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30 April, 2023

Signed On : <https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au>

Submission to Inquiry - Privately George LOVETT

Part 1 – Name of Inquiry

Name of Inquiry *

Rifle Company Butterworth -

Part 2 – About the Submitter

Title or Rank *

Privately

Given Names *

George

Surname *

LOVETT

Post-nominals (if applicable)

Street Number and Name *

[REDACTED]

Suburb *

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] *

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Secondary Contact Number

Is the Submission on behalf of an organisation? If yes, please provide details:

Yes - Australian Rifle Company Veterans Group.

Part 3 – Desired outcome

Provide a summary of your submission:

In support of previous submission on behalf of Australian Rifle Company Butterworth Veterans Group, I would like to submit the attached addendum to submission # 79 (g) in support of recognition of warlike service.

Part 4 - Your submission and Supporting Documentation

Part 5 – Consent and declaration

✓ I do not consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal making my submission publicly available. My reasons are

✓ I also consent to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal:

- using information contained in my submission to conduct research;
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation considered by the Tribunal to be appropriate; and
- providing a copy of my submission to a person or organisation the subject of adverse comment in the submission;
- using content in my submission in its report to Government.

The Tribunal will decide which person or organisation is appropriate, and this may include:

1. persons or organisations required to assist with the inquiry; and
2. persons or organisations with an interest in the inquiry.

✓ I declare that the information I have provided is correct.

Name

George Lovett

Date

30/04/2023

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "George Lovett". The signature is written in a cursive style with some overlapping letters.

Signed by Privately George LOVETT

Signed on: 30 April, 2023

[Redacted]

LEGALLY SIGNED USING
WPsignature

[Redacted]



[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Handwritten Signature]

[Redacted]



[Redacted]

[Redacted]



[Redacted]

Thank you for allowing the following attachment to be submitted as an addendum to our previous submission #079 (g).

The attachment relates to a monthly RAAF intelligence report reference #34 dated August 1975 in which the security of Air Base Butterworth is considered against a background of communist terrorist activity and the availability and response by the Malaysian forces.

The salient points of the report are summarised as follows:

Paragraph 3 –

- The Communist Terrorists had the capability in terms of training and manpower to plan and carry out a large scale methodical ambush attack as evidenced in the report by a force of between 60 to 80 cts.

The Threat Assessments (1971 & 1974) predicted that if the CTO decided to attack the air base then it would most likely be by frontal attack by a force of up to 60 cts.

Paragraph 5 –

- Butterworth Air base was used as a forward operational air base by the Malaysian Forces from which counter offensive operations were launched. RMAF carried out strikes against the cts direct from Butterworth.

Butterworth Air Base was not exempt from attack and as referenced in a report by the CIA “*the terrorists have overlooked a prime target*”

Paragraph 6 –

- The vulnerability of the air base is exposed due to the unavailability of the Malaysians to provide adequate protection external to the air base.

Concerns were raised in the report regarding the security of the air base as being less than adequate.

There was a lack of permanently manned posts by the security forces in the area immediately surrounding Butterworth.

External patrolling of the air base only took place at times of VIP visits *or when a positive threat existed*. This must be taken in the context that at some stage previously a positive threat did exist.

Paragraph 7 –

- There was no contingency plan by the Malaysians for the reinforcement of Butterworth Air Base except for a local plan implemented in 1975 for the deployment of troops from the 6MIB who at the time were heavily committed to operations to the north.

This tells us that up until this point in time, the defence of the air base was reliant upon the Base Defence Plan being activated through the GDOC to counter any threat. RCB/QRF were central to the Base Defence Plan.

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MINUTE PAPER

(Write on this side only) INT 8/10/3(150)

(75)
184

Subject: SECURITY SITUATION - AIR BASE BUTTERWORTH REPORT NO 34

SR(GB) *5 Aug 75*
W/Lan

SR(GB) Dismissed
Note that DSE
has not signed off
12 Aug 75

W/Lan
1/052

1. Peninsular Malaysia has been reported, by RAAF Air Base Butterworth, as having little CT activity during the month of July.
2. Reports dating from early June have mentioned groups of about 80 CT sighted in an area eight kilometres east of Kroh ($5^{\circ} 43'N 101^{\circ} 00'E$), and near the Thai border 24 kilometres north of Kuala Nerang ($6^{\circ} 15'N 100^{\circ} 36'E$). However, apart from the ambush on 18 June (Report No 33) there has been little activity in these areas.
3. A more detailed report of the action on 18 June states that the leading element of the joint patrol was ambushed by 60 to 80 CT. A CT 'blocking' group prevented the remainder of the patrol assisting those caught in the killing zone, while the first group collected about 12 rifles, a M79 grenade launcher and a PFF906 radio. The ambush was well sighted and about 400 metres in length. Security forces have stated that in this and other ambushes, some casualties can be directly attributed to stoppages with HK33 weapons. The HK33 is being replaced by the SLR for Malaysian Forces.
4. In an endeavour to gain initiative, security forces have been laying booby traps in areas known to have been used by CT. The booby traps are similar to those used by the CT, so that if local friendlies are injured the blame could be put on the CT. There is also a possibility that injury to CT could cause discord between CT groups.
5. Two air strikes were launched from Butterworth against targets northwest of the Muda Dam during July. On 25 July four Tebuan aircraft each armed with 2 x 500lb bombs and 56 rockets struck a target 50 nautical miles O20° from Butterworth. The following day four Tebuans with minigun pods and rockets struck the same target. Four Sabre sorties were planned, but not flown.
6. A recent report from Air Base Butterworth indicates that the security arrangements at the Base are less than adequate. No posts are permanently manned by security forces in the area immediately surrounding Butterworth. Two observation towers which have been built on the eastern boundary are still waiting for the installation of searchlights, and are not manned. External patrolling of the Air Base only takes place if a VIP is visiting, or a positive threat exists.
7. Local authorities have stated that no Malaysian Security Force contingency plan exists for the reinforcement of Air Base Butterworth. It is not known if such a plan exists at the Ministry of Defence. A locally known plan, which has been implemented once in 1975, allows for the deployment of troops from HQ 6MIB at the request of the OC RMAF Butterworth. Troops from 6MIB are fairly heavily committed on the Thai/Malaysian border and the size of the force that could be sent to Butterworth depends largely on this commitment. The nearest artillery units to Butterworth are at Taiping.

/8. Continued

SECRET SECRET

Gaps in the Defence of Air Base Butterworth - Operational Order 1-72 -

Operational Order 1-72 was implemented as a Fail Safe Plan which in essence reflected the Malaysians inability to carry out their obligations under Operational Order 1-71.

SECRET

PARLEY

Copy No 3 of 46



Headquarters
RAAF
Air Base Butterworth
C/- GPO Penang
MALAYSIA

20th April 1972

DIA
A SEC
17/5
HQ 12/49/Air

done
file + B/E DGP

Operation Order No 1/72

**FAIL-SAFE PLAN FOR
OPERATION ORDER 1/71**

W. J. J.

Reference: A. Air Base Butterworth Operation Order No 1/71 dated 18th September 1971

Time Zone used throughout the Order: GOLF HOTEL

Task Organization

Headquarters RAAF Butterworth
Base Squadron
No 478 Squadron
No 75 Squadron
No 3 Squadron
No 4 RAAF Hospital

Attached

ANZUK Company

Detached

Fighter Squadron to SAF Tengah

1. Situation.

a. Outline. In the event of the Malaysian Armed Forces being unable to meet their commitments within the provisions of Reference A., the Task Organization and Attached Units as specified in this Order must be prepared to undertake the additional responsibility for securing our operational assets and providing the necessary protection for personnel and property.

- 1. DCOeq
- 2. In
- 3. Sig O
- 4. AFSA
- 5. Dms
- 6. DSA

b. Delegation of Responsibility.

(1) For the purpose of this order the operating procedures and instructions affecting ANZUK personnel, as detailed in the appropriate sections of Reference A, are to be observed.

../(2) The Officer

The task organisational structure of Op Order 1-72 involved RAAF units and the attached Anzuk Company with a detachment of fighter squadron to Tengah air base in Singapore.


The situation under which Op Order 1-72 was activated was when the Malaysian Armed Forces were unable to meet their commitments under Op Order 1-71.

This meant that the units referenced in the Order 1-72 which included the Anzuk Company were required to undertake the additional responsibility for securing the operational assets and for providing the necessary protection for personnel and property as required under Operational Order 1-71. This involved the total responsibility for the defence of the air base for which a new level of alert was introduced- alert level – “Black”

Situation.

- a. Outline. In the event of the Malaysian Armed Forces being unable to meet their commitments within the provisions of Reference A., the Task Organization and Attached Units as specified in this Order must be prepared to undertake the additional responsibility for securing our operational assets and providing the necessary protection for personnel and property.

Delta Company 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment deployed from Singapore in January 1973 were tasked under Operational Order 1-72.



Objective- 2 (b) “*Supplement normal protective security of the Air Base Butterworth and RAAF families when approved by 28Azuk Brigade.*”

One must consider the extent of what it is meant by the term “*supplement normal protective security*” in the context that the Anzuk Company filled the void due to the Malaysian Forces being unable to meet their obligations for the defence of the Air Base.