

Additional Submission by MAJ Mark GALLAGHER (Ret)

THREAT – RISK – EXPECTATION of CASUALTIES

Introduction

I wish to acknowledge and thank the Tribunal for allowing additional time for final submissions on this matter. I also want to acknowledge the RCB and RAAF veterans who have made submissions to the Tribunal providing insight into their lived experience during service at Airbase Butterworth (ABB) in the period 1970 to 1989.

Why are we at this point today?

Answers include, but are not limited to:

- The ongoing deceit of the Government and Defence since 1973, when the Defence Committee stated that:
- “...security duties at Butterworth ... **could be presented publicly as being for training purposes.**”. The deceit continues today despite overwhelming objective evidence to the contrary of RCB’s role in the security of Australian assets, as part of the shared defence plan for ABB.
- The absence of records, likely due to inadequate archive management and record keeping by Defence and other Government agencies in the era before electronic record keeping. This has led to the loss of operational and tactical records of direct relevance to the day-to-day dynamic risks and the expectation of casualties during the years 1970 to 1989.
- This lack of evidence is being used to the detriment of applicants.
- Defence’s statements at both hearings of words to the effect that the Australian Government and Defence refused to acknowledge that there was a Second Malaysian Emergency.
- This is despite comprehensive evidence to the contrary. Including a statement by the former Labour Defence Minister, the Hon Stephen Smith MP, who stated:
 - *“In 1973 an Australian infantry company was established as Rifle Company Butterworth in Malaysia. This provided a protective and quick-reaction force to assist our regional partners during a resurgence of the Communist Insurgency.”¹*
- Defence’s continuing refusal to acknowledge, accept or refute the large body of objective evidence that describes the security role of RCB. This evidence includes the RAAF/RMAF Shared Defence Plan, the authorisation that was provided under Australian orders, and Malaysian law (Protected Areas and Protected Places Act (1959) (Malaysia)) for RCB to use lethal force to secure ABB assets and Australian personnel.
- Defences failure to act in accordance with Government guidelines on being a model litigant by refusing to comply with the Tribunal’s request to undertake a Casualty Risk

¹ Australian Defence Minister address to the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific at Curtin University on the 10 November 2011

<https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/11/10/minister-for-defence-address-to-the-australian-member-committee-of-the-council-for-security-cooperation-in-the-asia-pacific/>

Assessment and comparison of similar military operations that have led to the award of the AASM.

- There are no recorded operational engagements by RCB or RAAF security personnel with the CT. This reflects the success of the deterrence provided by RCB to the security of ABB.
- There are no recorded KIA/WIA of ADF personnel posted to Airbase Butterworth (ABB). This reflects the success of the deterrence provided by RCB to the security of ABB.
- Attempts to apply contemporary C3 capabilities, doctrine, and methodologies to RCB operational activities that occurred between 40 and 50 years ago when contemporary capabilities were not available to RCB or RAAF elements at ABB.
- Despite Defence's refusals, the RCB Group has been able to apply the current doctrine, in relation to operational thresholds and demonstrate that RCB operations and the expectation of casualties clearly exceed the thresholds and standards applied to Ubon, Diego Garcia, and East Timor where pilots of unarmed aircraft at 30,000 ft only needed to fly over East Timor to receive the AASM.

Background

I attended the Brisbane DHAAT hearing on the review of RCB service. It became clear to me after two days of hearing that the Tribunal was attempting to apply and assess in isolation the threat, risks, and expectation of casualties to RCB operational activities at ABB and in Malaysia.

As a result, I reached out to RCB and RAAF Butterworth veterans seeking feedback on their operational experience at Butterworth. I sought feedback on incidents where RCB and RAAF members experienced, what they believed to be direct threats and felt there was a direct risk of casualties.

It is impossible to consider Threat – Risk – Expectation of Casualties in isolation or as stand-alone concepts in the context of RCB's commitment to ABB given the consequential nature of the concepts.

Put simply in the RCB context: if there was no threat, there would be no risk, and as a result, there would be no expectation of casualties and no need to deploy RCB in a security role to ABB.

This was not the case with RCB deployments to ABB between 1970 and 1998 the deployments were for “...security duties at Butterworth ...” for the following reasons:

- There was a CT threat to ABB that was clearly articulated in strategic JIO and ANZUK assessments that are a matter of record.
- Despite the absence of documentary records on tactical and operational intelligence there is sufficient evidence available from limited files and anecdotal witness testimony of the ongoing operational CT risk to RCB and RAAF personnel deployed to ABB.
- There were multiple incidents on ABB and in other locations in Malaysia where RCB members were at risk of armed confrontation and the consequent risk of becoming casualties.

- There were casualties, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) suffered 1009 KIA or WIA (Encl. 1) between 1969 and 1989. More by good luck any one of the MAF casualties could have been an ADF casualty given the below discussion.

Purpose

The purpose of this submission is to present evidence, via Statutory Declarations, statements, and online commentary of the day-to-day operational and tactical risks, and the expectation of casualties experienced by RCB and RAAF personnel between 1970 and 1989 at ABB and in Malaysia.

Evidence of Risk and Expectation of Casualties

The feedback received is discussed in the following paragraphs and summarised in the table in Encl. 2 Individual statements have been lodged as a private submission due to the personal identifiers they contain.

The overarching conclusion that can be drawn from the feedback was that during over 80 RCB deployments, between 1970 and 1989, risk experiences differed between deployments. In part, this can be linked to the extant levels of CT risk at the time of individual deployments as discussed in LTCOL Mickleburgh's latest submission.

The ever-present but changing levels of CT threat, risk and expectation of casualties have been confirmed by a retired Malaysian Army LTCOL whose duties during the Second Emergency included Military Intelligence Officer (MIO) Kedah/Perlis and Staff Officer Grade Two Intelligence West Malaysia. The officer also had substantial operational experience during the Second Emergency. The retired Malaysian Army Officer's statement has been provided in a private submission to the Tribunal. Notably, the statement confirms:

- Monthly security briefings were held at Police Headquarters Alor Star.
- *"The threat to ABB was constant during the emergency."*
- *"Armed Guards [RCB QRF and RAAFPOL] patrolling the perimeter with dogs was indeed a deterrent against MNLF/MPLF and CTO incidents."*
- *"ABB as a base was already a target and using the base for launching operations against the CTO would certainly aggravate the situation. It would also invite CTO elements to conduct surveillance on ABB."*

Common themes of risks and expectation of casualties in the responses include:

- There were no orders or instructions to QRF Sections, RAAF Police (RAAFPOL) or RAAF Base Combatant Personnel (BCP) on "...shoot to wound..." as part of Rules of Engagement (ROE). The matter of "...shoot to wound..." is dealt with in a separate SME submission.
- QRFs reacted to multiple real incidents on ABB.
- There were blue-on-blue incidents between RAAF security elements and the RCB QRF that occurred, which could have resulted in casualties.
- There were blue-on-green incidents between RMAF security elements and the RCB QRF where the QRF was fired upon or risked being fired upon.
- That RMAF security elements used lethal force against persons on base and on the ABB perimeter.
- There were risks to RAAF dependents outside ABB.

- There were risks to RCB beyond ABB as the RCB undertook authorised activities throughout Malaysia.

How could the blue-on-blue and blue-on-green incidents occur?

To answer this question, we must put the period 1970 – 1989 into context and not attempt to apply contemporary C3 capabilities, doctrine, and methodologies.

At the time, 1970 to 1989, the realities of RCB and RAAF security operations at ABB were limited by:

- The ABB perimeter was approximately 15.3 kilometres in length, and the base area was approximately 408 hectares. Additionally, the North, South and East perimeters of the base abutted rudimentary kampongs and villages. While the major North/South highway split the base into airside on the East and Quarters on the West. As a result, there was much incidental movement of people on the base perimeter or the North/South Road.
- RAAF security elements and RCB were not equipped with night vision devices and only rudimentary electronic intrusion devices.
- Tactical communications were limited to manpack VHF radios only carried at the Section level.
- There was essentially no interoperability between RCB, RAAF and RMAF communications systems.
- There was limited to no tactical interoperability between RAAF, RMAF and the RCB QRF security elements.
- There were no allocated or clearly delineated operational boundaries or areas of operation on the air base. This is not unexpected as the RCB provided a base-wide QRF.
- Communications with Australia were limited to telex via HF radio links and restricted telephone access.

Contemporary Consideration of Risk and Expectation of Casualties

The RCB Group has already provided, at the Tribunal's request, an assessment of the risk of casualties based on contemporary risk assessment standards. The independently validated conclusions of that assessment were, in relation to ABB:

- Likelihood: **Probable.**
- Consequences: **Critical.**
- Indicative Risk Level: **High.**

A separate Risk Analysis, recently undertaken by Captain Kim Stuart-Gray (Ret), who has professional expertise and experience in contemporary military risk management concluded that:

"In conclusion we can now establish that the Risk of a Warlike Operation affecting RCB during the Second Malaysian Emergency was Extreme."

Captain Start-Gray's risk analysis and statement are included in my private submission of statements.

Actual Experiences – Common Themes

Attachment 2 provides a synopsis of the actual risks experienced by RCB, RAAF, and RAAF dependents during deployment/service at ABB.

Common themes of the responses include:

- The RCB QRF orders, delivered verbally to mounting QRF Sections, included the use of lethal force, after appropriate warnings. And “...shoot to wound...” was not part of these orders.
- The RCB QRF were issued live ball ammunition on mounting duty, and when reacted were in most cases at a minimum state of loaded weapon readiness.
- There was a reserve of ammunition carried on the QRF truck, in addition to the ammunition carried by individuals.
- The RCB QRF was activated for actual perimeter incursions and other on-base incidents, where the use of lethal force was probable.
- There were blue-on-blue incidents between the RCB QRF when reacted and RAAF members which could have resulted in casualties, except for the appropriate application of ROE.
- That RMAF security elements including the HANDAU when encountered especially at night were prone to “shoot first and ask questions later”. This was probably due to individual levels of training and the protections provided by Malaysian Protected Place legislation for the use of lethal force in Protected Places.
- When “Exercising” with MAF forces in other parts of Malaysia the RCB operated in areas of known/historical CT activity.
- That MAF forces’ ability to transition from real-time CT operations where live ball ammunition was carried, and where contacts occurred or were expected. To “Exercises” with blank ammunition appears to have not been rigorous which led to reported green-on-blue live fire incidents.
- Actual MAF and CT contacts that occurred on RCB/MAF “Exercises”.

Blue on Blue Incidents (RAAF/QRF) (Encl. 2 - Ser. 1-3)

There were three reported incidents where the QRF reacted to ABB Key Point/ Site/Incidents. At each of the callout’s intruders were detected who were subsequently identified as RAAF members. On each occasion, until identified there was clear risk of the QRF firing on a RAAF member who had initially been identified as a possible intruder.

ABB QRF Incidents (Encl. 2 - Ser. 4-22)

There were multiple corroborated incidents reported including:

- The QRF being fired upon, the incident is confirmed by a second statement (Ser. 20 & 21).
- The apprehension of intruders on ABB perimeter where weapons were at the action/instant state of weapons readiness, the incident is confirmed by a second statement (Ser. 6 & 7).
- Going to the action state of weapon readiness at an on-base Vehicle Check Point when ID could not be produced by a Malaysian, the incident is confirmed by the Section Commander (Ser. 4 & 5).

- Deployment outside the ABB perimeter to guard a downed aircraft that had allegedly suffered gunfire damage, the incident is confirmed by a second statement (Ser. 20 & 21).
- Deployment outside the ABB perimeter to establish an observation post, the incident is confirmed by the Company Commander (Ser. 17 & 18).
- Discovery of perimeter breach and establishing an ambush on a perimeter breach (Ser. 9 & 31).
- Multiple RCB being placed on full alert and Platoons recalled to ABB. Weapon pits were dug and Machine Guns were sited in pits with ball ammunition (Ser. 10, 11, 12, 14, 19).
- Reacting to “drive by shootings” in support of RMAF security elements (Ser. 19, 20, 21).

RCB Off Base Incidents (Encl. 2 – Ser. 23 -42)

There were multiple incidents reported of direct and indirect probable CT encounters. These encounters either occurred whilst on Exercise with MAF infantry units, or at PULADA where RCB conducted live firing training in Platoon groups. Incident included:

- On Ex Haringaroo RCB elements were fired on with live rounds, the incident is confirmed by other statements (Ser. 23,24, 25,26).
- Deployment to the Malay/Thai border with MAF into a known CT area. Improvised booby trap located. The incident was confirmed by Company Commander (Ser. 29 & 30).
- Weapons being ordered to loaded state on a road move to a range off base (Ser. 31).
- On an MAF/RCB Exercise one MAF Company carried first-line ball ammunition to deal with any CT incidents. Patrolling through high grass in the action condition (Ser. 32).
- Carriage of ball ammunition in the Kulim area only 35 km from ABB. Confirmed by Platoon Commander (Ser. 33).
- Attached to 9 RMR fired on while patrolling (Ser. 35).
- Incident where a Platoon was fired upon over their heads by their Platoon Commander (Ser. 36 – 39).
- Encounter with armed males while patrolling, the incident was confirmed by a Platoon member (Ser. 40).
- MAF/CT contact while on exercise in Johor (Ser. 41).
- Guarding a large ammunition stockpile and was fired on (Ser. 42).

RAAF Police Incidents (Encl. 2 – Ser. 43 – 47)

Incidents reported included:

- A confrontation with a suspicious boat and attending a suspected bomb incident (Ser. 43).
- Armed escorts on school buses and heightened security in Married Quarter areas (Ser. 44).
- Alleged destruction of CT incident and other detrimental reports (Ser. 45).
- Perimeter fence breach (Ser. 46).

General RAAF Incidents (Encl. 2 – 48 – 50)

Incidents reported included:

- A suspicious package in a RAAF Married Quarter (Ser. 49).
- A dependent’s experiences (Ser. 50).

Green Incidents (RMAF security incidents) (Encl. 2 – Ser 51 – 57)

A variety of incidents were reported including:

- The shooting of a Locally Employed Civilian (Ser. 55 & 56).
- Observing RMAF aircraft taking off with full bomb loads (Ser. 51).
- Observing RMAF helicopters return to ABB with KIA and WIA, RAAF firefighters hosing blood out of the aircraft (Ser. 53).

Does RCB service satisfy the 1993 Definition of Warlike Service?

The 1993 definition of the nature of service classification for warlike service states that warlike operations are those military activities where:

- The application of force is authorised to pursue military objectives; and
- There is an expectation of casualties.²

Conclusion

The evidence provided in this submission, drawn from the detailed individual statutory Declarations, statements and other reports in my private submission clearly establishes that RAAF and RCB service at ABB between 1970 and 1989 satisfies the 1993 definition as follows:

- ***The application of force is authorised...***
 - The shared RMAF/RAAF Defence Plan authorises the application of force including, lethal force, under the provisions of the Protected Areas and Protected Places Act 1959 (Malaysia).
 - ROE for RCB authorises the use of lethal force.
- ***...to pursue military objectives.***

Which was *“To protect operational assets, property and personnel within the perimeter of Air Base Butterworth by joint arrangement and mutual support”*.
- ***There is an expectation of casualties.***
 - There were casualties the MAF suffered 1009 KIA or WIA between 1969 and 1989.
 - LTCOL Mickelberg’s recent submission examines 4 RAAF Hospital plans for dealing with expected casualties.
 - Contemporary casualty risk analysis has concluded that the likelihood of casualties was high.
 - The above discussion and Enclosure 2 describe actual incidents at ABB and elsewhere, in Malaysia where casualties were expected.

Outcome

There is a clear and compelling case for RCB service to be reclassified as warlike service.



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² Faulkner, J. and Brererton, L., *Cabinet Submission 1021 - ADF Personnel Deployed Overseas - Conditions of Service Framework*, 13 May 1993.

	CT DESTROYED				SF CASUALTIES			ACTIVITIES						
Year	Killed	Captured	Surrendered	Total	Killed	Wounded	Total	Clashes	Incidents	Movements	FINDINGS			
											Camps	Resting places	Food Dumps	Total
1969	-	-	1	1	5	22	28	-	5	83	-	18	-	18
1970	9	2	5	16	13	28	41	11	18	192	6	25	2	33
1971	9	1	3	13	9	35	44	17	13	315	7	46	12	65
1972	1	1	2	4	4	17	21	5	11	18	14	34	37	85
1973	8	-	1	9	4	19	23	15	22	181	17	50	76	143
1974	41	8	10	59	3	28	41	34	63	377	25	86	48	159
1975	7	1	5	13	33	150	183	22	76	323	34	117	35	186
1976	16	10	19	45	3	6	9	41	168	571	25	83	53	161
1977	23	28	27	78	13	85	98	31	35	285	17	58	32	107
1978	15	5	8	28	14	124	138	60	116	396	89	84	36	209
1979	30	7	9	42	15	80	95	54	64	449	58	102	52	212
1980	17	-	1	18	12	27	39	36	33	362	53	81	32	166
1981	8	3	10	21	9	34	43	16	32	314	18	28	11	57
1982	4	-	1	5	2	38	40	36	42	249	19	32	9	60
1983	10	-	3	13	5	23	28	15	34	171	22	43	20	85
1984	5	-	1	6	5	40	45	18	32	105	18	36	11	65
1985	-	-	-	-	3	23	26	3	14	142	18	45	10	73
1986	5	-	2	8	1	28	29	9	3	136	38	56	68	162
1987	7	2	-	9	1	28	29	10	6	35	40	73	46	153
1988	2	82	1	85	-	8	8	2	7	55	12	34	13	59
1989	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	8	10	21	4	35
Total	212	150	117	479	155	854	1009	439	796	4768	540	1152	601	2293

■ Figure 4.42: Statistics of Operational Achievement in Peninsular Malaysia from 1969 until 1989.
Source : National Security Council.

Source: The Malaysian Army's Battle against Communist Insurgency in Peninsular Malaysia 1968-1989. Army Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, Kuala Lumpur, 2001

Ser	Name	RCB/RAAF	Dates	Synopsis	Confirmation
Blue on Blue Incidents – QRF and RAAF					
1	STEVENSON, Darryl Kenton	RAAF	1976-1978; 1981-1983	Locked in RAAF Armoury on 24/7 picquet over Christmas. Allowed to leave armoury for showers. One night returning from a shower, challenged by QRF. The other picquet in the armoury observed the incident and activated the Emergency Alarm. Was also Blue on blue with RCB QRF. Also allocated to BCP duties.	
2	GEARY, Brad	RCB	Feb - May 1982 D Coy 2/4 RAR	QRF Reacted to Control Tower after activation of alarms. Clearing building almost shot a RAAF member located in Control Tower.	General details confirmed by OC Richard Greville.
3	MORAN, Michael	RCB		QRF was patrolling around the fighter bays at night investigating suspicious movement. Suspicious movement was a RAAF POL with dog. Dog attempted to attack me. RAAF POL <i>"don't shoot the dog"</i> .	via FB - in response to author's post.
ABB QRF Incidents					
4	BAILEY, Michael Edward	RCB	Jun-Sep 1977 C Coy 3 RAR	Part of an RCB Section manning an on base Vehicle Check Point at night doing ID checks. Been briefed that CT might try and enter base in MAF uniform. A uniformed MAF person stopped and could not produce ID. Section Commander ordered weapons to action.	Cfm by Section Commander Bill Garrett.
5	GARRETT, Billy	RCB	Jun-Sep 1977 C Coy 3 RAR	VCP incident, weapons to instant.	Cfm Michael Bailey statement

Ser	Name	RCB/RAAF	Dates	Synopsis	Confirmation
6	DOUGLASS, Grant David	RCB	Dec 1984 - Mar 1985 A Coy 2/4 RAR	QRF reaction to perimeter incident at the Fuel Point. Cleared the area on foot. Went to action weapons state when intruder sighted. Physically apprehended the intruder. In another incident I stopped a fellow soldier kicking an unexploded mortar round.	Cfm by Stephen Birt.
7	BIRT, Stephen	RCB	Dec 1984 - Mar 1985 A Coy 2/4 RAR	QRF reaction to perimeter incident at the Fuel Point. Intruder apprehended and handed over to HANDAU. Douglass ordered not to shoot intruder.	Cfm Grant Douglass statement
8	BROWN, Philip Gregory	RCB	Jun-Sep 1977 C Coy 3 RAR	Shots fired onto base near RCB lines. After incident a fence was erected to screen the lines.	See photo with dec.
9	BUTLER, Mark Anthony	RCB	Nov 1977 - Feb 1978 B Coy 1RAR	QRF conducting perimeter clearing patrol, perimeter breach discovered. Ambush sighted on breach with weapons at action.	Photographic evidence QRF orders and belt 7.62mm ammo being carried.
10	CAIRNS, Pat (Spud)	RCB	Mar - May 1978 A Coy 2/4RAR	QRF deployed outside perimeter to KP 1 on two occasions. During F111 deployment gun pits were dug and M60 MG on tripods sighted in the pits. A full PL was allocated to QRF duties. Whole Coy stood to one night and weapons issued and held by individuals overnight.	
11	NELSON, Bryan	RCB	Jun - Sep 1975 A Coy 1 RAR	Base on high alert multiple perimeter standing patrols each night. One night a perimeter breach was discovered standing patrols stood to for remainder of night. First light clearing patrol outside the wire, MG in fire sited. Patrols carried first line ammo.	
12	CAMPBELL, William	RCB	Sep - Dec 1979 D Coy 5/7 RAR	GPMG in pits with ammunition manned 24/7. Weapons in loaded condition at night.	Cfm by Stapleton

Ser	Name	RCB/RAAF	Dates	Synopsis	Confirmation
13	STAPLETON, Peter	RCB	Sep - Dec 1979 D Coy 5/7 RAR	Pits dug, manned by GPMG on tripod, ball ammunition in pit. Pits manned at night with weapons in loaded state of weapon readiness. Manned a VCP on base with MAF ball ammunition in basic pouches.	Photos of both provided.
14	CANNAN, Graham	RCB	1978, 1980, 1981	On QRF in 1978 we were called out and went to instant state of weapons readiness. After 40 min of hand flares, we returned to loaded weapons condition. July 1978 Coy confined to base due to unrest. One PL on QRF, one PL on standby, one PL on rest. On another deployment we were issued ball ammo on Thai/Malay border. In 1978 witnessed MAF wounded, and dead being unloaded from RMAF helicopters.	
15	MOTLEY, Glenn	RCB	1974 or 1975, 1977	Multiple RCB deployments a Stretcher Bearer did additional medical training before all deployment. Stood too on base. Alleged bomb in MQ.	
16	PARRY, Winston	RCB	1973, 1974-75, 1976	Loaded weapons on QRF. I walked around Vietnam with B Coy 2RAR FOR ABOUT 5 MONTHS AND DID NOT FIRE A SHOT!!	
17	SMITH, Jim	RCB	Sep - Nov 1974 C Coy 2/4 RAR	Threat to ABB, Platoon deployed outside wire with MAF to establish an observation post. The platoon carried more than first-line ammunition. Witnessed a civilian on a pushbike killed by a logging truck. 1975 "Ex Three Bridges" drove past a Malaysian Police Station that was on fire from a CT attack. Subsequently encountered armed CT, both elements elected to disengage and avoid contact.	Aspects confirmed by BRIG Paul O'Sullivan OC of Coy

Ser	Name	RCB/RAAF	Dates	Synopsis	Confirmation
				In 1975 on a DC3 that landed at ABB and was confronted by armed MAF.	
18	O'SULLIVAN, Paul	RCB	Sep - Nov 1974 C Coy 2/4 RAR	Threat to ABB, Platoon deployed outside wire with MAF. RAAF aircraft on 24/7 alert status.	Cfm SMITH statement.
19	THORPE, James	RCB	Jun - Sep 1989 C Coy 5/7 RAR	Coy placed on full alert twice. Reacted to a live fire incident where MAF had opened fire on persons attempting to enter ABB.	
20	WALLACE, Mark Richard	RCB	Mar - Jun 1974 C Coy 5/7 RAR	QRF fired on from outside the perimeter on E side of ABB near ammo storage bunkers. Drive by shooting near ABB South gate. Guarded a crashed Mirage, weapons in the loaded state. Damage to Mirage looked like .50 cal gunshot damage.	
21	WHARTON, Trevor James	RCB	Mar - Jun 1974 C Coy 5/7 RAR	QRF incoming fire on E side of ABB near ammo storage bunkers. Drive by shooting near ABB South gate. Guarded a crashed Mirage, weapons in loaded state.	Cfm Wallace
22	WHITE, Neil Brian	RCB	Feb - May 1984	Ammo Storeman. Large ammo holdings compared to quantities and natures available in Australia.	
RCB Off Base Incidents					
23	BROWN, Stephen Henry	RCB	Aug - Dec 1984 D Coy 1 RAR	On Ex Haringaroo with the MAF. MAF officer and NCO visited Coy defence position. The MAF members were carrying ball ammunition in the magazines on their weapons.	Brown also confirms incident in Hansen statement.
24	HANSEN, Alan James	RCB	Aug - Dec 1984 D Coy 1 RAR	On Ex Haringaroo in a defensive position. At night probed by the enemy, incoming fire was live rounds. MAF umpire wounded. Explained that MAF had just returned from border ops	Hansen confirms Brown, S statement. This incident confirmed by Brown, S.

Ser	Name	RCB/RAAF	Dates	Synopsis	Confirmation
				and had probably not cleared ball ammo carried on operations.	
25	KAYE, Phillip Geoffrey	RCB	Aug - Dec 1984 D Coy 1 RAR	On Ex Haringaroo in a defensive position. At night probed by the enemy, the incoming fire was live rounds. Standing Patrol 500m away had incoming live rounds.	Confirmed by Brown, S
26	REYNOLDS, Trevor James	RCB	Aug - Dec 1984 D Coy 1 RAR	On Ex in a defence position incoming live fire at night. MAF had returned from border ops and had not cleared ball ammo.	Confirms Hansen statement
27	BYLES, Douglas	RCB	1988	Armed escorts on the road movement of ammunition from ABB to PULADA in Johor. Counter ambush drills briefed. Security on a special C130 issued with live ammunition and briefed on possible CT threat.	Author can cfm armed road escorts. Only travelled by daylight. Overnight stops in MAF barracks. Ammo trucks were guarded.
28	FOSSSEN, Ronald Robert	RCB	Feb - May 1982 D Coy 2/4 RAR	Went to action before patrolling through a kampong. Immediate sense of danger.	subsequently served in SASR
29	GEARY, Brad	RCB	Feb - May 1982 D Coy 2/4 RAR	Deployed to Malay/Thai Border in an MAF vehicle carrying loaded weapons following MAF SOP. On arrival at location MAF pers advised that CT had operated in the area. There were reported bobby traps in the area, sighted an improvised hand grenade. Sighted flares at night in the distance. Blue on Blue Control Tower incident.	Generally confirmed by Richard Grenville, OC of Coy.
30	GREVILLE, Richard	RCB	Feb - May 1982 D Coy 2/4 RAR	OC D Coy 2/4 RAR	Cfm Geary, response includes comments from PL SGT.

Ser	Name	RCB/RAAF	Dates	Synopsis	Confirmation
31	GRAETZ, Russell Brian	RCB	Jun - Sep 1975 A Coy 1 RAR Jun – Sep 1980 A Coy 3 RAR	On a road move to the range ordered load mags while in transit. M60 MG had a belt of ammunition loaded. Reason given possible CT ambush. 1980 deployment recalled to base due to the discovery of a hole in the perimeter fence. Deployed in half Section groups to key points with first line ammunition.	
32	LANGFORD, Ross	RCB	Mar - Jun 1986 B Coy 5/7 RAR	Patrolling with MAF on Thai/Malay border, CT reported in area. Sect Comd carried ball ammo. Instructed to hold if contact occurred and let MAF manage any CT incidents. One MAF Coy carried first line ball ammunition. Personally ordered to patrol through high grass. Did so in the action condition until clear of the area. Felt great danger.	
33	MOL, Alex	RCB	Sep - Dec 1981 B Coy 6 RAR	Carriage of live ammo in Kulim area. Searched for CT caches.	Essentially confirmed by PL COMD Ken Brownrigg.
34	O'HAIRE, Rick	RCB	Oct - Nov 1971 D Coy 6 RAR	Deployed by train from Singapore, armed train from KL to BUT, bridges and cuttings on rail line guarded. Trained in "Aid to the Civil Power" incl shooting of selected rioters on order.	
35	STEWART, Mark T	RCB	Oct 78 - Feb 1979; Jun - Sep 1985	Deployed direct to field to 9 RMR. Fired on while patrolling. Second RCB witnessed MAF personnel shoot an LEC.	

Ser	Name	RCB/RAAF	Dates	Synopsis	Confirmation
36	STEWART-GRAY, Kim	RCB	Nov 1973 - Mar 1974 A Coy 3 RAR	RCB PL fired on at range by PL COMD. Completed Risk Assessment: <i>In conclusion we can now establish that the Risk of a Warlike Operation affecting RCB during the Second Malaysian Emergency was Extreme. Accepting that this has been an historically retrospective Risk Assessment, I submit that its as objective and practical a process as we can reasonable expect; to establish a Warlike context and expectation of a Warlike Operation in RCB's case.</i>	Cfm by PI members John HUNT (SA Police Officer); Joe Storer; Bradford Wolff. Post RCB service as a risk manager with AAvm.
37	HUNT, John	RCB	Nov 1973 - Mar 1974 A Coy 3 RAR	Confirms Stewart-Gray incident.	
38	STORER, Joe	RCB	Nov 1973 - Mar 1974 A Coy 3 RAR	Confirms Stewart-Gray incident.	
39	WOLFF, Bradford	RCB	Nov 1973 - Mar 1974 A Coy 3 RAR	Confirms Stewart-Gray incident.	
40	STOREY, Andrew	RCB	Jun - Sep 1985 B Coy 8/9 RAR	Encounter with armed males in Johor.	Cfm by Steve W Johnson: <i>yes that's right i was a scout we didn't know if they were wood cutters or CT we just went to ground and let them pass .and then got out of there quickly ..</i>

Ser	Name	RCB/RAAF	Dates	Synopsis	Confirmation
41	WHALAN, Dale	RCB	Aug - Nov 1977 A Coy 3 RAR	Deployed to Singapore then Johor. Contact while patrolling with MAF. MAF took over the lead and RCB harboured up. The firing heard in the distance was explained by MAF as a CT contact.	
42	PEARSON, Col	RCB	May - Sep 1983 C Coy 1 RAR	Guarding a large ammo stockpile at PULADA Johor, Incoming fire. Possibly targeting the ammo stockpile.	
RAAF Police Incidents					
43	BARTLEY, Peter	RAAFPOL	1971-1973	Armed while working on base and Penang. A suspicious boat that departed after a standoff. A suspected bomb incident on Penang.	via FB - in response to the author's post.
44	DEVINE, Tom	RAAFPOL	1987 - 1988	General heightened threat to MQ. Armed escorts on school buses.	via FB - in response to the author's post.
45	FOAN, Graham	RAAFPOL		Destruction of RAAFPOL records that included reports of <i>"...many detrimental incidents of CT activities in and around Penang and Butterworth including assaults on the Airbase and close proximity to kampongs and Australian married quarters."</i>	via FB - in response to the author's post.
46	LUCAS, Robert	RAAFPOL	Aug 1973 - Nov 1975	Ambulance escort in CT area, Breach in the perimeter fence.	via FB - in response to the author's post.
47	REID, Gary	RAAFPOL	1987	A direct threat to COMD IADS weapons carried.	via FB - in response to the author's post.
General RAAF Incident's					
48	O'DONOGHUE, Michael	RAAF	1971 - 10974	Worked in a Base Admin role but was required to do weapons training every Fri as part of BCP duties. This did not occur on Australian bases. Went to a rifle range off base where MAF were subsequently ambushed.	via FB - in response to Trevor WHARTON's post.

Ser	Name	RCB/RAAF	Dates	Synopsis	Confirmation
49	WILLIAMS, Trevor	RAAF	1972 - 1974	Package in yard, Robina Park Butterworth	via FB - in response to author's post.
50	CHRISTIANSEN, John	RAAF dependent	1969 - 1972	Lived in Butterworth, caught ferry/bus to school on Penang. Parent escorts on buses. Red flag incident at school on Penang. Scout trip to Bukit Mertajam warned about how to behave if CT encountered. Horried look on mothers face on first night in Butterworth.	
Green Incidents (MAF)					
51	ROXBURGH	RAAF	1974 - 1976	RAAF 3 Sqn aircraft would fly photo recon missions. And 2-3 days later RMAF bombing operations occurred in similar locations.	via FB - in response to Trevor WHARTON's post.
51	VILLIERS, Del (Brent)	RAAF	1973-1976	RMAF aircraft would taxi past RAAF flight line loaded with visible ordnance. Returned after sorties with no ordnance on board.	via FB - in response to Trevor WHARTON's post.
53	WOOLRICH, Bill	RAAF		RMAF helicopter returning to ABB with wounded. RAAF firefighters hosing blood out the aircraft.	via FB - in response to Trevor WHARTON's post.
54	FELLOWS, Gordon	RAAFPOL	1968-1971	In 1969 or 70 an RMAF helicopter landed at ABB with "...a dozen..." MAF KIA.	via FB - in response to the author's post.
55	PIGGOTT, Gregory John	RCB	Jun - Sep 1985 B Coy 8/9 RAR	Locally Employed Civilian shot by HANDAU. Involved in Arms Cote incident held at gunpoint by HANDAU.	Compares RCB to RAE deploy to Namibia.
56	STEWART, Mark T	RCB	Oct 78 - Feb 1979 D Coy 8/9 RAR Jun - Sep 1985 B Coy 8/9 RAR	Deployed direct to field to 9 RMR. Fired on while patrolling. Second RCB witnessed MAF personnel shoot an LEC.	

Ser	Name	RCB/RAAF	Dates	Synopsis	Confirmation
57	THORPE, James	RCB	Jun - Sep 1989 C Coy 5/7 RAR	Coy placed on full alert twice. Reacted to a live fire incident where MAF had opened fire on persons attempting to enter ABB.	Ser 19 above