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21 January, 2023

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Submission to Inquiry - Squadron Leader Bernard Kevin Farley

Part 1 – Name of Inquiry

Name of Inquiry *

Medallic recognition for service with Rifle Company Butterworth

Part 2 – About the Submitter

Title or Rank *

Squadron Leader

Given Names *

Bernard Kevin

Surname *

Farley

Post-nominals (if applicable)

CSM

Street Number and Name *

[Redacted]

Suburb *

[Redacted]

Postcode *

[Redacted]

State *

VIC

Email Address: *

[Redacted]

Primary Contact Number *

[Redacted]

Secondary Contact Number

Is the Submission on behalf of an organisation? If yes, please provide details:

It is my belief that there is ample justification for RCB and RAAF personnel posted or attached to Air Base Butterworth in the period 1970 to 1989 to be classified as 'warlike service' and the following entitlement be considered: a. Service at Butterworth 1970-1989 be afforded full entitlements under the Veterans Entitlement Act 1986; and b. RAAF and RCB service personnel posted or attached to Air Base Butterworth in the period 1970-1989 be awarded the AASM with Malaysian clasp.

Part 3 – Desired outcome

Provide a summary of your submission:

I Bernard Kevin Farley SQNLDR (Retd) O321473 am making a submission to the Medallic recognition for service with Rifle Company Butterworth. I note that the RCBRG has now sourced significant documentation for the period 1971 to 1975 and a small amount from BSBUT Unit History Sheets in 1977-1978. This information is confirmed by many previous private submissions to this inquiry. This submission outlines my tasking at BSBUT during a 2 year posting in 1982 and 1983 and then refers to historical documentation already presented to the DHAAT RCB Inquiry and additional open source information to demonstrate the need for a heightened level of defence preparedness against an identified insurgent threat of attacks by the CPM/CTO against Australian assets and personnel at Butterworth and Penang in the period between 1970 to 1989 now referred to as the 'Second Malaysian Emergency'. Both Malaysia and New Zealand have now reclassified military service 1970 to 1989 as 'Active Service' and I believe there is now ample documentation that has been made available to the DHAAT RCB Inquiry to justify a recommendation of VEA entitlement and AASM for Australian Service Personnel who served at Air Base Butterworth in the period 1970 to 1989. Full details are contained in the attached submission documents.

Part 4 - Your submission and Supporting Documentation

File Attached: Submission-to-RCB-V4-3.pdf

ABB-Families-Protection-Plan.pdf

Part 5 – Consent and declaration

I consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal making my submission publicly available.

I also consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal:

- using information contained in my submission to conduct research;
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation considered by the Tribunal to be appropriate; and
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation the subject of adverse comment in the submission;
- using content in my submission in its report to Government.

The Tribunal will decide which person or organisation is appropriate, and this may include:

1. persons or organisations required to assist with the inquiry; and
2. persons or organisations with an interest in the inquiry.

I declare that the information I have provided is correct.

Name

Bernard Kevin Farley

Date

21/01/2023



Signed by Squadron Leader Bernard Kevin Farley

Signed on: 21 January, 2023

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Personal Background

1. I Bernard Kevin Farley joined the RAAF in January 1976 as an Airmen and graduated the Army Officer Training School (OCS) Portsea in December 1978. I served as a RAAF Ground Defence Officer (GRDEFO) until discharge in March 1997 and attained the rank of Squadron Leader. I then service transferred to the Army Reserve in the RAINF in late 1997 and was allocated the rank of Major and discharged from the Army Reserve in 2006. In March 2013 I re-joined the RAAFAR as a SQNLDR GRDEFO and served until compulsory age retirement in June 2018.
2. I was posted to the FLTLT GRDEFO position at BSBUT in December 1981 and served in that role until January 1984 and these were my duties:
 - 2.1. Support the SGRDEFO in his role as Ground Defence Advisor to CO BSBUT with planning and coordination of the Shared Defence Plan of Air Baser Butterworth (ABB). Functions include, but not limited to liaison with Royal Malaysian Regiment (RMR), RMAF Special Service Police (HANDAU) and Royal Malaysian Police Field Force (RMPFF);
 - 2.2. Provide advice to SGRDEFO on GDOC procedures and assist with the annual review of the Shared Defence Plan;
 - 2.3. As part of a BSBUT team visit to Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) Base Tengah to review Defence and Fire Service plans and preparedness appropriate to RAAF aircraft deployments;
 - 2.4. Plan and coordinate annual weapon training for all RAAF personnel at ABB;
 - 2.5. Manage the operation of the Base airfield and domestic fire service capability;
 - 2.6. Co-ordinate training of RMAF Firefighters in preparation for the handover of Fire Service capability to RMAF;
 - 2.7. As part of HQBUT briefing team, conduct arrivals briefs for RAAF personal, dependents, RCB and visiting military groups;
 - 2.8. Plan and deliver basic infantry skills to RAAF Mobile Reserve Flight (MRF) - later renamed the Base Combatant Personnel Flight (BCP FLT);
 - 2.9. Train the Unit Defence SQN FLTCDRs and SNCO in GDOC procedure and their roles in the Shared Defence Plan;
 - 2.10. Manage all GDOC operation and ground defence security during increased security or ground defence exercises as part of annual 1ADC air defence exercise.
 - 2.11. Conduct Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Agent (EORA) training and manage the Base EORA response to bomb threats,
 - 2.12. Provide an armed Ground Defence team for SAR response to off base downed aircraft incidents, and
 - 2.13. For a six month period in 1983, I was on higher duties as SGRDEFO and Ground Defence Advisor to CO BSBUT.
3. I acknowledge RAAF Ground Defence Officer (GRDEFO) submissions to the RCB DHAAT Inquiry No 045 from GPCAPT R. J. Coopes MBE and Submission No. 115 by WGCDR G.R. Penney and these members held the same FLTLT GRDERO position as myself in the four previous years. There was a 3rd submission No. 054 by WGCDR J. Piers who held the SQNLDR Senior GRDEFO (SGRDEFO) position 1979-1981. I concur with all information provided by the three previous GRDFO submissions. I also acknowledge all other submissions, particularly the significant input of RCBRG and their sourcing of declassified documents from the 1971-1975.

Submission Aim

4. The aims for this submission are:
 - 4.1. That service in Butterworth between 1970 to 1989 be classified as warlike service under the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986.
 - 4.2. That service at Butterworth between 1970 to 1989 be awarded with AASM with clasp Malaysia.
5. I refer to the 2010 Inquiry 'Terms of Reference' of Recognition For Member Of Rifle Company Butterworth For Service In Malaysia Between 1970 and 1989 dated 10 June 2010 and believe it is appropriate for the current Inquiry to consider similar matters:
 - 5.1. consider any other material relevant to these claims;
 - 5.2. consider the possible impact of recognition for Australian Defence Force service on the recognition of other Australian Government service, such as members of the Royal Australian Air Force at Royal Malaysian Air Force Base Butterworth and 4th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment at Terendak during the period; and
 - 5.3. make findings and recommendations as to the eligibility of members of the RCB for the AASM 1945-75 or AASM or the granting of any other form of recognition for their service.¹
6. **Additional factors to consider:**
 - 6.1. RAAF Service Members were posted to RAAF Butterworth for 24-30 months in the period 1970-1989 and accompanied by their dependents. RCB was attached for three months per Company and then relieved by a replacement Company. RCB were not accompanied by their dependents.
 - 6.2. This submission will provide details related to the RAAF Service Members tasks as part of the Air Base Butterworth 'Shared Defence Plan', and RCB command status as OPCON to OC RAAF ABB as part of the same Shared Defence Plan; and
 - 6.3. It would be difficult to understand how two groups, both integral components of the same shared defence plan, would not be considered to be facing the same threat levels and therefore both eligible for 'warlike' status.

Security Threats 1971

7. RCBRG has sourced ANZUK Intelligence Group (Singapore) Note. 1/1971. The points below will summarise the threat assessment listed in that document:
 - 7.1. it is unlikely that any threat to Air Base Butterworth will arise from an external overt attack on Malaysia;
 - 7.2. there is a potential threat to the Base from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO), and related communist subversive organisation, whose aim is the establishment of a communist state in Malaysia/Singapore; ultimately by "armed struggle"-widespread guerrilla/militant action – and who have an estimated 1,800 to 2,000 terrorists in the Thai/Malaysia border areas. Of these some 300 are estimated to be within West Malaysia, with some 60, assumed to be armed with rifles, machine guns and explosives, in the Kulim and nearby forest areas approximately 15 to 25 miles from the Base;
 - 7.3. it is possible, but we consider still unlikely, that the CPM/CTO could take a decision to attack the Base in certain circumstances, namely:
 - 7.3.1. "if communist infrastructure in the northern states of Western Malaysia were rapidly and progressively expanded during 1972... ;

¹ DHAAT Inquiry Into Recognition For Members Of Rifle Company Butterworth For Service In Malaysia Between 1970 And 1989, Terms of Reference, dated 11March 2010

- 7.3.2. if there were large-scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest, perhaps involving the diversion of Security Forces;
- 7.3.3. if the CPM/CTO were to see significant psychological or propaganda advantage in an attack either in terms of Australian or Malaysian government or public attitudes to the Base in the context of the Five Power Defence Arrangements or as a morale-boosting demonstration, possible related to a communist anniversary;
- 7.3.4. there is definitely a risk one or more CTs, or members of subversive groups known to be operating in the vicinity, could; regardless of CPM/CTO policy and/or acting on their own initiative, attempt an isolated attack on or within the Base at any time;
- 7.4. If there were large scale civil disturbances or major industrial unrest, perhaps involving the diversion of Security Forces; and
- 7.5. There is definitely a risk one or more CTs, or members of subversive groups known to be operating in the vicinity, could, regardless of CPM/CTO policy and/or acting on their own initiative, attempt an isolated attack on or within the Base at any time.”²
8. The 1971 threat assessment also made the following points:

“The Royal Malaysian Military Police 26 company, Special Security Police (SSP) are responsible for the security of the Base, including control of entry, the guarding on a 24-hour basis of eight Vital Points, and the patrolling of the others regular intervals. They maintain a quick reaction force of section strength (approximately ten men). The RAAF Mirage lines are not guarded during working hours when they are under normal surveillance by RAAF personnel; outside these hours they are guarded by two RAAF Security Guards, each armed with a pistol and accompanied by a dog. RAAF Service Police carry out mobile patrols at irregular intervals every night during which they check the security of Vital Points and observe the state of vigilance of the SSP guards, reporting by voice radio (also held by the SSP guards) to the RAAF duty security controller at the RAAF guardroom near the main entrance to the Base.”³

“The OC ABB, has drawn attention to serious weaknesses in the current defence, including: inadequacy in the control and performance of the SSP generally and especially in regard to lack of patrolling of the perimeter, ineffective guarding of Vital Points, the inexperience and youth of the officers and personnel, and their un-willingness to co-operate closely with the RAAF; the fact that the ANZUK company (with its quick reaction section) is not present on the Base at all times; inadequate control by the SSP of access to the Base, the fact that the perimeter fence is in the main single chainlink, unpatrolled and inadequately lit, and has kampong dwellings abutting on certain sections; ineffective lighting of most Vital Points including bomb dump (although this aspect should be improved in the near future); lack of knowledge and control of the vetting of LEC and contractor personnel and doubt the SSP is carrying out effect vetting; the parking of mirage in straight lines because of limitations in ground servicing equipment; and the absence of revetments to protect the Mirages.”⁴
9. By 1982 there had been minor improvement in the base defence infra-structure. Notable changes were: RCB was permanently stationed at Air Base Butterworth, and an eastern perimeter revetment and internal blast walls that house four aircraft per bay with installed in 1976 to enhance protection

² ANZUK Intelligence Group (Singapore) Note No. 1/1971, The Threat to Air Base Butterworth up to the End of 1972, dated 30 November, 1971, Paragraph 61

³ Ibid., pg 16-17

⁴ Ibid., pg 5-6, paras 9-15

of on the RAAF Mirages flight lines. The Mirages remained parked in straight lines and four aircraft remained wing tip to wing tip within each of the bays separate bays. Other concerns raised by the OC RAAF ABB in 1971, related to the performance of the SSP remained relevant in 1982 – 1983 and when briefed on this aspect on arrival were of significant concern to RAAF personnel and RCB in particular.

The 1975 Threat

10. Attached at RCBRG Submission 079 is a copy of JIO Australia Bulletin No. 13/75, The Security of Air Base Butterworth⁵. The bulletin notes that threats to Air Base Butterworth had escalated from the earlier 1971 threat assessment referred to in paragraph 7 above. The 1975 threats are listed as follows:

“An open conventional assault on the Base by day or night, by a large group of communist terrorists using small arms and explosives. This would run the risk of meeting the superior fire-power of Base defence personnel and could result in severe casualties for the terrorists. An air photo showing likely approaches for CTO assault groups is at Annex F.”⁶

“Covert penetrations by night by separate groups of terrorists using explosives, with the object of attacking Vital Points and aircraft. The CTO has demonstrated its capability to carry out such operations, and such a plan offers the prospect of destroying a large amount of expensive equipment with a relatively low risk of casualties among the terrorists.”⁷

“An attack by fire using mortars or other indirect weapons from the surrounding paddy-field/kampong areas, especially those to the east. Crude rockets have already been used in attacks on military installations, and is likely the CTO has a mortar capability; this form of attack is QUITE LIKELY.”⁸

“Sabotage, by the planting of delayed-action explosives, booby-traps, and other similar devices designed to damage equipment and to injure personnel, by members of subversive groups or sympathetic locally-employed civilians or contractor personnel. In this case targets outside the Base might be chosen, and there would not be as much danger of detection by security patrols. Minor acts of sabotage committed within the Base by such personnel would result in their detection by security patrols. Minor act of sabotage committed within the base by such, would result in in their detection and in a tightening of security with no significant gains for the CTO cause. Nevertheless the use of booby-traps and minor acts of sabotage by subversive groups are relatively common through-out Peninsular Malaysia and pose a DISTINCT THREAT, both to the Base and to Australian personnel and their dependents.”⁹

“Acts of terrorism against RAAF married quarters adjacent to the Base (tan Sai Gin and Rubina Park)”¹⁰

“The CTO could easily adopt tactics used by other terrorist organisation, notably those in South America, of murdering or kidnapping important foreign residents in order to embarrass the Government publicity and obtain concessions, such as release of political prisoners, as part of a wider campaign of urban terrorism. ...”¹¹

⁵ JIO Australia, Bulletin No. 13/75, The Security of Air Base Butterworth, dated October 1975,

⁶ Ibid., para 48(a)

⁷ Ibid., para 48(b)

⁸ Ibid., para 48 (c)

⁹ Ibid., para 48(d)

¹⁰ Ibid., para 48(e)

¹¹ Ibid., para 30

11. Arms and Equipment. CTO have upgraded from WWII British weapons to modern weapons purchased or sourced from Thai and Malaysian Security Forces, including US M-16, 7.62 SLR, 9mm SMGM-79 grenade launchers and shotguns¹² and have shown a capability to manufacture anti-personnel and anti-vehicle explosive devices¹³ and Voice of Malaya Radio (VMR) has claimed Communist Terrorist Organisation (CTO) had used mortars and Malaysian authorities claim to have photos of CTO training with mortars in Southern Thailand¹⁴

Summary of Threat Upgrade from 1971 to 1975

12. It is clear from the threat assessment documents in 1971 and 1975 that the CPM/CTO capability has increase. The likelihood of direct assaults on the base by large groups remains unlikely. It appears that the CPM/CTO had built increased capabilities in the use of indirect weapons (mortars and rocket), and the use of explosive devices for sabotage by either CTO penetration or by sympathetic locally employed contractors is now quite likely.
13. An emerging tactic is the use of booby-traps and minor acts of sabotage by subversive groups are relatively common throughout Peninsular Malaysia and pose a distinct threat, both to the Base and to Australian personnel and their dependents. In 1975, acts of terrorism against Married Quarters (MQ) adjacent to the Base are threatened. It is difficult to see why only two of the possible four suburbs (Tan Sai Gin, Rubina Park, Telok Ayer Tawar and senior officers married quarters at the southern end of the Base) were not all listed. Given the majority of RAAF MQ were located on Pinang Island, it is also difficult to understand why these were are not listed.
- 14. 1975 Likely Threats.** JIO 13/75, assessed the use of delayed-action explosives, booby-traps, and other similar devices designed to damage equipment and to injure personnel as a DISTINCT THREAT, and the use of mortars and indirect fire weapons as QUITE LIKELY. Both of these weapon types have the capability of producing multiple casualties to Service personnel. In light of these issues the RCB DHAAT Panel attention is directed to the following reference:

14.1. Briefing for DCAS Concerning Security of Butterworth:

14.1.1. "Ground defence and security of assets are achieved by a combination of military and police actions:

- a. "...on-base ground defence arrangements are required to provide close defence of assets when attack is imminent and a specialist ground defence (or infantry) force capable of responding quickly to an attack, to relieve an over-run position and counter attack any group which occupy positions on the base."¹⁵
- b. "... The obvious and immediate effects from rocket mortar and other forms of attack ... (would be) the death and injury to personnel and families."¹⁶

14.2. Hon. J. Clarke, The report on the Review of Veterans' Entitlements 2003 make the following assessment:

"It is considered that if the government judges that a particular area is vulnerable to attack and dispatches armed force there they are sending forces (potentially) into harm's way, or danger."

¹² .Ibid., para 29

¹³ Ibid., para 31

¹⁴ .Ibid., para 31

¹⁵ Department of Air, Briefing for DCAS Concerning Security of Butterworth, October 1975, Ref 564/8/28, para16.

¹⁶ Ibid, para 12

“If ADF personnel are placed in circumstance where they may be used to react to an assessed threat made by Australian Government, intelligence agencies, it has to be considered operational service. This is regardless of whether the threat is realised or not.”¹⁷

14.3. DHAAT, Inquiry into Recognition of Australian Defence Force Special Air Service Counter terrorist and Special Recovery Duties, 2009 has the following quote:

“Both the Clarke Review and repatriation law provides ample interpretation of the notion of incurred danger. Various courts and tribunals have that no attempt is made to indicate how much, how close, how long or how intense the incurred danger must be before it meets the requirement for the legislation or relevant policy. Indeed, its strongly argues that the belief of authorities has an enemy poses a significant threat to a particular part of Australia (leading, for example, to the Government sending forces to defend that area, or conduct operations in that area) provides strong evidence that the force sent in response to that threat have been sent into harm’s way and therefore have incurred danger. In fact, the danger need only be possible, not probable, nor does it have to eventuate.”¹⁸

15. A minute to the Director of Joint Services (DJS) from the Strategic and International Policy Division addressed Malaysian Ministry of Defence concerns regarding “the possibility of rocket attacks on Butterworth”. The writer drew attention to a small but active urban CTO cell in Penang that had the capability of launching such attacks on ABB. The significance of any such attack “on RAAF aircraft would obviously have significance going beyond the actual damage sustained, bringing into question fundamental political aspects of Australian policy. Risk to aircraft thus means risk for that policy and political difficulty for the Government in the handling of policy, both substantively and presentationally (e.g. in the Parliament).¹⁹

16. The Chief of Air Staff (CAS), Air Marshall J.A. Rowland, expressed concern to the Minister regarding the lack of security in the area surrounding ABB in the light of “recent intelligence information concerning possible CTO intentions to launch rocket attacks on bases in Malaysia ...” and the “possibility that the CTs have or are able to obtain 81/82mm mortars to supplement their known supplies of 3.5 inch rockets.”²⁰

17. Academic Weichong Ong, University of Exeter contended that the ‘second emergency’ had three distinct phases:

17.1. **First Phase** was characterised by the infiltration and movement of CPM groups into Peninsular Malaysia and the re-establishment of an underground mass support and supply infrastructure from 1968 to 1973;

17.2. **Second Phase** was in 1974: This was a watershed year that witnessed an increased armed violence as all three CPM groups tried to outdo each other;

17.3. **Third Phase** was from 1975 to the end of the CPM’s armed struggle in 1989 and the signing of the Haayai Peace Accords...”²¹

¹⁷ Hon. Clarke J., The report on the Review of Veterans’ Entitlement, January 2003, para9,

¹⁸ DHAAT, Inquiry into Recognition of Australian Defence Force Service Special Air Service Counter Terrorist and Special Recovery Duties, 22 December 2009, para 81

¹⁹ Strategic and International Policy Division Minute D58/4/1(176) RAAF Mirage Squadron at Butterworth. 27 May 1975.

²⁰ Security of Butterworth. J.A. Rowland. AIR MSHL. CAS. 554/9/33(87) 7 Oct 75.

²¹ Weichong Ong, Securing the Population from Insurgency and Subversion in the Second Emergency (1968-1981), University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Research in History, August 2010.
<https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10036/119566/OngW.pdf?sequence=2>

18. Academic Chean Boon Kheng, in his book, *The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia, 1948*; makes the following statement:

“ ... The 1970s and 1980s saw the CPM intensify its activities of terrorism and clashes with security forces. Communists groups attempted to blow up the National Monument in Kuala Lumpur, carried out ambushes of police field forces and succeeded in assassination the Chief of Perak State and the Inspector-General of Police. These activities were due to rivalry amongst three factions in the CPM. The split had been over part purges and strategies and each faction tried to outdo the other in militancy and violence. The communist threat was serious during the administration of third Prime Minister Hussein Onn (1976 – 81) that it was alleged the government had been infiltrated and there was communist influence among UMNO politicians ”²²

19. Whilst threat assessments dated later than 1975 have not been found or made available, the above academic opinion indicates the threat of terrorism was still rising in the period 1976-1981.

20. **Increased Security October 1977 to September 1978.** There was a period of increased security over an 11 month period in 1977-78. Copies of the Commanding Officer Monthly – Base Squadron – Air Base Butterworth, Unit History Sheets²³ were acquired by RCBRG under FOI. These monthly reports advise increased security was implemented for a total of 20 day. Copies of these Unit History Sheets are attached to RCBRG Submission No 079. Further, GPCAPT Coopes (Submission No 045) who filled the FLTLT GRDEFO position at BSBUT during the period 1977-1978, noted in this submissions is the same high threat activity period.

21. The 1975 threat assessment also indicates movement toward the use of indirect weapons and covert placement of explosive weapons that limited possible casualties for CPM/CTO, but are capable of producing significant threats to Australian of assets and personnel. There is also an emerging threat to ‘soft targets’, such as dependents (consider JIO 13/73 quote in para 11 of this document). Such soft targets are beyond the immediate response of specialised infantry QRF and therefore present less risk of casualties for the CTO. Given the assessment of academics and the direct evidence of 1977-78 BSBUT Unit History Sheets, it is reasonable to assume that JIO Bulletins issued after 1975 will reflect further development in CPM/CTO capabilities and tactics and greater threat to Australian assets and personnel at ABB.

22. In contrast to the trend outlined above, the CDF Submission to this inquiry contains the following assessment:

“The Joint Intelligence Organisation (now known as the Defence Intelligence Organisation) consistently assessed the treat level as LOW for Butterworth over the period in question”²⁴

23. The ADF submission characterised the JIO assessed threat levels for the entire 1970 to 1989 period as ‘consistently LOW’. The word ‘consistently’ is not an absolute term and this assessment appears to be challenged by the escalation noted in the increasing threat from 1971 to 1975, BSBUT Unit History Sheets for 1977-78 (copies attached to Submission No 79), personnel collaboration of the BSBUT Unit History Sheets from Submission No. 045 and the academic assessments listed at paragraphs 17 – 18 above, all of which strongly indicate an increase threat from CTO in at least the period 1976 to 1981.

²² Chean Boon Kheng (National University of Singapore, *The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia, 1948-90: Contesting The Nation-State and Social Change*, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 11, 1 (June 2009), pg 148

²³ National Archives, Commanding Officer’s Report, Base Squadron – Air Base Butterworth, Unit History Sheets, October 1977 – September 1978. (copies attached to RCBRG Submission No 079)

²⁴ CDF Reference EC22-001541, 6 July , Page 16 Para. 3.29 (E), (copy at Submission No. 096)

The RCB DHAAT Inquiry would benefit greatly from improved access to information for the years following 1975 and to the end of the Malaysian declared 'Second Emergency' in 1989.

24. As a final comment: I commend consideration of Submission 036a - Major Mark Gallagher (Retd) that relate to his three tours at ABB. In particular his comments as the Senior Army Officer at ABB 1988-1990 in the role of OC 65 GL Sect. ²⁵

Shared Base Defence Plan

25. The Shared Defence Plan for Air Base Butterworth in 1971²⁶ is attached in documents provided with Submission No 079 to RCB DHAAT Inquiry. The copy is difficult to read in-part and will not be reproduced to avoid further loss of detail.
26. At OP ORDER No. 1/71, the Officer Commanding RAAF Air Base Butterworth Is the designated Ground Defence Commander and allocates tasking and preparedness levels to meet his responsibilities for Defence of RAAF assets and personnel. Having worked closely with later versions (1981-1983) of this plan, I will summarise the 1971 plan to assist a better understanding of the detail:
- 26.1. The OC RAAF ABB further delegates to Commanding Officer BSBUT all forces assigned to him for ground defence
- 26.2. CO BSBUT commands specialist security elements of RAAF Police and Ground Defence. RAAF Police manage period of normal security (low threat) and Ground Defence manages the Ground Defence Operations Centre (GDOC) that assumes control in periods of increased security.
27. The following groups have be allocated specific tasking under ABB OR ORDER 1/1971:
- 27.1. Rifle Company Butterworth.**
- 27.1.1. Normal Security - under OPCON to Ground Defence Commander a Section (10 pers) is on immediate Notice to Move (NTM) for QRF response and activated by RAAF Police Duty Security Controller;
- 27.1.2. Security GREEN – Bring Platoon (PLT) to 2 hours' NTM and enhance RCB logistics;
- 27.1.3. Security AMBER – OPCON through GDOC, PLT to immediate NTM, bring remaining PLT to full readiness, allocated Liaison Officer (LO) to GDOC for duty as Ground Defence Advisor and COY LO;
- 27.1.4. Security RED
- 27.1.4.1. RCB employed on tasks commensurate with training and specialist skills;
- 27.1.4.2. Deploy PLT as directed by Ground Defence Commander;
- 27.1.4.3. Provide QRF capable of responding by vehicle, foot and helo;
- 27.1.4.4. Be prepared to undertake, cordon and search, road blocks, crowd control/dispersal, additional protection of Vital Points (VPs) and support control of entry to Base.
- 27.2. Mobile Reserve Flight**
- 27.2.1. BSBUT is to provide 39 pers FLT with enhanced infantry skill for activation at Security AMBER. Tasks:
- 27.2.1.1. A quick reaction capable to respond to any incident within the perimeter as directed by GDOC;
- 27.2.1.2. Patrols within the perimeter as directed by GDOC; and
- 27.2.1.3. Assistance to RMAF SSP as directed by GDOC.

²⁵ Gallagher M, Submission 036a, Submission to The DHAAT Inquiry into Medallic Recognition for Service with Rifle Company Butterworth.

²⁶ Air Base Butterworth OP Order No.1/71, Shared Defence Situation of Air Base Butterworth, Annex A to F.

27.2.1.4. FLT Cdr draw weapons and equipment at Security Amber and deploy for tasking at Security RED.

27.3. Squadron Defence Flights

27.3.1. Normal Security No. 3SQN, No. 11SQN, No. 75SQN and No. 478SQN (main) provide 36 personnel for guarding VPs within SQN AOs.

27.3.2. Draw weapons and equipment at Security AMBER and deploy to duties at Security RED.

27.4. Increment to RAAF Service Police

27.4.1. No.3SQN, No. 75SQN, No. 478SQN to provide 8 pers per SQN under command of RAAF SP;

27.4.2. Task is to support RMAF SSP with remote VP guarding tasks.

27.4.3. FLT Cdr draw weapons and equipment at Security Amber and deploy for tasking at Security RED.

27.5. No.1 Air Defence Centre (1ADC) RMAF Defence Flight

27.5.1. Tasks.

27.5.1.1. OC No. 1ADC is to provide 17 pers flight to protect 1ADC operational installations to mound duty at Security RED.

Families Protection Plan

28. JIO Bulletin No. 13/75 advise the following:

28.1. Under customary international law the Malaysian Government has a duty to protect all persons in Malaysia: However, under the provisions of the Australian/Malaysian Defence Accord, Commonwealth forces have a right to take additional measures for the protection of dependents of Service members and families of employees of Australian Government Departments attached to the RAAF including visitors resident with these families.²⁷

29. Headquarter RAAF Air Base Butterworth, Operation Order No 2/72²⁸ provides the following details of the 1971 Families Protection Plan (FPP) for RAAF families at Air Base Butterworth and a copy is attached to this submission. The 1972 Families Protection Plan is summarised as follows:

29.1. Threat. There is a threat of racial communal disturbances to families resident in Base Married Quarters, housing estates and hiring's in Butterworth and Penang

29.2. Delegation of Responsibility.

29.2.1. The Officer Commanding RAAF Butterworth has delegated to the Commanding Officer Base Squadron Butterworth the responsibility of the Families Protection Plan.

29.2.2. The Assistant Provost Marshal (APH) is to control a warden organization through the families Protection Operation Centre (FPOC). The Deputy Assistant Provost Marshall (DAPM) will direct operations from FPOC, Penang.

29.2.3. The FPP is managed by RAAF Police and utilises a Warden Organisation of RAAF Service Personnel living in each designated MQ suburb in Penang and Butterworth.

29.2.4. Forces assigned are RAAF Service Police, Wardens Organisation, and other forces as required.

29.2.5. Families are protected in three stages:

29.2.5.1. State Alpha (Cautionary). .Contain Families in Suburban Zones and restrict movement.

29.2.5.2. State Bravo. (Alert). Confine Families to their homes. State Bravo may involve the issue of weapons to wardens and any additional guards.

²⁷ Joint Intelligence Organisation (Australia) Bulletin No. 13/75, issued Oct. 1975, para 13

²⁸ RAAF Headquarters Air Base Butterworth, Op ORDER 2/72 RAAF Families Protection Plan, dated 8 May 1972.

29.2.5.3. State Charlie. If a situation arises in which the security of families in their homes can no longer be guaranteed, requiring a prompt and controlled evacuation to guarded safe areas at the RAAF School, RAAF Centre and Air Base Butterworth.

29.2.5.4. Evacuation to Singapore and Australia. Op ORDER No. 2/72 does not provide any provision for evacuations of Families outside Malaysia. It is however my recollection that later versions of the Families Protection Plan had provision for evacuation to Singapore and thereafter to Australian on an as required basis.

29.2.5.5. Augment. OP ORDER No. 2/72 only states additional personal for logistics and security as required. It is my recollection that RCB and RAAF MRF had secondary tasking to provide security support to the Families Protection Plan. Submission No 046 by Mr. Iain Cruickshank CSC, DSM contains the following personal recollection:

“A reconnaissance with my section commanders of RAAF married quarters at Hillside on Penang Island, to identify evacuations points, in case of protected evacuation of families if required”²⁹

29.2.6. Our Farley family lived in Rubina Park and the two girls were only 4.5 and 1.5 years on return to Australia and too young to express views. My wife and I avoided ‘no go’ areas and were careful in both crowds and isolated areas. It is my belief that most ADF personnel accepted the personal risk of operating in a threat environment, but what they found difficult was any threat to their partner and especially their children. On arrival families were briefed on the threats, ‘no-go’ areas, and their roles in the Families Protection Plan. Key to this advice was a strong recommendation to contact RAAF Police in the first instance, if an incident occurred in the local community. The key message was RAAF SP are best place to manage negotiations with Malaysian Police. Surprisingly, this advice extended to ‘do not to stop after an accident’ involving injury to Malaysian’s person, because of the risk of assault or even being killed by any mob that formed was significant.

29.2.7. Whilst the reports below are unconfirmed posts on Facebook, it is useful for the DHAAT RCB Panel to hear the words of dependent children (now adult), who actually experience the increase threat of living in Penang/Butterworth area 1970-1989. Facebook comment below:

“Hi Ken, just like to thank you for the work on butterworth, I was a school kid in Penang it maybe an other avenue to look at for the tribunal as school kids we were taught about booby traps at school and report them to the SP, far from a safe place of school kids went through this. Also at one time there was armed Guards on the school buses. Hope this helps if it hasn’t been brought to your attention before”

“I did school bus guard in 79 didn't get issued live ammo though. Was doing my bit in my battery room overalls (with acid holes) and a gun. Told the kids they were bullet holes. Closest I got to action...lol”

*“yep true story , I was there from late 1968 til 71
Remember seeing a red flag go up in the jungle behind the school one day”*

²⁹ Mr Iain Cruickshank CSM, DSM, Submission No. 046, RCB duties as 2LT, September to December 1980.

“My anecdote is a different one to most. As the dependent of a RAAF officer, when Dad did a golf game with other RAAF members and local Malaysian people, at a more remote course in northern Kedah... the Malaysian Army provided protection to the entire golf course and surrounds. Fully armed Malay forces, in jeeps, effectively guarding Australians and locals from the ever present Communist insurgents who made their way down the Malay peninsula on a regular basis, from southern Thailand and remote villages in the far north of West Malaysia. Just to fill people in.”³⁰

29.2.8. Comment- JIO No. 13/75 advised an emerging threat to RAAF MQ Areas. My recollection is that RCB were tasked with QRF responses to the ‘On Base Senior Officers MQ Area’ on the western side of the Butterworth/Alor Setar Highway and outside the RMAF SSP guarded perimeter. Further RCB received QRF callouts to RAAF Officers and Sergeants Messes, No. 4 RAAF Hospital and Radio Antenna Farm, also located outside the guarded perimeter.

Personal Recollections 1982-1983

30. During my posting to BSBUT the following points are worthy of note:

- 30.1. The RAAF POL Dog Handlers were tasked with out-of-hours security on the air flight lines and they were armed with 9mm Browning pistols and a dog.
- 30.2. During periods of normal security ABB command and Control (C²) of all security was managed by the RAAF POL SNCO Duty Security Controller at the ABB main entry guard room and a subordinate RAAF POL command centre was staffed at RAAF Centre Penang for security of the RAAF Centre and Penang MQ. 9mm Pistols and ammunition were held at both Butterworth and Penang RAAF POL locations and issued on authority of the Duty Security Controller;
- 30.3. During increased security Base Combatant Personal (BCP) were armed and tasked to guard designated Vital Points, and RCB alert states were increased;
- 30.4. RAAF Butterworth was at the higher level of defence preparedness compared to any of the larger Australian RAAF Bases, with higher ground defence training and sufficient small arms weapon to arm all RAAF personnel on posted strength at Butterworth and a surplus available for attached Squadrons.
- 30.5. The RAAF Shared Defence plan, including RCB, BSBUT Mobile Reserve flight and Squadron Defence flights were exercised annually.
- 30.6. RAAF BCP were armed and allocated guarding tasks on Vital Assets during increased threat;
- 30.7. School Buses from Butterworth to Penang School and return were provided with armed guards during high threat period;
- 30.8. Ground Defence Officers and Airfield Defence Guards carried weapons and live ammunition during ABB increase security, and in outer urban and jungle areas during reconnaissance and field training;
- 30.9. In 1982, I was deployed as an umpire in support of a RMR 6MIB to EX Haringaroo (joint RCB and RMR Exercise). On a second EX Haringaroo in 1983, I was acting RCB 2IC during the absence of the RCB 2IC on compassionate leave to Australia.

Summary

31. The available 1971 and 1975 threat assessment confirm that the CPM/CTO moved from an establishment phase with limited capability to a more operation phase with increase capability and

³⁰ RAAF Base Butterworth Facebook page, posts and comments, 21November 2022 (approximate date)

increased threats. Beyond 1975 there is no specific available threat information and the Inquiry can only consider a combination of academic assessment, BSBUT Unit History Sheets and individual submissions that strongly indicated a heightened threat for the in at least the period 1976-1981.

32. There was strong situational awareness by RAAF Service personnel and RCB that MAFs and Police Field Forces were engaged in active conflict with CPM/CTO and these operations were supported by RMAF aircraft bases at ABB in the period 1970-1989. This resulted in direct threats to RMAF at ABB and by association RAAF assets and personnel.
33. In response to these threats RCB provides a Section sized QRF capability on immediate NTM with live ammunition and this capability was upgraded to the full RCB contingent during increased security. RAAF Dog Handles on the aircraft flight lines had a trained attack dog, weapons and live ammunition and RAAF Police patrols at Butterworth and Penang had weapons and live ammunition in their locations and available for issue under the authority of RAAF Police duty controller. In higher threat RAAF personnel were armed and tasked with Vital Point guarding and GDOC as staffed during increase security.
34. The Families Protection Plan was a supporting document to the Shared Defence Plan, and was responsive to increased threats to the families and government employees, up to and including protected evacuations.
35. ADF soldiers, sailors and airmen are volunteers', who rely on the ADF to allocate conditions of service appropriate to the service provided. Given the Australian Governments enduring commitment to the FPDA, decisions taken by the ADF; do however, take on a political dimension and the following comment by the ADF to the 2010 RCB Inquiry demonstrated this point:

“The Minister will only act after firstly considering the informed advice of the CDF, and secondly having obtained the agreement of the Prime Minister. The briefing provided by the CDF would be expected to take into account the impact of collateral financial benefits costed by the Department of Defence, the Department of Veterans' Affairs and the Department of Finance and Delegations and any views or concerns that are raised by these agencies.”³¹

36. Both Malaysia and New Zealand have reclassified service during the 'Malaysian Second Emergency' to the equivalent of Australian 'Active Service'. There have been at least five previous inquiries and the ADF has consistently recommended that service at ABB 1970 to 1989 remain classified as 'peacetime service'. In 1975 CAS raised concerns with the Minister about the treat of standoff rocket or mortar attack on Air Base Butterworth (see para. 16). In the same year a minute from the Australian Director of Joint Services (DJS), Strategic and International Policy Division (at para. 15) addressed Malaysian Ministry of Defence concerns and provided advice to the Australian Government on challenges to the 1971 FPDA policy. When viewed in retrospect the Australian Government of 2023 again faces political risks, similar to concerns first raised by DJS in 1975:

“the possibility of rocket attacks on Butterworth”. The writer drew attention to a small but active urban CTO cell in Penang that had the capability of launching such attacks on ABB. The significance of any such attack “on RAAF aircraft would obviously have significance going beyond the actual damage sustained, bringing into question fundamental political aspects of Australian policy. Risk to aircraft thus

³¹ Hurley D.J. AC, DSC, VCDF Submission to 'Inquiry into the Recognition of Members of Rifle Company Butterworth for Service in Malaysia between 1970 to 1989, 23 June 2010

means risk for that policy and political difficulty for the Government in the handling of policy, both substantively and presentationally (e.g. in the Parliament)³²

37. RCB and RAAF Personnel who served and defended ABB between 1970 to 1989 were briefed on the current threats that existed at that time to Australian assets and personnel, but their input to this inquiry is limited by legislation. The onus is therefore on the Commonwealth to make the facts available to the DHAAT Inquiry for consideration. If the DHAAT RCB Inquiry is in full possession of the facts and decides that conditions fall short of 'warlike service' that decision will be accepted. If however the full facts are not presented to the current inquiry, many will feel aggrieved and we will find ourselves revisiting the same questions as more information becomes available in the years' ahead.

Desired Outcome

38. It is my belief that there is ample justification for RCB and RAAF personnel posted or attached to Air Base Butterworth in the period 1970 to 1989 to be classified as 'warlike service' and the following entitlement be considered:

38.1. Service at Butterworth 1970-1989 be afforded full entitlements under the Veterans Entitlement Act 1986; and

38.2. RAAF and RCB service personnel posted or attached to Air Base Butterworth in the period 1970-1989 be awarded the AASM with Malaysian clasp.

Bernard Farley

Bernard K. Farley, CSM
RAAF SQNLDR (Retd)

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Headquarters RAAF Base Butterworth, OP ORDER 2/1972, The RAAF Families Protection Plan, 8 May 1972

³² Strategic and International Policy Division Minute D58/4/1(176) RAAF Mirage Squadron at Butterworth. 27 May 1975.

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6th March 1973

AHS 30/11 oo. 30/3

Headquarters, RAAF Butterworth

PROTECTIVE SECURITY

A* HQ RAAF Butterworth Operation Order No 2/72 RAAF Families Protection Plan.

1. As a result of discussions held during the Force Commander Conference of 30 June 1972» Commander 29 ANZUK Brigade was instructed to make recommendations to meet the ANZUK COSC Directive to Commander, ANZUK Force "to arrange for the protection and evacuation in an emergency of Australian, New Zealand and United Kingdom and other friendly nationals in Malaysia and Singapore" Hq 28 AHZBK Brigade Operation Instruction no 5 "Safe Haven" is being produced to meet the situation in Singapore. The Air Commander has now been requested to investigate the best method of introducing a similar plan at BAA? Butterworth for AHZBK and other friendly nationals in Malaysia.

2. It is appreciated that the problem at this stage is not clearly defined in either geographical terms or in what constitutes friendly nationals. In any event the first criteria to be established is what is the RAAF Butterworth capability for the reception and accommodation of persons evacuated and is there any spare capacity after the needs of RAAF dependants are met. Could you therefore provide details of the capacity in terms of numbers of persons who could be accommodated within the guarded safe mean of the RAAF School, RAAF Centre and Air Base vSutterworth and what capacity if any is surplus to the requirements of RAAF dependants.

Any other comment you may have on the subject which will assist in establishing the best means of producing a plan would also be appreciated.

(N.E, rjc RD-os)

Wing Commander for Air Commander



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Headquarters RAAF

Air Base Butterworth PW C/- GPO Penang MALAYSIA

HQ 17/25/Air

8th May 1972

Operation Order No 2/72

RAAF FAMILIES PROTECTION PLAN

Reference : A. HQBUT Operation Order No 1/70
dated 30th June 1970

Time Zone used throughout the Order: GOLF HOTEL

Task Organization

Headquarters RAAF Butterworth

Base Squadron Butterworth

No 478(M) Squadron RAAF

No 75 Squadron RAAF

No 3 Squadron RAAF

Transport Support Flight RAAF

No 4 RAAF Hospital

1. Situation.

a. The Threat.

(1) There is a threat of racial communal disturbances to families resident in Base Married Quarters, housing estates and hirings in Butterworth and Penang.

b. Preservation of Law and Order.

(1) Under customary international law the Malaysian Government has a duty to protect all persons in Malaysia; however under the provisions of the Australian/Malaysian Defence Accord Commonwealth forces have the right to take additional measures for the protection of dependants of Service members and families of employees of Australian Government Departments attached to the RAAF, including visitors resident with those families.

c. Delegation of Responsibility.

(1) The Officer Commanding RAAF Butterworth has delegated to the Commanding Officer Base Squadron Butterworth the responsibility of the Families Protection Plan.

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2.

* Reinforcements. Reinforcements may be available from ANZUK Headquarters and Department of Air.

2. Mission. To protect service personnel, dependants, including visitors of dependants resident with families, in the Penang/ Butterworth area.

* General Outline.

(1) Protection measures will be implemented in three stages relating to a progressively worsening situation.

(2) Operations will be directed by the APM. From the declaration of Alert Bravo he will do this from the Families Protection Operation Centre, Penang. The Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal (DAPM) will implement operations as directed by the APM from the Family Protection Centre Butterworth.

(3) Families will be protected by:

(a) RAAF Police-

(b) a warden organization; and

(c) other forces made available as required.

b* Alert States. Protective operations will be conducted in three stages signified by the declaration of successive operational states applicable to a worsening situation in any area.

(1) State Alpha (Cautionary). This alert state will be declared on the advice of the APM. State Alpha signifies the possibility of civil unrest or other trouble which may threaten the safety of families. It is designed to restrict movement.

(2) State Bravo (Alert). This alert state will be declared when it is known that an emergency is imminent. It is designed to confine members to their homes.

(3) State Charlie (Emergency). This state will be declared, when there is a severe threat to families and it may be necessary to temporarily move them to guarded safe areas.

c. Families Protection Operation Centre (FPOC) and Family Protection Centre (FPC).

(1) Alpha. The FPOC Penang and FPC Butterworth will be skeleton manned and the APM and DAPM will exercise command through the normal channels.

(2) Bravo. FPOC and FPC will be fully manned and activated. The APM will exercise command.

(3) Charlie. As for Bravo.

(4) The organization and functions of FPOC and FPC are shown at Annex 'A'.

.../d. Warden

- (1) The Assistant Provost Marshal (APM) is to be Chief Warden of the warden organization and OIC Penang Families Protection Centre. The Chief Warden is responsible for ensuring that the warden organization is ready at all times to communicate information and instructions to and from families during periods of civil unrest.
 - (2) To assist in his responsibilities the Chief Warden will divide the residential districts into four zones - Zone A Penang North; Zone B Penang South, Zone C Jesselton Crescent and isolated hirings and Zone D Butterworth district.
 - (3) On declaration of State Alpha the responsibility of Zone D will be passed to DAPM. The Chief Warden will be responsible for Zones A, B and C and he is to activate a District Headquarters at the RAAF Centre.
 - (4) The warden organization within each zone will be divided into geographical areas, which are the responsibility of area wardens, and sub areas which will be the responsibility of wardens.
 - (5) Zone D will be modified as follows:
 - (a) Areas. Base Married Quarters, Pantai Road, Tan Tan Kilat, Robina Park, Tan Sai Gin and Bagan Ajam.
 - (b) Sub-Areas. Additionally, Robina Park, Tan S'at Gir Pand Bagan Ajam will be broken into sub areas with wardens assisting area wardens.
 - (6) Area wardens and wardens will be nominated by the APM from members living within the area or sub area who have no other essential duties in the base security situation. The duties of the APM and DAPM are set out in Annex H. The duties of the wardens are set out in Annex C. A diagram illustrating warden organization is at Annex D.
- Co-Ordinating Instructions.
- (1) Implementation Alert Status. Refer Annex E.
 - (2) Parties of Service Police. Refer Annex F.
 - (3) Evacuation of Personnel to Safe Areas. Refer Annex G.

Administration and Logistics.

- a. Training. The APM is responsible for the training of wardens in the performance of their duties and responsibilities.
- b. Master List of Family Addresses. The APM is to ensure that a master list of family addresses for both Penang and the mainland is maintained in the FPOC and FPC. The Housing Officer is to report immediately any amendments of the mainland housing list to the DAPM; similarly, amendments to the Penang housing list are to be submitted to the BCO i/c RAAF Police RAAF Centre.

v/v/a Co-operation

* Co-operation of Dependants. If protective arrangements are to be successful, willing and prompt co-operation of dependants is necessary. The Chief Warden is to ensure that servicemen and their dependants are aware of the value of the warden organization.

d. Rations.

- (1) Householders are to ensure that they hold at least 72 hours non perishable rations in stock.
- (2) The Catering Officer will be required to arrange emergency food supplies on the mainland and may be required to supplement the RAAF Centre.

e. Emergency Signs. The APM is to detail advice concerning the use of distress and emergency signals.

f. Medical. Commanding Officer No 4 RAAF Hospital InlthTerworth is to ensure that sufficient medical supplies are held for emergency use during the periods of alert.

g. Beds and Bedding. The Barracks Officer is to make emergency arrangements for provision of beds and bedding to the limit of available resources. The Senior Equipment Officer is to make emergency arrangements for the provision of beds and bedding from external sources if available resources prove inadequate.

h. Weapons. Normally wardens will not require weapons. However, if orders are given for the arming of some or all wardens the DAPM is to arrange for the issue of rifles as directed by the Commanding Officer Base Squadron or his Deputy. Authority to issue ammunition to wardens rests with the Officer Commanding RAAF Butterworth.

i. Transport. Transport arrangements for FPOC and FPC are shown at Annex H.

j. Curfew Requirements. APM is to ensure suitable instructions are issued to members and their dependants.

Command and Signal.

*« C ommunications.

- (1) Area wardens will have radio communication with FPOC and FPC. The communications diagram is shown at Annex J.
- (2) The APM is to maintain sufficient radio sets and spares to issue to all area wardens. He is to ensure that operating instructions and simple fault finding instructions are held by all wardens and area wardens.
- (3) On declaration of State Alpha the APM is to ensure that radio equipment necessary for Zone A, B and C is available for issue from FPOC. DAIM is to ensure that radio equipment is available at FPC for wardens in Zone D.
- (4) With the approval of the Commanding Officer Base Squadron Butterworth the APM, in conjunction with the DAPM, is to conduct exercises to test the efficiency of the families protection communications plan.

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- (5) Radio RAAF Butterworth may be used as a means of giving information to members and families, subject to approval by the Commanding Officer Base Squadron Butterworth.

b. Locations.

- (1) FROC. RAAF Centre Penang.
 (2) FPC. Building No 23 - Guardroom.

c. Code Name. The code name for this order is LIFELINE. The name is unclassified and the meaning restricted.

Acknowledgement Instructions. Acknowledge receipt of correct copy in accordance with distribution list by return of form A59 appropriately completed.

Air Commodore Officer Commanding Air Base Butterworth

Annex:

- A. Organization and Function of Families Protection Centres.
 B. Duties of APM and DAPM.
 C. Duties of Wardens.
 D. Warden Organization.
 E. Alert States.
 F. Duties of Service Police.
 G. Emergency Movement to Safe Areas.
 H. Transport Arrangements for FPOC and FPC.
 I. Radio Communications Organization.

I. S. PARKER
 (I. S. PARKER)

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ANNEX A TO

HQBW W/O KDER NO 2/72

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF

TMTL78&WITOIOM FLEHRES

Penang

1. The Families Protection Operation Centre is established as part of the Provost Section RAAF Centre Penang. It has the following functions

- a. co-ordination and control of all service police operations in Zones A, B, C and D for the protection of nominated persons in these districts:
- b. activation of the warden system in Zones A, B and C;
- c. maintenance of an efficient communications system?
- d. expeditious arrangement of any assistance required by families, as reported through the warden organization; and
- e. maintenance of a detailed log of events.

Butterworth

2. The Families Protection Centre is established as part of the Provost Section Butterworth. It has the following functions

- a. co-ordination and control of all service police operations in Zone D for the protection of nominated persons in this district;
- b. activation of the warden system in Zone D;
- c. maintenance of an efficient communications system;
- d. expeditious arrangement of any assistance required by families, as reported through the warden organization; and
- e. maintenance of a detailed log of events.

ANNEX B TO

HQBUT OF "UNDER NO 2/72 DATED 25/2 MAY —

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES APM, DAPM

1. The APM is responsible to the CO B3BUT for the Family Protection Warden Scheme.
 2. The DAPM is responsible to the APM for the implementation of the Family Protection Warden Scheme at Butterworth.
 3. The AM and DAPM are to ensure that:
 - a. area wardens are available and properly trained in their duties at all times, and that suitable arrangements are made to cover absences;
 - b. area wardens are issued with, and suitably hold, a comprehensive set of instructions on the detail of their duties and the operations of equipment to be issued to them, and that there is available for issue to area wardens and wardens the following items from the two protection centres:
 - (1) to area wardens only - ANPR25 transceiver and spare battery;
 - (2) warden armbands;
 - (3) torch and spare batteries;
 - (4) whistle; and
 - (5) log book and ball point pen;
 - c. area wardens and wardens are promptly and adequately briefed on the situation and are kept well informed throughout the period of duty;
 - d. radio contact with wardens is promptly established, maintained and coordinated;
 - e. communication with GDOC is maintained;
 - f. a log book of all incidents, reports and other records as necessary is properly maintained;
 - g. messages are passed promptly to families through service police patrols and the warden organization*
 - h. requests by families are promptly actioned, and all details recorded;
 - i. all district housing areas are patrolled, and all area wardens contacted at least every two hours during any period of curfew;
 - j. close liaison is maintained with the civil police and that any information of value is passed on to the GDOC;
 - k. service police are armed as required in accordance with paragraph 3h. of the main order.
- . . /l. a master

ANNEX C TO

~~HOWLSFINDER~~ NO 2/72 FATED 8:11H MAY 13>V2

DUTIES OF WARDENS

1. General. Area wardens are responsible to the Officer in Charge Families Protection Plan for all aspects of the warden organization within their area. Wardens are responsible to the area warden in charge of their area, but must be prepared to take over the responsibilities of area warden at any time if so required.
2. The APM is to ensure that each area warden and warden is issued with written instructions on the detail of his duties and a list of hirings in his area of responsibility.
3. Area wardens and wardens are responsible that the written instructions are readily accessible in their residences.
4. Area wardens and wardens are to thoroughly acquaint themselves with their areas of responsibility, including number of adults and children in each house.
5. The following is a list of duties of area wardens and wardens. They are to:
 - a. proceed to prospective Zone protection centres for the briefing on notification of alert and each is to be in possession of his:
 - (1) arm band - to be worn on left arm;
 - (2) torch and spare battery;
 - (3) log book and ball point pen; and
 - (4) whistle;
 - b. maintain a log of events;
 - c. maintain check of family addresses;
 - d. deliver all messages received from protection centres promptly;
 - e. maintain a radio watch with protection centres (applicable to area, wardens only);
 - f. if armed, ensure that:
 - (1) weapons are safeguarded;
 - (2) weapons are unloaded unless in use; and
 - (3) they do NOT fire the weapon unless in danger of death or serious injury to themselves or to a person for whose safety they are responsible;
 - g. report to protection centre if unavailable for duty and arrange a suitable replacement;
 - h. hand a report to the respective protection centre within 48 hours of cessation of duty.

ANNEX D TO
OTtTTotT³ ORDER NO 2/72
CJOT³tT 'MAY 1972 —

WARDEN _____ ORGANIZATION

CHIEF WARDEN (APM)

AII* (Area of Responsibility)			DAPM (Area of Responsibility)
ZONE A	ZONE B	ZONE C	ZONE D
Penang North	Jesselton Crescent & Isolated		
penang South	Mirings Butterwort h District		

~~HQBHQ~~ OP ' ORDER NO 2/72 DATED 8TH MAY 1972

ALERT STATES

1. State Alpha. On the declaration of State Alpha the APM and DAPM will arrange patrols of residential areas to be increased. Commanding Officers are to release wardens for duty and the APM is to skeleton man the Families Protection Operation Centre. The APM is to decide what restrictions on movement are to be imposed on servicemen and their dependants, and what information should be passed to families.
- 2* State Bravo. On declaration of State Bravo messages to fit the circumstances are to be produced by the Operation Centre and passed to families through the warden organization. If civil curfew has not been imposed the APM will pass a confinement message to all families. The Motor Transport Officer is to provide transport as required to convey members to areas where it is judged necessary to use only service vehicles. The APM is to maintain close liaison with OCPD Penang and Butterworth to ensure that unnecessary restrictions are not placed on service families.
3. State Charlie. State Charlie will be declared only in relation to specific areas from which it is necessary to evacuate nominated persons, and it is not envisaged as applying to Base Married Quarters, Robina Park or Tan Sai Gin. State Charlie will be declared if a situation arises in which the security of families in their homes can no longer be guaranteed, requiring a prompt and controlled evacuation to guarded safe areas at the RAAF School, RAAF Centre and Air Base Butterworth. Declaration of this state will be made only by the Officer Commanding RAAF, Air Base Butterworth. On the declaration of state Charlie the Housing Officers, Penang and Butterworth will be directed by the APM to assist evacuation operations. General briefing - detail of this operation are shown in Annex 'G'.

' ANNEX F TO

SIJJWTOTIURDER NO 2/72

DATED III MAY 1972 —

DUTIES OF SERVICE POLICE

1. Service police patrols of RAAF housing areas and hirings are normal routine. During an internal security situation the frequency of patrols will be increased and patrols will ensure that members and their dependants are warned to avoid certain areas.
2. When the warden system is activated the APM is to ensure that patrols maintain frequent contact with area wardens. During curfew hours patrols are to issue prompt warning to RAAF personnel and dependants whose actions could be taken as curfew breaking.
3. The APM is to ensure that patrols are co-ordinated with the civil police, and will if necessary, seek civil police assistance through OCFD Penang and Butterworth to ensure adequate protective cover for RAAF housing areas.

ANNEX C TO

OTuTWTJKDFR NO 2/72 EMERGENCY MOVEMENT TO

SAFE AREAS

1. If the security of families within Zone A, B, C and D and isolated hirings can no longer be guaranteed, families will be moved to guarded safe areas at the RAAF School, RAAF Centre and Air Base Butterworth.
2. Detailed Movement Plan. APM is responsible for the preparation of "a detailed plan, in consultation with the Senior Ground Defence Officer and Motor Transport Officer, and ensuring that the plan is kept up to date at all times.
3. Briefing. APM is to ensure that a written brief for distribution *to* families is prepared setting out the following:
 - a. arrangements for accommodation and meals;
 - b. restriction of movement;
 - c. facilities available;
 - d. control of children;
 - e. hygiene requirements; and
 - f. the need to remain in designated areas until approval otherwise is given.

OTuTWTJKDER NO 2/72 EMERGENCY MOVEMENT TO

SAFE AREAS

1. If the security of families within Zone A, B, C and D and isolated hirings can no longer be guaranteed, families will be moved to guarded safe areas at the RAAF School, RAAF Centre and Air Base Butterworth.
2. Detailed Movement Plan. APM is responsible for the preparation of a detailed plan, in consultation with the Senior Ground Defence Officer and Motor Transport Officer, and ensuring that the plan is kept up to date at all times.
3. Briefing. APM is to ensure that a written brief for distribution to families is prepared setting out the following:
 - a. arrangements for accommodation and meals;
 - b. restriction of movement;
 - c. facilities available;
 - d. control of children;
 - e. hygiene requirements; and
 - f. the need to remain in designated areas until approval otherwise is given.

BATED 'em HAT 1972

TRANSPORT ARRANOEMENTS FOR FPOC PENANG

----- 100^{TMTM} -----

FBO Penang

1. RAAF vehicles on permanent allocation to RAAF Centre and RAAF School Penang consist of:

- a. 3 buses, 35 seater;
- b. 4 Vans, Kombi;
- c. 1 Flat Top;
- a. Two ambulances; and
- e. One sedan.

2. Immediately upon declaration of Alert Alpha vehicles listed at a. to c. inclusive are to be placed under the control of the Chief Warden operating from FPOC Penang. Transport arrangements will be co-ordinated through the O i/c or NCO i/c RAAF Centre Transport Pool. The two ambulances and one sedan are for use by Medical Section.

3* Service Police Transport. Vehicles on permanent allocation to Service Police Patrol Penang, are to be controlled by the Chief Warden operating at FPOC.

FPC Butterworth

4. Upon notification of Alert Alpha the Transport Officer is to arrange for the following vehicles to be placed on standby for use by DAPM operating from FPC Butterworth:

- a. 2 buses, 35 seater;
- b. 2 Vans, Kombi; and
- c. 1 LGS Truck, 3 ton.

5. Vehicles on permanent allocation to Service Police Butterworth are to be controlled by DAPM at FPC.

6. Riot Proofing of RAAF Vehicles. The Transport Officer is responsible for o-b^{TA}ETng arrangements for fitment of riot proofing of service vehicles listed in paras 1, 3, 4 and 5.