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23 April, 2023

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Submission to Inquiry - Mr Peter John Mills

Part 1 – Name of Inquiry

Name of Inquiry *

Medallic recognition for service with Rifle Company Butterworth.

Part 2 – About the Submitter

Title or Rank *

Mr

Given Names *

Peter John

Surname *

Mills

Post-nominals (if applicable)

Street Number and Name *

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Postcode *

[REDACTED]

State *

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]s: *

[REDACTED]

Primary Contact Number *

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Number

[REDACTED]

Is the Submission on behalf of an organisation? If yes, please provide details:

Part 3 – Desired outcome

Provide a summary of your submission:

Supplementary Submission 120a by Peter John Mills That service at RAAF Base Butterworth, as part of the Rifle Company Rotations, between 1970 and 1989 be classified as warlike service under the Veterans' Entitlement Act 1986. That service at RAAF Base Butterworth, as part of the Rifle company rotations, between 1970 and 1898 are awarded the AASM with clasp Malaysia.

Part 4 - Your submission and Supporting Documentation

File Attached: Peter-John-Mills-Supplementary-Submission-to-DHAAT-23April-2023.pdf

Part 5 – Consent and declaration

✓ I consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal making my submission publicly available.

✓ I also consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal:

- using information contained in my submission to conduct research;
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation considered by the Tribunal to be appropriate; and
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation the subject of adverse comment in the submission;
- using content in my submission in its report to Government.

The Tribunal will decide which person or organisation is appropriate, and this may include:

1. persons or organisations required to assist with the inquiry; and
2. persons or organisations with an interest in the inquiry.

✓ I declare that the information I have provided is correct.

Name

Peter John Mills

Date

23/04/2023

Mr Peter John Mills

Signed by Mr Peter John Mills

Signed on: 23 April, 2023

Supplementary Submission of Peter John Mills (Submission 120a) to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal in relation to 'Medallic recognition for service with Rifle Company Butterworth' (RCB) for service in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989.

The Australian Army in the 1970's was vastly different to the Army of today in many aspects.

- Documents/forms were either hand-written or were generated by typewriter.
- Documents being placed on files required human intervention – manually placing the document on the CORRECT file.

I have personal experience relating to problems with Army records:

- I was deployed to ABB twice with 2/4 RAR as a member of "A" Coy, 2/4RAR from 11 March 1975 to 3 June 1975 and as a member of "B" Coy, 2/4RAR from 3 December 1980 to 3 March 1981.
- However, my service history does not record that I was at a member of RCB for the second tour with B Coy.
 - It states I was detached to Darwin during that period.
 - The only time I have ever been to Darwin with the Australian Army was during the K89 exercise with 3RAR.
 - Was this human error or a deliberate attempt to hide service in Malaysia during this period?
 - I don't know.
- After discharge, I obtained my medical records.
 - While looking through the file I was horrified to find records that did not relate to me.
 - I did send those records back to the Army to place on the correct file.
 - However, this error could have potentially impacted another soldier's future claim through DVA for injuries sustained in the military as he would not have any documentation to support a claim.

Comments relating to the Department of Defence lack of documentation relating to RCB service:

- From personal experience I know that records are incorrect or go missing.
- It is damning that the Army is unable to locate any documents/material requested by the tribunal to assist in their determination for medallic recognition for service with RCB.
- It is not surprising given the secrecy surrounding the reason for the deployments – the protection of Australian RAAF assets including people in a foreign country (shared role with Malaysian security forces) where the rifle company was fully armed with Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Orders for Opening Fire (OFOF) which allowed the use of lethal force.
 - The RCB veterans have spent years (thousands of hours) locating a multitude of TOP SECRET, SECRET, including the caveat AUSTEO and other classified documents which the Department of Defence have failed to address at this tribunal or even located in previous reviews.
 - It stands to reason that the Department of Defence would not locate and hand over documents to the tribunal which did not support their continued stance that it was peacetime training, the same as that carried out in Australia.
 - The Government of the day and the Chiefs of Staff were intent on hiding the nature of the RCB deployments from the Australian public using deceitful tactics.
 - The Department of Defence have provided the tribunal with previous review reports with no analysis or supporting documentation on how the decisions were reached.
 - Even their last submission included over 400 pages of irrelevant White Paper documents.
 - It is obvious that the Department of Defence was trying to answer the question of why the deployments changed to 'actual training' deployments after 1989 by

implying the RAAF assets were slowing being withdrawn from ABB prior to that date.

- However, they did not address the fundamental question asked by the tribunal of why the Ready Reaction Force and Quick Reaction Force was no longer required after 1989.
 - Everyone, except the Department of Defence hierarchy, knows the reason was because the Malaysian government had signed a peace accord with the CTO (Ching Peng) and there was no longer a threat to ABB.
 - Perpetuating a deception that commenced in the 1970's was easy in the past due to a lack of evidence available to dispute that stance.
 - That is not the case today.
- The Department of Defence also refuse to address the Matrix Submission 65b Attachment F (page 44-50).
 - The Tribunals role is to identify issues that impact on the integrity of the system in relation to medallic recognition.
 - However, the Department of Defence remains silent on this issue.
 - The Matrix reveals the application and awarding of the AASM has been inconsistent in several criteria, most notably casualties.
 - One can draw the assumption from this refusal to address the Matrix and provide analysis of how the determination of war like service in each case was reached would undermine their current stance regarding the recognition of RCB service.

Occupational health and safety standards in the 1970's were not the same as today.

- Personal protection equipment (PPE) was not provided in the 1970's.
 - A bullet would have easily penetrated my green cotton shirt and trousers and those clothes would not have provided any protection against booby trap injury.
- The QRF vehicle was inadequate by today's standards, providing little protection to those on board.
- The government of the day and the military chiefs of staff knowingly sent Australian infantry soldiers to a foreign country and placed them in danger.
 - RCB were undertaking the role of the Malaysian security forces who were on active service and were unable to provide a sufficient force to defend the Malaysian Airforce Base (ABB) during the period 1970 to 1989.
 - ABB was actively being used by the Malaysian security forces in their military campaign against the CTO threat within the country.
 - The RAAF were located at ABB and the intelligence documents located so far by the RCB group (not the Department of Defence) identified a threat to the Australian assets and personnel.
 - The Communist terrorists, dissident elements, or belligerents (the terminology changes however they mean the same thing) were operating in Malaysia during the period 1970 to 1989.
 - The Department of Defence stance to isolate the land mass occupied by ABB from the insurgency war occurring in the rest of the country is fanciful and ludicrous.
- The restrictive rules of engagement within the ABB increased the risk of casualties being incurred in the event of an attack on the base.

Comments regarding the Department of Defence submission 96b

- The Department of Defence Submission 096b includes a copy of the HQ FF COMD Staff Instruction 2/79 dated 6 July 79 (pages 66 to 110).

- Page 70 paragraph 19 b states “...training for security duties should be carried out before departure...at annex B...”
 - Annex B (page 96 to 105) provides comprehensive details of the training required prior to deployment.
 - Pre-deployment security training paragraph 1 states “...To enable the company to properly carry out security duties on arrival at Butterworth, it is recommended that the company complete security training prior to deployment...”
 - The actual role of RCB was security duties at Butterworth.
 - Training in Australia was to be completed prior to deployment to enable the company to carry out their role on arrival in Butterworth.
 - Paragraph 2 c states “...Some training and familiarization will still need to be conducted at Butterworth...appreciation of **the enemy threat** and likely approaches...”
 - The HQ FF COMD Standing Orders reveals that an enemy threat existed at ABB.
- Page 71 paragraph 22 relating to the carriage of ball ammunition on Field Training Exercises states: “...because of the possibility of chance encounters with wild animals or **belligerents** a company commander may wish to issue a limited amount of ball ammunition to provide a degree of safety...”
 - See annex D (page 107).
 - Paragraph 1 d Briefing “...all personnel to whom ball ammunition is issued are briefed on...**the circumstances under which it can be used...**”
 - Paragraph 1e “...the senior member present, who is to nominate the member or members who are **to load and fire...**”
 - The HQ FF COMD Standing Order confirms that ball ammunition can be carried outside of the ABB perimeter and that those carrying such ammunition on field training exercises did have the authority to open fire on **belligerents**.
- Page 92 Annex A paragraph 1 states “...All ranks are to be made aware through briefings of...identifying friend from **foe...**”
 - The HQ FF COMD Standing Order confirms that there was the existence of a **foe** (an enemy in war).

Comments regarding the Department of Defence submission 096c dated 2 April 2023

Question 8(m) (i) (ii)

- The Department of Defence state they have located documents which include the rules of engagement (ROE) during the period 1978, 1979 and 1982.
- I was deployed to ABB with 2/4 RAR as a member of “A” Coy, 2/4RAR from 11 March 1975 to 3 June 1975 prior to these standing orders and staff Instructions were created.
 - What document is the Department of Defence stating covered the ROE during this period?
 - I can categorically state that during this deployment I was never told the ROE and OFOF included the term “shoot to wound”.
 - During the QRF duty the weapon was always brought to the LOAD condition when called out to a Vital Point, as we did not know if we were being called out to an incident.
 - Shooting to wound is a lot harder than it seems.
 - In the event of any encounter with CT’s, dissident elements, or belligerents the QRF would be opening fire and aiming at muzzle flash and partial silhouettes in the darkness of night.
 - It would be impossible to shoot to wound in this scenario.
 - The “shoot to wound” is at odds with the type of weapons that were carried by the QRF team.

- Any encounter would be very fast which would not permit the time to attempt to shoot to wound.
 - Any delay could possibly result in more casualties to the QRF.
 - However, in this scenario there would be an expectation of casualties to the CT.
- I was also deployed to RAAF Butterworth as a member “B” Coy, 2/4RAR from 3 December 1980 to 3 March 1981.
 - The ROE and OFOF were the same as my previous deployment.
 - I was never advised that the ROE and OFOF included the instruction to “shoot to wound”.
- During my two deployments I never carried taped magazines.
- The Department of Defence states (last paragraph page 3) “... instructions are characterized as being defensive as they limited to the protection of Australian persons (including family of ADF members) and their property from criminal acts (e.g. theft or assault)...”
 - This statement implies that this was the role of the RCB/QRF – to protect ADF members, their families and property from theft or assault.
 - If that is the case, why was a company of infantry soldiers sent to ABB for the period 1970 to 1989 with a full complement of weapons and front-line ammunition to stop a few thieves and thugs?
 - Why were we not just armed with pick handles to deal with thieves and thugs?
 - Why not send some extra Military Police to deal with this issue instead?
- The Department of Defence state that the RCB rules of engagement differ from warlike rules of engagement due to a number of factors outlined on page 4 and 5.
 - The author of the Defence submission would not have been a serving member of the military in the early 1970’s so he is unable to rely on his recollections of what would have been included in ROE and OFOF during that timeframe.
 - Defence has been unable to provide or locate any further Standing Orders (1970 to 1989) which includes ROE and OFOF or any reference to show what information would have been included for warlike rules during this timeframe.
 - Where are the Standing Orders for the period 1970 to 1976 and 1982 to 1989?
 - Why is the Department of Defence unable to locate these records?
 - Have they been destroyed and, if so, who authorised the destruction; when and why?

Questions 8(m) (iii)

- The Department of Defence have failed to answer the question regarding ROE for Army personnel on garrison duty in Australia.
 - This is because weapons and ball line ammunition are not carried on garrison duty.
 - Therefore, no ROE or OFOF were issued.
 - The legalities and ramifications of shooting someone on Australian soil defending any base (Army, RAAF or Navy) would be problematic for Defence.

Question 8(n)

- The comment “...The rules of engagement stipulated in HQ Field Force Standing Orders and Staff instructions are not typical of rules of engagement issued by operational headquarters deploying to areas of conflict...”
 - The use of the words “not typical” (not belonging to a representative specimen; characteristic or distinctive) confirms that these ROE were different to the standard but **did not deny** they could have been used by personnel deploying to an area of conflict.
 - The Department of Defence have not provided a comparative rules of engagement document during the time frame 1970 -1989 associated with warlike service.

- Once again, the RCB veterans and the tribunal are to just accept the word of Defence without documented evidence.
- The Department of Defence Submission 096b includes a copy of the HQ FF COMD Staff Instruction 2/79 dated 6 July 79 (pages 66 to 110).
 - Page 71 paragraph 21 states “...Any training areas used by the company are to be well clear of areas in which **counter insurgency operations** are being carried out or where there is **insurgent activity**...”
 - Page 71 paragraph 22 states “...Because of the chance encounters with wild animals or **belligerents**, a company commander may wish to issue a limited amount of ball ammunition to provide a degree of safety...”
 - Page 92 – 93 Annex A - Rules of Engagement state at paragraph 1 “...All ranks are to be made aware through briefings ...the necessity for, identifying friend from **foe**...”
 - Paragraph 5 states “...within a ‘Protected Place’ the right to shoot is automatic...”
 - Paragraph 7 a, b, and c clearly state “...You may open fire at a person or persons only in the flowing circumstances...”
 - Page 96 – Annex B Pre-Deployment Security Training paragraph 1 states “...To enable the company to properly carry out security duties on arrival at Butterworth, it is recommended that the company complete security training prior to deployment...”
 - Paragraph 2 states “...Some training and familiarisation will still need to be conducted at Butterworth, in particular... familiarisation with key points; appreciation of **the enemy threat and likely approaches**...”
- The Department of Defence has cherry picked some of the evidence that is available and at the same time excluded key information to suit their agenda.
 - The HQ FF COMD Staff Instruction 2/79 dated 6 July 79 clearly reveals that HQ FF COMD were aware of an enemy threat and planned for it. The use of the words - **counter insurgency operations, insurgent activity, belligerents, foe, appreciation of the enemy threat and likely approaches** do not describe the odd thief or thug.
 - The ROE and OFOF clearly state within a ‘Protected Place’ (ABB) the right to shoot is automatic.
 - Lethal force was approved.

Question 8(t)

- Defence agrees that RCB ROE provided for the **use of lethal force**.
- Defence states “The rules of engagement are strictly self-defensive in nature... they include measures to ensure only the minimum necessary force...”
- “...Lethal force, to wound only, was to be used as a last resort...”
 - The definition of ‘Lethal Force’ means the use of force to cause death to another person.
 - Lethal force to wound only is a contradiction in itself.
- If the role of RCB was non-warlike in nature, why did the rules of engagement allow the use of “lethal force” rather than state “non-lethal force” which by its own definition would mean ‘do not shoot to kill’.
 - The rules of engagement for non-warlike service state: “...the application of force is limited to self defence...; “...minimum force...”; and “...no powers of enforcement...”
- However, the HQ FF COMD Staff Instruction 2/79 dated 6 July 79 on page 92-93 reveals the “orders for opening fire in the following circumstances:
 - If you are ordered to guard any building...you may open fire at any person who is in the act of destroying or damaging by fire or explosives the building...provided there is no other means of preventing the person...
 - If you or any other person is illegally attacked in such a way as to give you reason to fear that death or grave bodily injury will result you may open fire...

- To effect the detention or arrest of a suspected illegal entrant, or to prevent the escape of an arrested illegal suspect you may open fire...”
 - This statement confirms that RCB veterans were allowed to open fire on an unauthorised person or criminal and also if they attempt to escape after being caught.
 - Do these orders refer to the answer Defence provided for Question 8(m) (i) (ii) paragraph 3 – “...the protection of Australian persons (including family of ADF members) and their property from criminal acts (e.g. theft or assault)...”
 - It is against the law in Australia to open fire on a thief or a thug.
 - Why would the orders allow this in a foreign country?
- The rules of engagement are not the equivalent of rules of engagement for non-warlike service or peacetime service.

Question 8(u)

- Defence confirmed there is no spectrum or scale of rules for opening fire.
 - There are no half measures: you either fire or you don't, depending on the circumstance at the time.

Further Information from Defence dated 8 December 2022

- Department of Defence has submitted the definition of Warlike Service at page 19 and also on page 59 of their submission dated 8 December 2022.
- The tribunal chair advised they will use this definition in relation to the determination of RCB service and the request for an upgrade to warlike service and entitlement to the Australian Active Service Medal (AASM).

The definition provided by the Department of Defence for Warlike Service is:

“Warlike operations are those military activities where the application of force is authorised to pursue specific military objectives and there is an expectation of casualties.”

The definition comprises of 25 words only.

There is no explanation in relation to how this definition is applied apart from the following statement:

“These operations can encompass but are not limited to:

- A state of declared war;
- Conventional combat operations against an armed adversary; and to intervention and may be engaged in combat activities.
- Peace Enforcement operations which are military operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting.”

The description relating to operations identifies three examples, however, the addition of the words **“...but are not limited to...”** at the end of the sentence implies other circumstances not identified can qualify for warlike service.

The definition of 1993 Warlike Service is broken down into 3 parts:

- 1) military activities where the application of force is authorised;
- 2) to pursue specific military objectives; and
- 3) there is an expectation of casualties.

- Where are the explanatory notes attached to the definition regarding how this is applied?

- Are all three parts given equal weight?
- If not, how is the application assessed?
- The integrity of the system comes into disrepute when those applying for medallic recognition of service are not advised of the exact parameters to be met.
- These appear to differ for each application of the award of the AASM.
- Is this the reason that Defence will not address the Matrix supplied by RCB veterans?

Further information from Defence on 8 December 2022, Annex B Inquiry into Defence related to awards:

- The CIDA principles state:
 - "...The standards for measurement of service must be transparent and fair in the eyes of the community..." (page 21)
 - "...The integrity of any system of honours and awards requires service to be recognized by a medal to be validated and verified through official records. However, it is recognized that this is not possible in certain cases because of an absence of official records. In this instance, if a member or veteran is able to provide substantive proof, then this can be considered. There is also a consideration that those who rendered service should be the ones who enjoy personally the celebration of that service through a decoration or award..." (page 22)
 - "...Assessing authorities will always have to take a fresh look at all issues as they arise and seek to deal with them fairly and equitably..." (page 23)
 - "...Matters relating to honours and awards should be considered on their merits in accordance with these principles, and these considerations should not be influenced by the possible impact, real or perceived, on veterans entitlements..." (page 23)

Mohr, Clarke, and the Federal Court have all roundly condemned the use of adjectives as being unhelpful in determining service when all that is required is to meet the threshold.

- The tribunal is now also guilty of inserting words and meanings in relation to the 1993 definition of Warlike Service.
 - At the public hearing on 4 April 2023 the chair stated he felt the expectation of casualties for RCB is not high enough to be deemed warlike service.
 - Why are the words (adjectives) 'not high enough' being inserted into the definition?
- The definition states "...an expectation of casualties..." How is this determined – 1, 10 or more?
- The expectation of casualties must be tied to the threat assessments at the time of service.
- The Defence submission in relation to the level of threat at RCB states it was always considered to be low.
 - No documentation has been provided by Defence to support this assertion.
 - The RCB group has provided multiple threat assessments relating to the circumstances on the ground at the time to dispute this assertion.
 - However, a threat is a threat regardless of the level. Anything other than the statement **there was no threat** reveals a threat.

Conclusion

- Unfortunately, the Department of Defence and the tribunal are now applying standards and definitions which did not exist during my deployments to ABB with 2/4 RAR, to the detriment of the RCB veterans from 1970 to 1989.
- Previous reviews into medallic recognition of RCB service did not have the current abundance of classified material available when making their determination.
- Department of Defence continues to disregard the documents provided that do not support their stance.

Warlike service:

1. military activities where the application of force is authorised;

- The RCB were involved in a security operation in a foreign country.
- The RCB had ROE and OFOF that allowed **the use of lethal force** against what is described by the HQ FF COMD standing orders as counter insurgency operations, insurgent activity, belligerents, foe, appreciation of the enemy threat.
- The RCB had ROE and OFOF that approved the use of weapons off base (ABB) and necessitated the carriage of live/ball ammunition for safety reasons for trips to training sites and firing ranges (some in black areas) **in the event of encountering belligerents.**

2. to pursue specific military objectives:

- The RCB role was to protect Australian assets (RAAF) including equipment, personnel and families located at ABB from communist insurgency actions.
- The role was described as a security operation.
- The role evolved in the early 1970's when the Government and the Defence Chiefs of Staff colluded to deploy an Infantry Rifle Company to defend the Malaysian airforce base and denying the true purpose of the mission.
- The Australian RAAF were deployed in South-East Asia as part of a strategic military mission and the government would not withdraw these assets.
- The Malaysian Security Forces were unable to ensure the security of both the Malaysian and Australian air force assets located at their largest air force base during this time, as they were heavily involved in a communist insurgency action within their country.
- The Australian government entered an agreement with the Malaysian government for an armed Australian infantry company to perform the joint role of defending ABB.
- This allowed the Malaysian security forces who were on active service to concentrate on the defeat of the CT's operating within the country.
- The Department of Defence stated in their submission that the RCB service was not continuous during the period 1970 to 1989.
 - RCB submission 066 Annex C reveals a period from 20 May to 20 June 1973 with no record identified of a rifle company at ABB.
 - This was during the period when the infantry from the ANZUK forces located in Singapore were sent to ABB.
 - The fact that no record has been located for this period is probably due to the bad record keeping at the time. As evidenced by the lack of documents from the time frame being provided by the Department of Defence.
 - The RCB rotations from Australia included one company arriving and the other company departing on the same day (HQ FF COMD 2/79 - paragraph 16 Main body) so that the base was not left without an active Quick Reaction Force in case of an attack.
 - If the role was training, there would not be a requirement for a continuous presence at RCB during the period 1970 to 1989.
 - The absence of the RCB force from ABB would have been observed and provide the CT with a golden opportunity to time an attack with little chance of consequences to the attacking party but potential devastation to RAAF assets and personnel on the ground.

3. there is an expectation of casualties.

- Submission 65e Annex B includes a Risk Assessment detailing the Likelihood and Consequences of casualties based on the available intelligence assessments of the situation on the ground at the time.
- The report from a subject matter expert also concurred with the matrix findings.

- The risk matrix identifies a likelihood of attack as probable and the consequences of an attack as catastrophic.
- The assessed level of risk is very high.
- There is then an expectation of casualties.
- I would challenge the Department of Defence to provide documents revealing the actual numbers associated with expectation of casualties prior to a warlike deployment. The answer is subjective and an estimate only.
 - I do not believe that number exists.

I have attached some links in relation to the ballistic capability of the type of weapons in use by both the Communist Terrorist Insurgents and the infantry company (RCB) to provide some perspective for those who have never used an infantry weapon.

These videos should be viewed in the context of the ROE and OFOF which authorized lethal force and the misnomer of the term 'shoot to wound'.

Company	U-Tube Title	Demonstration Time in Video	URL Link
Kentucky Ballistics	Full auto AK-47 on dummy WEAPON OF CHOICE OF CT	Timeframe: 2:44 – 3:47	(368) Full Auto AK-47 & AR-15 vs Ballistic Gel Dummy (Full Auto Friday) - YouTube
Buffman – R.A.N.G.E.	7.62 x51mm NATO 130gr ball M*)A! Vs Concrete Block	Timeframe 1:40 – 3:22 4:16 to end	(369) 7.62x51mm NATO, 130gr Ball M80A1 EPR Vs Concrete Block - YouTube
The Wound Channel	M80A1 – 7.62 NATO ball round gel test	Timeframe 2:56 – 4:40 5:30 – 5:32 (front end view of damage)	(368) M80A1 Ballistic Gel Test - YouTube
Ballistic High Speed	9mm pistol Xtreme Defense Ballistic Gel test	Timeframe: 0:00 – 5:36	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sxRqYPpDCZU
Dual Liberty Firearms	Demonstration with a ballistic gel head 223 with a 55 grain round	Timeframe: 1:41 – 2:44	(368) Ballistic Gel Human Head VS 223 - YouTube
Ballistic High Speed	Rifle Calibers vs Steel Plate live fire into steel plate	Timeframe: (5.56 round) 2:16 to 4:00 (7.62 x 39 round) 6:14 - 7:50 (7.62 x 54 round) 7:50 – 9:45	(367) Rifle Calibers vs Steel at 250,000fps! - Ballistic High-Speed - YouTube
KGW News	What an AR-15 does to the human body (AR-15 is semi automatic vs M16 is fully automatic)	Timeframe: 0:14 – 0:46 (News Anchor) 0:48 – 1:53 (Trauma Surgeon) 1:58 – 2:21 (Gel block visualization)	(395) What an AR-15 does to a human body - YouTube
To access the videos – copy URL link and paste into browser for the U-Tube video link			

My final comments regarding the RCB request for medallic recognition are:

- The integrity of the honours and awards system is destroyed when a group is denied the medallic recognition associated with service because of the NUMBERS of veterans associated with a particular deployment and the flow on effects that could have.
- The Government and the Chiefs of Staff made a conscious decision to send Australian military personnel, some accompanied by their families, to a country that was fighting a communist insurgency war for 19 years.
- The Department of Defence are now baulking at the consequences of decisions made over 50 years ago when they chose **NOT** to withdraw RAAF assets from the country with a growing internal threat.
- For Defence to now state that Australian infantry company were not involved in the Second Malaysian Communist Insurgency is laughable.
- What did they think that RCB would do if a communist terrorist attack occurred at ABB against the Malaysian security forces based there?
 - Stand around and watch the show?
 - No, the QRF would have engaged the ENEMY!
- The fact that no actual attack eventuated should not be the reason that recognition for warlike service is denied. The threat was always there.

Peter John Mills

Dictionary definitions used by the Department of Defence in the HQ FF COMD Standing Orders are referenced in this submission.

Macquarie Dictionary Definitions (Used by Australian Government Departments and the Australian Court System)		
Insurgent	Noun	Someone who rises in forcible opposition to lawful authority; someone who engages in armed resistance to a government or to the execution of laws
Insurgent	Adjective	Rising in revolt; rebellious
Belligerent	Noun	Means a state or nation at war or a member of the military forces of such a state
Belligerent	Adjective	Waging war; engaged in war; relating to war or those engaged in war
Foe	Noun	Someone who entertains enmity, hatred or malice against another; an enemy; an enemy in war; hostile army or nation
Enemy	Noun	Someone who cherishes hatred or harmful designs against another, an adversary or opponent; an armed foe; an opposing military force; a hostile nation or state
	Adjective	Belonging to a hostile power or to any of its nationals
Threat	Noun	A declaration of an intention or determination to inflict punishment, pain or loss on someone in retaliation for, or conditionally upon, some action or course; menace; an indication of probable evil to come; something that gives indication of causing evil or harm
Enemy Treat		An armed foe with an intention or determination to inflict punishment, pain or loss
Lethal	Adjective	Of, relating to, or such as to cause death
Force	Noun	Multiple meanings in different contexts – most appropriate is: strength or power exerted upon an object; physical coercion; violence; to use force in order to do something; to use force on a person
Lethal Force		To use force on a person to cause death
Not typical	Adjective	Not belonging to a representative specimen; characteristic or distinctive