL

File

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

File 213/1/9/5/1
Kh 105
IN _____

Reg. No. _____

RESTRICTED

H.C. <u> a </u>	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec (Con)
D.H.C. <u> / </u>	1st Sec (Inf)	Attache (S & A)
S.A. <u> / </u>	A.S.A.	Attache
Trade <u> / </u>	2nd Sec (Con)	Records Clerk
1st Sec (1) <u> / </u>	2nd Sec (Adm)	Registrar
1st Sec (2) <u> / </u>	3rd Sec <u> / </u>	S. T. O.

ACTION COPY

KLC2165
KLS346
MBA496
IKZXE COUMW
IKZXE OTUAP
IKZXE BWRTH

RESTRICTED

72 6 22 17 16

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1887, REPEATED BUTTERWORTH 119,
COMANZUKFOR 78, SINGAPORE 302.

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY.

OUR 1753 OF 9 JUNE REFERS.

2. THE FOLLOWING LETTER RECEIVED TODAY FROM SMAD NOOR.
BEGINS:-

''PLEASE REFER TO YOUR LETTER OF 8 JUNE RELATING TO CERTAIN
PROPOSALS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF PHYSICAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
AT THE BUTTERWORTH AIR BASE.

I AGREE IN PRINCIPLE WITH YOUR PROPOSALS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT
OF THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE BASE AND THAT THE DETAILS OF THE
PROPOSALS COULD BE DISCUSSED BY OUR RELEVANT OFFICIALS.''

ENDS.

3. WE ARE FOLLOWING UP IN THE LIGHT OF BUTTERWORTH'S TELEGRAM
0348 OF 14 JUNE.

CFM 1887 119 78 302 1753 9 SAMAD NOOR 8 348 14
ENDS 221634LT
VBR

RESTRICTED

File

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

File **213/119/5/1** 104
[Signature]

Reg. No. 

CONFIDENTIAL

IN

H.C. <i>[Signature]</i>	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec (Con)
D.H.C. <i>[Signature]</i>	1st Sec (Inf)	Attache (S & A)
S.A. <i>[Signature]</i>	A.S.A.	Attache
Trade <i>[Signature]</i>	2nd Sec (Con)	Records Clerk
1st Sec (1) <i>[Signature]</i>	2nd Sec (Adm)	Registrar
1st Sec (2) <i>[Signature]</i>	3rd Sec	S. T. O.

ACTION COPY

CSQ3231 141025
O.51842
COUNW IKZXE BWRTH (PRIORITY)
COUNW OTUAP ANZUK

8 23

2/2 6 14

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED KUALA LUMPUR (PRIORITY) (PASS TO BUTTERWORTH FOR PARKER)
2207, REPEATED SINGAPORE (COMANZUKFOR FOR INFORMATION) 2284

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY (UNDERLINED)

THANKS YOUR 1753.
GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD FOLLOW UP AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR PARAGRAPH

6.

CFM 2207 2284 1753 6
ENDS 141002AEST

DMD

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten initials]
ANZUK
jms

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

103



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
44, JALAN AMPANG,
KUALA LUMPUR.

In reply quote No. 206/2
207/2/3/5
Memorandum No. FA2014

8 June, 1972.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
Canberra.

c.c. Australian High Commission,
Singapore. 157

Commander,
ANZUK Force,
Singapore.

Officer Commanding RAAF,
Air Base Butterworth.

Threat to Air Base Butterworth

Please refer to our memo 928 (Singapore memo 107)
of 12 May, 1972.

2. Recently we received a copy of an article "Rebels
Strike Near Malaysia Air Base" by Michael Richardson, the
Melbourne Age South East Asia correspondent, which appeared
.... in the Age on 15 March, 1972 (copy attached). When this
article is compared to the Suara Revolusi broadcast of
1 April, it is found that the information in the broadcast
largely appears to have been taken from the Age article.

which must have
gone to China
airmail!

(G.V. Brady)
Deputy High Commissioner

*Mr R. K. Fley
Capt Jones*
[Signature]

Mr Hill Copies to Thomas
Sawley
Lyoch
CLO
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL
File on Dullemall file.

[Signature] 14/6

Worry for Canberra



From MICHAEL RICHARDSON,

our South-East Asia correspondent

Rebels strike near Malaysia air base

SINGAPORE, March 14. The drive against communist guerillas in the Kulim — Selama — Baling triangle starting only 15 miles east of the Butterworth airbase in the north-west of the Malayan peninsula is an unwelcome reminder to the Australian Government that it has a very tangible interest in the Malaysian insurgency problem.

It is the latest of a series of signs that terrorist activities near the airfield — where 32 of the RAAF's 110 Mirage supersonic fighters, six Dakotas and two Iroquois helicopters are based — are on the increase.

[Under the terms of the Five Power arrangements linking Australia, New Zealand and Britain in the defence of Malaysia-Singapore the RAAF has 40 Mirages stationed in the region. Eight rotate through Tengah airfield in Singapore and the balance operate from Butterworth.]

The present anti-guerilla operation follows a number of clashes between terrorists and security forces in the area east of Butterworth over the past 18 months and numerous reports of communist activity.

Each of the Mirages is worth about \$2 million and the two squadrons comprise a very considerable part of Australia's air strike capacity.

In purely military terms, Butterworth would be a top priority target in a sustained communist offensive.

The former British base is now fully owned by the Malaysian Government but, by agreement, remains under joint occupation by the RAAF and the RMAF.

The latter has 16 Sabre jets — a gift from Australia — and a number of Alouette helicopters and Tebuan attack-trainers stationed there.

Butterworth belongs to the Malaysians and base security is a Malaysian government responsibility.

The RAAF puts guards and dogs around the immediate vicinity of its planes and a company — about 120 men — of soldiers from the Sixth Battalion Royal Australian Regiment in Singapore within the joint Anzuk brigade is stationed at Butterworth. One of its functions is, presumably, a standby security role.

But the security of the high cyclone - and - barbed-wire perimeter and beyond is Malaysia's charge and, no matter how effectively it is carried out, Canberra is in the invidious position of having all responsibility but no care so far as taxpayers' money is concerned.

To be fair, a communist attack on Butterworth is considered here to be unlikely in the near future.

This assessment is premised on the belief that the Malayan Communist Party is not ready for such an assault and would not risk provoking retaliation from heavy Anzuk firepower.

It is believed the Malaysian authorities recently tightened up security at Butterworth after discussions with Australia. Measures included introduction of a stricter entry-exit pass system and investigation of the squatter communities living just outside the base perimeter.

ANZUK

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

File OUT

213/19/51
ANZUK 100

CONFIDENTIAL

H.C.	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec (Con)
D.H.C. <i>10</i>	1st Sec (Inf)	Attache (S & A)
S.A.	A.S.A.	Attache
Trade	2nd Sec (Con)	Records Clerk
1st Sec (1)	2nd Sec (Adm)	Registrar
1st Sec (2)	3rd Sec	S. T. O.

ACTION COPY

RR RBMWC
DE RBMWAH
R 020710Z JUNE 72
FM AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION SINGAPORE
TO COMANZUKFOR
ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM FOREIGN CANBERRA.

2123 (FOR COMANZUKFOR).
ADDRESSED KUALA LUMPUR 2089, REPEATED BUTTERWORTH, SINGAPORE

BUTTERWORTH ARRANGEMENTS.
YOUR 1689.

COUNTER-SUGGESTIONS IN YOUR 1(A), (C) AND (F) ARE FOR WORDING WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH NEW FORM OF THE DOCUMENT. MALAYSIANS SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS REMAINS OUR VIEW.

2. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT SUGGEST THAT MALAYSIANS BE PRESSED FURTHER. ALL THE MALAYAN CHANGES MAY BE ACCACCEPTED AND YOU MAY SIGN THE LETTERS.

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

File

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

File 213/1/9/5/1
IN *KL 09*

Reg. No. _____

H.C. <i>1/01</i>	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec (Con)
D.H.C.	1st Sec (Inf)	Attache (S & A)
S.A.	A.S.A.	Attache
Trade	2nd Sec (Con)	Records Clerk
1st Sec (1)	2nd Sec (Adm)	Registrar
1st Sec (2)	3rd Sec	S. T. O.

KLC 2004
KLS 31
MBA 453
IKZXE COUMW (PRIORITY)
IKZXE OTUAP
IKZXE BWRTH ANZUK

CONFIDENTIAL

72 6 9 18 19
CAT A 1/6/72
5/11

ACTION COPY
File Butterworth

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1753, REPEATED SINGAPORE 278, COMANZUKFOR 75 (FOR INFO) BUTTERWORTH (FOR PARKER).

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY.

YOUR 2132.

WITH SERVICES ADVISER I SAW SAMAD NOOR TODAY AND GAVE HIM A LETTER EXPLAINING PROPOSALS FOR ERECTION OF FENCE AND THREE WATCH TOWERS.

ANNEXED WERE PHOTOSTATS (SUITABLY MASKED TO DELETE THE REFERENCE NUMBERS) OF PLANS SHOWING SECURITY FENCE AND WATCH TOWER LOCATIONS ATTACHED TO DOCUMENT ANZUK 007/3001/1/DOOPS OF 15 MARCH, 1972.

I ALSO GAVE HIM SUARA REVOLUSI EXTRACT (OUR 1453).

I SAID THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO PROCEED WITH DELAY, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THERE WAS A THREAT, EVEN IF ITS PRECISE DEGREE WAS DIFFICULT TO DEFINE, BUT BECAUSE THE WHOLE QUESTION OF BUTTERWORTH SECURITY HAD ALREADY ATTRACTED SOME PUBLIC ATTENTION IN AUSTRALIA AND MIGHT SOON ATTRACT MORE: I BELIEVED WE WANTED TO BE IN A POSITION TO MEET THIS.

2. SAMAD WAS SYMPATHETIC AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE MATTER COULD BE EXAMINED URGENTLY.

THEY WOULD NEED TO LOOK AT ANY IMPLICATIONS FOR RMAF.

HE ALSO SHOWED SOME DISPOSITION, HOWEVER, TO PLACE OUR PROPOSALS IN THE CONTEXT OF BASE SECURITY IN GENERAL, SAYING THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A STUDY OF WHAT SECURITY MEASURES WERE POSSIBLE AND WOULD BE JUSTIFIED AGAINST AN EVALUATION OF THE THREAT.

FOR EXAMPLE, IT MIGHT BE THAT THE PERIMETER FINCE ALL ROUND THE BASE SHOULD BE DOUBLED (AS HE HIMSELF WOULD FAVOUR) THOUGH THAT WOULD BE VERY EXPENSIVE: OR THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MORE EXTENSIVE SYSTEM OF WATCH TOWERS COVERING ALL THE PERIMETER.

ON THE OTHER HAND, SINCE SECURITY COULD NEVER BE ABSOLUTE, IT MIGHT BE THAT THE CT THREAT ON THE BORDER WAS NOT SUCH THAT GREATER MEASURES WOULD BE JUSTIFIED.

HE SHOWED IN SHORT SOME DISPOSITION TO ARGUE AGAINST A PIECEMEAL APPROACH.

3. I SAID THAT WE SAW IMPORTANCE IN TAKING EARLY ACTION.

WE WOULD NOT WANT TO SPEND SOME PERIOD OF PERHAPS WEEKS OR MONTHS UNDEERTAKING JOINT STUDIES BEFORE DECIDING WHAT TO DO.

EVEN IF SOMETHING MORE WERE TO BE DONE LATER, WE STILL WANTED TO TAKE THESE MEASURES NOW - EVEN IF (AS SAMAD THEN SUGGESTED) THEY MIGHT BECOME PHASE ONE OF SOME WIDER PROGRAMME.

THEY WERE MODEST MEASURES WHICH SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

AS TO THE THREAT, WE COULD BOTH AGREE THAT THERE WAS SOME DEGREE OF ONE, WHICH DID NOT DEPEND ONLY ON THE CTS BUT ALSO, AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE, ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SABOTAGE BY CIVILIAN SYMPATHISERS.

4. SAMAD SAID HE THOUGHT THAT MORE DOGS MIGHT BE VERY USEFUL: WE SAID THAT THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN THOUGHT OF.

HE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE SITING OF ONE WATCH TOWER AT THE AMMUNITION DUMPT ITSELF WAS WISE: THE TOWER ITSELF MIGHT PROVIDE A TARGET FOR ATTACK AND BE BETTER PLACED SOME DISTANCE AWAY.

5. ON COSTSHARING HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT MALAYSIA COULD HELP PAY FOR BOTH TOWERS AND FENCE: I SAID THAT I DOUBTED IF COST SHARING NEED APPLY TO THE FINCE WHICH WAS FOR PROTECTION OF MIRAGE AREA.

HE ALSO SPOKE OF GETTING AN EARLY VISIT OF INSPECTION TO BUTTERWORTH TO SEE WHAT IMPLICATIONS WOULD BE ON THE GROUND, E.G. WHETHER FENCE WOULD LIMIT FREEDOM OF NORMAL MOVEMENT FOR RMAF.

6. IT WAS LEFT THAT HE WOULD PASS MY LETTER AND ANNEXURE FOR STUDY AND THAT THERE WOULD BE AN EARLY MEETING TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER.

WE SUGGEST THAT A REPRESENTATIVE FROM BUTTERWORTH SHOULD ATTEND THIS: AND THAT WE SHOULD FOLLOW UP NEXT WEEK AFTER PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTURE ON 14 JUNE.

KLC 2004
KLS 31
MBA 453
1KZXE COUMW (PRIORITY)
1KZXE OTUAP
1KZXE BWRTH ANZUK

CONFIDENTIAL 72 6 9 18 19

CAT A

ACTION COPY
15/6/72
File Butterworth

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1753, REPEATED SINGAPORE 278, COMANZUKFOR
75 (FOR INFO) BUTTERWORTH (FOR PARKER).

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY.

YOUR 2132.

WITH SERVICES ADVISER I SAW SAMAD NOOR TODAY AND GAVE HIM
A LETTER EXPLAINING PROPOSALS FOR ERECTION OF FENCE AND THREE
WATCH TOWERS.

ANNEXED WERE PHOTOSTATS (SUITABLY MASKED TO DELETE THE
REFERENCE NUMBERS) OF PLANS SHOWING SECURITY FENCE AND WATCH
TOWER LOCATIONS ATTACHED TO DOCUMENT ANZUK 007/3001/1/00PS
OF 15 MARCH, 1972.

I ALSO GAVE HIM SUARA REVOLUSI EXTRACT (OUR 1453).

I SAID THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO PROCEED WITH DELAY, NOT ONLY
BECAUSE THERE WAS A THREAT, EVEN IF ITS PRECISE DEGREE WAS
DIFFICULT TO DEFINE, BUT BECAUSE THE WHOLE QUESTION OF
BUTTERWORTH SECURITY HAD ALREADY ATTRACTED SOME PUBLIC
ATTENTION IN AUSTRALIA AND MIGHT SOON ATTRACT MORE: I
BELIEVED WE WANTED TO BE IN A POSITION TO MEET THIS.

2. SAMAD WAS SYMPATHETIC AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE MATTER
COULD BE EXAMINED URGENTLY.

THEY WOULD NEED TO LOOK AT ANY IMPLICATIONS FOR RMAF.

HE ALSO SHOWED SOME DISPOSITION, HOWEVER, TO PLACE OUR
PROPOSALS IN THE CONTEXT OF BASE SECURITY IN GENERAL, SAYING
THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A STUDY OF WHAT SECURITY MEASURES
WERE POSSIBLE AND WOULD BE JUSTIFIED AGAINST AN EVALUATION OF
THE THREAT.

FOR EXAMPLE, IT MIGHT BE THAT THE PERIMETER FENCE ALL
ROUND THE BASE SHOULD BE DOUBLED (AS HE HIMSELF WOULD FAVOUR)
THOUGH THAT WOULD BE VERY EXPENSIVE: OR THAT THERE SHOULD BE
A MORE EXTENSIVE SYSTEM OF WATCH TOWERS COVERING ALL THE
PERIMETER.

ON THE OTHER HAND, SINCE SECURITY COULD NEVER BE ABSOLUTE,
IT MIGHT BE THAT THE CT THREAT ON THE BORDER WAS NOT SUCH THAT
GREATER MEASURES WOULD BE JUSTIFIED.

HE SHOWED IN SHORT SOME DISPOSITION TO ARGUE AGAINST A
PIECEMEAL APPROACH.

3. I SAID THAT WE SAW IMPORTANCE IN TAKING EARLY ACTION.

WE WOULD NOT WANT TO SPEND SOME PERIOD OF PERHAPS
WEEKS OR MONTHS UNDEERTAKING JOINT STUDIES BEFORE DECIDING
WHAT TO DO.

EVEN IF SOMETHING MORE WERE TO BE DONE LATER, WE STILL
WANTED TO TAKE THESE MEASURES NOW - EVEN IF (AS SAMAD THEN
SUGGESTED) THEY MIGHT BECOME PHASE ONE OF SOME WIDER PROGRAMME.

THEY WERE MODEST MEASURES WHICH SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

AS TO THE THREAT, WE COULD BOTH AGREE THAT THERE WAS
SOME DEGREE OF ONE, WHICH DID NOT DEPEND ONLY ON THE CTS BUT
ALSO, AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE, ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SABOTAGE
BY CIVILIAN SYMPATHISERS.

4. SAMAD SAID HE THOUGHT THAT MORE DOGS MIGHT BE VERY USEFUL:
WE SAID THAT THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN THOUGHT OF.

HE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE SITING OF ONE WATCH TOWER AT
THE AMMUNITION DUMPT ITSELF WAS WISE: THE TOWER ITSELF MIGHT
PROVIDE A TARGET FOR ATTACK AND BE BETTER PLACED SOME DISTANCE
AWAY.

5. ON COSTSHARING HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT MALAYSIA
COULD HELP PAY FOR BOTH TOWERS AND FENCE: I SAID THAT I DOUBTED
IF COST SHARING NEED APPLY TO THE FENCE WHICH WAS FOR PROTECTION
OF MIRAGE AREA.

HE ALSO SPOKE OF GETTING AN EARLY VISIT OF INSPECTION TO

~~TO~~
BUTTERWORTH TO SEE WHAT IMPLICATIONS WOULD BE ON THE GROUND,
E.G. WHETHER FENCE WOULD LIMIT FREEDOM OF NORMAL MOVEMENT FOR
RMAF.

6. IT WAS LEFT THAT HE WOULD PASS MY LETTER AND ANNEXURE FOR
STUDY AND THAT THERE WOULD BE AN EARLY MEETING TO DISCUSS THE
MATTER FURTHER.

WE SUGGEST THAT A REPRESENTATIVE FROM BUTTERWORTH SHOULD
ATTEND THIS: AND THAT WE SHOULD FOLLOW UP NEXT WEEK AFTER
PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTURE ON 14 JUNE.

ROWLAND.

CFM: 1753 75 105 2132 007/3001/1/OPW 15 1972 1453

14
ENDS 091730LT
CD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

98

213/1/9/5/1

5th June, 1972.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Memo No. 816

The Secretary,
Department of Defence,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Memo No. DRS.147

The Director,
Joint Intelligence Organisation,
Department of Defence,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.


Memo No. DRS.148

Australian High Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR

Memo No. KL.133

THE THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

Further to paragraph 6 of the Review of Current Intelligence No. 10/72 issued by the ANZUK Intelligence Group (Singapore) concerning VMR broadcast about Mr Fairbairn's visit to Malaysia and Butterworth, the staff of the Chief Staff Officer (Int.), ANZUK Force Headquarters, have made a search of public material available to them which could have possibly been used as a basis for the VMR broadcast. They have noted that an article which appeared in the "Age" on 15th March, 1972 contains a good deal of material similar to that used in the broadcast. Copies of the article are attached for ease of reference.


(M.E. Lyon)
Deputy High Commissioner

CONFIDENTIAL

(a)

AHCKL

206/rf

207/9/33 Para

3 refs.

(b) ANZUKIC/RCI10/7Y

Para 6. refs

Worry for Canberra



From MICHAEL RICHARDSON,

our South-East Asia correspondent

Rebels strike near Malaysia air base

SINGAPORE, March 14. The drive against communist guerrillas in the Kullim — Selama — Baling triangle starting only 15 miles east of the Butterworth airbase in the north-west of the Malayan peninsula is an unwelcome reminder to the Australian Government that it has a very tangible interest in the Malaysian insurgency problem.

It is the latest of a series of signs that terrorist activities near the airfield — where 32 of the RAAF's 110 Mirage supersonic fighters, six Dakotas and two Iroquois helicopters are based — are on the increase.

[Under the terms of the Five Power arrangements linking Australia, New Zealand and Britain in the defence of Malaysia-Singapore the RAAF has 10 Mirages stationed in the region. Eight rotate through Tengah airfield in Singapore and the balance operate from Butterworth.]

The present anti-guerrilla operation follows a number of clashes between terrorists and security forces in the area east of Butterworth over the past 18 months and numerous reports of communist activity.

Each of the Mirages is worth about \$2 million and the two squadrons comprise a very considerable part of Australia's air strike capacity.

In purely military terms, Butterworth would be a top priority target in a sustained communist offensive.

The former British base is now fully owned by the Malaysian Government but, by agreement, remains under joint occupation by the RAAF and the RMAF.

The latter has 16 Sabre jets — a gift from Australia — and a number of Alouette helicopters and Tebuan attack-trainers stationed there.

Butterworth belongs to the Malaysians and base security is a Malaysian government responsibility.

The RAAF puts guards and dogs around the immediate vicinity of its planes and a company — about 120 men — of soldiers from the Sixth Battalion Royal Australian Regiment in Singapore within the joint Anzuk brigade is stationed at Butterworth. One of its functions is, presumably, a standby security role.

But the security of the high cyclone- and barbed-wire perimeter and beyond is Malaysia's charge and, no matter how effectively it is carried out, Canberra is in the invidious position of having all responsibility but no care so far as taxpayers' money is concerned.

To be fair, a communist attack on Butterworth is considered here to be unlikely in the near future.

This assessment is premised on the belief that the Malayan Communist Party is not ready for such an assault and would not risk provoking retaliation from heavy Anzuk firepower.

It is believed the Malaysian authorities recently tightened up security at Butterworth after discussions with Australia. Measures included introduction of a stricter entry-exit pass system and investigation of the squatter communities living just outside the base perimeter.

5 Parik
ANZUK

File Butterworth
Threat to

SINGAPORE

213/19/5/1
File
IN *Cha* 96

Reg. No. _____

H.C. _____

CONFIDENTIAL

D.H.C. _____ 1st Sec (C & A) _____ 3rd Sec _____

S.A. _____ 1st Sec (Inf) _____ Attache (S & A) _____

Trade _____ A.S.A. _____ Attache _____

1st Sec (1) _____ 2nd Sec (Con) _____ Registrar _____

1st Sec (2) _____ 2nd Sec (Adm) _____ S.T.O. _____

ACTION COPY

CSQ3081 0619590.49834
P R I O R I T Y
COUMW IKZXE BWRTH
COUMW OTUAP ANZUK
CONFIDENTIAL

72 6 6 17 39

ADDRESSED KUALA LUMPUR 2132 REPEATED SINGAPORE 2185.

FOR INFORMATION COMANZUKFOR OC BUTTERWORTH.

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY.

YOUR 1542 REFERS.

GLAD IF YOU WOULD IMMEDIATELY APPROACH SAMAD NOOR AS YOU SUGGEST, SEEKING MALAYSIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE ERECTION OF THE FENCE AND TOWERS.

2. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THE QUESTION OF WARNING DEVICES IS ALSO BEING CONSIDERED (WE ARE AWAITING MORE DETAILS) BUT SHOULD NOT IMPEDE YOUR APPROACH TO SAMAD.

3. WITH REGARD TO COST SHARING OF THE TOWERS WE AGREE THAT THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN UP AS YOU PROPOSE, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT SHOULD BE PRESSED SHOULD DEPEND UPON THE REACTION RECEIVED.

WE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WISH THE QUESTION OF SHARING COST OF THE TOWERS TO CAUSE ANY DELAY EITHER TO APPROVAL FOR OR WORK ON THE FENCE, TO WHICH COST SHARING DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE RELEVANT.

NOR WOULD WE WISH COST-SHARING ISSUE TO DELAY WORK ON THE TOWERS.

4. WE WOULD APPRECIATE EARLY REPLY.

(CFM. 2132 2185 1542 SAMAD NOOR 2 3 4)
ENDS 6/1918AEST
VB

CONFIDENTIAL

F)

95
213/19/5/1
File
IN
2002

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

Reg. [Redacted] IN
H.C. 1st Sec (C & A) 3rd Sec (Con)
D.H.C. 1st Sec (Inf) Attache (S & A)
S.A. A.S.A. Attache
Trade 2nd Sec (Con) Records Clerk
1st Sec (1) 2nd Sec (Adm) Registrar
1st Sec (2) 3rd Sec S. T. O.

CS2993 02/1655AEST
O.48590
COUMW IKZXE BWRTH
COUMW OTUAP ANZUK

CONFIDENTIAL

72 6 2 14 40

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED KUALA LUMPUR 2089, REPEATED BUTTERWORTH, SINGAPORE
2123 (FOR COMANZUKFOR).

BUTTERWORTH ARRANGEMENTS.
YOUR 1689.

COUNTER-SUGGESTIONS IN YOUR 1(A), (C) AND (F) ARE FOR WORDING
WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH NEW FORM OF THE DOCUMENT.
MALAYSIANS SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS REMAINS OUR VIEW.

2. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT SUGGEST THAT MALAYSIANS
BE PRESSED FURTHER.
ALL THE MALAYAN CHANGES MAY BE ACCACCEPTED AND YOU MAY SIGN THE
LETTERS.

CFM: 2089 2123 1689 1(A) (C) (F) 2.
ENDS 021642AEST
DJS

CONFIDENTIAL



213/195/1
94
CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
44 JALAN AMPANG,
KUALA LUMPUR.
206/2

In reply quote No. 207/2/3/5
Memorandum No. FA928

12 May, 1972.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
Canberra.

c.c. Australian High Commission,
Singapore. 107

Commander,
ANZUK Force,
Singapore.

Officer Commanding,
RAAF,
Air Base Butterworth.

Threat to Air Base Butterworth

Please refer to our telegram 1453 to Canberra (repeated as 220 to Singapore, 64 to COMANZUKFOR, and 80 to OC Butterworth) referring to a monitored report from the Communist Party of Malaya radio station, Suara Revolusi, broadcasting out of Southern Yunan, in regard to the visit by Mr Fairbairn to Malaysia and Singapore, the Five Power defence arrangements, and the defences at Air Base Butterworth.

- 2. We attach for your information the full text of the transcript of the broadcast, and would be grateful if you would pass it to the Departments of Defence, Air, and to JIO.
- 3. It is difficult to assess the significance of the broadcast, but it certainly shows that the CTs have access to information of some accuracy and detail. While the broadcast is not a call to attack the Air Base, it must be considered possible that it could have some inciting effect on CT activists and supporters. It is the first direct reference to Air Base Butterworth of which we have record.

Mr Lyon
CAPT JOE
LT COL SARY
Hill

See also Anzuko (to) in RCI 18/5/72

J. S. Holloway
(J. S. Holloway)
First Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
44 JALAN AMPANG,
KUALA LUMPUR.

206/2

In reply quote No. 207/2/3/5

Memorandum No. FA928

12 May, 1972.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
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ANZUK Force,
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Officer Commanding,
RAAF,
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....

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(J.S. Holloway)
First Secretary

92

RADIO SUARA REVOLUSI BROADCAST IN MALAY TO SINGAPORE
AND MALAYSIA 1030 GMT 1 APRIL 1972

"The Australian Defense Minister is Plotting in our Country"

(Text) Australian Defense Minister David Fairbairn has been wandering around Malaya and other countries in Southeast Asia in mid-March. Since the establishment of the Five-Power Defense Pact by British imperialism, the senior officials of the Australian Reactionary Government and its military leaders made frequent visits to Malaya for secret talks with the Razak and Lee Kuan Yew cliques.

During David Fairbairn's visit, an Australian Military Survey Mission was already active in Kuala Lumpur. Meanwhile, an Australian fleet under the command of a Rear Admiral arrived in Singapore territorial waters for a one 1-week naval exercise beginning nineteen 19 March. The exercise was participated in by the Air Forces and Navies of Britain, New Zealand and both puppet cliques. That was the biggest fleet dispatched by Australia to Singapore in recent years.

Besides being an accomplice of U.S. imperialism in the Indochina war of aggression, the Australian Reactionary Government is also an accomplice of British imperialism to suppress our country's people struggle for independence. In coordination with British imperialists' strategic arrangement in the Far East, the Australian Reactionary Government has been actively providing military assistance and training to both puppet regimes in recent years. It is also responsible for managing the British imperialists' military bases in our country and plays an important role in the Five-Power Defense Pact.

On fifteen 15 March, Fairbairn shouted blatantly opposing China and defending crimes committed by the Australian Reactionary Government as an accomplice of U.S. and British imperialists to enslave the people of Southeast Asia and Malaya. As such, his ugly colonialist features were barely exposed. He said: "The liberation war backed by China will continue in several areas and the necessity of the Five-Power Defense Pact is necessary."

In Singapore, he reiterated that Australia has a great strategic interest in seeing the freedom of the Southeast Asian region guaranteed. The Australian Defense Policy is formulated in a manner which enables it to protect its interest by stationing Australian forces in this region and by participating in various defense pacts with allied and friendly countries.

Fairbairn was satisfied with his talks with Razak and Goh Keng Swee and assured them of the continued presence of Australian troops in Malaya. He also announced Australia's military assistance to the Lee Kuan Yew clique amounting to four 4 million dollars and fifty million 50,000,000 dollars to the Razak clique within a period of three 3 years. This assistance includes military facilities and the training military personnel of both puppet cliques.

According to Fairbairn, the Australian Government has trained 15,000 fifteen thousand Malaysian military personnel.

During his sojourn in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, Fairbairn visited the Butterworth and Singapore Airbases and met with British, Australian and New Zealand military leaders.

Before departing from Singapore, he disclosed that the Air Forces of the Five-Power Pact will carry out an exercise in Malaya this month.

Fairbairn is plotting in our country at a time when the Malayan National Liberation Army is advancing successfully. The Butterworth Airbase which is managed by the Royal Australian Air Force is only fifteen 15 miles from our Army's Operation Area. It is reported that forty 40 out of the one hundred and ten 110 Mirage jet fighters of the Royal Australian Air Force are stationed in our country and out of the 40 forty supersonic jet fighters, thirty two 32 are stationed at Butterworth Airbase and eight at the Tengah Airbase in Singapore. In addition, there are also a number of other types of Royal Australian Air Force aircraft including sixteen 16 Sabre jets which are Australian gifts to the Razak clique and also a number of puppet helicopters. The Australian reactionaries and the Razak clique are frightened over the rapid expansion of our Army guerrilla areas.

The Australian reactionaries have been worried lately over Butterworth Airbase being the principle target of continued Communist attacks.

Under the pressure of the Australian reactionaries, the Razak clique has reinforced its defenses at Butterworth Airbase recently. At this stage, an Infantry Company of about one hundred and twenty 120 men from the Sixth 6th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment is stationed there to help guard base along with the Royal Australian Air Force dogs.

The puppet clique soldiers are responsible for guarding the barbed-wire fences of the base and the surrounding area. Nevertheless, the Australian reactionaries are still not happy with the security measures.

An Australian reactionary newspaper criticized Fairbairn's recent visit to Kuala Lumpur. Fairbairn's visit to the Butterworth Airbase is aimed at resuscitating members of the Australian Air Force. But this cannot cover up the uneasiness of the Australian ruling clique.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

File 213/11/9/ST/
IN KLC 86

Reg. No. _____

CONFIDENTIAL

H.C. _____	1st Sec (C & A) _____	3rd Sec (Con) _____
D.H.C. _____	1st Sec (Inf) _____	Attache (S & A) _____
S.A. _____	A.S.A. _____	Attache _____
Trade _____	2nd Sec (Con) _____	Records Clerk _____
1st Sec (1) _____	2nd Sec (Adm) _____	Registrar _____
1st Sec (2) _____	3rd Sec _____	S. T. O. _____

ACTION COPY

KLC 1748
KLS 268
MBA 303
IKZXE COUMW
IKZXE OTUAP
IKZXE BWRTH ANZUK

72 5 19 12 51

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1542 REPEATS SINGAPORE 236 COMANZUKFOR 70 AND BUTTWEWORTH 87.

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY.

YOUR 1777.

1. ONLY POINT WE WOULD WISH TO MAKE ON NATURE OF MEASURES TO BE PROPOSED IS OBVIOUS ONE THAT THE LESS PUBLICLY CONSPICUOUS THEY ARE THE EASIER THEY MAY BE TO SELL TO THE MALAYSIANS.

WE THINK IT WOULD BE BEST FOR YOU TO AWAIT REPORT OF EXPERTS AND DECIDE WHAT MEASURES SHOULD BE PROPOSED (WITH DETAILS OF COSTS IF COST SHARING IS SUGGESTED) BEFORE WE RAISE MATTER WITH MALAYSIANS.

2. COST SHARING WOULD NOT SEEM TO APPLY TO FENCE FOR MIRAGE LINES.

BUT WE COULD TRY MALAYSIANS ON OBSERVATION TOWERS AND PERHAPS ALSO ON WARNING DEVICES, DEPENDING ON TYPE AND COST.

3. WE SUGGEST BEST MEANS OF RAISING THESE MATTERS WOULD BE BY LETTER TO SAMAD NOOR WHICH WE COULD DELIVER AND DISCUSS WITH HIM.

THIS COULD SAY THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX 2 SECTION 12, AUSTRALIA WANTED TO INCREASE SECURITY OF ITS OWN INSTALLATION AT BUTTWEWORTH WITH FENCING, OBSERVATION TOWERS AND WARNING DEVICES, BUT BECAUSE SECURITY OF AUSTRALIAN INSTALLATION DEPENDS IN FIRST INSTANCE ON OUTER PERIMETER, AS DID SPECIFIC MALAYSIAN INSTALLATIONS, E.G. NO. 1 AIR DEFENCE RADAR CENTRE, PERHAPS MALAYSIA WOULD APPROVE LATTER TWO PRECAUTIONS BEING EXTENDED TO PERIMETER FENCE, AND MIGHT ALSO WISH TO CONTRIBUTE.

4. WE WOULD ENVISAGE LETTER BEING FOLLOWED UP BY TALKS WITH SAMAD AND SULEIMAN(CAS) AT WHICH WE COULD EXPLAIN REASONS FOR OUR CONCERN AND RAISE QUESTION OF COST SHARING.

HOW FAR TO PRESS LATTER WOULD DEPEND ON REACTION WE RECEIVED: PRESUMABLY WE WANT MEASURES TAKEN FOR OUR OWN SAKE, AND SO MIGHT NOT WISH TO ALLOW MALAYSIAN RELUCTANCE TO PAY TO BLOCK PROGRESS.

5. MALAYSIAN REACTION WILL DEPEND TO SOME EXTENT ON THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THREAT COINCIDING WITH OUR OWN: AND YOU MIGHT LIKE TO CONSIDER WHETHER WE SHOULD GIVE THEM SOMETHING IN WRITING ON THIS.

ON THE WHOLE WE WOULD VE INCLINED TO REST ON THE GENERAL FACT THAT THERE IS A CLEAR THREAT, AVOIDING DEBATE ABOUT ITS PRECISE DEFINITION.

THE SUARA REVOLUSI BROADCAST (OUR 1453) COULD BE USEFULLY QUOTED HOWEVER.

CFM : 1542 236 70 87 17777 2 12 1 1453
ENDS 191200LT
CD

CONFIDENTIAL

File

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

File 213/11/12.

Reg. No. _____

IN h/h 85

H.C. <u>1/10</u>	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec (Con)
D.H.C.	1st Sec (Inf)	Attache (S & A)
S.A.	A.S.A.	Attache
Trade	2nd Sec (Con)	Records Clerk
1st Sec (1)	2nd Sec (Adm)	Registrar
1st Sec (2)	3rd Sec	S. T. O.

KLC 1641
KLS 251
MBA 376
IKZXE COUMW
IKZXE OTUAP
IKZXE BWRTH ANZUK

CONFIDENTIAL 12 5 11 13 00

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1453, REPEATED SINGAPORE 220, COMANZUKFOR 64, BUTTERWORTH 80.

FOR FA, DEFENCE, DEPAIR CANBERRA.

THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH.

US EMBASSY HAS PASSED A MONITORED REPORT OF CLANDESTINE SUARA REVOLUSI BROADCAST OF 1 APRIL, 1972 HEADED "THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE MINISTER IS PLOTTING IN OUR COUNTRY".

2. ARTICLE MAINLY CONCERNS ATTACK ON VISIT OF MR FAIRBAIRN AND FIVE POWER EXERCISES (FULL TEXT BY BAG), BUT FINAL PARAGAPHS CONCERNING BUTTERWROTH READ AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS:

FAIRBAIRN IS PLOTTING IN OUR COUNTRY AT A TIME WHEN THE MALAYAN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY IS ADVANCING SUCCESSFULLY.

THE BUTTERWORTH AIRBASE WHICH IS MANAGED BY THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE IS ONLY FIFTEEN 15 MILES FROM OUR ARMY'S OPERATION AREA.

IT IS REPORTED THAT FORTY (40) OUT OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TEN (110) MIRAGE JET FIGHTERS OF THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE SUPERSONIC JET FIGHTERS, THIRTY TWO 32 ARE STATIONED AT BUTTERWORTH AIRBASE AND EIGHT AT THE TENGAH AIRBASE IN SINGAPORE.

IN ADDITION, THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF OTHER TYPES OF ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT INCLUDING SIXTEEN 16 SABRE JETS WHICH ARE AUSTRALIAN GIFTS TO THE RAZAK CLIQUE AND ALSO A NUMBER OF PUPPET HELICOPTERS.

THE AUSTRALIAN REACTIONARIES AND THE RAZAK CLIQUE ARE FRIGHTENED OVER THE RAPID EXPANSION OF OUR ARMY GUERRILLA AREAS.

THE AUSTRALIAN REACTIONARIES HAVE BEEN WORRIED LATELY OVER BUTTERWORTH AIRBASE BEING THE PRINCIPLE TARGET OF CONTINUED COMMUNIST ATTACKS.

UNDER THE PRESSURE OF THE AUSTRALIAN REACTIONARIES, THE AZAK CLIQUE HAS REINFORCED ITS DEFENSES AT BUTTERWORTH AIRBASE RECENTLY.

AT THIS STAGE, AN INFANTRY COMPANY OF ABOUT ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY 120 MEN FROM THE SIXTH 6TH BATTALION OF THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT IS STATIONED THERE TO HELP GUARD BASE ALONG WITH THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE DOGS. *RUNNING DOGS*

THE PUPPET CLIQUE SOLDIERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR GUARDING THE BARBED-WIRE FENCES OF THE BASE AND THE SURROUNDING AREA.

NEVERTHELESS, THE AUSTRALIAN REACTIONARIES ARE STILL NOT HAPPY WITH THE SECURITY MEASURES.

AN AUSTRALIAN REACTIONARY NEWSPAPER CRITICISED FAIRBAIRN'S RECENT VISIT TO KUALA LUMPUR.

FAIRBAIRN'S VISIT TO THE BUTTERWORTH AIRBASE IS AIMED AT RESUSCITATING MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE. ?

BUT THIS CANNOT COVER UP THE UNEASINESS OF THE AUSTRALIAN RULING CLIQUE.

ENDS.

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AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE

File

IN

213/1/12
Chong

Reg. No.

CONFIDENTIAL

H.C.	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec (Con)
D.H.C.	1st Sec (Inf)	Attache (S & A)
S.A.	A.S.A.	Attache
Trade	2nd Sec (Con)	Records Clerk
1st Sec (1)	2nd Sec (Adm)	Registrar
1st Sec (2)	3rd Sec	S. T. O.

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ADDRESSED KUALA LUMPUR 1777, REPEATED COMANZUKFOR FOR INFORMATION
BUTTERWORTH SECURITY (UNDERLINED)

SEE RECOMMENDATIONS IN ANNEX A TO COMANZUKFOR LETTER ANZUK
007/3001/1/OPS OF 15 MARCH 1972.

2. ON THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL SECURITY GUARDS AND DOGS,
DEPARTMENT OF AIR IS NOT CONVINCED THAT THESE WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN
ROLE ENVISAGED.
PROVOST MARSHAL AND A GROUND DEFENCE OFFICER FROM DEPARTMENT OF
AIR WILL VISIT BUTTERWORTH DURING PERIOD 12 TO 20 MAY TO INVESTIGATE
THIS REQUIREMENT FULLY AND WILL REPORT ON RETURN.

3. WE ARE INCLINED TO SEE MERIT IN THE OTHER THREE RECOMMENDATIONS,
EACH OF WHICH INVOLVES EITHER NEW YORKS OR NEW EQUIPMENT.
OUR PRELIMINARY VIEW IS THAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT
THEM.
DISCUSSIONS WILL, HOWEVER, FIRST NEED TO BE HELD WITH MALAYSIANS
ABOUT TWO ASPECTS:

- (A) POSSIBILITY OF COST SHARING.
THERE MAY BE A CASE IN LOGIC AS WELL AS UNDER WORKS COST SHARING
ARRANGEMENTS FOR MALAYSIA TO MEET PART OF THE CHARGES, AT LEAST
FOR OBSERVATION TOWERS.
SECURITY FENCE AROUND MIRAGE AREA AND WARNING DEVICES COULD BE
IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY.
- (B) COMPLIANCE WITH RELEVANT ANNEX PROVISIONS (ANNEX 2 SECTION 12
(QL AND (WL AND ANNEX 3 SECTION 2 (1) AND (2)).

3. AS YOU HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, IT MAY BE OPPORTUNE TO RAISE
THESE QUESTIONS AT THIS TIME IN VIEW OF THAI INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSIDERATION THAT CIVIL USE OF BUTTERWORTH WILL
UNDOUBTEDLY COMPLICATE SECURITY PROBLEMS.

4. GLAD YOUR COMMENTS ON FOREGOING INCLUDING VIEWS ON POSSIBILITY
OF COST SHARING, AND BEST MEANS OF RAISING THESE MATTERS IN
DISCUSSIONS WITH MALAYSIANS.

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CONFIDENTIAL

File Butterworth

**AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE**

File

OUT *ANZUK* 83

H.C.	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec (Con)
D.H.C.	1st Sec (Inf)	Attache (S & A)
S.A.	A.S.A.	Attache
Trade	2nd Sec (Con)	Records Clerk
1st Sec (1)	2nd Sec (Adm)	Registrar
1st Sec (2)	3rd Sec	S. T. O.

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TO COMANZUKFOR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM FOREIGN CANBERRA.

ADDRESSED KUALA LUMPUR 1777, REPEATED COMANZUKFOR FOR INFORMATION.

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY (UNDERLINED)

SEE RECOMMENDATIONS IN ANNEX A TO COMANZUKFOR LETTER ANZUK 007/3001/1/OPS OF 15 MARCH 1972.

2. ON THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL SECURITY GUARDS AND DOGS, DEPARTMENT OF AIR IS NOT CONVINCED THAT THESE WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN ROLE ENVISAGED.

PROVOST MARSHAL AND A GROUND DEFENCE OFFICER FROM DEPARTMENT OF AIR WILL VISIT BUTTERWORTH DURING PERIOD 12 TO 20 MAY TO INVESTIGATE THIS REQUIREMENT FULLY AND WILL REPORT ON RETURN.

3. WE ARE INCLINED TO SEE MERIT IN THE OTHER THREE RECOMMENDATIONS, EACH OF WHICH INVOLVES EITHER NEW YORKS OR NEW EQUIPMENT. OUR PRELIMINARY VIEW IS THAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THEM.

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THERE MAY BE A CASE IN LOGIC AS WELL AS UNDER WORKS COST SHARING ARRANGEMENTS FOR MALAYSIA TO MEET PART OF THE CHARGES, AT LEAST FOR OBSERVATION TOWERS.
SECURITY FENCE AROUND MIRAGE AREA AND WARNING DEVICES COULD BE IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY.

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3. AS YOU HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, IT MAY BE OPPORTUNE TO RAISE THESE QUESTIONS AT THIS TIME IN VIEW OF THAI INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSIDERATION THAT CIVIL USE OF BUTTERWORTH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY COMPLICATE SECURITY PROBLEMS.

4. GLAD YOUR COMMENTS ON FOREGOING INCLUDING VIEWS ON POSSIBILITY OF COST SHARING, AND BEST MEANS OF RAISING THESE MATTERS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH MALAYSIANS.

BT

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213/1/9/5/1

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CANBERRA. A.C.T. 2600

File No. 696/6/4/5/6
Memo. No. 207

8th February, 1972



The Australian High Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR

Butterworth Security

Thank you for your memorandum 149 of 21st February on your file 207/2/3/5.

- 2. We are glad that momentum is being maintained to make necessary improvements to the security arrangements at Butterworth. We are ourselves in touch with the Departments of Defence and Air to ensure that the problem is kept prominently in mind by the Services authorities.
- 3. We have not yet seen the paper prepared for COMANZUKFOR but are checking with Defence. We shall try to hurry along their reaction to any recommendations made.
- 4. In the meantime we fully agree that, if not already operating, steps to introduce checks with Special Branch on locally-engaged civilian employees are an obvious and necessary precaution. We should be glad if, following your enquiries, you could let us have details of existing practice, and your views on any possible improvements which the Malaysians might be prepared to join in making workable.

(F.J.Blakeney)
First Assistant Secretary
Defence Division

Copied to Singapore

Memo.No. 136 The Australian High Commission,
SINGAPORE

For your information.

HIGH COMMISSIONER
 DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER
 SERVICES ADVISER
 FIRST SECRETARY (1)
 FIRST SECRETARY (2)
 ASSIST. SERVICES ADVISER
 THIRD SECRETARY

(F.J.Blakeney)
 First Assistant Secretary
Defence Division

CONFIDENTIAL

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213/1/12

31st January, 1972

The Commander,
ANZUK Force,
SINGAPORE

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY

At the request of the Australian High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, H.E. Mr. J.R. Rowland, I am sending to you a copy of his memorandum 149 of 21st January, 1972, to the Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.

W

(M.E. Lyon)
Deputy High Commissioner.

Australian High Commission,
KUALA LUMPUR

Memo No. 14.

Paragraph 9 of your memorandum 149 refers.

W

(M.E. Lyon)
Deputy High Commissioner.

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213/1/12

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AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
44 JALAN AMPANG,
KUALA LUMPUR.



In reply quote No. 207/2/3/5

Memorandum No. 149

21 January 1972.

The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

c.c. Australian High Commission
SINGAPORE. No. 19

BUTTERWORTH SECURITY

At his meeting with the six High Commissioners on 19 January, COMANZUKFOR gave a presentation on security at Butterworth, indicating deficiencies in the present security arrangements. He said that a report had been prepared by a committee which met at Butterworth over Christmas; this made various suggestions about improving base security, including the provision of extra guard dogs, increased patrolling, attempts to increase the efficiency of the Malaysian special service police and possibly building of revetments around aircraft.

John G

2. I said that I was glad that this report had been prepared, together with the assessment of the threat to Butterworth which had preceded it, and I recalled that the High Commission had drawn attention to these matters last year; I had also taken them up in Canberra when I was there last September.
3. I remarked that since much of what might be done to strengthen the present arrangements would probably require Malaysian agreement, we would need to carry the Malaysians with us; we would also need direction from Canberra. In particular, any suggestion of withdrawing the Mirages (which Admiral Wells had mentioned as one possible argument for use with the Malaysians to get them to do more) would require such direction, since the presence of the Mirages was of course one of the mainstays of the whole Five Power structure.
4. I said that we would be glad to see the paper prepared for COMANZUKFOR and its practical recommendations; Admiral Wells said that he intended to pass it to High Commissions.
5. I assume that he will also be passing it through his own channel to his superiors, though I did not have an opportunity to discuss with him what precisely he intended to do next. We shall keep you informed; and the present memorandum is simply by way of preliminary notice.

HIGH COMMISSIONER
 DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER
 SERVICES ADVISER
~~FIRST SECRETARY (1)~~
~~FIRST SECRETARY (2)~~
 ASSIST. SERVICES ADVISER
~~THIRD SECRETARY~~

28/1/72

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CONFIDENTIAL

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6. On my return to Kuala Lumpur I had an opportunity to mention over dinner to Enche Mahmood, the new head of Special Branch, that - as he already knew - concern was felt on our part about the possible threat to Butterworth, about whether present security measures were adequate, and whether something more might not be done; I mentioned in particular more dogs, more guards, and more patrolling; (but not, on this occasion, the inadequacies of the Malaysian Special Service police). He said that he felt himself that a threat did exist: he was not worried about the CTs, but rather about civilian saboteurs; for example, the MNLF, who had blown up the railway bridge last year, and might try throwing a grenade into an aircraft. He asked whether the local employees were security-checked: I said that they were, although I did not know whether more might not be done in that respect. (In fact, the situation is that all locally employed civilians are checked against central criminal records in Kuala Lumpur and we are proposing to ascertain whether this includes any check with Special Branch which we believe is not the case at present).

7. Mahmood said that if we had any suggestions to make about improving security at Butterworth he would be very ready to listen to them. Though this particular talk did not go very far, I think it was useful in preparing the ground for specific recommendations which I take it may emerge from Admiral Wells' paper.

8. Incidentally, Mahmood maintained, as he had done before, that the presence around the perimeter of Malay kampongs was a safeguard rather than a danger, since each kampong contained Special Branch informants, and the Malay village communities would be very conscious of any strangers and would report them. I can not evaluate this view, which might be optimistic; though there is I think something in the comment, made to the Services Attache by Air Commodore Suleiman and accompanying remarks on his part, that the forcible re-location of the kampongs, apart from its expense and other disadvantages, might itself cause grievances which could prompt a desire for retaliation.

For Singapore

9. Would you please pass the substance of this memo, especially paras 6 to 8 to COMANZUKFOR.

(J.R. Rowland)
High Commissioner

SINGAPORE

28

Reg. No. *[Redacted]* File *Amayak*
 H *[Redacted]* IN
 D.H.U. *103* 1st Sec (C & A) 3rd Sec
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 1st Sec (1) 2nd Sec (Con) Registrar
 1st Sec (2) 2nd Sec (Adm) S.T.O.

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S E C R E T FOR MR LYON FROM CSO (INT)

1. IN VIEW OF OCI DAILY 5/72 I HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING SIGNAL TO HQ BUTTERWORTH AND COMMANDER 28 ANZUK BRIGADE WITH THE FORCE COMMANDER'S APPROVAL.

QUOTE:
 (1) YOU WILL WISH TO KNOW THAT INTELLIGENCE CIRCLES ASSESS THAT TERRORIST ATTACK ON B52 BOMERS AT U-TAPAO ON 10 JANUARY MAY HAVE BEEN RETALIATORY ACTION FOLLOWING USE OF BASE TO ATTACK NORTH VIETNAMESE TARGETS.
 (2) IT IS OF NOTE THAT THAI FORCES WHICH HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF BASE REACTED RAPIDLY AFTER REPEAT AFTER THE RAID.
 UNQUOTE

2. ANZUKIG(S) REPORT ON THREAT TO BUTTERWORTH PARAS 48, 49, 50 ARE MORE THAN RELEVANT
 BT

ACTION COPY

He has been in contact with the Office for assessment. (Amayak) 13/1/72

1) told CSO (Int) 13/1/72 that thought he ought to be careful before drawing inferences from apparent parallels between U-TAPAO and Butterworth. All are ready to first sentence of para 50 groups of terrorists - for CPM/CTO. I thought the basic assessment.

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JIO, OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY BULLETIN NO. 5/72
DATED TUESDAY, 11TH JANUARY, 1972.

1. THAILAND: TERRORISTS RAID AIRBASE

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include?

A RAID BY A SMALL GROUP OF TERRORISTS WHICH SUCCEEDED IN DAMAGING TWO B52 STRATEGIC BOMBERS AT U-TAPAO AIRBASE ON 10TH JANUARY MAY HAVE BEEN A COMMUNIST RESPONSE TO THE RECENT US AIR ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM.

FOUR TERRORISTS SUCCEEDED IN PENETRATING THE AIRBASE DEFENCES AND LAYING EXPLOSIVE CHARGES. ONE B52 BOMBER WAS SEVERELY DAMAGED AND ANOTHER LIGHTLY DAMAGED. SEVERAL OTHER CHARGES DID NOT EXPLODE. A THAI SENTRY SHOT AND KILLED ONE OF THE TERRORISTS DURING THEIR ESCAPE FROM THE BASE. THAI FORCES WHICH HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF THE BASE REACTED RAPIDLY AFTER THE RAID.

IN PREVIOUS YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST US AIR BASES IN THE NORTH OF EASTERN THAILAND, BUT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CT ACTIVITY OF ANY NATURE NEAR U-TAPAO WHICH IS SOUTH OF BANGKOK. (THE ATTACK MAY INDICATE THAT COMMUNIST TERRORISTS IN THAILAND HAVE A COMMAND STRUCTURE CAPABLE OF RESPONSE TO HIGHER DIRECTION, PROBABLY IN THIS INSTANCE FROM HANOI.) ON THE OTHER HAND THE ATTACK COULD BE PART OF A NATIONWIDE PATTERN OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN WHICH A SHOW OF STRENGTH IS BEING MADE TO MARK THE BEGINNING OF THE DRY SEASON.



JOINT INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

4th January 1972.

Dear Malcolm,

I thought that you might find it useful if I dropped you a brief note to express our satisfaction in Canberra at the way in which ANZUKIG(S) is developing. I thought your assessment on Butterworth was very good and I think your regular bulletins are also maintaining an encouraging standard. From time to time we will probably reproduce in the OCI Bulletin items that we find particularly apposite in Canberra.

Yours ever,

(R.W. Furlonger)

Read to the Group 13/1/72

Mr M.E. Lyon,
Deputy High Commissioner,
Australian High Commission,
SINGAPORE.

ANZUK INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SINGAPORE)

NOTE No. 1/1971

THE THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

UP TO THE END OF 1972

SINGAPORE

30 November, 1971

High Com. ~~Phillips~~
captain ~~henson~~
captain ~~Jude~~ 2/6/72
Lt. Col. ~~Stacy~~
W. ~~Burley~~
W. ~~Armstrong~~
R/S DHC.
W. ~~...~~ 2/12/71.

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
ANZUK INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SINGAPORE)


NOTE No. 1/1971

THE THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
UP TO THE END OF 1972

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3.

THE THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTHUP TO THE END OF 1972A. AIM

The aim of this paper is to assess the threat to Air Base Butterworth up to the end of 1972.

B. INTRODUCTION(1) Description of the Base

2. Air Base Butterworth is a Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) base jointly used by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The Base also houses the Headquarters of the Five Power Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) and its Air Defence Operational Centre (ADOC) which are in the south-east section of the Base together with the RMAF Air Defence Centre (ADC).

3. The Base is a major all-weather airfield capable of sustained bomber and fighter operations. It is in Province Wellesley on the north-west coast of West Malaysia five miles north of Butterworth town (on either side of the main north-south road) and approximately 46 miles from the Betong Salient section of the Thai/Malaysian border (see map and photograph). The runway is 8,000 feet by 150 feet, with asphalt overruns of 450 feet on the northern end and 520 feet on the southern end.

4. There are approximately 1430 RAAF personnel at the Base of whom some 300 live on it. There are some 886 Malaysian Service and Police personnel living on the Base (610 RMAF servicemen, 126 Special Security Police (SSP) and 150 Royal Malaysian Navy personnel).

5. To the east of the Base there is flat agricultural land, mainly ricefields. A narrow civilian bitumen road passes parallel to the runway at a distance of about 400 yards through several small kampong areas. A side track from this road runs through ricefields to the eastern boundary gate of the Base. To the south there are scattered kampong dwellings; to the north a local housing estate, small holdings and ricefields; on the western side, where the married quarters, transmitter aerial farm, messes and hospital are located, the boundary runs along the sea front.

(2) Description of the Target

6. The Base (see plan) supports operations by two RAAF Mirage squadrons each with 19 aircraft, a flight of six RAAF C47 transports, and two RAAF Iroquois helicopters in a Search and Rescue (SAR) role.

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It is noted that the copy of this report is to be sent to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Chief of the Bureau of the National Security Agency, and to the Director of the Office of the Special Representative for the United States in the United Kingdom.

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1. The information in this report is classified "TOP SECRET" because it contains information that is so classified. The information in this report is classified "TOP SECRET" because it contains information that is so classified.

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7. The RMAF maintain a squadron of 10 (shortly to be 16) Sabre aircraft, three Tebuan strike aircraft and up to 10 Alouette helicopters. RMAF Caribou, Dove, Devon and Herald transport aircraft and Nuri helicopters as well as additional Tebuans operate from time to time from Butterworth. Other aircraft from the Five Power countries periodically visit the Base.

8. To support operations by these aircraft, the following facilities are located within the perimeter east of the north-south road: servicing and maintenance hangars and sections dealing with airframe, engine, radio, hydraulics, instruments, radar, armament and electrical repairs; fuel storage areas; ammunition and armament storage; missile (MATRA) preparation bay; equipment storage; motor transport storage and repair sections; control tower and Precision Approach Radar (PAR) section; emergency power plant; operations building; communications centre; Air Defence Centre; telephone exchange and administrative sections. The Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) installation and its emergency power plant, transmitter station, surveillance radar, single sideband receivers, water supply pumping station, and marker beacons are outside the perimeter fence. Thirty-eight of these installations have been designated Vital Points in the Shared Defence Plan for the Base (Operations Order 1/71) which covers co-operation between the ANZUK and Malaysian forces in the defence of the Base in an emergency.

(3) Current Security Arrangements

9. The Royal Malaysian Military Police (26 Company, Special Security Police (SSP)) are responsible for the security of the Base, including control of entry, the guarding on a 24-hour basis of eight Vital Points, and the patrolling of the others at regular intervals. They maintain a quick reaction force of section strength (approximately ten men). The RAAF Mirage lines are not guarded during working hours when they are under normal surveillance by RAAF personnel; outside these hours they are guarded by two RAAF Security Guards, each armed with a pistol and accompanied by a dog. RAAF Service Police carry out mobile patrols at irregular intervals every night during which they check the security of Vital Points and observe the state of vigilance of the SSP guards, reporting by voice radio (also held by the SSP guards) to the RAAF duty security controller at the RAAF guardroom near the main entrance to the Base.

10. A company (currently Australian or New Zealand but in the future possibly British as well) drawn from 28 ANZUK Brigade is stationed on monthly rotation

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at Butterworth although at certain times during periods of training and handover - expected to aggregate two months during a twelve-months' period - no company is present. The company on rotation normally travels by train and its movements are therefore easily observable. One of the company's tasks, when at Butterworth, is to assist with the protection of ANZUK personnel, property and shared facilities within the Base. The company provides a section (normally 10 men) as a quick reaction force from 1800-0600 hours daily. The area of active responsibility of ANZUK forces is restricted to within the perimeter of the Base.

11. The RAAF employs about 1,400 Locally Employed Civilians (LEC), of whom all but 60 were vetted by the RAAF before 1 April, 1971, after which date responsibility for vetting passed to the SSP. It is not known what vetting is carried out by the SSP, who have hitherto been unwilling to discuss their procedures with the RAAF on the grounds that they (the SSP) are responsible for the security of the Base. Senior Malaysian officials and service authorities undertook in November, 1971, however, to have RMAF Butterworth produce a consolidated list of LEC for use by the Malaysian authorities in Kuala Lumpur for re-vetting purposes. On average, some 50 LEC are employed within the Base area outside normal working hours, for example fire service, tanker and transport drivers, and air movements and messing staffs.

12. Contractor personnel are employed on the Base by the RAAF, the Australian Department of Works and the RMAF. Individual firms are carefully selected for reliability and experience but vetting of the rank and file employees is the responsibility of the SSP who are given lists of such personnel for the issue of passes. Details of whatever vetting may be carried out are not made available to the RAAF. Upwards of 150 contractor personnel could be working at the Base on any given day.

13. The main static defence of the Base east of the north-south road is a perimeter fence, due to be completed at end November, 1971, approximately 9.3 miles in length. Except in the IADS-ADC area where there is a double fence, the perimeter fence is a single, chainlink fence the height of which varies from six to eight feet. It is topped by a barbed wire outward overhand. Drains running under the fence are protected by bars. A number of Malay and Chinese kampong dwellings are built close to the perimeter fence; in some cases chicken runs and pig pens use the fence as part of their structure.

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14. The Mirage lines, the IADS complex and the TACAN installations are protected by good lighting. Most other Vital Points have ineffective lighting; a few are unlit. Lighting at the bomb dump is shortly to be improved, as is street lighting generally. Four sixty-foot towers with floodlights will shortly be erected; these will give good lighting protection to the Staging Aircraft Servicing Section (SASS) and the visiting aircraft/RMAF Sabre and helicopter lines.

15. The Officer Commanding, RAAF Butterworth, has drawn attention to serious weaknesses in the current defences, including: inadequacy in the control and performance of the SSP generally and especially in regard to lack of patrolling of the perimeter, ineffective guarding of Vital Points, the inexperience and youth of the officers and the personnel, and their unwillingness to co-operate closely with the RAAF; the fact that an ANZUK company (with its quick reaction section) is not present on the Base at all times; inadequate control by the SSP of access to the Base; the fact that the perimeter fence is in the main single chainlink, unpatrolled and inadequately lit, and has kampong dwellings abutting on certain sections; ineffective lighting of most Vital Points including the bomb dump (although this aspect should be improved in the near future); lack of knowledge and control of the vetting of LEC and contractor personnel and doubt that the SSP is carrying out effective vetting; the parking of the Mirages in a straight line because of limitations in ground servicing equipment; and the absence of revetments to protect the Mirages.

C. FACTORS AFFECTING THE THREAT

(1) The External Threat

16. The ANZUK Joint Intelligence Committee assessed in October, 1971, that it was unlikely that any external overt military threat against Malaysia would arise during the period under review.

(2) Capability of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO) and Related Organisations

(a) General

17. The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), with its guerilla arm the Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO), enjoys virtual control of areas along the Thai border, from where it has been developing a widespread infrastructure in West Malaysia. Although claiming to be multi-racial, the CPM is basically Chinese, but recent recruiting has included numbers of Thai Muslims and some Malays.

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18. The Joint Intelligence Organisation (Australia) estimated in October, 1971, that the CTO has about 1,800 to 2,000 armed terrorists, organised into three regiments - the 8th in the Sadao area of Thailand adjoining Perlis and Kedah States, the 12th in the Betong Salient adjoining Perak State and the 10th in the Weng District opposite Kelantan State - with up to 300 CTs operating in West Malaysia.

19. There is also a reserve and operational support organisation, the Malayan Communist Youth League (MCYL), estimated to number between 3,000 and 6,000, based mainly in Southern Thailand, but with small cells in West Malaysia. Since November, 1969, the CTO, which has always had propaganda support from Radio Peking, has also had similar support from a radio station, Voice of the Malayan Revolution, located in southern China.

20. The Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF), which first came to notice in April, 1970, is the largest and best-organised communist subversive organisation in West Malaysia. The MNLF has cells in most States. Direct links exist between the Perak and Kedah MNLF committees, and each of these also has direct links with the 12th CTO Regiment. The MNLF has already demonstrated a capability for co-ordinated subversive and minor terrorist activities in both West Malaysia and Singapore. There are also a number of other minor subversive groups, some of whom are in touch with the CPM or the MNLF, including the Malayan Patriotic Front (MPF) and the Malayan People's Liberation Front (MPLF). The organisations mentioned operate in the Penang/Butterworth area.

21. In the years 1960-1968, the CPM/CTO concentrated on establishing their bases in Southern Thailand. In mid-1968 the CPM/CTO began to probe the areas of West Malaysia near the Thai border, with the object of assessing whether conditions were suitable for re-establishment of bases prior to the eventual revival of the armed struggle. This new and more aggressive policy of revived activity within West Malaysia was marked in June, 1968, by the ambush of a Malaysian Police Field Force (PFF) patrol near the Thai border at Kroh, in which 17 PFF were killed. After the May, 1969, riots in Malaysia, the CPM/CTO took advantage of the unsettled situation and stepped up their policy of penetration into Malaysia; this has continued up to the present time (November, 1971).

(b) Nature of CT-Initiated Incidents and Modus Operandi

22. Since the CTO intensified their activity in West Malaysia from mid-1968, they have not attacked military installations or large formed units. Their

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activities have been directed to renewing contacts with supporters, to the development of lines of communication, bases and food caches, and to recruitment. The CTs have usually carried out these activities in small groups, but occasionally in larger groups of between 20 and 30. In general they have avoided contact with the Malaysian Security Forces, although they have initiated a few incidents within a few miles of the Thai/Malaysian border principally in the form of ambushes of Security Force patrols. Features of the CT modus operandi in such incidents have been the careful selection of ambush sites and timing, the placement of trip wires and anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosives about half a mile apart to trap security forces within a "killing zone", brief attacks by small arms fire and subsequent rapid dispersal.

(c) Arms

23. Up to 1969, arms used by the CTO were mainly of British manufacture, obtained from the British during World War II or captured during the Emergency. These include: British rifles (Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE) Nos. 1 Mk.III and 4 & 5); Bren Light Machine Guns (LMGs) Mk.1, 2 & 3; Thompson Sub-Machine Guns (SMGs); Sten guns; .38 Smith and Wesson (S & W) and 9mm. Browning pistols; and shotguns of various kinds. Other weapons have since been captured from the Thais and the Malaysian Security Forces as a result of ambushes; these include 9mm. and .45 pistols; American-made M3 and M3A1 carbines; LMGs (FN Bren); heavy-barrel, self-loading rifles (HBSLRs); self-loading rifles (SLRs); sub-machine guns (SMGs) and shotguns purchased locally in Thailand.

24. There is no evidence of the CTs having Chinese, Soviet or other communist weapons, nor of any heavier weapons, for example mortars or other indirect weapons. Although there is no evidence that the CTO have a mortar capability, we accept that this could be acquired at short notice and probably without our receiving advance warning.

25. The CTs have shown capability in the manufacture and effective use in ambushes of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle devices. Although these devices have usually been home-made, they have been technically sound. The amount of explosive used in anti-vehicle devices has been sufficient to cause severe damage to soft-skinned vehicles such as land rovers and 3-ton trucks. Subversive groups have used electrically-detonated booby traps and gelignite.

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(d) Activities in Butterworth Area

26. The following summarises known CPM/CTO and other subversive activities in areas close to Butterworth Air Base (i.e. within a radius of approximately 50 miles) during the period mid-1968 to November, 1971.

27. In September, 1969, two CTs were sighted 12 miles north-east of Kulim or about 20 miles east of the Base. This sighting was significant in that it showed that the terrorists were operating in the Kulim area well away from the Thai border. The Kulim area has been a traditional centre of CT operations; it was classified a "Black Area" (viz. an area of strong CT activity) during the 1948-1960 Emergency.

28. In April, 1970, booby-trapped flags were planted in many parts of Malaysia and Singapore mainly by the MNLF; in Georgetown (capital of Penang) and Butterworth town, they were planted by the Malayan Patriotic Front (MPF), a subversive political organisation some 200 strong in Penang.

29. Between 29 June and 8 July, 1970, there were eight unconfirmed sightings in southern Kedah, the majority about 12 miles north-east of Kulim. Malaysian Special Branch reported in June, 1970, that a group of CTs was operating near Junjong on the Kedah/Province Wellesley border, and that CT supporters in the Kulim area were supplying food on a regular basis to the CTO 8th Assault Unit (a unit of the 12th CTO Regiment) located nearby.

30. As a result of increased CTO efforts to recruit members, a meeting was held in the Kulim area in June, 1970, between the CTO and the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF). At this meeting the MNLF were instructed to send cadres to the CTO for guerilla training. In August, 1970, 14 Chinese cadres left the Kulim area for guerilla training in southern Thailand.

31. In January, 1971, groups of between four and seven CTs were sighted about two miles north-east of Bukit Mertajam in Province Wellesley about eight miles south-east of the Base. On 8 March the railway line spanning the Sungei Jarak about a mile south of Tasek Glugor about seven miles east of the Base was damaged by explosives. This was a rather inept attempt at sabotage by a small group from the Malayan People's Liberation Front (MPLF), which had received training from the 8th CTO Regiment in the Sadao area.

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32. Following increased attention to southern Kedah by the Security Forces, they successfully attacked a group of CTs from the 8th Assault Unit on 15 May, 1971. This group had been established in an overgrown rubber plantation in a hilly area three miles south of Kulim (from which area, incidentally, the Base can be seen). The CTs lost seven killed in the attack and follow-up actions. Documents obtained from the incident revealed that the CTs intended to establish contact with supporters in northern Perak and Junjong in Kedah. Other places mentioned were Penang and Sungei Bakap in Province Wellesley. Another directive stated that the 8th Assault Unit was to expand its activities (development of bases, contact with and training of supporters, recruitment) in southern Kedah and the Selama district of Perak. A further directive instructed the unit to continue stockpiling food and, in suitable circumstances, to supply arms to supporters (while avoiding exposure of their activities).

33. In September, 1971, a Malaysian military source stated that it was thought that the Kulim area would come to life again because "survivors of the 8th Assault Unit" were still in the Gunong Inas Forest area approximately 25 miles east of the Base. The number of these survivors was estimated in November, 1971, by Malaysian Special Branch to be between 20 and 30. The Malaysian military intelligence estimate of November, 1971, was that there were some 60 CTs in the wider Mahang/Gunong Inas/Bintang Hijau Forest Reserves area. In November, 1971, the Security Forces restricted road travel around the Gunong Bongsu Forest Reserve east of Kulim, and about 15 miles from the Base, an indication of official concern for the safety of military and civilian road traffic in an area of continuous CT presence.

34. Localities mentioned in sightings throughout 1971 indicate that Kulim is a centre of movement for terrorists between the Betong Salient and village areas east and south-east of Kulim in the southern part of Province Wellesley, southern Kedah and the Selama district of Perak. CT movement from the Salient appears to have followed the high terrain to Bukit Mertajam. No sightings of CTs have been reported in the "rice-bowl" areas around the Base. This may indicate that the CTs do not, as yet, have enough support from the population to enable them to move freely in this open and largely Malay-populated area.

35. In November, 1971, Malaysian Special Branch reported that they had recently obtained evidence of plans to establish Malayan Communist Youth League (MCYL) groups in Selama and Butterworth town.

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(e) Known Incidents on the Base

36. In June, 1971, about 40 feet of copper-core cable was stolen from the Mirage engine run-up bay near the Matra site. A locked building was also forcibly entered at the same time. This area is within 50 feet of an SSP guard position. Between 6 and 10 August, 1971, copper earth strips were stolen from the roof of a building in the bomb dump. A week later eight four-foot lightning arrestors and a number of fire extinguisher caps were stolen from the bomb dump. A search failed to reveal the method of entry to the dump. The building from which the metal strips were removed is in full view of the SSP guard room at the gate to the dump. There have been a number of other thefts from inside the Base area, some outside working hours. In mid-September, 1971, two Malays were seen on a platform in a tree outside but close to the eastern perimeter fence near the bomb dump. They were apprehended and handed over to the SSP and then to the Malaysian Police. Special Branch in Penang have informed RAAF Butterworth that they believe that those apprehended were engaged in surveillance of the Base.

37. These incidents are not necessarily attributable to the CTs or their supporters; the thefts were probably carried out by locals, perhaps LEC or contractor personnel, or even members of the SSP. The incidents do, however, reveal that unauthorised personnel have been able on several occasions within the past few months to gain access to areas within the Base including Vital Points.

(f) Summary of Capability

38. The CTO have an estimated 1,800 to 2,000 armed terrorists in the Thai border areas, with several hundred in the Betong Salient and an estimated 300 operating within West Malaysia. The Kulim area, a traditional area of CT influence and operation, appears to be currently a centre for CT movement between the Betong Salient and village areas to the east and south-east of Kulim in southern Kedah, the Selama district of Perak and the southern part of Province Wellesley. We assess that there are some 60 CTs in Kulim and nearby forest areas some 15 to 25 miles east of the Base with a group - estimated to be 20 to 30 strong - of the 8th Assault Unit (the 12th CTO Regiment) in the Gunong Inas Forest Reserve. It is assumed that these CTs possess small arms (rifles and machine guns) and have the capacity to use anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosives.

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There is no evidence that the CTO have a mortar capability but we accept that this could be acquired at short notice and probably without our receiving advance warning. Several communist subversive organisations linked with the CPM/CTO, including the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Malayan Patriotic Front (MPF), and the Malayan People's Liberation Front (MPLF) are known to operate in areas close to Air Base Butterworth, including Penang and Butterworth town. They have the capability to commit minor acts of sabotage (using explosive booby-traps and gelignite). There have been several incidents of minor theft at Air Base Butterworth within the past few months which have revealed that unauthorised persons have been able, despite the current defences, to gain access to areas within the Base including Vital Points. There has been one incident suggesting the possibility - we would put it no higher - of surveillance of the Base for unknown purposes.

(3) CPM/CTO Policy and Intentions

39. The basic aim of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and its associated organisations is the establishment of a communist state of "Malaya" embracing West Malaysia and Singapore. The CPM currently states that this will be accomplished ultimately by engaging in "armed struggle" (referred to in western military writing as Phase II of communist strategy) i.e. that phase of the insurgent campaign involving widespread terrorism, sabotage, guerilla action and attacks on military and para-military forces and government property.

40. This policy involves the development of an extensive underground infrastructure, accompanied by the systematic build-up of an armed capability. A captured document states CPM tasks as "to carry on strengthening the forces, to consolidate and expand the guerilla bases, to expand the operational areas of the vast area of the northern tip (i.e. the north of West Malaysia), to resume the masses' work in rural areas, to build underground bulwarks, to forge ahead with the masses' movement and to expand the guerilla war."

41. That this document is a reliable indicator of CTO intentions is confirmed by other captured documents containing directions to the 8th and 12th CTO Regiments; by the pattern of CTO activity since mid-1968 - small scale isolated incidents near the Thai border with limited objectives such as "blooding" newly trained groups, capturing arms and celebrating a particular anniversary in the CTO calendar; and by

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the fact that past CTO practice, has been to develop infrastructure support before embarking on wider armed action. Thus the expansion of "operational areas ... and guerilla war" mentioned in the CTO document is likely to be accorded a lower priority than the consolidation of guerilla bases and infrastructure.

42. It is difficult to predict how soon, and in what areas, the CPM/CTO will feel confident enough to initiate the armed struggle. Communist documents captured in May, 1971 (date of issue unknown) contain directives to build towards armed struggle in 2 to 5 years - a relatively short time-scale if mid-1968 were assumed to be the starting point. The initiation of armed struggle must largely depend on the rate at which the communists' infrastructure and influence can be expanded. The extent of progress here will in turn depend largely on the Malaysian Government's capacity to counter them. We consider it unlikely, chiefly because of lack of expertise, indifferent Thai co-operation and performance in the border area, shortage of training and sound intelligence, an apparent lack of overall strategy, and inadequate leadership, that the Malaysian Security Forces will be able during the period under review to prevent further extension of communist influence and activity. We consider, nevertheless, that the development of the communist infrastructure will not have proceeded to the point at which the CTO would judge the time ripe to proceed to the armed struggle phase.

43. We accordingly assess that current CPM/CTO intentions are to consolidate and extend their present position in West Malaysia; to continue recruiting and building up mass support among the Chinese peasants especially in those areas (such as Kulim) which were communist areas during the Emergency; to enlist support among the Malay peasants; to develop lines of communication and to establish camps as base areas and for training purposes; to develop food supply arrangements and lay down food caches; to obtain arms; and progressively to spread their influence and presence, including that of armed groups, while avoiding other than limited contact with the Malaysian Security Forces. We also consider that the CPM/CTO currently judge that an attempt to move to large-scale terrorism would be premature and possibly counter-productive, and we therefore assess the initiation of armed struggle throughout West Malaysia by the end of 1972 to be unlikely.

44. On the basis of present trends, therefore, we consider that by the end of 1972 the communist infrastructure is likely to be well on the way to completion

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in the West Coast states and in Kelantan; that, within that area, a competent and well-organised clandestine organisation will exist; that there is likely to be an increase in armed terrorist activities, largely confined to the border area in Kedah, Perak and Kelantan, although isolated incidents might occur further south; and that the MNLF, which will probably improve its present capacity for booby trapping and sabotage, could initiate a limited campaign involving minor acts of sabotage throughout West Malaysia for propaganda purposes or to celebrate certain communist anniversaries.

(4) Situations in which Air Base Butterworth might be Attacked

45. If the CTO succeeded in substantially expanding their infrastructure and area of influence in West Malaysia to the point at which a widespread campaign of attacks on prominent installations was launched towards the end of the period under review as an introduction to the "armed struggle" phase, Air Base Butterworth might be included as one of the targets; we consider this development unlikely. However, strengthening of the communist infrastructure in the northern states, which is likely, could enhance the risk of an isolated attack on the Base by the CTs.

46. The CTO might see advantage in mounting an attack on the Base in the event of large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest, perhaps involving the diversion of Security Forces. We do not, however, consider such developments likely during the period to end 1972.

47. The CTO might also conceivably decide to attack the Base if they judged that a significant psychological or propaganda advantage might result. This might occur for example if the Five Power arrangements or Australia's role in them were to come under severe criticism in Malaysia, or if the CTO were to assess that such an attack would diminish Malaysia's confidence in the support of her external partners; would result in the withdrawal of Australian aircraft; or would seriously embarrass the Australian Government or have a demoralising effect on Australian opinion. As the Five Power defence arrangements seem likely to remain firm during the period under review, the CTO would have to weigh, against any psychological/propaganda gains, the reaction that could be generated. On balance the CTO seem likely to assess that an attack on the Base for psychological/propaganda purposes would probably be counter-productive: they

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1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all activities. It emphasizes that these records are essential for the effective management of the organization and for ensuring that all operations are conducted in a transparent and accountable manner.

2. The second part of the document outlines the specific procedures for collecting and analyzing data. It details the methods used to gather information from various sources and the techniques employed to process and interpret this data. The goal is to ensure that the information is reliable and that the analysis is thorough and unbiased.

3. The third part of the document describes the reporting process. It explains how the results of the data analysis are communicated to the relevant stakeholders and how these results are used to inform decision-making. It also discusses the importance of providing clear and concise reports that are easy to understand and act upon.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the challenges associated with data collection and analysis. It identifies common obstacles such as incomplete data, inconsistent reporting, and limited resources. It also provides suggestions for how these challenges can be overcome and how the data collection and analysis process can be improved.

5. The fifth part of the document discusses the future of data collection and analysis. It explores emerging technologies and trends that are likely to shape the way data is collected and analyzed in the coming years. It also discusses the importance of staying up-to-date on these developments and how they can be leveraged to gain a competitive advantage.

6. The sixth part of the document discusses the importance of data security. It explains how data is protected and how access is controlled. It also discusses the risks associated with data breaches and the steps that can be taken to prevent them. The goal is to ensure that all data is kept safe and secure at all times.

7. The seventh part of the document discusses the importance of data privacy. It explains how personal information is protected and how it is used. It also discusses the rights of individuals regarding their data and the steps that can be taken to ensure that these rights are respected.

8. The eighth part of the document discusses the importance of data quality. It explains how data is validated and how errors are identified and corrected. It also discusses the impact of poor data quality on the organization and the steps that can be taken to improve it. The goal is to ensure that all data is accurate and reliable.

9. The ninth part of the document discusses the importance of data integration. It explains how data from different systems is combined and how this information is used. It also discusses the challenges associated with data integration and the steps that can be taken to overcome them.

10. The tenth part of the document discusses the importance of data governance. It explains how data is managed and how it is used. It also discusses the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in the data governance process and the steps that can be taken to ensure that it is effective.

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might judge that such an attack would not only be likely to bring immediate attention from the Security Forces in the area but would also be likely to have broader effects in the sense of stiffening the Malaysian Government's support for the Five Power arrangements and in other areas of foreign policy.

48. The use of the Base as an airfield from which anti-terrorist air operations were being flown might prompt CTO reaction. We assume that Australian aircraft will not, during the period under review, be operated from Butterworth in an anti-terrorist role. Operations being conducted by the Malaysians from the Base would not appear at present to invite such action.

49. In the past two months, however, the Malaysians have increasingly used the Base for operations involving Tebuan strike aircraft (three of which are now on permanent deployment), and Alouette and Nuri helicopters. We know that the Alouettes and Nuris have been used in support of anti-terrorist operations in the border areas but the extent of Tebuan operations in this role is not clear (although we know that they were so used on a few occasions earlier in 1971). It is believed that a squadron of RMAF Caribou will be progressively stationed at Butterworth during 1972. With the RMAF Sabres becoming operational shortly, we expect that during 1972 the Base will be increasingly used, and known by the CTs to be used, for anti-CT operations in the border areas, and in known CT areas such as Kulim.

50. It is possible that such increased use of the Base could lead the CTO to make some form of "reaction" attack on it but, in accordance with our assessment of basic CTO intentions during the period under review, a CTO decision to make such an attack would still seem unlikely. The possibility of a "reaction" attack by CTs in the Kulim area acting on their own initiative, or by supporters or sympathisers in the Penang/Butterworth area, particularly if RMAF aircraft are increasingly used against the CTs in Kulim, could not, however, be excluded.

51. The Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF) or one of the other smaller subversive groups might well, in connection with an anniversary of significance in the communist calendar or otherwise, make some limited sabotage and booby-trap attempt against the Base as part of a nation-wide, or more restricted, campaign.

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(5) Early Warning (Local Intelligence Arrangements)

52. The Formation Intelligence Officer, RAAF Butterworth, is the co-ordinating authority for local intelligence arrangements. He reports direct to the OC RAAF Butterworth, to HQ ANZUK Force and to the Australian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur, as well as to appropriate authorities in Australia. His sources are the Royal Malaysian Police at Alor Star, and reports received through the Australian Army Ground Liaison Officer at Air Base Butterworth, including fortnightly briefings from 6 Malaysian Infantry Brigade (MIB) at Sungei Patani, Kedah, and GOC West Malaysia sitreps received daily by signal from Kuala Lumpur. He also has access to reports of briefings received approximately fortnightly from Malaysian Special Branch, Penang, by the Assistant Provost Marshal (APM), RAAF Butterworth.

53. These local intelligence arrangements might give RAAF Butterworth advance warning of a reasonably large group of CTs making an approach from the border area. The CTs do not, however, usually operate in this manner and it is assessed that advance warning of any form of attempted attack, whether by CTs or members of subversive groups, would most probably not be received.

D. THREAT ASSESSMENT(1) Likelihood of Attack

54. On the basis of the factors affecting the threat discussed earlier in this paper, we make the following assessments for the period up to the end of 1972:

(a) it is unlikely that any threat to Air Base Butterworth will arise from an external overt military attack on Malaysia;

(b) there is a potential threat to the Base from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO), and related communist subversive organisations, whose aim is the establishment of a communist state in Malaysia/Singapore, ultimately by "armed struggle" - widespread guerilla/military action - and who have an estimated 1,800 to 2,000 terrorists in the Thai/Malaysian border area. Of these some 300 are estimated to be within West Malaysia, with some 60, assumed to be armed with rifles, machine guns and explosives, in the Kulim and nearby forest areas approximately 15 to 25 miles from the Base;

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(c) on the basis of present evidence, CPM/CTO policy will be directed towards the consolidation of its strength, influence, infrastructure and bases within West Malaysia. Development along these lines, while likely to be substantial in view of likely deficiencies in Malaysian counter-measures, will not be advanced to the point at which a decision will be taken to launch armed struggle. It is unlikely, therefore, that the CPM/CTO will, as a deliberate act of policy, attempt an attack on Air Base Butterworth;

(d) it is possible, but we consider still unlikely, that the CPM/CTO could take a decision to attack the Base in certain circumstances, namely:

- (i) if the communist infrastructure in the northern states of West Malaysia were rapidly and progressively expanded during 1972 to the point at which the CTO judged the time ripe for attacks on substantial military targets in those states (although the risk of an isolated attack on the Base would be enhanced by such expansion);
- (ii) if there were large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest, perhaps involving the diversion of Security Forces;
- (iii) if the CPM/CTO were to see significant psychological or propaganda advantage in an attack either in terms of Australian or Malaysian governmental or public attitudes to the Base in the context of the Five Power defence arrangements or as a morale-boosting demonstration, possibly related to a communist anniversary; and
- (iv) in retaliation for the increased use of the Base by the RMAF in anti-terrorist operations; and

(e) there is definitely a risk that one or more CTs, or members of subversive groups known to be operating in the vicinity, could, regardless of CPM/CTO policy and/or acting on their own initiative, attempt an isolated attack on or within the Base at any time.

(2) Timing, Advance Warning, Method and Strength of any Likely Attack

55. As to the timing of any attack, we have earlier recorded our assessment that it is unlikely that the CPM/CTO will as a deliberate act of policy attempt an attack on Air Base Butterworth during the period to the end of 1972. As to the possible attacks referred to in paragraph 56(d), we assess that these,

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if they took place at all, would be more likely towards the end of the period under review. The form of isolated attack mentioned in paragraph 56(e) could take place at any time.

56. We assess that advance warning of any form of attempted attack (other than by a large group of CTs which we assess as unlikely) would most probably not be received whether the attack were by CTs or members of subversive groups.

57. Methods and strengths which could conceivably be employed, if it were decided to attack the Base, range through a number of possibilities (or variants of these):

(a) direct frontal assault by a large group of CTs up to 60 strong using small arms fire and explosives;

(b) covert penetration, probably at night, by one or more individual CTs or small groups, totalling up to 20, with a view to surprise attack on Vital Points, especially the aircraft, by small arms fire and explosives;

(c) mortar or other indirect weapon attack, if the CTs acquired this capability, using a small force of up to ten men located in the surrounding ricefield/kampong areas, especially those to the east;

(d) sabotage by the planting of delayed-action explosives, booby-traps and other similar devices, designed to damage Vital Points and injure personnel, by one or more CTs, members of subversive groups, or sympathetic or suborned LEC/contractor personnel.

58. Of the foregoing, we assess (a) and (b) as the least likely methods, prompting as they would reaction from the Base defence system and, subsequently, the Malaysian Security Forces. Method (b) should not, however, be discounted especially in view of the relative ease of a covert approach to Vital Points through the current defences. Method (c) would be likely if the CTs acquired a mortar capability. Method (d) is assessed as currently by far the most likely.

59. In the event of a sabotage attempt as in (d) above, those making it, particularly if they were suborned LEC/contractor personnel or members of subversive groups, might well be tempted to attack "soft targets", e.g. those Vital Points outside the

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Base perimeter fence and/or those which are protected only by SSP patrols and dim lighting. They would probably also act partly on an opportunity basis, depending on where they had chosen to conceal themselves or cut through/climb over the fence. If an attack were the result of a deliberate CPM/CTO policy decision, or carried out by CTs in the area acting on their own initiative, however, we would expect Vital Points within the perimeter, especially the aircraft (probably RMAF before RAAF) to be priority targets, whether the attacks were carried out by mortar, surprise assault or sabotage.

E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(1) The Base and the Target
(Paragraphs 1 to 8)

60. Air Base Butterworth, an RMAF base jointly used by the RAAF and situated on the north-west coast of West Malaysia, 46 miles from the Betong Salient section of the Thai border, currently supports operations by RAAF Mirages (38), RMAF Sabres and Tebuans and other aircraft. Over 1,400 RAAF personnel work at the Base, of whom 300 live on it, as do nearly 900 Malaysian servicemen and police. Some 1,500 Locally Employed Civilians (LEC) and contractor personnel are employed at the Base. A wide range of installations, including an air defence centre, radar and navigational aids, fuel and ammunition storage, and a missile (MATRA) preparation bay, are situated on or near the Base.

(2) Current Security Arrangements
(Paragraphs 9 to 15)

61. The Malaysian Special Security Police (SSP) are responsible for the security of the Base including control of entry, guarding/patrolling of Vital Points (38 of which are designated in an ANZUK/Malaysian Shared Defence Plan for the protection of the Base in an emergency) and the maintenance of a 10-man quick reaction force. At night, pairs of RAAF Security Guards, each with a dog, guard the Mirage lines which are floodlit, and RAAF Service Police carry out mobile patrols of Vital Points at irregular intervals. A company from ANZUK Brigade is stationed at the Base for approximately 10 months of the year and, when there, provides a 10-man quick reaction force from 1800 - 0600 hours daily. Static defences comprise a single 6 to 8 foot perimeter fence with barbed wire overhang, and lighting of most Vital Points.

62. The Officer Commanding, RAAF Butterworth, has drawn attention to serious weaknesses in the current defences including the ineffective performance and inexperience

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of the SSP and the unco-operative attitude of their officers; the fact that the ANZUK company is not present at all times; deficiencies in the static defences, and in vetting procedures for LEC; and the parking of the Mirages in a straight line and without protection by revetments.

(2) Capability of Communist Organisations
(Paragraphs 16 to 38)

63. In the absence of an overt external threat to Malaysia, which is assessed as unlikely during the period under review, the potential threat is from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO) and related subversive groups.

64. The CTO have an estimated 1,800 to 2,000 armed terrorists in the Thai border areas, with several hundred in the Betong Salient and 300 in West Malaysia. Of these, we assess that there are some 60 in the Kulim and nearby forest areas about 15 to 25 miles east of the Base. They are assumed to have small arms (rifles and machine guns) and the capacity to use anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosives. There is no evidence that the CTs have mortar capability but we accept that this could be acquired at short notice and without our receiving advance warning. Several communist subversive organisations linked with the CPM/CTO are known to operate in the area and have the capability to commit minor acts of sabotage, using explosives and booby-traps. Recent cases of theft have shown that unauthorised persons (not necessarily CTs or supporters) have on several occasions gained access to areas within the Base, including Vital Points.

(3) CPM/CTO Policy and Intentions
(Paragraphs 39 to 44)

65. We assess that current CPM/CTO intentions are to consolidate their present position in West Malaysia by recruitment and extension of support among both Chinese and Malays; by the development of lines of communication, food supply arrangements, food caches and camps as base areas and for training; by the acquisition of arms, and by the progressive spread of their influence and presence, including that of armed groups, while avoiding other than limited contact with the Malaysian Security Forces. It is difficult to predict when and where the CPM/CTO will feel confident enough to initiate the "armed struggle" phase of communist insurgent strategy (widespread guerilla/military action including attacks on military forces and property) but, despite deficiencies in Malaysian countermeasures, we doubt that this phase will be initiated throughout West Malaysia by the end of 1972. We assess, however, that by then the communist infrastructure is likely to be well on the way

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to completion in the West Coast states and in Kelantan; that there is likely to be an increase in armed terrorist activities in the border area in Kedah, Perak and Kelantan, with the possibility of isolated incidents occurring further south; and that communist subversive organisations might initiate a campaign of sabotage for propaganda purposes or to celebrate communist anniversaries.

(4) Situations in which Air Base Butterworth might be Attacked (Paragraphs 45 to 53)

66. CTO attacks on prominent installations as an introduction to the "armed struggle" phase in West Malaysia are considered unlikely during the period under review, although the strengthening of the communist infrastructure in the northern states, which is likely, could enhance the risk of an isolated attack on the Base by the CTs.

67. Large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest, which might provide occasion for a CTO "opportunity" attack, are considered unlikely.

68. The CTO could decide to attack the Base to gain psychological or propaganda advantage; on balance, we expect them to judge that such an attack would probably be counter-productive.

69. Although we expect the Base to be increasingly used by the RMAF during 1972 for anti-CT operations, a "reaction" attack by the CT is assessed as unlikely. The possibility of such an attack by CTs or supporters in the area acting on their own initiative cannot, however, be excluded.

70. Subversive groups might well make a limited sabotage attempt against the Base as part of a nation-wide, or more restricted, campaign.

(5) The Threat Assessment

Likelihood of Attack
(Paragraph 54)

71. We assess that, during the period up to the end of 1972:

- (a) it is unlikely that any threat to Air Base Butterworth will arise from an external overt military attack on Malaysia;
- (b) there is a potential threat to the Base from the CPM, the CTO, and related communist subversive organisations. The CPM/CTO have an estimated 60 terrorists armed with rifles, machine guns and explosives in the Kulim and nearby forest areas approximately 15 to 25 miles from the Base;

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- (c) CPM/CTO policy will be directed towards the consolidation of its infrastructure within West Malaysia and this will not be advanced to the point at which a decision will be taken to launch armed struggle. It is therefore unlikely that the CPM/CTO will, as a deliberate act of policy, attempt an attack on Air Base Butterworth;
- (d) it is possible, but still unlikely, that the CPM/CTO could take a decision to attack the Base in certain circumstances, namely:
 - (i) if the infrastructure in the northern states were expanded to the point at which the CTO judged the time ripe for attacks on substantial military targets in those states (although the risk of an isolated attack on the Base would be enhanced by such expansion);
 - (ii) if there were large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest;
 - (iii) if the CPM/CTO were to see significant psychological or propaganda advantage in an attack either in relation to Australian or Malaysian governmental or public attitudes to the Base or as a morale-boosting demonstration, possibly related to a communist anniversary; and
 - (iv) in retaliation for the increased use of the Base by the RMAF in anti-terrorist operations; and
- (e) there is definitely a risk that one or more CTs or members of subversive groups could, regardless of CPM/CTO policy and/or acting on their own initiative, attempt an isolated attack on or within the Base at any time.

Timing, Advance Warning, Method and Strength of any Likely Attack (Paragraphs 55 to 59)

72. We assess that:

- (a) it is unlikely that the CPM/CTO will as a deliberate act of policy attempt an attack on Air Base Butterworth to the end of 1972. If, however, any of the possible attacks referred to in paragraph 71(d) took place, we assess that these would be more likely to occur towards the end of the period under review. The form of isolated attack mentioned in paragraph 71(e) of the preceding paragraph could take place at any time;

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- (b) advance warning of any form of attempted attack (except attack by a large group of CTs which is assessed as unlikely) would most probably not be received whether the attack were by CTs or members of subversive groups;
- (c) methods and strengths which could conceivably be employed, if it were decided to attack the Base, range through a number of possibilities:
 - (i) direct frontal assault by a large group of CTs up to 60 strong using small arms fire or explosives;
 - (ii) covert penetration, probably at night, by one or more individual CTs or small groups totalling up to 20 with a view to surprise attack on Vital Points, especially the aircraft, by small arms fire and explosives;
 - (iii) mortar or other indirect weapon attack, if the CTs acquired this capability, using a small force of up to 10 men located in the surrounding ricefield/kampong areas, especially those to the east; and
 - (iv) sabotage by the planting of explosive devices or booby traps, designed to damage Vital Points and injure personnel, by one or more CTs, members of subversive groups, or sympathetic or suborned LEC/contractor personnel;
- (d) of these methods, sabotage is by far the most likely, although covert penetration and surprise attack by a small group should not be discounted, and a mortar attack would be likely if the CTs acquired this capability; and
- (e) a sabotage attempt, if made by suborned LEC/contractor personnel or members of subversive groups, might well be directed against those Vital Points outside the

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perimeter fence or protected only by SSP patrols and dim lighting. If an attack were carried out by CTs as a result of a CPM/CTO policy decision, or by local CTs acting on their own initiative, however, we would expect Vital Points within the perimeter, especially the aircraft, to be priority targets, whether the attack were carried out by mortar, surprise assault or sabotage.

M.E. LYON
Australian Representative
(Chairman)

J.A. SANKEY
British Representative
(Co-ordinator)

D.G. HARPER
New Zealand Representative


F.E. BOLTON
(Squadron Leader)
Acting Chief Staff Officer
(Intelligence)

SINGAPORE
30 November, 1971

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TOP SECRET



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ANNEX A TO
ANZUK INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SINGAPORE)
NOTE No. 1/1971 OF
30 NOVEMBER 1971



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ORTHOMORPHIC GRID

AREA MAP

Dashing indicates the positions of reefs which are frequently allowed to show particularly in depths less than 10 fathoms

CAUTION NOTE
Owing to the numerous wrecks in the area, submarines, cables, vessels are warned not to anchor north of Pulau Pinang except as authorized above

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ANNEX A TO

ANZUK INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SINGAPORE)

NOTE No. 1/1971 OF

30 NOVEMBER 1971

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Air Component Commander	4
Officer Commanding, RAAF Butterworth	5
Chairman ANZUKIG(S) and Australian High Commission, Singapore	6
Chief Staff Officer (Intelligence), ANZUK Force HQ	7
JIC(L) Representative and British High Commission, Singapore	8
New Zealand High Commission, Singapore	9
Secretary, ANZUKIG(S)	10
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British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur	14
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SINGAPORE

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 RBMWAH
 DE RBMWC 117 3500700
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 R 160650Z DEC 71
 FM COMANZUKFOR
 TO ZEN/MODUK
 ZEN/NZ DEF WELLINGTON
 INFO ZEN/DEFENCE CANBERRA
 ZEN/AS HIGH COMMISSION KUALA LUMPUR
 ZEN/UK HIGH COMMISSION KUALA LUMPUR
 ZEN/NZ HIGH COMMISSION KUALA LUMPUR
 RBMWAH/AS HIGH COMMISSION SINGAPORE
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 ZEN/HQ BUT
 ZEN/COMANZUKAIR
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S E C R E T
 ANZUK/OPS/31
 REF: A COMANZUKFOR 100925Z DEC (ANZUK/OPS/11). THREAT TO AIR
BASE BUTTERWORTH.
 FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS HAVE NOW BEEN RECEIVED ON THIS MATTER.
 REF A IS CANCELLED
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H.C.	1st Sec (C & A)	3rd Sec
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1st Sec (2)		

FOR POLLARD - TELECON SPRY/POLLARD 15 DEC REFERS. (*Passed to KL*)

100925Z DEC
FROM COMANZUKFOR
TO DEFENCE CANBERRA

INFO:
MODUK
NZ DEF WELLINGTON
HQ BUT
AS HICOM KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE
NZ HICOM KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE
UK HICOM KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE
COMANSUKAIR

FOR CHAIRMAN ANZUK COSC AND INFO CDS NZ AND CDS UK.

SECRET ANZUK/OPS/11
THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH PD ANZUK (IG) NOTE NO
1/1971 REFERS PD

PARA ONE PD IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE DEFENCE OF BUTTERWORTH SHOULD
BE EXAMINED AGAINST THE REFERENCE PD TO ACHIEVE THIS EXPEDITIOUSLY
CMM IT IS PROPOSED THAT A COMMITTEE BE SET UP CHAIRED BY OC
BUTTERWORTH AND COMPRISING REPRESENTATIVES OF JPS CMM CHIEF
SCIENTIST DEP OF DEFENCE CMM DEP AIR CMM 28 BDE CMM BASE GDO
BUTTERWORTH AND THIS HEADQUARTERS PD

PARA TWO PD COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CAPACITY OF BUTTERWORTH
TO MEET THREAT AND REPORT TO COMANZUKAIR ON ACTION NEEDED TO
PROTECT ANZUK INSTALLATIONS AND AIRCRAFT AS HIGHEST PRIORITY
PD EYE ALSO HAVE IN MIND THAT COMMITTEE WILL PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS
FOR DISCUSSION WITH MALAYSIA TO ACHIEVE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION
OF PROTECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHARED DEFENCE OF BASE
PD MY PRIME CONCERN IS THAT ANZUK FORCES TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS
TO PROTECT ANZUK INSTALLATIONS AND QUIPMENT AT BUTTERWORTH PD
PARA THREE PD EYE SEEK YOUR CONCURRENCE IN SETTING UP COMMITTEE AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE (DATE ADVISED BY YOU) AND YOUR AGREEMENT TO
REPRESENTATION FROM AUSTRALIA PD EYE REALISE OF COURSE THE NEED
TO TREAD WARILY IN ORDER NOT TO OFFEND MALAYSIAN SUSCEPTIBILITIES
PD

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PRIORITY MESSAGE FORM

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FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE

PRECEDENCE—ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE—INFO DEFERRED	DATE—TIME GROUP 10 0425 Z DEC	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
FROM COMANZUKFOR	TO DEFENCE CANBERRA		PREFIX GR
INFO:	MODUK, NZ DEF WELLINGTON HQ BUT.		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET
INFO	AS HICOM KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE NZ HICOM KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE UK HICOM KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE COMANZUKAIR		ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER ANZUK/OPS/11

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Rec'd 13/12/71
Cops forward to ASA KL 0900 14/12 20/12/71

FOR CHAIRMAN ANZUK COSC AND INFO CDS NZ AND CDS UK(.) THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH PD ANZUK (IG) NOTE NO 1/1971 REFERS PD

PARA ONE PD IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE DEFENCE OF BUTTERWORTH SHOULD BE EXAMINED AGAINST THE REFERENCE PD TO ACHIEVE THIS EXPEDITIOUSLY CMM IT IS PROPOSED THAT A COMMITTEE BE SET UP CHAIRED BY OC BUTTERWORTH AND COMPRISING REPRESENTATIVES OF JPS CMM CHIEF SCIENTIST DEP OF DEFENCE CMM DEP AIR CMM 28 BDE ^{CMM} ~~AND~~ BASE CDO BUTTERWORTH AND THIS HEADQUARTERS PD

PARA TWO PD COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CAPACITY OF BUTTERWORTH TO MEET THREAT AND REPORT TO COMANZUKAIR ON ACTION NEEDED TO PROTECT ANZUK INSTALLATIONS AND AIRCRAFT AS HIGHEST PRIORITY PD EYE ALSO HAVE IN MIND THAT COMMITTEE WILL PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR DISCUSSION WITH MALAYSIA TO ACHIEVE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION OF PROTECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHARED DEFENCE OF BASE PD MY PRIME CONCERN IS THAT ANZUK FORCES TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO PROTECT ANZUK INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT AT BUTTERWORTH PD

/PARA THREE

Page 1 of 2 pages	REFERS TO MESSAGE CLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	DRAFTER'S NAME D. C. WELLS	OFFICE COMANZUKFOR	TEL. No. 5789
FOR OPR'S USE R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR
	D			
RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE J.S. FIELDING			Colonel for Commander	

G. B. R. Ltd. 2/66/51-3593

(Bates, CLO) was asked by H/C 14/12/71 to confirm to Col Corder of Anzuk Hq that all signals to this H/C should be signalled + sent by courier (S.D.S.) when 14/12
HGM 13/12
DHE 14/12
SA 14/12
ASA

Requiring file with papers on Anzuk's Note 1/71 and put copy on main Butterworth file please Wilson 14/12/71

S 1320 L

NUMBER

MESSAGE FORM

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE _____

PRECEDENCE—ACTION	PRECEDENCE—INFO DEFERRED	DATE—TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
FROM			PREFIX GR
TO			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
PAGE TWO			SECRET
INFO			ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
			ANZUK/OPS/11

PARA THREE PD EYE SEEK YOUR CONCURRENCE IN SETTING UP COMMITTEE AS
 SOON AS POSSIBLE (DATE ADVISED BY YOU) AND YOUR AGREEMENT
 TO REPRESENTATION FROM AUSTRALIA PD EYE REALISE OF COURSE
 THE NEED TO TREAD WARILY IN ORDER NOT TO OFFEND MALAYSIAN
 SUSCEPTIBILITIES PD

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Page 2 of 2 pages

REFERS TO MESSAGE CLASSIFIED YES NO

DRAFTER'S NAME OFFICE TEL. No.

FOR OPR'S USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM OPERATOR	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
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SINGAPORE

File 213/1/9/5/1
IN JTO Cwa

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TO AHCS
R 060530Z DEC 71
FM J10 CANNBERRA
TO COMANZUKFOR SINGAPORE
ZEM

S E C R E T
QUOTE

JIM504/71 FOR CHAIRMAN ANZUK INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SINGAPORE)
FROM DIRECTOR J10. ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO AIR BASE
BUTTERWORTH. YOUR MESSAGE 01/0940Z DEC 71. QUOTE IN REPLY NAS
117 DIR. THANK YOU FOR YOUR COMPREHENSIVE AND USEFUL ASSESSMENT
OF THE THREAT TO BUTTERWORTH. WE SHALL DISTRIBUTE IT TO CHIEFS
OF STAFF AS REQUESTED BY COMANZUKFOR AS WELL AS TO OTHER SENIOR
READERS IN CANNBERRA
UNQUOTE

150
£1935

Asked below to see Bates to distribute to: COMANZUK FOR

*✓ 180 (w)
N2 HC
B HC*

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Wm 9/12/71

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IN *Comanzukfor*

D.H.C. *103* 1st Sec (C & A) 3rd Sec
 S.A. 1st Sec (Inf) Attache (S & A)
 Trade A.S.A. Attache
 1st Sec (1) 2nd Sec (Con) Registrar
 1st Sec (2) 2nd Sec (Adm) S.T.O.

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V SQAD02 HH
 PP RBMWAH
 DE RBMWC 200 3360905
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 010940Z DEC 71
 FM COMANZUKFOR
 TO RAYWY/DEFENCE CANBERRA
 RBYWDA/NZ DEFENCE WELLINGTON
 INFO RBMWC/OFFICER COMMANDING RAAF BUTTERWORTH
 RBMWAH/AUSTHICOM SINGAPORE
 RBMWC/AUSTHICOM KUALA LUMPUR
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SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS

66. CTO ATTACKS ON PROMINENT INSTALLATIONS AS AN INTRODUCTION TO THE "ARMED STRUGGLE" PHASE IN WEST MALAYSIA ARE CONSIDERED UNLIKELY DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW, ALTHOUGH THE STRENGTHENING OF THE COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE NORTHERN STATES, WHICH IS LIKELY, COULD ENHANCE THE RISK OF AN ISOLATED ATTACK ON THE BASE BY THE CTS.

67. LARGE-SCALE CIVIL DISTURBANCES OR MAJOR INDUSTRIAL UNREST, WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE OCCASION FOR A CTO "OPPORTUNITY" ATTACK, ARE CONSIDERED UNLIKELY.

68. THE CTO COULD DECIDE TO ATTACK THE BASE TO GAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL OR PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE; ON BALANCE, WE EXPECT THEM TO JUDGE THAT SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD PROBABLY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

69. ALTHOUGH WE EXPECT THE BASE TO BE INCREASINGLY USED BY THE RMAF DURING 1972 FOR ANTI-CT OPERATIONS, A "REACTION" ATTACK BY THE CT IS ASSESSED AS UNLIKELY. THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH AN ATTACK BY CTS OR SUPPORTERS IN THE AREA ACTING ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE CANNOT, HOWEVER, BE EXCLUDED.

70. SUBVERSIVE GROUPS MIGHT WELL MAKE A LIMITED SABOTAGE ATTEMPT AGAINST THE BASE AS PART OF A NATION-WIDE, OR MORE RESTRICTED, CAMPAIGN.

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(5) THE THREAT ASSESSMENT
 LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK
 (PARAGRAPH 54)

71. WE ASSESS THAT, DURING THE PERIOD UP TO THE END OF 1972:

- (A) IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH WILL ARISE FROM AN EXTERNAL OVERT MILITARY ATTACK ON MALAYSIA;
 (B) THERE IS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE BASE FROM THE CPM, THE CTO, AND RELATED COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ORGANISATIONS. THE CPM/CTO HAVE AN ESTIMATED 60 TERRORISTS ARMED WITH RIFLES, MACHINE GUNS AND EXPLOSIVES IN THE KULIM AND NEARBY FOREST AREAS APPROXIMATELY 15 TO 25 MILES FROM THE BASE;
 (C) CPM/CTO POLICY WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THE CONSOLIDATION OF ITS INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN WEST MALAYSIA AND THIS WILL NOT BE ADVANCED TO THE POINT AT WHICH A DECISION WILL BE TAKEN TO LAUNCH ARMED STRUGGLE. IT IS THEREFORE UNLIKELY THAT THE CPM/CTO WILL, AS A DELIBERATE ACT OF POLICY, ATTEMPT AN ATTACK ON AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH;
 (D) IT IS POSSIBLE BUT STILL UNLIKELY, THAT THE CPM/CTO COULD TAKE A DECISION TO ATTACK THE BASE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, NAMELY:

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(I) IF THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE NORTHERN STATES WERE EXPANDED TO THE POINT AT WHICH THE CTO JUDGED THE TIME RIPE FOR ATTACKS ON SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY TARGETS IN THOSE STATES (ALTHOUGH THE RISK OF AN ISOLATED ATTACK ON THE BASE WOULD BE ENHANCED BY SUCH EXPANSION);

(II) IF THERE WERE LARGE-SCALE CIVIL DISTURBANCES OR MAJOR INDUSTRIAL UNREST;
 (III) IF THE CPM/CTO WERE TO SEE SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL OR PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE IN AN ATTACK EITHER IN RELATION TO AUSTRALIAN OR MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENTAL OR PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO THE BASE OR AS A MORALE-BOOSTING DEMONSTRATION, POSSIBLY RELATED TO A COMMUNIST ANNIVERSARY; AND
 (IV) IN RETALIATION FOR THE INCREASED USE OF THE BASE BY THE RMAF IN ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS; AND

(E) THERE IS DEFINITELY A RISK THAT ONE OR MORE CTS OR MEMBERS OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS COULD, REGARDLESS OF CPM/CTO POLICY AND/OR ACTING ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE, ATTEMPT AN ISOLATED ATTACK ON OR WITHIN THE BASE AT ANY TIME.

TIMING, ADVANCE WARNING, METHOD AND STRENGTH OF ANY LIKELY ATTACK

PAGE 4 RBMWC 200 SECRET

(PARAGRAPHS 55 TO 59)

72. WE ASSESS THAT:

(A) IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE CPM/CTO WILL AS A DELIBERATE ACT OF POLICY ATTEMPT AN ATTACK ON AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH TO THE END OF 1972. IF, HOWEVER, ANY OF THE POSSIBLE ATTACKS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 71(D) TOOK PLACE, WE ASSESS THAT THESE WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO OCCUR TOWARDS THE END OF THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW.

THE FORM OF ISOLATED ATTACK MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 71(E) COULD TAKE PLACE AT ANY TIME:

(B) ADVANCE WARNING OF ANY FORM OF ATTEMPTED ATTACK (EXCEPT ATTACK BY A LARGE GROUP OF CTS WHICH IS ASSESSED AS UNLIKELY) WOULD MOST PROBABLY NOT BE RECEIVED WHETHER THE ATTACK WERE BY CTS OR MEMBERS OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS;

(C) METHODS AND STRENGTHS WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE EMPLOYED, IF IT WERE DECIDED TO ATTACK THE BASE, RANGE THROUGH A NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES:

- (I) DIRECT FRONTAL ASSAULT BY A LARGE GROUP OF CTS UP TO 60 STRONG USING SMALL ARMS FIRE OR EXPLOSIVES;
 (II) COVERT PENETRATION, PROBABLY AT NIGHT, BY ONE OR MORE

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INDIVIDUAL CTS OR SMALL GROUPS TOTALLING UP TO 20 WITH VIEW TO SURPRISE ATTACK ON VITAL POINTS, ESPECIALLY THE AIRCRAFT, BY SMALL ARMS FIRE AND EXPLOSIVES;

(III) MORTAR OR OTHER INDIRECT WEAPON ATTACK, IF THE CTS ACQUIRED THIS CAPABILITY, USING A SMALL FORCE OF UP TO TEN MEN LOCATED IN THE SURROUNDING RICEFIELD/KAMPONG AREAS, ESPECIALLY THOSE TO THE EAST, AND

(IV) SABOTAGE BY THE PLANTING OF EXPLOSIVE DEVICES OR BOOBY TRAPS, DESIGNED TO DAMAGE VITAL POINTS AND INJURE PERSONNEL, BY ONE OR MORE CTS, MEMBERS OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS, OR SYMPATHETIC OR SUBORNED LEC/CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL;

(D) OF THESE METHODS, SABOTAGE IS BY FAR THE MOST LIKELY, ALTHOUGH COVERT PENETRATION AND SURPRISE ATTACK BY A SMALL GROUP SHOULD NOT BE DISCOUNTED, AND A MORTAR ATTACK WOULD BE LIKELY IF THE CTS ACQUIRE THIS CAPABILITY; AND

(E) A SABOTAGE ATTEMPT, IF MADE BY SUBORNED LEC/CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL OR MEMBERS OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS, MIGHT WELL BE DIRECTED AGAINST THOSE VITAL POINTS OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER FENCE OR PROTECTED ONLY BY SSP PATROLS AND DIM LIGHTING. IF AN ATTACK WERE CARRIED OUT BY CTS AS A RESULT OF A CPM/CTO POLICY DECISION, OR BY LOCAL

PAGE 6 RBMWC 200 SECRET

CTS ACTING ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD EXPECT VITAL POINTS WITHIN THE PERIMETER, ESPECIALLY THE AIRCRAFT, TO BE PRIORITY TARGETS, WHETHER THE ATTACK WERE CARRIED OUT BY MORTAR, SURPRISE ASSAULT OR SABOTAGE.

2. FOR DIRECTOR J10
 COMANZUKFOR HAS REQUESTED THAT THIS SIGNAL, AND FULL TEXT OF NOTE WHEN RECEIVED, BE MADE AVAILABLE TO CHIEFS OF STAFF
 BT

SECRET

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 FM COMANZUKFOR
 O RAYWY/DEFENCE CANBERRA
 RBYWDA/NZ DEFENCE WELLINGTON
 INFO RBMQC/OFFICER COMMANDING RAAF BUTTERWORTH
 RBMWAH/AUSTHICOM SINGAPORE
 RBMQC/AUSTHICOM KUALA LU PUA
 BT

SECRET

SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS
 FROM CHAIRMAN ANZUK INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SINGAPORE) FOR DIRECTOR
 JIC CANBERRA, SECRETARY JIC (NEW ZEALAND) WELLINGTON
 ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH
 FOLLOWING IS THE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS SECTION OF ANZUKIG(S)
 NOTE NO 1/1971 OF 30 NOVEMBER, 1971 - "THE THREAT TO AIR BASE
 BUTTERWORTH UP TO THE END OF 1972" WHICH WAS SUBMITTED TO THE
 COMMANDER, ANZUK FORCE, TODAY 2ND DECEMBER. FULL TEXT OF THE NOTE
 IN HARD COPIES BEING DESPATCHED BY BAG 3RD DECEMBER.

E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(1) THE BASE AND THE TARGET (PARAGRAPHS 2 TO 8)

O-3 2 RBMWC 191 SECRET

60. AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH, AN RMAF BASE JOINTLY USED BY THE
 RAAF AND SITUATED ON THE NORTH-WEST COAST OF WEST MALAYSIA, 46
 MILES FROM THE BETONG SALIENT SECTION OF THE THAI BORDER, CURRENTLY
 SUPPORTS OPERATIONS BY RAAF MIRAGES (38), RMAF SABRES AND TEBUANS
 AND OTHER AIRCRAFT. OVER 1,400 RAAF PERSONNEL WORK AT THE BASE
 OF WHOM 300 LIVE ON IT, AS DO NEARLY 900 MALAYSIAN SERVICEMEN
 AND POLICE. SOME 1,500 LOCALLY EMPLOYED CIVILIANS (LEC) AND
 CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL ARE EMPLOYED AT THE BASE. A WIDE RANGE OF
 INSTALLATIONS INCLUDING AN AIR DEFENCE CENTRE, RADAR AND NAVIGA-
 TIONAL AIDS, FUEL AND AMMUNITION STORAGE, AND A MISSILE (MATRA)
 PREPARATION BAY ARE SITUATED ON OR NEAR THE BASE.

(2) CURRENT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

(PARAGRAPHS 9 TO 15)

61. THE MALAYSIAN SPECIAL SECURITY POLICE (SSP) ARE RESPON-
 SIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE BASE INCLUDING CONTROL OF ENTRY,
 GUARDING/PATROLLING OF VITAL POINTS 23 OF WHICH ARE DESIGNATED IN
 AN ANZUK/MALAYSIAN SHARED DEFENCE PLAN FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE BASE
 IN AN EMERGENCY) AND THE MAINTENANCE OF A 10-MAN QUICK REACTION
 FORCE. AT NIGHT PAIRS OF RAAF SECURITY GUARDS, EACH WITH A DOG,
 GUARD THE MIRAGE LINES WHICH ARE FLOODLIT, AND RAAF SERVICE POLICE

PAGE 2 RBMWC 191 SECRET

CARRY OUT MOBILE PATROLS OF VITAL POINTS AT IRREGULAR INTERVALS.
 A COMPANY FROM ANZUK BRIGADE IS STATIONED AT THE BASE FOR APPROX-
 IMATELY 10 MONTHS OF THE YEAR AND, WHEN THERE, PROVIDES A 10-MAN
 QUICK REACTION FORCE FROM 1800 - 0600 HOURS DAILY. STATIC
 DEFENCES COMPRISE A SINGLE 6 TO 8 FOOT PERIMETER FENCE WITH BARBED
 WIRE OVERHANG, AND LIGHTING OF MOST VITAL POINTS.

62. THE OFFICER COMMANDING, RAAF BUTTERWORTH, HAS DRAWN
 ATTENTION TO SERIOUS WEAKNESSES IN THE CURRENT DEFENCES INCLUDING
 THE INEFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE AND INEXPERIENCE OF THE SSP AND THE
 UNCO-OPERATIVE ATTITUDE OF THEIR OFFICERS, THE FACT THAT THE ANZUK
 COMPANY IS NOT PRESENT AT ALL TIMES, DEFICIENCIES IN THE STATIC
 DEFENCES AND VETTING PROCEDURES FOR LEC, AND THE PARKING OF THE
 MIRAGES IN A STRAIGHT LINE AND WITHOUT PROTECTION BY REVETMENTS.

(2) CAPABILITY OF COMMUNIST ORGANISATIONS

(PARAGRAPHS 16 TO 38)

63. IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OVERT EXTERNAL THREAT TO MALAYSIA,
 WHICH IS ASSESSED AS UNLIKELY DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW,
 THE POTENTIAL THREAT IS FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA (CPM),
 THE COMMUNIST TERRORIST ORGANISATION (CTO) AND RELATED SUBVERSIVE
 GROUPS.

PAGE 4 RBMWC 191 SECRET

64. THE CTO HAVE AN ESTIMATED 1,800 TO 2,000 ARMED TERRORISTS
 IN THE THAI BORDER AREAS, WITH SEVERAL HUNDRED IN THE BETONG SALIENT
 AND 300 IN WEST MALAYSIA. OF THESE, WE ASSESS THAT THERE ARE
 SOME 60 IN THE KULIN AND NEARBY FOREST AREAS SOME 15 TO 25 MILES
 EAST OF THE BASE. THEY ARE ASSUMED TO HAVE SMALL ARMS (RIFLES AND
 MACHINE GUNS) AND THE CAPACITY TO USE ANTI-PERSONNEL AND ANTI-
 VEHICLE EXPLOSIVES. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CTS HAVE MORTAR
 CAPABILITY BUT WE ACCEPT THAT THIS COULD BE ACQUIRED AT SHORT NOTICE
 AND WITHOUT OUR RECEIVING ADVANCE WARNING. SEVERAL COMMUNIST SUB-
 VERSIVE ORGANISATIONS LINKED WITH THE CPM/CTO ARE KNOWN TO OPERATE
 IN THE AREA AND HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO COMMIT MINOR ACTS OF SAB-
 OTAGE USING EXPLOSIVES AND BOOBY-TRAPS. RECENT CASES OF THEFT
 HAVE SHOWN THAT UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS (NOT NECESSARILY CTS OR SUP-
 PORTERS) HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS GAINED ACCESS TO AREAS WITHIN
 THE BASE INCLUDING VITAL POINTS.

(3) CPM/CTO POLICY AND INTENTIONS

(PARAGRAPHS 39 TO 44)

65. WE ASSESS THAT CURRENT CPM/CTO INTENTIONS ARE TO CONSOLID-
 AT THEIR PRESENT POSITION IN WEST MALAYSIA BY RECRUITMENT AND

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EXTENSION OF SUPPORT AMONG BOTH CHINESE AND MALAYS, BY THE DEVELOP-
 MENT OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION, FOOD SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS, FOOD
 CACHES AND CAMPS AS BASE AREAS AND FOR TRAINING, BY THE ACQUISITION
 OF ARMS, AND BY THE PROGRESSIVE SPREAD OF THEIR INFLUENCE AND
 PRESENCE, INCLUDING THAT OF ARMED GROUPS, WHILE AVOIDING OTHER THAN
 LIMITED CONTACT WITH THE MALAYSIAN SECURITY FORCES. IT IS DIFFICULT
 TO PREDICT WHEN AND WHERE THE CPM/CTO WILL FEEL CONFIDENT ENOUGH TO
 INITIATE THE "ARMED STRUGGLE" PHASE OF COMMUNIST INSURGENT
 STRATEGY (WIDESPREAD GUERRILLA/MILITARY ACTION INCLUDING ATTACKS ON
 MILITARY FORCES AND PROPERTY) BUT, DESPITE DEFICIENCIES IN MALAYSIAN
 COUNTERMEASURES, WE DOUBT THAT THIS PHASE WILL BE INITIATED THROUGH-
 OUT WEST MALAYSIA BY THE END OF 1972. WE ASSESS, HOWEVER, THAT
 BY THEN THE COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE IS LIKELY TO BE WELL ON THE WAY
 TO COMPLETION IN THE WEST COAST STATES AND IN KELANTAN, THAT THERE
 IS LIKELY TO BE AN INCREASE IN ARMED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE
 BORDER AREA IN KEDAH, PERAK AND KELANTAN WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF
 ISOLATED INCIDENTS OCCURRING FURTHER SOUTHERN AND THAT COMMUNIST
 SUBVERSIVE ORGANISATIONS MIGHT INITIATE A CAMPAIGN OF SABOTAGE
 FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES OR TO CELEBRATE COMMUNIST ANNIVERSARIES.

(4) SITUATIONS IN WHICH AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH MIGHT BE ATTACKED

(PARAGRAPHS 45 TO 53)

BT

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213/1/7/5/1

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INFO RBMWAH/AUST HC SINGAPORE

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SMC NO.	B120
TOR:	B35

BT

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YOUR 3407 ADDRESSED CANBERRA, COPY ANZUKFOR AND SINGAPORE.

ROTATION COMPANY TO BUTTERWORTH.

IN VIEW YOUR SIGNAL REQUEST OBTAIN DIP CLEARANCE AUST COMPANY

14 DEC - 6 JAN

BT

DUTY OFFICER BEING NOTIFIED BY AIR OPS.

AC	NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR
	REFERENCE IF DATE TIME GROUP IS QUOTED

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DHC 7/12 ✓
SA
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file

CH guide 7/12

SECRET



12
213/1/9/5/1

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE

TELEPHONE:

Headquarters
RAAF
Air Base Butterworth
C/- GPO Penang
MALAYSIA

IN REPLY QUOTE 1/7/Air (49)



8th November 1971

ANZUK Force Headquarters (GPO Box)
Australia High Commission Singapore (Chairman ANZUKIG(S))

Where has this
been?

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT
AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH ON 4TH NOVEMBER 1971
TO DISCUSS THE SHARED DEFENCE OF
AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

Reference: A. Our 027 of 26th October 1971

1. As advised by Reference A, not to ANZUK Force Headquarters, a meeting on the shared defence plan was held with the Malaysian elements at Air Base Butterworth on the 4th November 1971.
2. The Chief of Air Staff Royal Malaysian Air Force was not in attendance but was represented by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff.
3. A copy of the minutes of that meeting is enclosed.

K.V.N. Stevens
(K.V.N. STEVENS)
Wing Commander
for Officer Commanding

Enclosure: 1. Minutes of a Conference held at Air Base Butterworth on 4th November 1971 to discuss the Shared Defence of Air Base Butterworth.

Head 107 ✓
Col Stevens 17/12
*File - The Threat to
Butterworth*

Col Stevens 10/12/71

SECRET

SECRET

Copy 16 of 25

1/7/Air (48)

Headquarters
RAAF
Air Base Butterworth
C/- GPO Penang
MALAYSIA

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT
AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH ON 4TH NOVEMBER 1971
TO DISCUSS THE SHARED DEFENCE OF
AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH

<u>Present:</u> Air Commodore I.S. Parker, DFC, AFC	Chairman
Group Captain J.C. Thorp	ASA KL
Group Captain R.P. Joske	CO BSBUT
Wing Commander Mohd Yunus bin Tasi	CO RMAF
Col Hassan	DMI
Lt Col Sulaiman	
Lt Col Khairuddin	PM
Gp Capt Omar	DCAS RMAF
<u>Observers:</u> Wing Commander K.V.N. Stevens	ADMIN SO
Squadron Leader H. McL. B. Miller	S Gr Def O
Squadron Leader M.L. Longland	ATM
Squadron Leader Beh	Air HQ
Major Rodrigues	BM MLB..
Major Ong	MIC CMI
2nd Lt Zainal	SSP
Flight Lieutenant L. Fraser	Secretary

1. The conference was opened at 1004 hours by Air Cdre I.S. Parker (Chairman) who presented the items to be discussed:

1. Assessment of Threat;
2. Joint Instruction on Internal Defence of Butterworth;
3. Assessment of Shortcomings in Present Organization;
4. Methods of Overcoming Deficiencies.

/ITEM 1

SECRET

ITEM 1: ASSESSMENT OF THREAT

2. The DMI introduced Major Ong (MIO) who presented a brief (attached as Annex A) on CT activities.

3. Several questions were asked:

Q. Chairman: Would it be wise to place restrictions on our people driving on roads in Kulin, Dublin Estate, etc.?

A. DMI: No need at this time. CT only interested in attacking senior officers and police.

Q. ASA KL: Of the two types of saboteurs - trained men and those who operate independently - is the possibility of sabotage greater from radical independent operators?

A. DMI: Not thought to be. It is worth noting that the primary aim of the CFM is getting new recruits and new training centres in the deep jungles, and developing the MPLF. This is only the second phase and the CT are presently considered incapable of sustained sabotage operations, but will attempt 'soft' targets.

Q. ASA KL: Is timing for the third phase known?

A. DMI: Dependent on support from local population.

4. The Chairman drew attention to the recent discovery of an observation platform near the bomb dump. The persons apprehended were handed to local security for interrogation and were released after being described as cow herders. The fact that the observation point did not allow a view of animals in the area is still subject to further investigation by the Special Branch Office, Penang. Special Branch have removed the platform, but have not yet given a direct indication that something had been detected in the area.

5. The Chairman drew attention to reports of people seen taking notes outside the base perimeter. It is not yet known how serious this is.

6. DMI requested quick reporting of incidents to enable Special Branch to follow up.

Chairman's Summary

We have a limited number of trained saboteurs in the area. However they are unlikely to take any offensive action at the moment. On the other hand if they, or lesser trained people can see any opening, they could well lay a booby trap, or carry out some type of sabotage, around the base. We have to close the loopholes.

/ITEM 2

ITEM 2: REVIEW OF THE JOINT INSTRUCTION ON
INTERNAL DEFENCE OF BUTTERWORTH

- 7. The Chairman requested comments on Headquarters Butterworth Operation Order 1/71 which had been published since the last meeting.
- 8. DMI had not had time to study the Operation Order but did point out that the allocation of code words was a matter for MINDEF. COBS and CO RMAF had no objection and the Chairman asked DMI to advise the code word to be used for Op Order 1/71.
- 9. COBS asked what was being done re provision of seven radio sets for RMAF. Sets should be compatible with those already in use.
- 10. DMI made a recommendation to have the 6 BDE radio expert discuss the requirement with RMAF and SSP.
- 11. As most representatives were in the same position as DMI and had not had time to study the document further replies would be submitted in the near future.
- 12. Delays in the distribution of amendments to the order were discussed.

<u>Decision</u>	<u>Action By</u>
Future amendments would, after CO RMAF agreement, be distributed direct to holders of the document.	OC RAAF CO RMAF

ITEM 3: ASSESSMENT OF SHORTCOMINGS IN PRESENT
ORGANIZATION

- 13. The Chairman discussed the local threat and highlighted the need to guard mainly against small time sabotage. He said our efforts should be aimed against unauthorized entry.
- 14. Several shortcomings were presented and discussed. They were:
 - DMI - Advised of CPM method of selecting celebration days for trouble making and suggested 6BDE and the Special Branch could warn when 'special days' were imminent.
 - COBS - Raised the question of squatters on land immediately outside the perimeter fence and highlighted the dangerous situation of the two squatter families in the proximity of the bomb dump.
 - Chairman - Defined the three varieties of squatter as being those illegally on Government land, those on private land and those in the dangerous situation, ie. the bomb dump area.
 - Chairman - Raised point of the number of thefts, albeit minor, that suggested the ease with which the perpetrators could enter, work, and leave the base undetected.

/COBS -

- COBS - In answer to DMI and ASA KL, mentioned holes dug under the perimeter security fence and informed of CDW plan to complete the fencing by December 1971.
- Chairman - Raised the need for the SSP to be fully briefed on their responsibilities - particularly when patrolling the perimeter fence.
- COBS - Suggested a DMZ could be created outside the present fence but considered cost would hardly be warranted.
- DMI - Suggested low concertina wire against the outside of the fence.
- Chairman - Raised the problem of entry via the monsoon drains.
- APM - Advised the value of the fence was mainly deterrent and suggested dog patrols would solve fence patrol problems now being encountered. He pointed out the problem of high undergrowth and trees leading up to the fence.
- BM MLB - Said that clearing of land adjacent to the perimeter fence could be done under 'emergency' rulings but this was dependent on whether restricted area gazettal action had been taken.

<u>Chairman's Summary</u>	<u>Action By</u>
CO RMAF is to liaise with local heads of villages to gain acceptance of CDW effort to clear areas immediately outside the security fence.	CO RMAF

ITEM 4: METHODS OF OVERCOMING DEFICIENCIES

15. presented:

The following methods of overcoming deficiencies were

- PM - Raised SSP manpower problem. Present strength/estab - 126/127.
- DMI - Suggested combined study by RMAF/RAAF/SSP to produce better patrol systems.
- ASA KL - Raised question on vetting methods.
- DMI - Raised doubt about vetting of contractors employees, and suggested that the RMAF provide a list of all LEC's so that re-vetting could be done.

/Chairman -

Chairman - Highlighted shortcoming in security lighting system and advised that further improvement was expected soon.

DMI - Suggested improvement could be made in experience level of SSP by increasing the percentage of experienced men. About 75% experience should be possible instead of the present 50%.

COBS - Pointed to a lack of control of European entry by failure to check ID cards or permits.

Chairman - Suggested 'snap checks' at irregular and unannounced intervals - which he approves.

APM - Offered RAAF assistance to save bottlenecks during 'snap checks'.

DMI - Offered PM for visit to SSP unit each month as a measure of raising the efficiency.

CO RMAF - Injected concern for the inadequacy of his establishment in the security specialist fields. He really needed an officer to investigate and advise on SSP matters.

DMI - Establishment requests through correct channels could overcome this.

Chairman's Summary

The shortcomings are the perimeter fence, quality and quantity of SSP, weakness in the vetting system, the standard of security lights, weakness in control of entry, lack of co-operation between various security elements within each service and relationship between SSP and RMAF is not as close as it should be.

Courses of Action

Action By

16. Perimeter Fence. By early next year the perimeter security fence should be as good as it ever will be, with regular maintenance and regular patrolling. BM MIB is to liaise with CO RMAF to define areas outside the perimeter fence that may be cleared under emergency rulings.

BM MIB
CO RMAF

17. SSP. DMI will endeavour to increase the experience level and the quality of SSP. CO RMAF will, after study and RAAF assistance, raise establishment increase requests for his needs for personnel and equipment.

DMI
CO RMAF


18. Vetting. CO RMAF, with RAAF Provost element assistance, will produce a list of all LECs for use by DMI in re-vetting.


CO RMAF

/19. Security

Action By

- 19. Security Lights. Formal approval of MINDEF KL is awaited to enable completion of the main tarmac area security lighting.
- 20. Control of Entry. With liaison between RAAF Provost and SSP better entry control can be effected. APM
CO SSP
- 21. Co-operation. A weekly discussion between RAAF Provost element and CO SSP was agreed. Where unsolved problems occur, OC RAAF and CO RMAF should be consulted. Regular visits to SSP by the PM were agreed. PM RMAF
APM
CO SSP
- 22. SSP/RMAF. CO RMAF to request, after study, any establishment increase considered necessary to raise RMAF specialist security personnel levels. CO RMAF
- 23. Squatters. CO RMAF, in liaison with 6 BDE Commander, to investigate removal of squatters in unsafe areas. 6BDE
CO RMAF
- 24. Conclusion. The Chairman declared the conference adjourned at 1205 hours.


 (L. FRASER)
 Flt Lt
 Secretary


 (I.S. PARKER)
 Air Cdre
 Chairman

Annex: A. Security Briefing on the Arm Threat at RAAF Butterworth.

<u>Distribution:</u>	<u>Copy No</u>
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RMAF Butterworth	7 - 8
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File 6/1/Air	14
Spares	15 - 25

SECURITY BRIEFING ON THE
ARM THREAT AT RAAF BUTTERWORTH
04 NOV 71

Introduction

1. The CPM in a Directive issued in June 1968, announced the CTO intention to return to the armed offensive to capture political power with all other forms of struggle subservient to it. Subsequent Directive or Statements of 1969 and 1970 reiterated the armed offensive aspirations by exploiting on the prevailing situation of the period. With the polarisation of racial sentiments in May 1969, the CPM considered the internal situation in West Malaysia as ripe for the launching of armed struggle. It thus began sending small groups of CTs into the country from across the Border. Initially these units carried out short term incursions to test their acceptance by the rural population. Subsequently deeper incursions were made by armed units and these are now in the process of renewing old contacts, recruiting locals as members, establishing guerilla bases and building up food supplies.

Militant Threat

2. Long range infiltration by armed groups of CTs into this country is targeted at areas which were CTO strongholds during the First Emergency of 1948-1960. Concentrating on the strategy of secrecy in jungle movements, CT groups have penetrated into the following areas:

- a. Kedah State: In Baling and Kulim Districts currently a group of about 60 CTs are believed operating in the Gunong Inas/ Mahang/Bintang Hijau Forest reserves.
- b. Perak State: In Grik, Lenggong, Sg. Siput and Chemor areas CT groups of varying strength operate in the jungle areas.
- c. Kelantan State: In the Tanah Merah and Ulu Kelantan areas small CT groups operate in the jungle fringes of remote areas.

3. Besides this, shallow incursions by larger groups of CTs were also carried out and such infiltration serves the purpose of:

- a. Diversion to attract SF attention.
- b. Ambush soft SF targets so as to project its militant capabilities and boost the morale of its supporters.

4. The groups of CTs which have penetrated into the areas of the Border States in this country as earlier mentioned, serve as a nuclei for large scale infiltrations which may be carried out at a later stage. The present phase of CT activities clearly indicate that they are preparing the ground work aimed at creating an atmosphere conducive to armed revolt.

/Communist

Communist United Front

5. Implementation of the CPM armed struggle policy has already begun, and this is taking shape in two parallel forms. One is the gradual establishment and build-up of CTO military presence in Malaysian territory and the other is the creation of Satellite and masses organisations in West Malaysia. An example of the type of Satellite organisation which the CPM has created is the Malayan People's Liberation Front (MPLF). Between December 1970 and March 1971, at least 30 Chinese youths from Kedah were taken across the border in batches, to the CTO 8th Regimental area where they were indoctrinated and given training in sabotage. A number of these youths have since returned to West Malaysia to carry out acts of sabotage. From the interrogation of some of the youths who were arrested by S.B., it was disclosed that the railway bridge which was blown at Sg. Jerak, Province Wellesley, was carried out by these youths.

6. Formulation of plans to systematically transform all open Front activities into underground preparations for the armed struggle was started as early as 1967. In the period which followed, secret directives spelling out the roles and tasks to be played by underground cadres were issued.

7. The progress achieved by underground cadres was the resultant campaign of Communist propaganda and pamphleteering including the use of booby traps to enhance the propaganda impact was carried out. The underground organisation calling itself the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF) was responsible for initiating this trend of activities which have since taken place sporadically. The MNLF including other clandestine underground organisations, in summary, are responsible for creating mass support base necessary to sustain the armed struggle.

Threat

8. The threat posed by the CPM elements in this country are two-fold:

- a. Militant. By the various armed groups of CTs which have penetrated and are operating in certain jungle areas of this country. Apart from this, other sizeable groups of CTs making short term incursions to create incidents (ie. sabotage, etc) or attack soft SF targets of opportunity near the Malaysian/Thai Border areas. In addition there are the acts of sabotage and the use of booby traps in conjunction to pamphleteering and flag-hoisting activities by underground cadres.
- b. Subversion. Subversion and exploitation by CTs and the underground operatives to the rural population for support to not only establish guerilla bases, recruitment and acquire supplies but also create the situation conducive for armed revolt.

/Threat to RAAF Base

Threat to RAAF Base

9. As mentioned earlier, there are still a number of these trained saboteurs who are still at large and who should be regarded as a threat to the RAAF base at Butterworth. It is our assessment that so long as the group of Communist terrorist are confined to the jungle areas of the Mahang Forest Reserve, it is very unlikely that these CTs will be able to carry out acts of sabotage against the air base. However, there is always the possibility that the trained saboteurs may carry out acts of sabotage at the air base if our security is lacking.

Conclusion

10. Viewing from the activities of the various armed groups operating in the fringe and deep jungle areas of West Malaysia and at their present preparatory phase of armed resurgence, an all out military assault on the air base is unlikely. It is also doubted as assessed from the available intelligence if CTs operating in this country would resort to the use of support weapons - ie. mortars, etc. - targeted at this area. However, threats by way of sabotage, and booby traps in conjunction with pamphleteering and flag-hoisting by CTO underground operatives within and around this area remain perpetual, as the success of such an activity enhance the image of the CTO as well as prove of its intention.

SINGAPORE

213/119/51
File
IN *Ubu*

Reg. No. _____

H.C. _____

D.H.C. _____

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1st Sec (Inf) _____ Attache (S & A) _____

Trade _____ A.S.A. _____ Attache _____

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PARLIAMENT - AUSTRALIAN TROOP INVOLVEMENT IN MALASIA

FOLLOWING QUESTION AND ANSWER ON AUSTRALIAN TROOPS IN MALAYSIA TOOK PLACE IN PARLIAMENT 7.10.71:

AUSTRALIAN TROOP INVOLVEMENT IN MALAYSIA

MR BARNARD - MY QUESTION IS DIRECTED TO THE MINISTER FOR THE ARMY. THE MINISTER WILL BE AWARE OF PERSISTENT PRESS REPORTS IN RECENT MONTHS THAT AUSTRALIAN TROOPS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN ACTION AGAINST COMMUNIST FORCES IN MALAYSIA NEAR THE THAI BORDER. SOME REPORTS HAVE REFERRED TO CASUALTIES AND LOSS OF LIFE IN SUCH ENCOUNTERS. HAS THERE BEEN ANY MILITARY CONTACT BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN UNITS AND MALAYSIAN COMMUNISTS? HAVE AUSTRALIAN UNITS EVER BEEN USED IN ANY WAY FOR INTERNAL POLICE OPERATIONS IN MALAYSIA? WHAT IS THE AREA OF OPERATIONS OF THE USN UNIT STATIONED AT BUTTERWORTH ON A ROTATIONAL BASIS? IF THESE REPORTS ARE WITHOUT SUBSTANCE WHAT ARRANGEMENTS CAN THE MINISTER MAKE FOR BETTER PRESS LIAISON FACILITIES AT BUTTERWORTH TO STOP DISSEMINATION OF THESE DISTURBING STORIES?

END OF QUESTION.

MR PEACOCK - I WOULD HAVE TO ADMIT THAT THE ONLY PRESS REPORT I HAVE SEEN ON THIS MATTER WAS CONTAINED IN A SUNDAY JOURNAL LAST SUNDAY WEEK AND THIS REPORT WAS ERRONEOUS ALMOST IN ITS ENTIRETY. IT WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THERE WAS BEING CONDUCTED MONTHLY A COMPANY FROM AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND UNITS WITH THE ANZUK COMPONENT AT SINGAPORE ON ROTATION. IT HAS BEEN THE INTENTION, AS HAS BEEN STATED BY ME AND THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT COMPANIES WOULD ROTATE SOLELY FOR TRAINING PURPOSES AROUND THE VICINITY OF BUTTERWORTH AND BE STATIONED THERE, AND THAT EACH COMPANY IN TURN WOULD BE DOING THIS.

THERE HAS BEEN NO ENGAGEMENT IN THE MANNER MENTIONED BY THE HON MEMBER. THERE HAVE BEEN NO WOUNDINGS OF AUSTRALIAN SERVICEMEN BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ENGAGED IN THIS SORT OF ACTIVITY. SO I CAN SAY THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS MATTER WAS DISCUSSED BY THAT PARTICULAR PRESS REPORT THE REPORT WAS ERRONEOUS.

THE MATTER OF PUBLIC RELATIONS IN REGARD TO FORCES STATIONED AT BUTTERWORTH COMES UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE MINISTER FOR AIR AND HE HAS, OF COURSE, A PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER THERE WHO IN THAT PARTICULAR REPORT WAS QUOTED AS GIVING INFORMATION THAT THERE WAS A JUNGLE WARFARE CENTRE AND THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WERE COMMITTED THERE. SO, IN A NUTSHELL, THE AUSTRALIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA ARE CONFINED SOLELY TO THE ROTATION OF COMPANIES. THIS IS PART OF OUR AGREEMENT UNDER THE 5-POWER ARRANGEMENT WITH OUR ANZUK FORCES THERE AND IT IS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES. OUR FORCES HAVE NOT BEEN ENGAGED IN ANY WAY IN THE ACTIVITIES MENTIONED BY THE HON MEMBER AND THE ONLY ARTICLE I HAVE SEEN REPORTED FALSELY ON THIS MATTER.

END OF ANSWER.

CFM: 3704 4093 3939 2091 12799 1571 7.10.71

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See file

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Capt Jule
~~LT Col Spang~~
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FM COMANZUKFOR

TO RBMWAH/AUST HC KUALA LUMPUR

INFO RBMWAH/AUST HC SINGAPORE

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL/SMC	
SMC NO.	<u>B120</u>
TOR:	<u>B35</u>

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

YOUR 3407 ADDRESSED CANBERRA, COPY ANZUKFOR AND SINGAPORE.

ROTATION COMPANY TO BUTTERWORTH.

IN VIEW YOUR SIGNAL REQUEST OBTAIN DIP CLEARANCE AUST COMPANY

14 DEC - 6 JAN

BT

AC	NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR
	REFERENCE IF DATE TIME
	GROUP IS QUOTED

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NNNC



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
OPEN WITH EXCEPTION

33(1)(a)

10/7/2019

*Reviewed 10/11/2020 JS
 no change to decision*

CLOSED



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