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25 January, 2023

Signed On : <https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au>

Submission to Inquiry - Mr Stephen Winthrop

Part 1 – Name of Inquiry

Name of Inquiry *

Recognition of RCB for the AASM

Part 2 – About the Submitter

Title or Rank *

Mr

Given Names *

Stephen

Surname *

Winthrop

Post-nominals (if applicable)

Street Number and Name *

████████████████████

Suburb *

████████

Postcode *

██████

State *

██████

Email Address: *

████████████████████

Primary Contact Number *

██████████████

Secondary Contact Number

Is the Submission on behalf of an organisation? If yes, please provide details:

No

Part 3 – Desired outcome

Provide a summary of your submission:

Meeting the definition of warlike.

Part 4 - Your submission and Supporting Documentation

File Attached: A-statement-on-meeting-the-definition-of-Warlike.docx

Part 5 – Consent and declaration

✓ I consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal making my submission publicly available.

✓ I also consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal:

- using information contained in my submission to conduct research;
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation considered by the Tribunal to be appropriate; and
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation the subject of adverse comment in the submission;
- using content in my submission in its report to Government.

The Tribunal will decide which person or organisation is appropriate, and this may include:

1. persons or organisations required to assist with the inquiry; and
2. persons or organisations with an interest in the inquiry.

✓ I declare that the information I have provided is correct.

Name

Stephen Winthrop


Date

25/01/2023

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "S. Winthrop". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Signed by Mr Stephen Winthrop

Signed on: 25 January, 2023



A statement on meeting the definition of Warlike.

I apologise for rehashing what has been stated before by many people, but it is important to the point I would like to make.

RCB was warlike for the following reasons.

1. There was a communist insurgency in Malaysia 1968 to 1989, The insurgents aim was to overthrow the elected government by armed force. We were in a country fighting a war against the communist.
2. RCB role was a Quick Reaction Force to defend RMAF Butterworth from a CT attack. That is to counter attack, to kill the enemy,
3. RCB had full front line ammunition and ROE to enable us to carry out our role.
4. There was threat to Butterworth as stated by Intelligence Agency and our JIO.
5. RCB was taking the place of the Malaysian army at Butterworth, we were doing their job of defending their air base during their communist insurgency, and we were expected if the need arose to go into battle with the Communist Insurgences, that is a live fire fight with the enemy, to kill or be killed.

The bottom line, RCB was expected to go into battle against the communist insurgents, that is kill or be killed, there was no other option for us if Butterworth was attacked or penetrated.

In any one's standard that is warlike conditions.

1. While without a doubt RCB was warlike, we have to fit the definition of warlike.
2. The definition of warlike was probably decided around a table, there would have been a debate of what should be included or not included, it was just what they decided at that time sitting in the office. Could they come up with a definition which covered every warlike situation.
3. How do you deal with a situation when what is in reality was warlike deployment but may not fit the definition of warlike 100%.
4. Does one use good and fair judgment in the decision knowing in truth that it was a warlike operation or does he say it only filled the definition by 99% so it fails the definition.
5. Is there any justice in finding we fail the man-made definition by a few %, when in truth and what was happening on the ground it was a warlike deployment.
6. It is impossible to know what is going on in someone's mind, if to attack or not to attack, we can only go on what their actions and said intentions are, as to an expectation of an attack, and expectation of casualties.

7. The Communist Terrorist clearly stated their aim was to take control of Malaysia by armed force. We know The Ct's conducted a bloody campaign throughout Malaysia, we also know by their action that no place in Malaysia was exempt from attack which included Butterworth. Butterworth was a likely target for an attack and casualties as any other military base was.
8. We know that the Ct's were very active around Butterworth, the 8th Assault Unit was operated in Butterworth area. We know that there was an active subversive group operating on Penang Island.
9. Evidence has been produced in submissions that bridges, railway lines, were blown up, Military Barracks on Penang rocketed.
10. Evidence has been provided in other submissions in the form of newspaper articles of fire fights between the Ct's and Malaysian forces on the door step of Butterworth.
11. These real live war activities of the Ct's around Butterworth clearly show there was an expectation of an attack and an expectation of casualties for Butterworth. This environment around Butterworth could only confirm Butterworth would be attacked and there would be an expectation of casualties.
12. There may be a possibility we do not fit the definition of warlike 100%, but in truth it was warlike, and should be found to be warlike, otherwise the system has failed the veterans of RCB.

Did the policy of not being able to operate outside the wire increase the Expectation of Casualties?

1. The government policy of staying behind the fence went against all good military tactics.
2. This denied us the opportunity to control and secure the area outside Butterworth, clearing patrols, fighting and standing patrols, all designed to prevent use of the ground by the enemy, and they were very active around Butterworth.
3. This is reinforced with the **SECRET Air Brief 546/8/28**
The major difficulty from a defence viewpoint is that the Ct's are able to decide the timing, nature and frequency of attack virtually unmindful and with fear of retaliation. The advantage remains with the Ct's.

Stephen Winthrop
25 January 2023